How to think together Lévinas and Deleuze? A possible and not surprising answer is to propose that both authors are "creators of concepts". This article aims to explore the relationships and points of encounter between two philosophers that burst with a way of doing philosophy that configures a new field of the "possible". Here are new meanings that through certain conceptual figures manage to dislocate sense and open new material and philosophical worlds. And it is through the figure of "evasion" (...) in Lévinas and the "exhausted" in Deleuze that we show a methodological and stylistic approach to these philosophies generating an opening towards a critical philosophical thought that exceeds, besieges, asphyxiates the meaning. We conclude this study by warping and differentiating these philosophical methods and styles. (shrink)

Como marca y vaticinio de un pensamiento por venir, el gesto que inaugura en 1935 el pensamiento de Lévinas consiste en la operación de una verdadera epojé mundana, que decanta, implícitamente, del examen de la vieja noción de evasión. Este trabajo intentará hacer explícita dicha epojé, para luego desentrañar las apuestas y destinos teóricos posibles para un punto de partida no-mundano para la obra de Lévinas.

En el siguiente texto intentaremos elucidar la particular estructura social, que define la utopía en el pensamiento de Lévinas, enfatizando su antagonismo estructural con la forma social propia de la estructura totalitaria. Es nuestro interés el argumentar aquí, que la utopía levinasiana en cuanto forma social, se fundamenta sobre la matriz de la "separación intersubjetiva", y que bajo este respecto ella aparece como una dimensión radicalmente opuesta a la estructura social del totalitarismo, en donde la "separación intersubjetiva" es imposible. De (...) una a la otra, el ser social se juega como separación, o bien, como aglutinación; mientras la utopía separa, el totalitarismo fusiona. Nuestro acercamiento será articulado con elementos de análisis aportados por el contundente trabajo de Miguel Abensour respecto a la utopía. Por ello, asumimos como nuestra la perspectiva de análisis críticopolítica de nuestro autor, según la cual, la crítica al totalitarismo resulta determinante para el despeje de la dimensión utópica. This articule attemps to clarify the unique social structure, which defines utopia in Levinas's thought, emphasizing its structural antagonism to the social form of the totalitarian structure. We argue that Levinasian utopia, as social form, is founded on the matrix of the "intersubjective separation". Hence, under this relation, the Levianasian utopia appears as a dimension that is radically opposed to the social structure of totalitarianism, where the "intersubjective separation" is impossible. The social being of utopia in Levinas is separation, whereas in totalitarianism the social being is agglutination. While the utopia separates the totalitarianism fuses together. Our approach will be supported with analytical elements drawn from Miguel Abensour's work about utopia. Thus, we assume Miguel Abensour's critical-political perspective of analysis as our own; consequently the critique of totalitarianism is determinant for the clearing of the utopian dimension. (shrink)

Resumen:Durante los últimos años nuestra cotidianidad ha sido afectada por una larga experiencia de encierro, producto de la pandemia de COVID-19. ¿Pero es realmente nueva la experiencia del encierro? En el siguiente texto intentaremos examinar la relación entre temporalidad y encierro, a la luz de las experiencias del sufrimiento y la depresión melancólica tematizadas por Lévinas y Maldiney. Así, mostraremos que ambas vivencias conllevan una clausura al tiempo de la trascendencia que nos mueve a preguntarnos si acaso el encierro existencial (...) agota su sentido en su dimensión puramente espacial.Palabras clave: tiempo; encierro; fenomenología; sufrimiento; depresión. (shrink)

The present study aimed to analyze the stability of the memory of a stressful event (medical examination within a hospital setting) over time in young people (age range 12 to 21, Mage = 15.11 years old, SD = 3.047) with mild or moderate intellectual disability (IQ = 54.32, SD = 13.47). The results show a stability of the memory of what happened an hour and a week after the event in relation to the people involved, the apparatus used, and the (...) parts of the body explored. No interaction effects were found between the stability of memory over time and the level of intellectual disability. The level of disability (mild or moderate) only affected the description of the doctor who performed the exploration and the explored parts of the body, showing better results for people with mild disability. In addition, the results highlight the relationship between memory and IQ, especially verbal IQ. (shrink)

