Abstract -/- In 1998, the Council for Science and Technology established the Bioethics Committee and asked its members to examine the ethical and legal aspects of human cloning. The Committee concluded in 1999 that human cloning should be prohibited, and, based on the report, the government presented a bill for the regulation of human cloning in 2000. After a debate in the Diet, the original bill was slightly modified and issued on December 6, 2000. In this (...) paper, I take a closer look at this process and discuss some of the ethical problems that were debated. Also, I make a brief analysis of the concept “the sprout of human life.” Not only people who object to human cloning, but also many of those who seek to promote research on human cloning admit that a human embryo is the sprout of human life and, hence, it should be highly respected. I also discuss the function of the language of utilitarianism, the language of skepticism, and religious language appeared in the discussion of human cloning in Japan. (shrink)

Human cloning is a main focus of current bioethical discussion. Involving the self-understanding of the human species, it has become one of the most debated topics in biomedical ethics, not only on the national, but also on the international level. This book brings together articles by bioethicists from several countries who address questions of human cloning within the context of different cultural, religious and regional settings against the background of globalizing biotechnology. It explores on a cross-cultural level (...) the problems and opportunities of global bioethics. (shrink)

Medicine; religious aspects; laws and legislations.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11.2 (2001) 205-209 [Access article in PDF] Bioethics Inside the Beltway Banning Human Cloning-Then What? Cynthia B. Cohen The public wonder and concern that accompanied the birth of Dolly, the cloned sheep, four years ago died down soon after her arrival. Little has been heard about human reproductive cloning since then in the public square. This silence was pierced recently when two (...) groups each announced its intention to clone a child from a human being within the next few years.The Raelians, a religious organization, disclosed in October 2000 that they had found a grieving American couple willing to pay $500,000 to clone their deceased child and that they would proceed with cloning in a secret laboratory within the United States. A few months later, an international consortium led by Pavos Zavos, Ph.D., a University of Kentucky emeritus professor of biology, and Severino Antinori, M.D., an Italian infertility specialist, declared that it intended to clone the first human within two years at an undisclosed location outside the United States. These announcements led Representative James Greenwood (R-PA), chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to convene a hearing on human cloning on 28 March 2001.Why did human reproductive cloning suddenly become of concern to the House of Representatives? What will the federal government do with regard to the development of human cloning at this point in time? And what should it do to address human cloning in the long-term? I will briefly highlight the major controversies that surfaced at the hearing and then consider the broader questions. Scientific Controversies The initial question of concern to the House subcommittee members was whether cloning science has now reached the point of application to humans. Scientists at the hearing offered widely diverging views about this. Zavos testified that only a small number of cloned animals has died after birth and declared that the key to avoiding impaired human clones is to engage in prenatal screening. Consequently, it is now safe to undertake human cloning, he maintained. He was supported in this view by Brigitte Boisselier, Ph.D., visiting assistant professor [End Page 205] of chemistry at Hamilton College and scientific director of the Raelians, who argued that human cloning would not give rise to the problems that have been encountered in nonhuman mammalian cloning.However, professor of veterinary medicine Mark Westhusin, Ph.D., of Texas A&M University, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology researcher Rudolf Jaenisch, Ph.D., maintained that the same sorts of problems that have appeared in nonhuman mammalian cloning would reappear in human cloning. Westhusin stated that mammals have incurred serious defects leading to spontaneous abortion and that mammalian newborns often display severe respiratory and circulatory problems. The most likely explanation for such abnormalities, Jaenisch hypothesized, is that in cloning, the genetic reprogramming that governs the way an organism develops must take place in a much shorter period of time than in coital or in vitro reproduction. This may result in faulty reprogramming leading to dysregulation of gene expression and consequent genetic defects in cloned animals. There is good reason to think that this also would occur in human cloning, Jaenisch maintained. Until reproductive cloning research has been carried out on several generations of primates and is better understood, he argued, human cloning should not be attempted. Even then, several generations of descendants of human clones would have to be observed before scientists could be sure that it would not have a destructive impact on humans. This process could take as long as a century. Ethical Controversy Bioethicists who testified focused on those aspects of the ethical controversy surrounding human cloning that are of particular interest to public policy makers. Thomas Murray, Ph.D., President of The Hastings Center and a member of NBAC, maintained that human cloning is still unsafe, as NBAC had predicted, and that, if carried out, would leave in its wake "damaged women, many dead fetuses, and children born with serious impairments." He expressed particular concern that couples suffering... (shrink)

