We have shown that FEF lesion-induced extinction could be compensated for by changing the relative temporal onsets of two targets presented on either side of the midline. Monkeys were trained to make saccades to either of two identical visual stimuli presented with various stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA). In intact animals the targets were chosen with equal probability when they appeared simultaneously. After unilateral FEF lesions an SOA of 67–116 msec had to be introduced, with the contralesional target appearing first, to (...) obtain equal probability choice. With a smaller target separation, averaging saccades occurred with highest frequency at similar SOAs. Our findings suggest that neglect may be attributable to more time being required in the damaged hemisphere for converting sensory information into motor responses. (shrink)

The computational complexity of finding a shortest path in a two-dimensional domain is studied in the Turing machine-based computational model and in the discrete complexity theory. This problem is studied with respect to two formulations of polynomial-time computable two-dimensional domains: domains with polynomialtime computable boundaries, and polynomial-time recognizable domains with polynomial-time computable distance functions. It is proved that the shortest path problem has the polynomial-space upper bound for domains of both type and type ; and it has a polynomial-space lower (...) bound for the domains of type, and has a #P lower bound for the domains of type. (shrink)

This essay examines the persistent engagement with cosmopolitan inclusivity through the endorsement of indigenous sacredness in works of ethnographic fiction. I focus on Ursula K. Le Guin’s Always Coming Home, James Cameron’s Avatar, and Taiwanese writer Ming-yi Wu’s science fiction The Man with the Compound Eyes, three iconic environmental representations of indigenous knowledge. These texts illustrate how indigenous thinking has very often been transformed from place-bound, locally-embedded cultural traditions to an embodiment of Euro-American eco-spirituality that overturns both national boundaries and (...) the humannature divide at the turn of the twenty-first century. In settler environmental narratives, the insistence on the ethnographic mode strengthens the desire for authenticity and intimacy. (shrink)

In this paper, have two parts: the first is the critical part, in this section I will critically pointed out that the reductionism of the research project in the face of ideas and language to explain the dualism of the plight of the game, only to avoid paying with phenomenology price. Followed by the construction of the part, I will be back "perspective of dualism," the anthropological roots, and this "perspective dualism" itself does not exclude a unified view of natural (...) evolution. On the "spirit of the decision situation of the brain" and "the spirit of stylized brain," the complex interactions between the images is a philosophical reflection of the results, rather than the results of natural science knowledge itself. I represent a non-scientific or a "soft" the naturalistic point of view and attempt to obtain a between Kant and Darwin compatible views. This article mainly has two parts: First is the critique part, I will criticize in this part and it will be pointed out that when the reductional research plan will face the dualism's difficult situation of the explanation viewpoint and the language game, it tries only to avoid to pay the price of epiphenomenon. Next constructs the construction part, I will recall the anthropological root of "the perspective dualism", because this "the perspective dualism" itself has not certainly repelled the unified viewpoint of the natural theory of evolution. About the complex interactive image between "cerebrum" and "spirit" is one philosophical reflexive achievement, but is not the natural sciences knowledge itself achievement. I represent one kind of non-science or "soft" naturalism viewpoint and try obtaining the compatible opinion between Kant and Darwin. (shrink)

On the seventh page of the People's Daily for April 15, 1958, Ma T'e published an article entitled "Discussions of Problems of Logic." In his conclusion he critically evaluates many people and even classifies me as a revisionist who must be criticized. I have studied this article closely and feel that it is shot through with difficulties.

Recently I have read in succession the four articles on formal logic and dialectics in the current year's Hsin chien-she: Mr. Chou Ku-ch'eng's "Formal Logic and Dialectics" in the second issue, Mr. I Chih's "A Criticism of Confused Concepts on Problems of Logic" in the fourth issue, Mr. Shen Ping-yuan's "A Discussion of ‘Formal Logic and Dialectics,’ " and Mr. Chou Ku-ch'eng's "Further Discourse on Formal Logic and Dialectics," both in the seventh issue. In my opinion, in Mr. (...) Chou's articles, several main theses on formal logic and on the relationship between formal logic and dialectics are erroneous; basically, I agree with the criticisms of Messrs. I and Shen. Nonetheless, I believe that Mr. Chou's errors have had their source in the theory of cognition in that he has unilateralized and absolutized certain aspects that were originally correct, thus leading himself in the wrong direction. In criticizing Mr. Chou, both Messrs. I and Shen failed to proceed from this premise, so they could not make others see where Mr. Chou's errors basically lie. Based on this approach, I am merely offering some personal views on several main problems concerning formal logic and the relationship between formal logic and dialectics as mentioned in Mr. Chou's article. It is hoped that Mr. Chou and other comrades will correct me. (shrink)

