There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by someone merely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perception enable us to be in ‘cognitive contact’ with objects and facts. I develop this (...) chal- lenge to the traditional conception and then show that it is possible to accommo- date an adequate account of cognitive contact in keeping with the traditional conception. One upshot of the discussion is that experiences do not bear the explanatory burden placed upon them by disjunctivists. (shrink)

: Liberal rights theory can be used either to challenge or to support social hierarchies of power. Focusing on Ronald Dworkin's theory of rights and Catharine MacKinnon's feminist critique of liberalism, I identify a number of problems with the way that liberal theorists conceptualize rights. I argue that rights can be used to chal-lenge oppressive practices and structures only if they are defined and employed with an awareness and critique of social relations of power.

The theoretical model of landscape that is still widespread is that of a spectacle-image that offers itself to a contemplative, detached and disembodied gaze. Rethinking landscape means investigating the role of the “aesthetic”, i.e. of bodily experience, characterized by sensitivity and movement. This experience, which is fundamentally interactive, has a formative and performative nature: the aisthesis is closely linked to praxis, to the concrete ways in which we re-late to the environment and which become interactive strategies. These strategies can become (...) experiential habits that, if repeated in a mechanical way, can jeopardize the very interaction with the phenomenal world in which we are immersed. We tend to grasp only certain aspects of the phenomena that present themselves to us, over-looking not only the richness and plurality of the phenomenal world, but also its fundamental systemic and relational unity. The possibilities of formative and performative interaction can be grasped if the ordinary and daily level of experience is chal-lenged by sudden and unexpected encounters, which can initially provoke a sense of bewilderment and disorientation. What becomes “present” is the rhythmic unity of the phenomenal world, understood as an energetic momentum that holds together in a dynamic way the different elements of the world we inhabit. Through the con-cept of rhythm elaborated by Henri Maldiney we could advance a new aesthetic model of landscape understood as an actual cosmogenesis. (shrink)

A growing body of evidence suggests that cognition is embodied and grounded. Abstract concepts, though, remain a significant theoretical chal- lenge. A number of researchers have proposed that language makes an important contribution to our capacity to acquire and employ concepts, particularly abstract ones. In this essay, I critically examine this suggestion and ultimately defend a version of it. I argue that a successful account of how language augments cognition should emphasize its symbolic properties and incorporate a view of embodiment (...) that recognizes the flexible, multi- modal and task-related nature of action, emotion and perception systems. On this view, language is an ontogenetically disruptive cognitive technology that expands our conceptual reach. (shrink)

The relationship between perceptual experience and memory can seem to pose a chal- lenge for conceptualism, the thesis that perceptual experiences require the actualization of conceptual capacities. Since subjects can recall features of past experiences for which they lacked corresponding concepts at the time of the original experience, it would seem that a subject’s conceptual capacities do not impose a limit on what he or she can experience perceptually. But this conclusion ignores the fact that concepts can be composed of (...) other simpler concepts that a subject possessed earlier, and that de- monstrative capacities can explain how a subject can experience a particular feature of her environment, even when she lacks a fully general concept for that feature. Using these resources, conceptualism can explain the relation between perceptual experience and memory. Nevertheless, a puzzle remains for the defender of conceptualism. A cer- tain view about the relation between perceptual experience and mental imagery in epi- sodic memory – that imagery in recall matches the experience retained in it – can make it difficult to understand how conceptualism could be true. For if a subject’s conceptual capacities determine what the phenomenology of an experience (or memory of it) is like, then one would expect a perceptual experience and its recall in memory to differ in phenomenology if they involve different concepts. In this essay, I solve this puzzle for conceptualism by undermining the assumption that there is a match between im- agery in episodic memory and the phenomenal character of experience. (shrink)

Epistemicists claim that vague predicates have precise but unknow- able cutoffs. I argue against against the standard, Williamsonian, answer, that appeals to metalinguistic safety: we can know that p even if our true belief that p is metalinguistically lucky. I then propose that epistemicists should be diagonalized epistemicists and show how this alternative formulation of the view avoids the chal- lenge. However, in an M. Night Shyamalan-style twist, I then argue we should not be diagonalized epistemicists either.

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 2, Page 10-14, March‐April 2022.

v. 1. Sŏngnihak pʻyŏn -- v. 2. Kyŏngse sasang pʻyŏn.

t. 1. Igry rynka -- t. 2. Torgovet︠s︡ v Khrame.

Questions revolving around the possibility and justifiability of reductive analyses of the concept 'not', lie at the heart of many of the problems in the philosophical interpretation of not-descriptions. In this thesis, I wish to show, by discussing various problems in the logic of not-descriptions, that, and why, reductive analyses must be unsatisfactory. Chapter 1, p. 1.

