When it comes to injustice, especially racial injustice, rage isn't just an acceptable response-it's crucial in order to fuel the fight for change. Anger has a bad reputation. Many people think that it is counterproductive, distracting, and destructive. It is a negative emotion, many believe, because it can lead so quickly to violence or an overwhelming fury. And coming from people of color, it takes on connotations that are even more sinister, stirring up stereotypes, making white people fear what an (...) angry other might be capable of doing, when angry, and leading them to turn to hatred or violence in turn, to squelch an anger that might upset the racial status quo. According to philosopher Myisha Cherry, anger does not deserve its bad reputation. It is powerful, but its power can be a force for good. And not only is it something we don't have to discourage, it's something we ought to cultivate actively. People fear anger because they paint it in broad strokes, but we can't dismiss all anger, especially not now. There is a form of anger that in fact is crucial in the anti-racist struggle today. This anti-racist anger, what Cherry calls Lordean rage, can use its mighty force to challenge racism: it aims for change, motivates productive action, builds resistance, and is informed by an inclusive and liberating perspective. People can, and should, harness Lordean rage and tap into its unique anti-racist potential. We should not suppress it or seek to replace it with friendly emotions. If we want to effect change, and take down racist structures and systems, we must manage it in the sense of cultivating it, and keeping it focused and strong. Cherry makes her argument for anti-racist anger by putting Aristotle in conversation with Audre Lorde, and James Baldwin in conversation with Joseph Butler. The Case for Rage not only uses the tools of philosophy to articulate its arguments, but it sharpens them with the help of social psychology and history. The book is philosophically rich and yet highly accessible beyond philosophical spheres, issuing an urgent call to all politically and socially engaged readers looking for new, deeply effective tools for changing the world. Its message will resonate with the enraged and those witnessing such anger, wondering whether it can help or harm. Above all, this book is a resource for the activist coming to grips with a seemingly everyday emotion that she may feel rising up within her and not know what to do with. It shows how to make sure anger doesn't go to waste, but instead leads to lasting, long-awaited change. (shrink)

The Moral Psychology of Anger is the first comprehensive study of the moral psychology of anger from a philosophical perspective. The collection provides an inclusive view of anger from a variety of philosophical perspectives.

I argue that gendered stereotypes, gendered emotions and attitudes, and display rules can influence extrinsic regulation stages, making failure points likely to occur in gendered-context and for reasons that the emotion regulation literature has not given adequate attention to. As a result, I argue for ‘feminist emotional intelligence’ as a way to help escape these failures. Feminist emotional intelligence, on my view, is a nonideal ability-based approach that equips a person to effectively reason about emotions through an intersectional lens and (...) use emotions to inform how we think and react to the world. This includes being attuned to the ways in which the world and our emotional lives are structured by and favors men. It stresses the need to be attuned to, as well as resist and challenge gender-based stereotypes and attitudes around emotions, paying close attention to the ways those stereotypes, norms, and attitudes differ across race, class, ethnicity, et cetera. (shrink)

Matthew Liao’s edited collection Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality covers a wide range of issues in moral psychology. The collection should be of interest to philosophers, psychologist, and neuroscientists alike, particularly those interested in the relation between these disciplines. I give an overview of the content and major themes of the volume and draw some important lessons about the connection between moral neuroscience and normative ethics. In particular, I argue that moving beyond some of the dichotomies implicit in some (...) of the debates advanced in the book makes the neuroscience of moral judgment much more useful in advancing normative ethics. (shrink)

Fairly recently, I came upon the following passage in a review of a book by Colin M. Turnbull, called The Mountain People : A child dumped on the ground is seized and eaten by a leopard. The mother is delighted; for not only does she no longer have to carry the child about and feed it, but it follows that there is likely to be a gorged leopard near by, a sleepy animal which can easily be killed and eaten. An (...) old woman who has been abandoned falls down the mountainside because she is blind, so a crowd gathers to laugh at the spectacle of her distress. A man about to die of gunshot wounds makes a last request for tea. As he feebly raises it to his lips, it is snatched from him by his sister, who runs away delighted. A child develops intestinal obstruction; so his father calls in the neighbours to enjoy the joke of his distended belly. (shrink)