"What do grown children owe their parents?" Over two decades ago philosopher Jane English asked this question and came up with the startling answer: nothing (English 1979). English joins many contemporary philosophers in rejecting the once-traditional view that grown children owe their parents some kind of fitting repayment for past services rendered. The problem with the traditional view, as argued by many, is, first, that parents have duties to provide fairly significant services to their growing children, and persons do not (...) owe repayment for others' mere performance of duty; second, even where parents go above and beyond duty in their loving and generous rearing of their children, the benefits are bestowed, at least on young children, without their voluntary acceptance and consent, and so, again, fail to generate any obligation of subsequent repayment on their part (see Blustein 1982: 182-3). Moreover, the entire idiom of obligation and repayment, in English's 1 words, "tends to obscure, or even to undermine, the love that is the correct ground of filial obligation" (352). English's alternative, however -- that children strictly "owe" their parents nothing except what flows naturally from whatever love and affection exist between them -- also strikes many as problematic. Christina Hoff Sommers offers examples of what seem to be clearly delinquent adult children, who simply don't "feel" like sharing their lives with their aging parents, or providing any emotional or financial support to them, and so don't (Sommers 1986: 440-41). Sommers points out that we need some talk of obligations in order to fill in the cracks in human relationships where love and affection fail: "The ideal relationship cannot be 'duty-free,' if only because sentimental ties may come unraveled, often leaving one of the parties at a material disadvantage'" (450-51). Sommers proposes as her alternative to English that legitimate duties arise out of special relationships defined by social roles: being a father or mother, a son or a daughter, "is socially as well as biologically prescriptive; it not only defines what one is; it also defines who one is and what one owes" (447).. (shrink)

With a novel approach to Aristotle's zoology, this study looks at animals as creatures of nature and reveals a scientific discourse that, in response to his predecessors, exiles logos as reason and pursues the logos intrinsic to animals' bodies empowering them to sense the world and live. The volume explores Aristotle's conception of animals through a discussion of his ad hoc methodology to study them, including the pertinence of the soul to such a study, and the rise of zoology as (...) a branch of natural philosophy. For Aristotle, animal life stems from the body in the space of existence and revolves around sensation, which is entwined with pleasure, pain, and desire. Lack of human reason is irrelevant to an understanding of the richness of animal life and cognition. In sum, the reader will acquire knowledge of the animal as such, which lay at the core of Aristotle's agenda and required a study of its own, separate from plants and the elements. This book is intended for students of history of science, ancient biology and philosophy and all those who, from different fields, are interested in animal studies and the human/animal relation. (shrink)

Presenting real life cases from clinical practice, this book claims that children can be conceived of as moral equals without ignoring the fact that they still are children and in need of strong family relationships. Drawing upon recent advances in childhood studies and its key feature, the ‘agentic child’, it uncovers the ideology of adultism which has seeped into much what has been written about childhood ethics. However, this book also critically examines those positions that do accord moral equality to (...) children but on grounds not strong enough to support their claim. It lays the groundwork for a theory of moral equality by assessing the concepts of parenthood, family, best interest, paternalism, and, above all, autonomy and trust which are so important in envisioning what we owe the child. It does not only show how children – like adults – should be considered moral agents from infancy but also how ethical theories addressing adults can significantly profit from recognizing this. The analysis takes into account contributions from European as well as American scholars and makes use of a wide range of ethical, psychological, cultural, and social-scientific research. (shrink)