Chuang Chou is counted among the greatest of the classical, Chinese philosophers. His thought, strongly inspired by the father of Taoism, Lao Tzu, is a reaction against the ritualized and ossified Confucianism of his own time. He shows little interest in legal matters and moral casuistry, and his whole work, i.e., the collection of texts attributed to him since ancient times, is centered around the deepest metaphysical and religious problems. God, and the way to Him, are the real subject (...) matter of his writings. But Chuang Chou attempted to write no treatise on systematic theology: he preferred to clothe his ideas in short stories, tales, and magnificent aphorisms. Practically no knowledge of the history of Chinese civilization is needed to understand and to love this book, which manages to preserve, after twenty-three centuries, its marvellous freshness.—M. J. V. (shrink)

"Chuang Tzu" means "Master Chuang". If we are to believe traditional accounts (like those in the Records of the Historian , by Ssu-ma Ch'ian), he lived in the fourth century BC, contemporary with Plato and Aristotle. He was from a place called Meng, probably in the state of Sung, where he was "an official in the lacquer garden"; nobody knows what that means. Chuang Chou is also recorded as being a member of the Chi-Hsia academy maintained by the larger (...) and more advanced state of Ch'i, along with many of his most famous philosophical contemporaries, like Mencius and Hui Shih. And that is about it, so far as Chuang Chou goes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 63-76 [Access article in PDF] Formal Practice: Buddhist or Christian Robert Aitken Diamond Sangha In this paper, I write from a Mahayana perspective and take up seven Buddhist practices and the views that bring them into being, together with Christian practices that may be analogous, in turn with their inspiration. The Buddhist practices sometimes tend to blend and take on another's attributes and functions. I (...) name them according to their usage in Western Buddhism.The Nembutsu (Ch. Nien-fo, "Recalling Buddha") is the pronouncement of veneration to Amida Butsu (Ch. A-mi-to-fo, Skt. Amitabha Buddha), an appeal to his salvific power, and sometimes an endeavor to unify with him.The ekomon (Ch. hui-hsiang-men, Skt. parinamana) is a verse that transfers merit back to Buddhas, bodhisattvas, and past teachers for their further empowerment to bring beings to the way of the Buddha.Zazen (Ch. tsao-ch'an, Skt. dhyana) is focused meditation intended to enable the student to personalize the realization and way of the Buddha.The vow or expression of aspiration (J. gan, Ch. yuan,Skt. pranidhana) pronounces a determination to make realization possible for the self and others.Sange, or zange (Ch. chang-hui, Skt. kshamayati), is the confession of personal responsibility for bad karma in the past and repentance for it.Mudra(J. in, Ch. yin) and dharani(J. darani or ju, Ch. chou) are ritualized presentations of realizations and their dharma. They can be gestures, hand positions, or postures; dharaniare esoteric formulas or texts.Sutras and sutra services, from the Sanskrit (J. kyo,Ch. ching), traditional Buddhist chants and texts. The Nembutsu The Nembutsu invokes Amida, the Buddha of Infinite Light and Life and the Lord of the Pure Land, a powerful savior by dint of vows he took while still in his Bodhisattva Dharmakara incarnation. He is venerated across Asia—in Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and the Chinese diaspora. The Nembutsu formula, "Namu amida butsu," or the equivalent in the other languages ("Veneration to 'Amida Butsu'"), is repeated devotionally, bringing promise of a joyous afterlife, and for some, intimacy with Amida, [End Page 63] the spiritual oyasama, or parent, an effect not unlike that of Christian mysticism. 1 The Myokonin (Pure and Happy People), the Pure Land movement of Japanese who take it upon themselves to practice the Nembutsu moment-to-moment, set forth their experience in artless poetry that is poignant and metaphysically clear: I thought it was all due to my self-power, That [the Nembutsu] was uttered; But it was not so, it all came from the power of Oya. What I was imagining to be the other power Was no other than the self-power itself. Wishing to shun the evil path And ever hoping for the Pure land— The very thought was no other than the self-power. I have been designing all the time, Saying, "Is this the way, or that?" But there was no designing after all, All was given fully, and freely How grateful I am! Namu amida butsu! 2Interior repetition of the Nembutsu hundreds of times a day brings the fulfilling gift of spiritual intimacy with the oya, and the Christian analoy is clearly the Jesus Prayer, "Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner," or its shortened version, "Lord have mercy" ("Kyrie eleison"). 3 Yet there is more than a shade of difference between devotion to a savior empowered by his original vows for his all-embracing compassion, and devotion to the one who inherits the power of an omnipotent God. In the words of Saint Teresa of Avila, "God is almighty. His power has equaled His will; and so He can do everything that pleases him. The less I understand this, the more I believe it and the greater the devotion it arouses in me. Blessed is He forever! Amen." 4 The EkomonIn contrast to the Nembutsu, the ekomon is not an appeal for redemption but a return of the "auspicious power" (J. fukutoku, Ch. fu-tu, Skt. punya) of the sutra or sutras just recited to... (shrink)