What role should religion play in a religiously pluralistic liberal society? Public bioethics unavoidably raises this question in a particularly insistent fashion. As the 20 papers in this collection demonstrate, the issues are complex and multifaceted. The authors address specific and highly contested issues as assisted suicide, stem cell research, cloning, reproductive health, and alternative medicine as well as more general questions such as who legitimately speaks for religion in public bioethics, what religion can add to our understanding of (...) justice, and the value of faith-based contributions to healthcare. Christian (Catholic and Protestant), Jewish, Islamic, and Buddhist viewpoints are represented. The first book to focus on the interface of religion and bioethics, this collection fills a significant void in the literature. (shrink)

The Scottish scholar James McCosh was a champion of the Free church, a successful and much-published philosophy professor at Belfast for 16 years, and an energetic and innovative President of Princeton University from 1868 to 1888. The Religious Aspect of Evolution was published in 1888, and this second edition from 1890 took account of A. R. Wallace's latest work, Darwinism. McCosh, who already in Ireland had developed a 'theory of the universe conditioned by Christian revelation' was one of very (...) few clergymen in America who defended evolutionary theory. He impressed upon his students that while there seemed to be great truth in Darwin's theory, the work of the coming age must be to separate that truth from the error springing up around it. This would enable scholars to follow and even embrace science while also retaining their faith in the Bible. (shrink)

This article explores the religious dimensions of Confucianism during the Ly-Tran dynasties (1009-1400 AD) in Vietnam, a period marked by significant sociopolitical and cultural transitions. Initially introduced as a moral and ethical philosophy from China, Confucianism underwent a complex process of localization, blending with indigenous Vietnamese beliefs and practices as well as Buddhism and Taoism. Through historical records, literary works, and ritual practices documented in “The Complete Annals of Đại Việt” and other classical texts, this study delves into how (...) Confucianism not only served as a guiding principle for governance, education, and social norms but also manifested religious aspects that influenced spiritual and religious life in Vietnam. The religious aspects of Confucianism during this era are evident in several key areas. Firstly, the concept of Heaven (Tian) and the Mandate of Heaven played a crucial role in legitimizing royal authority, with rulers and Confucian scholars frequently invoking divine will to justify political actions and social order. This sacralization of monarchy underpinned by Confucian ideals facilitated the integration of Confucianism into Vietnamese spiritual life. Secondly, the incorporation of Confucian rituals and practices, such as the Heaven Worship Ceremony (Tế Giao) and the veneration of Confucius and other sages at the Temple of Literature, highlights the religious dimensions of Confucian practice, emphasizing reverence, filial piety, and the moral obligations of rulers and subjects alike. Moreover, the article discusses how Confucianism interacted with and was influenced by Buddhism and Taoism, leading to a syncretic religious landscape in Vietnam. This interaction is illustrated through the blending of Confucian principles with Buddhist and Taoist ideals, affecting notions of kingship, governance, and the cosmological order. In conclusion, the religious aspect of Confucianism during the Ly-Tran dynasties significantly contributed to the shaping of Vietnamese identity, governance, and cultural heritage. By examining the religious dimensions of Confucianism, this article provides a more nuanced understanding of its role in Vietnamese society, highlighting the complex interplay between philosophy, religion, and politics in historical Vietnam. (shrink)

The national hero of the present-day Albania is Skanderbeg’s father, Gjon (Yuvan) Kastrioti. Despite the fact that the Albanians tried to resist the Ottomans expeditions during the reign of Gjon, they were eventually defeated. As a result of this defeat by Sultan Murad II in 1423, Gjon was forced to give his four sons as captives. The youngest of his children was Skanderbeg, who together with three older brothers was given as captive due to the defeat by the Ottomans, had (...) to reside in the palace for many years. During this time, he had the opportunity to obtain a remarkable Ottoman education and to benefit from other privileges provided for them. It is obvious that the facilities provided by the Ottomans as well as the personal abilities and skills he gained in the Ottoman Empire enabled him to achieve successes in various fields. Therefore, he was able to be promoted to important positions within the Ottoman Empire. However, some of his demands were rejected and he became deprived from some of privileges granted to him due to the promises and incentives of the opponents of the Ottomans and some small victories resulting from his father's dominance in the direction of rebellion. During this rebellion against the Ottomans, they have received both material and spiritual aid Western powers as result the warm relations they enjoyed with the Western powers. In addition, these warm relations gave the opportunity to be acquainted with the Western culture. In the course of events, it can easily be said that Skanderbeg became a renowned figure not only in the Eastern culture but also in the Western culture. After his rebellion against the Ottomans, he denounced Islam and returned to his former Christian faith. There have always been controversies about the sect he adopted related to the Christian belief whether became a Catholic or Orthodox Christian. Although he had close ties with the Pope, the greatest enemy of the Ottoman Empire, his rebellions against the Ottomans did not originate from his religion.In this study, we appealed mostly to the daily reports of the priests of the time, primarily in Albanian and Turkish and English as well. In terms of Ottoman and Turkish - Albanian relations, the issue is a very important one and therefore has occasionally been evaluated in view of the historical perspective of religions. (shrink)

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1913 Edition.