A sustainable system has all the essential characteristics of an organism?an irreducible whole that develops, maintains and reproduces, or renews, itself by mobilizing material and energy captured from the environment. What is the nature of the material and energy mobilization that makes an organism? I begin with a brief description of a tentative theory of the organism?developed in detail elsewhere (Ho, 1993; 1994a; 1995a,b; 1996b,c)?as a dynamically and energetically closed domain of cyclic non?dissipative processes coupled to irreversible dissipative processes, which (...) effectively frees the organism from thermodynamic constraints so that it is poised for rapid, specific intercommunication, enabling it to function as a coherent whole. I shall then show how this novel theoretical framework may begin to provide normative criteria for sustainable economic systems, thereby also exposing some of the inadequacies of current models and assumptions. (shrink)

Discussions about the evolution of human social cognition usually portray the social environment of early hominins as highly hierarchical and violent. In this evolutionary narrative, our propensity for violence was overcome in our lineage by an increase in our intellectual capacities. However, I will argue in this article that we are at least equally justified in believing that our early hominin ancestors were less aggressive and hierarchical than is suggested in these models. This view is consistent with the available comparative (...) and palaeoanthropological evidence. I will show that this alternative model not only does not support long-held views of human origins, but also has important consequences for debates about the evolution of our capacity for normative guidance. _1_ Introduction _2_ Philosophical Motivation _3_ The Puzzle of Hominin Evolution _4_ The Mosaic Hypothesis _5_ Evidence for the Model _6_ Palaeoanthropological Support _7_ Philosophical Consequences. (shrink)

Wanneer ben je sexy, en wie bepaalt dat eigenlijk? Gelden dezelfde normen voor mannen en vrouwen? En hoe moeten we als maatschappij omgaan met de toenemende druk om er hot uit te zien? In dit boek zoekt filosoof Hans Maes een antwoord op deze vragen. Onderweg reflecteert hij over sekssymbolen, over de erotiserende werking van macht en rijkdom, en over de rol van kunst. Hij buigt zich over de notie van seksuele authenticiteit en lanceert ten slotte ook een oproep voor (...) betere pornografie. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the relationship between Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism, both of which are well-known accounts of the nature of scientific inference. In Sect. 2, I give a brief overview of Bayesianism and IBE. In Sect. 3, I argue that IBE in its most prominently defended forms is difficult to reconcile with Bayesianism because not all of the items that feature on popular lists of “explanatory virtues”—by means of which IBE ranks competing explanations—have confirmational import. (...) Rather, some of the items that feature on these lists are “informational virtues”—properties that do not make a hypothesis \ more probable than some competitor \ given evidence E, but that, roughly-speaking, give that hypothesis greater informative content. In Sect. 4, I consider as a response to my argument a recent version of compatibilism which argues that IBE can provide further normative constraints on the objectively correct probability function. I argue that this response does not succeed, owing to the difficulty of defending with any generality such further normative constraints. Lastly, in Sect. 5, I propose that IBE should be regarded, not as a theory of scientific inference, but rather as a theory of when we ought to “accept” H, where the acceptability of H is fixed by the goals of science and concerns whether H is worthy of commitment as research program. In this way, IBE and Bayesianism, as I will show, can be made compatible, and thus the Bayesian and the proponent of IBE can be friends. (shrink)

Being aware of social injustices can cause existential and mental pain; comes with a burden; and may impede a flourishing life. However, I shall argue that this is not a reason to despair or to choose to be willfully ignorant. Rather, it’s a reason to conclude that being conscious is not enough. Rather, during times of oppression, resisters must also prioritize well-being. One way to do this is by extending what I refer to as solidarity care. I begin by providing (...) an account of solidarity care. I then offer pragmatic ways in which one can extend solidarity care to others. I conclude by responding to two possible worries. (shrink)