In Aristotle's Ethics as First Philosophy Claudia Baracchi demonstrates the indissoluble links between practical and theoretical wisdom in Aristotle's thinking. Referring to a broad range of texts from the Aristotelian corpus, Baracchi shows how the theoretical is always informed by a set of practices, and specifically, how one's encounter with phenomena, the world, or nature in the broadest sense, is always a matter of ethos. Such a 'modern' intimation can, thus, be found at the heart of Greek thought. Baracchi's (...) book opens the way for a comprehensively reconfigured approach to classical Greek philosophy. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo fundamental analizar las bases de una apreciación estética de los animales en clave no antropomorfista, una con la que valorarlos en sus propios términos. Otras apreciaciones tienen un fundamento antropomórfico: la concepción de los animales desde el modelo artístico o desde nuestras necesidades evolutivas, por ejemplo. El contexto de esta investigación es doble: por una parte, la actitud antropomórfica dominante en la cultura moderna y, por otra, las nuevas iniciativas artísticas y culturales alejadas de la (...) comprensión del ser humano como centro de todo lo que existe. La metodología empleada en este estudio es hermenéutica y dialéctica. Hermenéutica porque pretende, ante todo, comprender estas nuevas manifestaciones estéticas animalistas, y dialéctica porque para comprenderlas establecemos un debate crítico con las anteriores posiciones antropocentristas. La conclusión del trabajo es que la apreciación estética de los animales no antropomorfista solo puede fundarse en una ética animalista. Para lograrlo, es necesario, primero, tener conciencia de nuestra tendencia antropomórfica. Y, segundo, adoptar una ética empática que nos permita acceder al punto de vista de los animales, porque solo así podremos percibirlos en sí mismos. (shrink)

The central question of this article is what hope contributes to a good life. The starting point is the assumption that living a good life involves having a good relation to the past, present and future. Hope is a central attitude towards the future that contributes, I argue, to having an own future. I distinguish three ways in which there is reference to an "own future" and thus different ways in which hope contributes to the good life. Finally, I discuss (...) the objection that hope is detrimental to a good life precisely because of its reference to the future, insofar as a good life essentially takes place "in the present". (shrink)

The way information is perceived and defined today is no longer an accurate portrayal of the interactions occurring among user–information–interface. We are so accustomed to the traditional models of human–machine interactions that we often overlook the fact that first- and second-order cybernetics definitions are now antiquated and one-dimensional when used to describe user–information–interface interactions. Within this new era of user–information–interface relationship, the introduction of the concept of Meta-Environment reflects a more accurate representation of the processes of information gathering and sharing (...) and their interactions. Meta-Environments break the mold of traditional thinking and refocus attention not on the user, information or interface alone, but on the relationships and processes as a whole. It expands cybernetics to its fourth order while focusing on the relationship among user-information-interface as a Complex Adaptive System. (shrink)

Physician-assisted dying is currently an intensely discussed topic in several countries. Despite differences in legislation and application, countries with end-of-life laws have similar eligibility criteria for assistance in dying: individuals must be in a hopeless situation and experience unbearable suffering. Hopelessness, as a basic aspect of the human condition, is a central topic in Albert Camus’ philosophical work The Myth of Sisyphus, which addresses the question of suicide. Suffering in the face of a hopeless situation, and the way doctors approach (...) this suffering, is the topic of his novel The Plague, which describes the story of a city confronted with a plague epidemic. In this paper, I draw philosophical and ethical conclusions about physician-assisted dying based on an analysis of central concepts in the work of Camus—specifically, those treated in The Myth of Sisyphus and The Plague. On the basis of my interpretation of Camus’ work, I argue that hopelessness and unbearable suffering are useless as eligibility criteria for physician-assisted dying, given that they do not sufficiently elucidate where the line should be drawn between patients who should to be eligible for assistance and those who should not. (shrink)

In political philosophy, trust, legality and violence are interdependent, with different weights, connecting and excluding. Trust structures suffer most from an anticipation of violence or violence itself. Violence systematically takes place in three stages, according to the german sociologist Jan-Philipp Reemtsma: expulsive, abusive, and homicidal violence, all of which have their distinctive and recurring verbal and nonverbal equivalents. The hyperviolence phenomenon goes beyond this, however, and even mutilates the dead body, whether actually physically, or through massive propaganda that declares the (...) enemy a killable non-human. The goal of hyperviolence is a demonstration of absolute power over victim and bystander by means of a traumatizing violation of trust, reason, and individuality. At the same time, hyperviolence is an atavism in modernity (a historical regression); therefore the practitioner of hyperviolence is the anti-modern type par excellence. The french philosopher Georges Bataille introduces here the concept of "sovereignty" and the "sovereign" as the perpetrator also of hyperviolence. The sovereign's sovereignty is the immediate experience of the moment, free of any responsibility, with a rhetoric of mock justification of each of the three types of violence including hyperviolence. With the ahistorical view of escalating violence and the denial of any rational legitimation by the sovereign as the actor of hyperviolence, the structure of trust and the contract system of democracy itself is also endangered. So the question is, how does one unmask the "sovereign" on his way to undermine legal relations already in his linguistic patterns, in his non-linguistic codes, and how can escalation be prevented by early detection? Keywords: violence, hyperviolence, criminal linguistics, Georges Bataille, sovereign. (shrink)