In this essay, the author tries to show the religious aspect of Rawls's work using a condition of religiosity that he himself endorsed. Section 1 looks at the passage in which Rawls asserts his condition of religiosity. In section 2, the author argues that Cohen's and Nagel's observation itself rests on a religiosity condition. In section 3, he shows how Rawls argued that Kant satisfied the religiosity condition and why Rawls thought Kant's moral philosophy has “a religious aspect.” (...) Section 4 explains that justice as fairness as presented in TJ has a religious aspect as well. In section 5, the author asks whether the religious aspect of justice as fairness survives Rawls's political turn. The chapter concludes by observing that the significance Kant gives to the moral law and our acting from it has an obvious religious aspect, and that his text occasionally has a devotional character. (shrink)

Based on the concept of community, Kant's conception of religion may be connected, on my view, to the question of which mental attitude is suitable for the collective life of human society. It is possible to imagine a successful community, even if such a community does not exist in the empirical world, and to be oriented toward this ideal without ever being able to realize it. According to Kant, human moral self-understanding is developed by human reason, and this explains the (...) structural similarity between the secular republic and the Kingdom of God under the specific conditions of the enlightened consciousness of a person who thinks for herself. Thus the anthropological "fact": the self-understanding of the human being characterised by his faculty of reason. (shrink)

칸트 윤리학에서 도덕이 종교를 필요로 하는지에 대해서 크게 두 가지 해석이 가능하다. 첫째 해석은 칸트가 『도덕형이상학 기초놓기』나 『실천이성비판』과 같은 자신의 윤리학 저술에서 윤리학의 토대를 신이 아니라 인간 이성의 자율성에서 발견한 것을 근거로 칸트 윤리학을 세속적인 비종교적 윤리학으로 이해한다. 그러나 칸트 윤리학에 대한 다른 해석은 칸트가 『실천이성비판』 변증론에서 최고선의 실현 가능성 문제를 다루면서 최고선의 현세적 실현을 주장하는 에피쿠로스학파와 스토아학파의 윤리학을 비판하는 한편, 최고선의 내세적 실현을 주장하는 기독교 윤리학을 옹호하고 있다는 사실에 근거하여 칸트 윤리학을 종교적 윤리학으로 이해한다. 본 논문은 지금까지 많이 다루어지지는 (...) 않았지만 칸트 윤리학 연구를 위해 중요한 자료인 칸트의 『윤리학 강의』를 이용하여 칸트 윤리학 해석을 둘러싼 이 논란을 해결하려고 시도하였다. 자신의 다른 윤리학 저술들에서와 마찬가지로 칸트는 『윤리학 강의』에서 무엇이 도덕적으로 옳은 행위인지를 알기 위해서 신에 의존할 필요가 없음을 강조한다. 그러나 『윤리학 강의』에서 칸트는 도덕이 하나의 관념에 머무르지 않고 구속력을 갖기 위해서는, 도덕적 행위를 통해서 행복할 자격을 갖춘 사람이 실제로 행복을 희망할 수 있게 해주는 존재인 신에 대한 믿음이 필수적임을 동시에 강조한다. 우리가 칸트 윤리학을 이해할 때 도덕법의 근거가 신이 아니라 인간이성이라는 사실에만 초점을 맞춘다면 칸트 윤리학을 인간 중심의 세속적 윤리학으로 보는 것은 타당하다. 하지만 이러한 이해는 칸트 윤리학의 전체 모습이 아니라 일부만을 반영한 것임을 『윤리학 강의』를 통해 알 수 있다. (shrink)

Howard W. Jones, Jr.'s Personhood Revisited chronicles reproductive technology's debate-evoking history meanwhile exploring the ongoing moral dilemmas of the twenty-first century, including: personhood, in vitro fertilization, conjugal love, eugenics, cloning, stem cell research, and more. Balanced readings on each reproductive topic represent conflicting viewpoints from legal, religious, and scientific perspectives. And Jones' personal experiences, such as meetings with the Vatican, add a unique look into the highly political yet benevolent world of reproductive medicine. Author Howard W. Jones, Jr., (...) alongside Robert Edwards (winner of the Nobel Prize for Medicine 2010), fertilized the first human eggs in vitro. Jones and his wife, Georgeanna Seegar Jones, established the first in vitro fertilization program in the United States, which went on to develop America's first test tube baby in 1981. Book jacket. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d . The article is devoted to the Minnemystik of Hadewijch of Brabant in the XIII century. It deals with the genesis of Hadewijch's concept of Minne in its relation to the monastic Cistercian mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Saint-Thierry in the XII century and Beatrice of Nazareth in the XIII century. It also considers the conception of theologist and philosopher Richard of Saint-Victor in the XII century. Considering the (...) existing advances of researchers on Hadewijch's Minnemystik, since the XX century, this investigation especially focuses on the primary role of the secular tradition of minnesingers and trobairitz of the mid-XIII century in her texts. M e t h o d s . The main method of the article is a comparative analysis. It is used to find the common meaning of Minne in two traditions: secular and religious minnesingers. The historical-philosophical approach allows us to demonstrate the conceptual link between monastic theology in the XII–XIII centuries and Hadewijch's beguinal Minnemystik. R e s u l t s . The article sheds light on Hadewijch's concept of the Minne and stresses the primary role of the secular and religious conceptions of predecessors and contemporaries in Hadewijch's Minnemystik. C o n c l u s i o n . The author underlines that Hadewijch's concept of Minne comes from the secular tradition of minnesingers and, especially, trobairitz. It also derives from the XII-century male and female mystic theology, which follows Augustine. Thus, the concept of the Minne is deeply connected with the notion of Amor and the tradition of "courtly love", and with Caritas and the tradition of "pure love". K e y w o r d s : Hadewijch's concept of the Minne, Caritas, trobairitz, minnesingers, troubadours, Minnemystik, Unio Mystica, William of Saint-Thierry, Beatrice of Nazareth, Richard of Saint-Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux. (shrink)