In this article, I will provide a critical overview of the form of non-deductive reasoning commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). Roughly speaking, according to IBE, we ought to infer the hypothesis that provides the best explanation of our evidence. In section 2, I survey some contemporary formulations of IBE and highlight some of its putative applications. In section 3, I distinguish IBE from C.S. Peirce’s notion of abduction. After underlining some of the essential elements of IBE, (...) the rest of the entry is organized around an examination of various problems that IBE confronts, along with some extant attempts to address these problems. In section 4, I consider the question of when a fact requires an explanation, since presumably IBE applies only in cases where some explanation is called for. In section 5, I consider the difficult question of how we ought to understand IBE in light of the fact that among philosophers, there is significant disagreement about what constitutes an explanation. In section 6, I consider different strategies for justifying the truth-conduciveness of the explanatory virtues, e.g., simplicity, unification, scope, etc., criteria which play an indispensable role in any given application of IBE. In section 7, I survey some of the most recent literature on IBE, much of which consists of investigations of the status of IBE from the standpoint of the Bayesian philosophy of science. (shrink)

Philosopher Myisha Cherry teaches us the right ways to deal with wrongdoing in our lives and the world Sages from Cicero to Oprah have told us that forgiveness requires us to let go of negative emotions and that it has a unique power to heal our wounds. In Failures of Forgiveness, Myisha Cherry argues that these beliefs couldn’t be more wrong—and that the ways we think about and use forgiveness, personally and as a society, can often do more (...) harm than good. She presents a new and healthier understanding of forgiveness—one that will give us a better chance to recover from wrongdoing and move toward “radical repair.” Cherry began exploring forgiveness after some relatives of the victims of the mass shooting at Emanuel A.M.E. Church in Charleston, South Carolina, forgave what seemed unforgiveable. She was troubled that many observers appeared to be more inspired by these acts of forgiveness than they were motivated to confront the racial hatred that led to the killings. That is a big mistake, Cherry argues. Forgiveness isn’t magic. We can forgive and still be angry, there can be good reasons not to forgive, and forgiving a wrong without tackling its roots solves nothing. Examining how forgiveness can go wrong in families, between friends, at work, and in the media, politics, and beyond, Cherry addresses forgiveness and race, canceling versus forgiving, self-forgiveness, and more. She takes the burden of forgiveness off those who have been wronged and offers guidance both to those deciding whether and how to forgive and those seeking forgiveness. By showing us how to do forgiveness better, Failures of Forgiveness promises to transform how we deal with wrongdoing in our lives, opening a new path to true healing and reconciliation. (shrink)

Perhaps nature is simply a challenge to be addressed, overcome, and set aside.This volume is a critical exploration of natural law theory.

In this book, Kevin M. Cherry compares the views of Aristotle and Plato about the practice, study, and above all, the purpose of politics.

Creation of for-profit markets in organs for transplantation ignites in many deep moral repugnance. Proposals to broker organs have been denounced by the US Congress and professional groups alike. Financial incentives are believed to undermine consent, coercing the poor into selling their organs, violating human dignity, and improperly commodifying the human body; such concerns are held to trump the possibility of increasing life-sustaining transplants. While such views summarize the apparent global consensus which marks worldwide prohibition of the sale of human (...) organs, I argue that closer examination reveals significant grounds for concluding that markets would be more successful in preventing exploitation, preserving human dignity, and protecting against improper commodification than governmental bureaucratic procedures for procuring and allocating organs. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 2, February 2022.

In this novel account of global citizenship, Luis Cabrera argues that all individuals have a global duty to contribute directly to human rights protections and to promote rights-enhancing political integration between states. The Practice of Global Citizenship blends careful moral argument with compelling narratives from field research among unauthorized immigrants, activists seeking to protect their rights, and the 'Minuteman' activists striving to keep them out. Immigrant-rights activists, especially those conducting humanitarian patrols for border-crossers stranded in the brutal Arizona desert, (...) are shown as embodying aspects of global citizenship. Unauthorized immigrants themselves are shown to be enacting a form of global 'civil' disobedience, claiming the economic rights central to the emerging global normative charter while challenging the restrictive membership regimes that are the norm in the current global system. Cabrera also examines the European Union, seeing it as a crucial laboratory for studying the challenges inherent in expanding citizen membership. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an analysis of the radical disagreement over the adequacy of string theory. The prominence of string theory despite its notorious lack of empirical support is sometimes explained as a troubling case of science gone awry, driven largely by sociological mechanisms such as groupthink (e.g. Smolin 2006). Others, such as Dawid (2013), explain the controversy by positing a methodological revolution of sorts, according to which string theorists have quietly turned to nonempirical methods of theory assessment given (...) the technological inability to directly test the theory. The appropriate response, according to Dawid, is to acknowledge this development and widen the canons of acceptable scientific methods. As I’ll argue, however, the current situation in fundamental physics does not require either of these responses. Rather, as I’ll suggest, much of the controversy stems from a failure to properly distinguish the “context of justification” from the “context of pursuit”. Both those who accuse string theorists of betraying the scientific method and those who advocate an enlarged conception of scientific methodology objectionably conflate epistemic justification with judgements of pursuit-worthiness. Once we get clear about this distinction and about the different norms governing the two contexts, the current situation in fundamental physics becomes much less puzzling. After defending this diagnosis of the controversy, I’ll show how the argument patterns that have been posited by Dawid as constituting an emergent methodological revolution in science are better off if reworked as arguments belonging to the context of pursuit. (shrink)