The counterfactual approach to explainable AI (XAI) seeks to provide understanding of AI systems through the provision of counterfactual explanations. In a recent systematic review, Chou et al. (Inform Fus 81:59–83, 2022) argue that the counterfactual approach does not clearly provide causal understanding. They diagnose the problem in terms of the underlying framework within which the counterfactual approach has been developed. To date, the counterfactual approach has not been developed in concert with the approach for specifying causes developed by (...) Pearl (Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Woodward (Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press, 2003). In this paper, I build on Chou et al.’s work by applying the Pearl-Woodward approach. I argue that the standard counterfactual approach to XAI is capable of delivering causal understanding, but that there are limitations on its capacity to do so. I suggest a way to overcome these limitations. (shrink)

Lei, a twenty‐seven‐year‐old Mandarin speaker, visits the United States seeking curative treatments for his acute myeloid leukemia. His mother, Hua, has traveled with him. Neither she nor Lei speak English, and the hospital does not have an onsite professional Mandarin‐speaking interpreter. Using a professional interpreter over the phone, Lei's oncologist, Dr. Branson, attempts to initiate a face‐to‐face goals‐of‐care conversation with Hua as the surrogate decision‐maker. Dr. Branson explains that Lei has “only weeks to months to live” and recommends initiating comfort‐care‐only (...) measures, but Hua says that she wants (and that Lei would want) continued aggressive measures. Hua says that her son might be a candidate for a phase I trial. Eventually, Dr. Branson brings in Dr. Chou, a Mandarin‐speaking resident to provide face‐to‐face interpretation. Hua insists that “there must be more standard therapies available” and says that she will wait until the trial begins. She begins crying, and the meeting disintegrates. Following this, Dr. Branson calls for an ethics consultation for “help in end‐of‐life communicating and reconciling discordance about prognostic information.”How should the ethicist use the institution's interpreter services? (shrink)