Translated by Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith. Excerpted from Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy , (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2012). THE END TIMES OF PHILOSOPHY The phrase “end times of philosophy” is not a new version of the “end of philosophy” or the “end of history,” themes which have become quite vulgar and nourish all hopes of revenge and powerlessness. Moreover, philosophy itself does not stop proclaiming its own death, admitting itself to be half dead (...) and doing nothing but providing ammunition for its adversaries. With our sights set on clearing up this nuance, we differentiate philosophy as an institutional entity, and the philosophizability of the World and History, of “thought-world,” which universalizes the narrow concept of philosophy and that of “capital.” We also give an eschatological and apocalyptical cause to this end, of “times” or “ages” rather than those of philosophical practice. Last but not least, it is the Future itself in the performativity of its ultimatum that determines this end times, reversing these times from the Identity the Future accorded to it, withdrawing the thought-world from the lie of its death. Why this style of axioms and oracles, these more or less subtle distinctions, old and debased, with an appeal to the ultimata , to end times and last words? We fight to give, parallel to the concept of Hell, its new theoretical position, for its philosophical return and its non-philosophical transformation. No more so than any other word, Hell is not a metaphor here, just the Principle of Sufficient World. Every man, no doubt, has his “hell” readily available, connivance, control, conformism, domestication, schooling, alienation, extermination, exploitation, oppression, anxiety, etc. We have our little list that the Contemporaries established in the previous century in the same way one used to construct lists of virtues and vices or honors and wealth. They invented it for us without knowing it, for us-the-Futures who have as our responsibility to invent its use. In the Christian and Gnostic tradition, the struggle of the End Times takes place “on earth.” The most sophisticated of believers have it taking place in Heaven as well, above all in Heaven. The various kinds of gnosis imagine infinite falls and vertiginous highs, the vertigo of salvation. On Earth as in Heaven, a hell is available. The Marxists have the law of profit and the control of production, the class struggle Capital imposes on man. The Nietzscheans, the dull grumble of the struggle in the foundations of World and History, the domestication of man, the society of control. The phenomenologists, the capture of being, the most superficial amongst them, the age of suspicion. But all of these “hells” are taken from World, History, Society, and Religion. What we call Hell is no longer of the order of these specific and total intra-worldly generalities, it is both more singular and more universal, no longer being at all of the same order, it is the determinant Identity of these small hells strung out through history but unified here in the name of the last Humaneity. It is even found within the French idiom for hell [ enfer ], en-fer literally means “in-irons.” We are as much “in-irons” as we are “alive” [ en-Vie ]. We believe in Hell but as non-philosophers and it is even because we are non-philosophers that we can believe in it outside of any sort of religion. Hell is less mythological than ideological, it combines philosophizability with universal capital. Under what form? A single term could work for them without being a metaphor or something they would participate in by analogy, a more innovative and conjectural term than control, more universal than profit. It would denote the growing and permanent extortion of a surplus-value of communication, of speed and of urgency in change, in productivity and in work, in the pressure of images and slogans. It would be worse than solicitation, more tenacious than capture, more active and persecutory than control, softer and more insidious than a frontal attack, just as perverse as questioning and accusation, less brutal and offensive than extermination, less ritualized than inquisition, it would be soft and dispersed, instantaneous and vicious, it would be a crime without declared violence. Collusion and conformism, it would be afraid to show itself. Related to rumor, from which it borrows its infinite and tortuous ways. It is harassment. As a modernized form of Hell, perhaps harassment has a long future in front of it, of innocent torture, slow assassination, in short the fall, but radical with no way of recovering and which tolerates only salvation. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PAST OF NON-PHILOSOPHY Non-philosophy is thus Man as the utopian identity of the philosophical form of the World, a utopia destined to transform it. We still have to understand these equations, in particular that of the being-uni-versed from Man, and this book adheres to this by re-exposing non-philosophy in a different way via one of its new possibilities. It uses this opportunity to once again take up formulations that lead to objections answering certain external critics, as well as revisiting diverging interpretations specific to non-philosophers. A portion of this book is devoted to going through these theories via a strict or “lengthy” presentation of non-philosophy, and its defense against more expeditious solutions. This work of rectification is the occasion, merely the occasion, for refocusing non-philosophy on Man (the “Man-in-person,” “Humaneity”), and in a more innovative manner, on its utopian vocation established since the book Future Christ . As for this “occasion,” it is quite obvious. A school of posture, not to say a school of thought, supposes a minimum of closure from the most liberating of knowledge, a heritage, its utilization, and its no less certain dispersal. Within its development, a variety of interpretations will no doubt appear, deviations that are as much normalizations, and a struggle against this multiplication of divergent tendencies. These are perhaps not inevitable evils, especially here, merely a normal development according to the twisting paths of history. But the problem is made worse by the fact that this school of non-philosophers is that of utopia. Not the former attempts devoted to commenting on the worst authoritarian and criminal forms of the past and the present, but utopia as the determinant principle for human life, or to put it another way, of the Future as an irreducible presupposition of (for) thinking the World and History. Non-philosophers are engaged in an aleatory navigation between the respect for the most rigorous utopia, whose rules are not that of the reproductive imagination but those from the Future determining imagination itself, as well as the temptations, diversions, and remorse of history. Little by little, we will begin to understand that the Future as we understand it no longer has any temporal consistency or positive content, without being an empty form or a nothingness, but that it is foreclosed to past and present History, just as it is foreclosed to the place of places, the World, and that it is the only method for establishing the practice of thinking in a non-imaginary instance. Because it is the World and History that are imaginary and have a terrible materiality, it is not necessarily utopia. We will overlap two objectives here: the defense of non-philosophy against the (non-) philosophers that we are, only occasionally, and the introduction of philosophy to a rigorous future. Together they set out to definitively render, without any possible return to philosophical conformism or towards the facilities of the past and present, the non-philosophical enterprise understood as utopia or uchronia. Imagination and speculation, left to themselves and thus undistinguished, are quite good for participating in the grand game of History but have little value or worse for the Future which is unimaginable and unintelligible and must be maintained as such. MAN-IN-PERSON AS SUSPENSION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHORA The point where philosophical resistance is concentrated is without a doubt the invention of the Name-of-Man, first name, oracular as much as axiomatic, of the determining cause for the non-philosophical posture. And that which concentrates the differends is the style of non-philosophy as identity that possesses the dual aspect, of discipline and of the oeuvre, of the theorem and of the oracle. But the real difficulty in understanding the simplicity of non-philosophy is profoundly hidden in the depths of philosophy itself. Because philosophy, from Parmenides to Derrida, even Levinas, continues to be a divided gesture, without a veritable immanence, transforming its thematic contents of transcendence in also forgetting to transform the operative transcendence in the element from which the ontology of surface is established which we will call, in memory of Plato, the chorismos. The general effect of the chora literally gives place to philosophy, demanding binding and sutures to which we will once and for all “oppose” the Man-in-person, his power of cloning, and his future being. All philosophy contains a hinter-philosophy in which it deploys its operations and weaves its tradition like an understudy of a topographical nature and in the best of cases being itself topological. Philosophy as well consists of two levels, its pre-ontological operative conditions on the one hand, and its superficial theme on the other, it too has its presupposed, but is not aware of it or erases it within the unity of appearance named Logos. Rightly, the Logos, and its flash or lightning nature, possesses a “dark precursor,” the chora, which is as much a virtual image, and philosophy, dazzled by its own lightning flash, seems to completely forget about it at the same time it sets itself up within it. Non-philosophy risks taking this same path, of confusing what it believes to be the real with