In Postsocial History: An Introduction, historian Miguel A. Cabrera points to the crisis of modernity as a locus for the collapse of social historical models. Previously established theories of social change and social relations are proving insufficient, calling for the emergence of a new social historical theory. By arguing convincingly for the inclusion of language in that model, Cabrera awakens a revolutionary new approach to historiography. The book will prove indispensable to historians, and to social scientists in general, (...) who are dissatisfied with the old paradigms and seek new ways of addressing the challenges of social research. (shrink)

Thepresentwork is arevisedand enlarged English versionofa book originally writtenin Spanish and published in late 1996, La rejlexion de DavidHume en lorno a /a religion. SinceDavidHume is arguablynot only the most important philosopherwhohaseverwrittenintheEnglishlanguage,butthemoststudiedand influential,itisonlynaturalthatsoonerthanlaterIwouldfeelthe urgencyto bring totheattentionofamuchwiderpublicaworkwhoseoutlook is, I think, signifi cantlydifferentfrom that ofother books which deal with the Scottish thinker's worksonreligionandnaturaltheology.Thisdesirewassostrongastoallowmeto overcome the all-too-natural fear that my wavering and uncertain command of English wouldmakethe few valuableinsights theworkmight containappearun clear,andmyphilosophicalerrors,evenmoreastonishing. This book is addressednot only to scholarswhomay beinterested in modem philosophy in (...) generalorHume'sphilosophyofreligion in particular,but also to themoreextensivecompassofreaderseitherintriguedortroubledby religion and themyriadofissuesandproblemsitposes,whichare, as it were, the primematter forphilosophicalanalysisandtheorizing.Inspiteofitsphilosophicaland linguistic limitations,forwhichIamentirelyresponsible,Iferventlyhopethatthisworkmay befoundtocontainsomethingofthatelusivetruthafterwhichHumestrove, andto whichheremainedconstantto theend, particularlyatatime whenthe priceto be paidforthepublicationofcontroversialphilosophicalandreligious views wascon siderablyhigherthanthatofbecominganeasytargetforuniversalridicule. Thecompletionofthisworkhasbeenmadepossible principally by asabbatical leavethattheUniversityofPuertoRico grantedme fortheyear 1999. This leave gavemethenecessarytimeto readandstudy thepertinentliterature,aswell asto writemostoftheEnglish manuscript.Italsoallowedmeto visit Edinburgh and spendmostofJuly andAugust 1999 attheNationalLibraryofScotlandand the EdinburghUniversityLibrary.Although Ihaveincorporatedinto thepresentwork onlyasmallpartofmyresearchatthose libraries,ifthis bookshows agreaterap preciation of the immediate social and religious context of Hume's thought than its Spanish predecessor, it is in no small measure due to the books, articles, and xi xii Preface manuscritsIwasabletoconsultatthe time. Inthis respect, Iwouldliketo thank Professor Peter Jones, Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the HumanitiesattheUniversityofEdinburgh, who was very instrumental in making myvisittoEdinburghareality,andgenerouslyputthefacilitiesoftheInstitute at mydisposal. Manythoughts andlinesofargumentcontained in this bookdatebackto my doctoraldissertation,andsomeearlierversionsofanumberofchaptersorsections ofchaptershavebeenpublished in differentphilosophyjournalsor anthologies. I oftheminthebibliographyundermy name. But sincemy previousworks listall onthe subjecthavebeenrevisedandmodifiedsomanytimes in the lightofnew fmdingsortomeetactualorpossiblecriticism,Ican saythatthey havebeeneffec tivelysupersededbythepresentwriting. (shrink)