Kerridge et al recently published a paper in the journal about organ transplantation and the diagnosis of death.1 Although I appreciate the authors’ efforts to present their arguments about such a controversial issue, I found some inconsistencies in this article that I would like to discussWhen Kerridge and his collaborators discussed the origins of the concept of brain death , they emphasised that after the report of the medical consultants on the diagnosis of death to the US President’s Commission was (...) published in 1981,2 clinicians equated the concept of BD with brainstem death. In fact, the brainstem criterion was first proposed by Mohandas and Chou in Minnesota, in 1971.3 The Minnesota criteria inspired the UK code, which was mainly adopted in UK commonwealth countries.4 This view was afterwards powerfully defended by Christopher Pallis.5 After the US President’s Commission report,2 a lot of countries, and most US states, accepted the whole brain, and not the brainstem, criterion.6Regarding the “dead donor rule”, with the advent of transplant surgery, interest in definitions and diagnosis of death based on brain formulations really acquired a new urgency. None the less, it is important to point out that the concept of BD as death of the individual, did not appear to benefit organ transplantation, but was a consequence of the development of intensive care. As Pallis emphasised, if organ transplant techniques had never been developed, intensive care procedures would have provided the possibility of supplying life support to those cases with destroyed brains and preserved heart function, and physicians would need to face the clinical syndrome called BD.5 When French neurophysiologists and neurologists described the death of the nervous system and coma dépassé, organ transplant techniques were only in the very early stages of development. …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:In Search of Personal Welfare: A View of Ancient Chinese ReligionAnne Behnke KinneyIn Search of Personal Welfare: A View of Ancient Chinese Religion. By Mu-chou Poo. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Pp. xiii + 331. $21.95.In Mu-chou Poo's new book, In Search of Personal Welfare: A View of Ancient Chinese Religion, the author argues that "by studying relatively 'ordinary' factors, one reaches the (...) basic stratum of the religious mentality of everyday, private life" (p. 3). Poo describes the religious mentality of ancient China at its most fundamental level as being based on a concern for personal welfare and personal access to mantic knowledge. His book investigates broadly shared religious beliefs and practices from China's earliest period up through the Han dynasty, taking into account not just the yearly religious cycle of the common people, but also the relationship between official and local cults.Poo begins with a discussion of archaeological evidence from the late Neolithic period and posits three levels in the development of religious expression in China. The first, appearing perhaps in the late Neolithic and certainly in Shang times, was a form of religious expression directed toward ancestors and nature deities that was divided according to the richness of ritual acts and distinctions derived from an increasingly [End Page 627] stratified society. The second level of religious expression, embraced by the ruling elite of the early Zhou and closely related to agricultural cycles, posited the idea of a moral Heaven that benefited the ruler and the entire state. The third, propounded by intellectuals of the Eastern Zhou, stressed personal piety toward a supreme being, but with little stress on material gain. Despite this threefold development, Poo points out the existence of a more fundamental religious mentality that extended from court to commoner, typified by its emphasis on gaining personal protection from evil spirits and establishing contact with benevolent spirits. Magic, mantic techniques, shamanic rites, and prayers were all utilized toward these ends. As Poo states, "The important matter was propitiation, not where or how the powers came from, or why the powers existed at all" (p. 207). Poo also argues that propitiation of extra-human powers and the use of efficacious apotropaic techniques mattered more than moral behavior, and reliance on these techniques resulted in a confidence that extra-human powers could be successfully dealt with before death. The central theme of religious beliefs in early China was therefore the search for personal welfare: to seek happiness and avoid misfortune.Poo has used a rich array of sources—traditionally transmitted texts as well as recently excavated archaeological texts and artifacts—to examine topics such as divination, exorcism, rishu or "daybooks," immortality, apotheosis, and the netherworld. Poo makes judicious use of the highly limited sources concerning the religious practices of ordinary individuals in early China, though these sources are far more numerous than one might imagine. Given these limitations, Poo's study is highly ambitious and raises questions that must be considered if our view of early China is not to be hopelessly skewed. Poo's reconstruction of the religious practices of the common people is moreover an important contribution to the study of religion in early China in that it helps correct the tendency to represent elite Eastern Zhou culture as the pervasive culture of all periods of early China. [End Page 628]Anne Behnke KinneyUniversity of VirginiaCopyright © 2000 University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