its phantom double, contenting itself to working on the thematic level of philosophy, not its surface objects and its idle chatter (we stopped talking about this a long time ago and in any case they are merely simple materials for inducing a work of transformation), but the transcendence-form of its objects. In the end it risks, through precipitation, taking back up the heritage of philosophy, a heritage of a misunderstood presupposed, even more profound than the play of transcendences. This is what the imperative of the radicality of immanence meant, to treat immanence in an immanent manner, not to make a new object out of it. And from here we get non- (philosophy) and its refusal of the Platonic chorismos , symbol of all abstraction, and thus all transcendental appearance. There are no illusions. The message will leave a heritage in tattered pieces and interpretations. But it was difficult not to dispute the differend to its core. There will be complete confusion of the multiple, possible, and necessary effectuations of non-philosophy with its interpretations. The non-philosophical or human freedom of philosophical effectuation and the philosophical freedom of interpretation. Effectuations demand non-philosophy to return to zero from the point of view of its philosophical material and thus also but within these limits the formulation of its axioms , but in no way providing from the outset divergent interpretations of the aforementioned axioms. They are divergent because they do not take into account the material from which these axioms are derived within non-philosophy, and because they do not see themselves as symptoms of another vision of the World. The utterances of non-philosophy are not mathematical theorems and pure axioms, they merely have a mathematical aspect . They are, by their extraction or origin, mathematical and transcendental. And by their determined function in-Real, within non-philosophy, they are identically in-the-last-Humaneity entities which have an aspect of an axiom and an aspect of interpretation (or an oracular aspect as we say) that attempts (sometimes it is ourselves who provide the occasion) to isolate and transform, in complete freedom of interpretation. There will be an opportunity to complain about the complex character of the language of non-philosophy, an idiom saturated with classical references, sophisticated in a contemporary way. Its freedom of decision up against the whole of philosophy demands these effects of “complication” and “privatization,” as the saying goes. But it also demands fighting against the drift [ dérive ] of the pedagogical-all and the mediatic-all that leads philosophy into the shallow depths of opinion, which is the site of its impossible death. The noble idealism of “pop-philosophy” has been consumed into a “philo-reality;” against this we propose philo-fiction. Parricide, which is at the bottom of these interpretations and which we can judge as being quite fertile, although it has informed tradition, only takes place once or within one lone meaning. In regards to Parmenides, it was possible; Plato introduced the Other as non-being and language, bringing into existence the philosophical system of the World, but is it possible to repeat it again with the same fecundity in regards to non-philosophy, this time in introducing (non) religion or (non) art, still mixing them without taking into account this mixture, alternatively as a philosophical or religious resentment? If philosophy begins via a crime, it is no doubt obliged to continue down similar pathways, to the effect that the crimes of philosophy, once the founding crime has been committed, are a reaction of self-defense. It is undoubtedly from this that we get Marx’s declaration that history begins by tragedy and repeats itself or ends in farce. The preservation of rigor and fecundity is, in every respect, a psychologically difficult task within a theory such as non-philosophy. Having posited an essential objective of liberation in regards to philosophy and its services, one has often understood this objective as an authorization of providing particular interpretations of its axioms and ends up obliterating their scope. This ends up confusing, on one hand, two kinds of freedoms in regards to non-philosophy, the freedom of its interpretations and the freedom of its effectuations. On the other hand, any defense of “principles” against precipitated interpretations is immediately taxed with a will to orthodoxy, a prohibitive objection when we are dealing with, as is the case here, a heretical theory of thought. Nevertheless, it is time to stop confusing heresy as the cause of thought with an ideology of heresies, which is certainly not at all our object, but rather a form of normalization. As for the “disciplinary” aspect, which is not the only aspect, it demands something other than philosophical “answers to objections,” a precision in the definition and use of its procedures in the formation of utterances, since non-philosophy is neither a supplementary doctrine interior to philosophy nor a vision of the world but one whose priority is a “vision of Man,” or rather Man as “vision” that implies