I provide three types of dialogue found in everyday life. I then show how the latter dialogical model is ideal for public philosophical engagement. I refer to it as ‘liberatory dialogue’—a theoretical framework that shapes my public philosophy practice and provides invaluable benefits. In liberatory dialogue, characters are subjects, active, teachers and students, creative and critical, and collaborative. Influenced by the work of Paulo Freire, I argue that knowledge, mutual humanization, and liberation are some of the benefits that liberatory dialogue (...) provides. I then highlight several ways in which I incorporate liberatory dialogue in my work as well as some of the challenges of doing so. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je considère les travaux de Richard Bodéüs qui traitent de la manière dont Aristote envisage la relation entre loi, vertu, et éducation. Je soutiens qu’il y a une différence importante entre les exigences de la loi et celles de la raison, en particulier dans les régimes défectueux, qui sont aussi les plus communs. Cette différence existe aussi dans le meilleur régime possible pour la plupart des cités, le régime mixte qu’Aristote nomme «politie», parce qu’il représente un mélange (...) d’oligarchie et de démocratie. Dans ce régime, éduquer les citoyens exige ce qu’Aristote appelle la philosophie politique. (shrink)

IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE TO DIVIDE ALLEGEDLY EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS, "SECULAR" OR OTHERWISE, INTO TWO BROAD CATEGORIES. THE FIRST CATEGORY COMPRISES EVENTS WHICH APPEAR TO BE EXTENSIONS OF THE FAMILIAR, SINCE THEIR CHARACTERIZATION APPARENTLY INCORPORATE A REFERENCE TO EVENTS WHICH ARE SCIENTIFICALLY COMMONPLACE. THE SECOND COMPRISES EVENTS WHICH APPEAR TO BE TOTAL BREAKS WITH THE FAMILIAR, SINCE APPARENTLY NO SUCH REFERENCES CAN BE ELICITED. THE WRITER EXAMINES IN DETAIL POSSIBLE BASES FOR THE DISTINCTION, IN CONNECTION, ESPECIALLY, WITH THE NOTION OF THE DEFEASIBILITY (...) OF AN ACTION. HE CONCLUDES THAT ALTHOUGH THE DISTINCTION CANNOT IN THE END BE SUSTAINED, ANY ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A COHERENT LOGIC OF THE MIRACULOUS MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF A NUMBER OF POINTS ARISING FROM THE EXAMINATION. (shrink)

'Human Communication' is a field of interest of enormous breadth, being one which has concerned students of many different disciplines. It spans the imagined 'gap' between the 'arts' and the 'sciences', but it forms no unified academic subject. There is no commonly accepted terminology to cover aU aspects. The eight articles comprising this book have been chosen to illustrate something of the diversity yet, at the same time, to be comprehensible to readers from different academic disciplines. They cannot pretend to (...) cover the whole field! Some attempt has been made to present them in an order which represents a continuity of theme, though this is merely an opinion. Most publications of this type form the proceedings of some sympo sium, or conference. In this case, however, there has been no such unifying influence, no collaboration, no discussions. The authors have been drawn from a number of different countries. The first article, by John Marshall and Roger Wales concerns the pragmatic values of communication, starting by considering bird-song and passing to the infinitely more complex 'meaningful' values of human language and pictures. The 'pragmatic aspect' means the usefulness - what does language or bird song do for humans and birds? What adaptation or survival values does it have? These questions are then considered in relation to brain specialisation for representation of experience and cognition. (shrink)

‘The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.’.