Compiled in the twelfth century A.D. by Chu Hsi, leading exponent of Neo-Confucianism, with the assistance of Lü Tsu-Ch'ien, Chin-ssu Lu serves as a summary of, and introduction to, the vast literature of Neo-Confucian philosophy. Adding a more rational theoretical foundation and new methods of moral cultivation and study to traditional thought and practice, Neo-Confucianism has exercised great influence upon thought and social life in East Asia in the past six hundred years. As the classical statement of this philosophy, this (...) anthology brings together passages from Chou Tun-i, Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, and Chang Tsai on the Way, Learning, and Self-improvement, as well as assessments of the character of Sages and Worthies; also included is a chapter on the doctrines of Buddhism and Taoism, pointing out ways in which they deviated from the Confucian Way. It is a very stimulating work; indeed almost every sentence has spark and substance. Although it has been widely studied by East Asian scholars, so far in the West there has been only the translation into German by Father Olaf Graf, now virtually unobtainable. With his mastery of Chinese philosophical literature, his industriousness in research and his augmentation of the text by generous quotations from the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean commentaries, the translator has achieved extraordinary success in making the English version even more comprehensible than the original Chinese.--T. S. C. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophical Meditations on Zen BuddhismWhalen LaiPhilosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism. By Dale S. Wright. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xv + 227.As "philosophical meditations" on the Zen of Huang Po, Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism by Dale S. Wright is an impressive work. Philosophers will appreciate it, for it well shows how far Zen studies in America have moved ahead since the days of D. T. Suzuki (...) and Alan Watts. Just as Bernard Faure has deconstructed "Suzuki Zen," Dale S. Wright has here de-romanticized John Blofeld's 1959 book on Huang Po, the third "house" in the Hung-chou lineage of Ma-tsu Tao-I, being the successor to Pai-chang and master to Lin-chi.Wright's "post-romantic" reading strives for relevance in contemporary discourse. Each of the chapters takes up a key topic that dovetails into the next and escalates from Textuality, Reading, Understanding, Language, Rhetoric, and History to Freedom, Transcendence, Mind, and Enlightenment. Concerning the first, Textuality, it is shown how Blofeld has taken the records of Huang Po as true and holistic—a view that has been disputed by modern scholarship, which details a complex history of accretion instead. Renouncing the former romance with its single portraiture, Wright accepts the critical approach. Huang Po exists, then, as a series of images projected by the respondent Zen community. Wright then recalls the Buddhist doctrine of "no-self" (in the context of there being no unchanging Huang Po) and notes how a number of masters in that mountain-based lineage were also named Huang Po. In short, whereas Bernard Faure has dissolved the early images of Bodhidharma into a number of literary skandhas (heaps), fragments that do not even add up to a pudgala (fictive whole), Wright finds these socially constructed images to be born out of (Buddhist) "dependent origination" vis-à-vis the Zen community.This leads to the next topic, on how one should read a text. Wary of Blofeld's strong belief, a hermeneutics of faith that is possibly masking modern, subjective bias and projections, Wright sees a need for critical distance while granting the text its own horizon or an "otherness" that engages the reader anew. All ten chapters follow this format of pitting point against counterpoint before ruminating on some lead gleamed from the repertoire of Buddhist doctrines. Some chapters are more subtle than others, but all work to jog the reader into a sudden recognition of some past prejudice while offering a fresh take on the material. The book, though not always easy, nonetheless deserves a close reading by any and all Zen enthusiasts.Wright's choice of target—Blofeld and Huang Po—is somewhat of an unexpected delight. As with Buberism in Hasidic studies, D. T. Suzuki has perpetuated a certain "Suzuki-ism" in the Zen field, but compared with Suzuki or even Watts, Blofeld is never known to be that independent a thinker as to deserve similar attention. An eclectic collector of Eastern esoterica, Blofeld's "romance" with the Orient is not always that reflective; sometimes he just reports what he was told, unvarnished. His "romanticism" is thus often second- or thirdhand. The introduction to his 1959 work is anything but aggressive; he sounds at times all too apologetic. But [End Page 631] precisely because of this, Wright is able to cite Blofeld and use him to get at a more general but pervasive set of European "romantic" assumptions about the Buddhist East and submit that to a coherent and intriguing critique. He also whets our appetite for a good, intellectual biography of Blofeld, which we do not have. We do not really get a good picture of Huang Po either—but then, asking for that might be chalked up to a yearning for "romance" or just wishful thinking. One longs for some middle ground.That is because, unlike Descartes' Meditations, which set forth a singular, modern rationality, Wright's postmodern Meditation cannot help but suggest just one way of dealing with the polysemy of the text. Perhaps some histoire de mentalité in the future can restore some sense of the significance of Huang Po the person and his historic hour. Maybe a different... (shrink)

Some of the authors of the essays on Chinese philosophers prefer the pin yin system of romanization for Chinese names and words, while others prefer the Wade‐Giles system. Given that both systems are in wide use today, important names and words are given in both their pin yin and Wade‐Giles formulations. The author's preference is printed first, followed by the alternative romanization within brackets.