a theory and a practice of philosophy. In the end, struggle is only one aspect of non-philosophy, not its whole or telos, struggle coming only from its materiality. In particular, if the discipline of non-philosophy is inseparable from struggle, it is not a question of reducing the monomaniacal obsession of its “marching orders.” This would reduce its complexity and kill its indivisibility, deploying it in a “long march” and a form of Maoization whose philosophical presuppositions no longer have any pertinence here, a case of the One and the Two, which are now cloned and no longer tied together. More generally, non-philosophy is a complex thought composed of a multitude of aspects, which is to say, unilateral interpretations, of a philosophical origin but reduced by their determination in-the-last-instance . The “liberalism” of non-philosophy is merely one of the aspects of which it is capable, not an essence. Similarly, it is only capable of having a “Maoist” aspect. Let us generalize. The weakness of non-philosophy is due to a specific cause, the determination-in-the-last-Humaneity of a subject for the World. Everything that has a right to the philosophical city can be said about it in turn and in a retaliatory mode since Man contributes nothing of himself that Man takes from the World. We can consider non-philosophy as being pretentious, absurd, idealistic, empty, materialistic, formalistic, contradictory, modern, post-modern, Zen, Buddhist, Marxist; it endures or tolerates, perhaps “appeals” to, or at least renders possible, sarcasms, ironies, and insults without even talking about the misunderstandings, partly for the same reason as psychoanalysis. All of this goes beyond simple “deviations.” They are its aspects, which is to say, its “unilateral” philosophical interpretations in both senses of the word, being either sufficient coming from the mouth of philosophers, or reduced to their absolute dimension of sufficiency and totality in the mouths of non-philosophers, and both times due to the weakness and strength of Man-in-person as their determination only in-the-last-instance. The non-philosopher is certainly not a Saint Paul fantasizing about a new Church. The non-philosopher is either a (Saint) Sebastian whose flesh is pierced with as many arrows as there are Churches, or a Christ persecuted by a Saint Paul. What is engaged in here is the practice of retaliation. A negative rule of the non-philosophical ethics of outlawed discussion by way of argumentation (the sufficient is you, the orthodox one is always you, you are the fashionable one, and when a master you are someone else) that is founded on the confusion of effectuations of non-philosophy and of its overall interpretations. Retaliation is the law but as with any too-human law, it must acquire a dimension that displaces it, or rather emplaces it and takes away its authority but not all of its effectiveness. If the non-philosopher is only authorized by himself, which is to say by philosophy but limited by the Real-of-the-last-instance, its critique of other non-philosophers can merely be retaliatory under the same conditions, only by the Real limited in-the last-instance. THE TREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SAINTLINESS The thematic horizon or material of these debates is in the relationships between philosophy, religion as gnosis, and non-philosophy. It is inevitable, regarding non-philosophers in general (whether they are non-philosophers by name or simply its neighbors) that we often end up evoking Marx’s Holy Family and imagining, arranged on the neighboring branches of the tree of philosophy and annexed, sometimes abusively, to non-philosophy, authors who would quite evidently and quite rightly refuse this label. So it is that we find, for example, a Saint Michel, a Saint Alain, a Saint Gilles 1 without even mentioning the youngest who aspire as well to the freedom of “saintliness” and who make their muted voices heard here. If there is a Holy Family of non-philosophers, it extends completely beyond these three, provided that the sectarian spirit can save us. This book is organized in the following manner: To begin, in order to recall the essential part of the problematic, we have organized a Summary of Non-Philosophy , a vade-mecum of notions and basic problems, in a classical style. Secondly, there is Clarifications On the Three Axioms of Non-Philosophy , designed to posit their proper use as much as to elucidate their meaning. Thirdly, an analysis of Philosophizability and Practicity , both being extreme constituents of philosophical material or the contents of the third axiom. Fourthly, the heart of this work: Let us Make a Tabula Rasa of the Future or of Utopia as Method . Fifthly, we have a theoretical outline of a non-institutional utopia, The International Organization of Non-Philosophy, L’Organisation Non-Philosophique Internationale, (ONPHI) already created in practice but under the conditions of possibility and functioning from which here we put into question “de jure,” thus not without a perplexity concerning “facts,” in any case, without the capability of “getting to the bottom of things.” Sixthly, an