Since Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, the idea of descent with modification came to dominate systematics, and so the study of morphology became subgugated to the reconstruction of phylogenies. Reinstating the organism in the theory of evolution (Ho & Saunders, 1979; Webster & Goodwin, 1982) leads to a project inrational taxonomy (Ho, 1986, 1988a), which attempts to classify biological forms on the basis of transformations on a given dynamical structure.Does rational taxonomy correspond to thenatural system that Linnaeus and (...) his contemporaries as well as all pre-Darwinian morphologists had in mind? Here, we examine how rational taxonomy and the natural system can coincide in the dynamics of processes generating forms during development, which conferexclusivity, genericity androbustness to the forms that do exist. We use the example of segmentation, especially inDrosophila, as an illustration to explore the implications of rational taxonomy for evolution and systematics, and the relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny. (shrink)

La premiere partie exposera la conception ambrosienne de la nature en general, puis de la nature humaine plus specialement. Depuis plusieurs annees, pas mal d'etudes ont ete faites sur l'anthropologie chez plusieurs Peres de l'Eglise. Peu a peu s'est dessinee une reponse a cette question: comment les Peres voient-ils l'homme? Quelle est, pour eux, sa nature, son essence? Ces etudes ont beaucoup d'importance pour tous ceux qui veulent aborder le probleme de la loi naturelle chez les Peres. La seconde partie (...) etudiera d'une maniere approfondie la loi naturelle selon l'eveque de Milan. Puisque le concept nature est polyvalent, il est clair que celui de loi naturelle le sera aussi. En traitant de la nature dans la premiere partie et de la loi naturelle dans la seconde, nous faisons une distinction explicite entre les considerations philosophiques et la conception theologique que saint Ambroise a developpees. (shrink)

A la luz del relato de Carolina María de Jesús, una temprana cartonera de la favela de Canindé, en Sao Paulo, quien escribiendo su diario de vida en las mismas hojas que recogía en sus calles termina ofreciendo el más crudo y vívido relato de la vida en ellas, en este artículo se examina su testimonio y la escritura de él como una otra modalidad de práctica política, ello a partir del concepto de campos de acción social y política, y (...) su problematización a propósito del carácter colectivo de su contenido, el explícito interés de su autora de hacerlo público y la inadecuación, entre otros elementos, de las categorías con que se observa y distingue el fenómeno de la participación entre hombres y mujeres. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically evaluate several related, provocative claims made by proponents of data-intensive science and “Big Data” which bear on scientific methodology, especially the claim that scientists will soon no longer have any use for familiar concepts like causation and explanation. After introducing the issue, in Section 2, I elaborate on the alleged changes to scientific method that feature prominently in discussions of Big Data. In Section 3, I argue that these methodological claims are in tension with a (...) prominent account of scientific method, often called “Inference to the Best Explanation”. Later on, in Section 3, I consider an argument against IBE that will be congenial to proponents of Big Data, namely, the argument due to Roche and Sober Analysis, 73:659–668, that “explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant.” This argument is based on Bayesianism, one of the most prominent general accounts of theory-confirmation. In Section 4, I consider some extant responses to this argument, especially that of Climenhaga Philosophy of Science, 84:359–368,. In Section 5, I argue that Roche and Sober’s argument does not show that explanatory reasoning is dispensable. In Section 6, I argue that there is good reason to think explanatory reasoning will continue to prove indispensable in scientific practice. Drawing on Cicero’s oft-neglected De Divinatione, I formulate what I call the “Ciceronian Causal-nomological Requirement”, which states, roughly, that causal-nomological knowledge is essential for relying on correlations in predictive inference. I defend a version of the CCR by appealing to the challenge of “spurious correlations,” chance correlations which we should not rely upon for predictive inference. In Section 7, I offer some concluding remarks. (shrink)

An essay on the operation of the powers of control during the pandemic lockdown. Thus, the meaning of contemporary noise, the anthropause, the connection as a norm, the appearance of a new chain between biopolitical regulations, norms and subjective modulations are analyzed. The untimely force of the event is proposed as a way of resisting control. -/- Un ensayo sobre el funcionamiento de los poderes de control durante el encierro pandémico. Se analizan, así, el sentido del ruido contemporáneo, la antropausa, (...) la conexión como norma, la aparición de un nuevo encadenamiento entre regulaciones biopolíticas, normas y modulaciones subjetivas. Se propone la fuerza intempestiva del acontecimiento como forma de resistir al control. (shrink)