The key problems of Ivan Vyghovsky’s rule (the main problem among them – is Gadiatskiy pact in 1658) in Mykhailo Grushevskiy’s works are considered in the article. It’s emphasized the scientist’s ambiguity in treatment of polish Ukrainian compromise in 1658. On the one hand the researcher highly evaluates Ivan Vyghovskiy and his like minded persons for their realization the basic idea of social and political development of Ukrainian nation, the necessity of being independent and trying to legalize it in the (...) appropriate paragraphs of “Big kingdom of Russia”.On the other hand emphasizes the factors which caused the union “lack of vitality” and hopeless of I. Vyghovskiy’s polish foreign policy choice.In the scientist’s conception the compromise of 1658 is the result of acombination of a set of factors, opposing tendencies, which had a deep foundation; the current geopolitical realities. For the «Zaporizhzhya Army» it was seen as a salvation from the expansionist, incorporationist policy of Muscovy, the mechanism of affirmation of the Orthodox « Grand Duchy of Rus» as an equal component of the reorganized Commonwealth.Mykhailo Hrushevsky, while paying tribute to the Treaty of Hadiach asa political and legal act, which testified to the level of state thinking of the then Ukrainian elite, indicates, at the same time, his doom.First of all, the historian observes that the treatise was in a hurry, under pressure of circumstances, it may have a temporary character. The most dangerous thing in the treaty is the «... competition of the Cossack and Nobility element...». The researcher believes that the basis of the Hadiach Union was nobility, because it was called «... to restore the economic and political affluence... of this social stratum...».Even the acquisition of the nobility`s rights by the Cossack sergeant «... meant only the strengthening of the nobility stratum against the Cossack masses». Therefore, for the Cossack public (for the common people - moreover, because it was not mentioned in the treaty) the union was unacceptable. In addition, the weak power of the Commonwealth government was incapable of fulfilling allied obligations to the «Zaporizhzhya Army» and the magnate-nobility community has demonstrated its inability to engage in relations with it on a parity basis.In contrast to the Hadiach apologists in 1658, who admired the preferencesfor the Ukrainian in the field of education and culture. Mykhailo Hrushevskyconvincingly states: «For us, from a retrospective perspective, it is quite clear that the Hadiach Union did not look to be successful...».In fact, only a formal Ukrainian-Polish compromise on the 6th(16th ) September 1658, could have been the basis of a federal union of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania: the really progressive provisions of the treaty, which were proposed by Y. Nemirich - I. Vyhovsky, were already limited in time by signing it near Hadiach ; then - substantially eliminated in the process of ratification by the Warsaw Sejm; The illogical view of the coexistence of the Cossack emancipated Ukraine with the state-regulated Crown (with privileged nobility and followed by a feudal dependent slap) is seen in the «renewed» Commonwealth. That is why the Hadiach Treaty eventually became one of the decisive factors in defeat of Vyhovsky as a hetman.And at the same time it remains a Memorandum of such a desired mutual forgiveness and consent of the elites of the two peoples for a better life of each of them. (shrink)

I M M Gregory; The Right to Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 85–102, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.197.

PENSAMENT POSITIVISTA A CATALUNYA és un conjunt d'estudis sobre la recepció al nostre país de les idees culturals, socials, polítiques i científiques del corrent de categories formulades per August Comte i Émile Littré. L'objectiu de l'estudi que es presenta és mostrar el marc històric i institucional —la funció instructora d'ateneus com el Centre de Lectura reusenc— en què es produeix l'evolució de la concepció positivista de la realitat. La recerca se situa en el context contemporani que abocarà a la industrialització (...) i a l'emergència del moviment obrer i republicà. Pel que fa a l'àmbit del pensament econòmic, el volum estudia el programa de Pere Estasén —relació entre política econòmica i territori—, que duu a plantejar la irrupció del positivisme a Catalunya com una estratègia explicativa que vincula les idees generals a la situació de la vida nacional, tant políticament (catalanisme regeneracionista) com econòmicament (proteccionisme com a via de modernització de les estructures productives). En aquesta línia de coneixement sociològic també cal destacar, com es planteja al llibre, un cert gir humanista del cientisme en l'àmbit de la cultura fisiològica representat per les Monografies Mèdiques. Finalment, arran de la lectura del text, el lector es pot arribar a formular un doble interrogant: si existeix un pensament positivista autòcton o bé si a quest pensament sorgeix de la formalització i aplicació de la idea de progrés en un context determinat. (shrink)

Издание содержит: Есть ли ошибка в формуле мира?; Бегство от смысла; Секрет формулы мира - закон притяжения?

We may have different ways of defining the nature of philosophy. One view would take philosophy to be a system of knowledge just like science; only it is a more comprehensive system that includes all science, or rather, it is a synthetic system of knowledge. Another view would take philosophy to be just a reflective and critical attitude. It purports to reflect on methods, postulates, axioms, and fundamental concepts that science relies on to build its knowledge in order to clarify (...) other scientific concepts and principles and to understand the limit of each science and of scientific knowledge itself so that they will not be wrongly applied to areas where they do not apply. Still another view would take philosophy to be that which helps us to understand the universe and human life, to have wisdom to penetrate into history, culture, and concrete affairs, and to give us direction for our actions. Of these three, the first view takes philosophy to be an activity for pursuing knowledge, the second view takes philosophy to be an activity for understanding our knowledge, and the third view takes philosophy to be an activity that starts with knowledge in order to achieve wisdom, which is above and beyond knowledge. All these views have their justifications. I would like to elaborate on them in the following. (shrink)

First published in 1979. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.