Considering the high impact strain that the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 pandemic has put on medical personnel worldwide, identifying means to alleviate stress on healthcare professionals and to boost their subjective and psychological wellbeing is more relevant than ever. This study investigates the extent to which the relationships between the status of working in healthcare and the subjective and psychological wellbeing are serially mediated by work recovery experiences and the need for recovery. Data were collected from 217 Romanian (...) employees using a cross-sectional design with self-report instruments, during the first stage of the nationwide lockdown. The results of the serial mediation analyses revealed that working in the medical field is indirectly related to subjective and psychological wellbeing through the following: mastery experiences and mastery experiences as an antecedent of the need for recovery. As such, our findings indicate that working in the medical field is, in fact, linked to healthcare professionals’ subjective and psychological wellbeing, and they provide some input on how recovery experiences and the need for recovery intervene in these relationships. Based on these findings, theoretical, methodological, and practical implications were suggested, and future research directions were proposed to maximize healthcare professionals’ wellbeing. (shrink)

No presente artigo pretendo apresentar a Autopoiesis, uma teoria formulada pelo biólogo chileno Humberto Maturana e pelo médico chileno Francisco Varela. Além de mostrar as similaridades entre o processo orgânico e o processo epistemológico, presentes nesta teoria, busco ressaltar a importância da Autopoiesis não somente no campo científico, como teoria epistemológica, mas também no campo ético e cultural, como uma teoria que ressalta desde a dinâmica interna do ser vivo, enquanto unidade, até a importância de sua interação com o mundo (...) em que vive. Assim, descrevo a formação do processo cognitivo através dos fundamentos autopoiéticos e de conceitos centrais, tais como: fronteira membranosa, metabolismo dinâmico, sistema operacionalmente fechado, acoplamento estrutural e deriva natural. A Autopoiesis demonstra que a experiência cognitiva do observador é intrínseca a sua estrutura biológica, ressaltando, assim, o papel do observador e questionando a validade de suas certezas sobre o que se propôs observar. A proposta deste trabalho será, portanto, trazer a discussão sobre a forma como conhecemos e sobre o processo de aprendizagem do homem e a influência de sua estrutura biológica e toda complexidade de fatores que estão envolvidos na extensa rede da vida que serão considerados aqui, fatores que são, antes de tudo, biológico-culturais. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 10, October 2024, Page 50-53.

I The Kantian notion of ‘affection’ is indeed problematic and obscure. In so far as the subject is finite and does not create the object of knowledge, the latter must always be somehow given. The passive faculty of sensibility makes it possible for the object to appear. But this receptive character of the subject correlates to some affection. Something affects us, and our sensibility receives this affection under the pure forms of space and time. The question that immediately arises is (...) what performs the action of affecting. And any answer, in the theoretical framework of the transcendental idealism, is always troubling. If we say that the thing in itself affects us, we are speaking about something that is not cognoscible. If we say that the object performs the action of affecting, we are considering that the sensation that is involved in every experience is, at the same time, a result of an affection produced by the object of experience. (shrink)

This paper addresses the following questions from the point of view of Nietzsche’s philosophy: What is the mind, and which kind of relationship does it hold to the body? Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to show that Nietzsche’s philosophy suggested a view of the mind that allows to outline an alternative stance to both mentalism and physicalism, as well as to both dualism and reductionism. It is argued that Nietzsche’s rehabilitation of the body as the specific seat of (...) the mind in opposition to the Cartesian supremacy of the Ego still is of a great interest for contemporary philosophy, since it is not equivalent either to a reversed form of Cartesian dualism or to a physicalist reductionism. It is argued that Nietzsche did restrict the concept of the mind but in order not to eliminate it, rather to “de-substantialise” it. As the body is described as “Leib-Organisation”, the mind becomes the course of various and manifold mental states that depend on a bodily basis. (shrink)