essay characterizing The Right and the Left of Non-Philosophy , a brief topology of several philosophizing and normalizing positions of proponents or tenants of this problematic. Seventhly, Rebel in the Soul: A Theory of Future Struggle , a systematic discussion starting from a confrontation of non-philosophical gnosis and non-religious gnosis to the extent that they pose, posed or perhaps still will pose themselves as rivals to non-philosophy in a mixture of fidelity and infidelity. Despite the fact that it can also be read as putting non-philosophy into perspective: it pits against a standard Platonism two contemporary appropriations of Gnosticism. On the basis of the paradigm of Man who never ceases to come as the Future-in-person, each one of these moments strives to reestablish not the “true” non-philosophy and its orthodoxy, but the minimal conditions to respect in order to allow for its maximum fecundity. And in order to bring about one of the last possibilities of its development, making explicit Humaneity as a utopia-for-the-World. In introducing these considerations in the form of a “testament” and “ultimatum,” we want to indicate two things: First, that this is the last time we will intervene in order to caution non-philosophers against the temptation of returning and looking backwards towards philosophy. Only a disillusioned nostalgia for the former World and its traditions barely remain permissible to us.… Secondly, that non-philosophy is also a sort of ultimatum for considering one’s life and transforming one’s thought from the perspective of a uni-version rather than a conversion. Man as future is this ultimatum in action, not an impatient self-proclaimed genius, and philosophy is his testament. It is obviously the ultimatum that determines this testament as “old” with a view towards a life that is, itself, non-testamentary. In and of itself, the “old” can never bear a veritable eschaton. Thus, this book intersects according to the logic of this paradigm, under the sign of the ultimate or “last” as future, philosophy as testament and cautionary note for maintaining the non-philosophical oeuvre as “future” or “utopian.” We will see that between these two dimensions it cradles a theory of struggle. In the end, this book envisions non-philosophers in multiple ways. It inevitably sees them as subjects of knowledge, most often academics insofar as life in the world demands, but above all as close relatives of three great human types. The analyst and political militant are quite obvious, for non-philosophy is close to psychoanalysis and Marxism insofar as it transforms the subject in transforming philosophy. Here again, one must have a sense not of certain nuances but of aspects (of the interpretations, albeit unilateralized) and not in order to construct a simple proletarization or militarization of thought as theory. To be rigorous, rather than authoritarian or spiteful, is its task. And lastly, non-philosophy is a close relative of the spiritual but definitely not the spiritualist. Those who are spiritual are not at all spiritualists, for the spiritual oscillate between fury and tranquil rage, they are great destroyers of the forces of Philosophy and the State, which are united under the name of Conformism. They haunt the margins of philosophy, gnosis, mysticism, science fiction and even religions. Spiritual types are not only abstract mystics and quietists; they are heretics for the World. The task is to bring their heresy to the capacity of utopia, and their utopia to the capacity of the paradigm. NOTES We will recognize allusions, and sometimes references, to closely related or distant themes, but which are related, in the work of Michel Henry, Alain Badiou and via the representative of “non-religious” gnosis of a Platonic origin, in Gilles Grelet. It goes without saying that these discussions are current and local, neither concerning the ensemble of doctrines nor prejudging the eventual evolution of certain amongst them. This concerns defining certain proximities with non-philosophy (rather than adversaries which in some sense they are) and typological and emblematic differends (rather than conflicts with a certain author). (shrink)

The ArgumentMuslims share with others both the interest in and the concern about genetic engineering. Naturally their reactions and views stem from general Islamic dogma and from Islamic medical ethics, but they are not unaware of Western scientific data. Particularly relevant is the Islamic religious prohibition against “changing what Allah has created.” Muslim muftis try to offer practical solutions for individuals. Islamic law is concerned about maintaining pure lineage. Consanguineous matings are very common, but induced abortions are usually ruled (...) out. Cloning has reawakened among Muslims an old debate over the positive as well as hazardous aspects of genetic engineering. (shrink)

Religion is intrinsically social, and hence irretrievably organizational, although organization is often seen as the darker side of the religious experience--power, routinization, and bureaucracy. Religion and secular organizations have long received separate scholarly scrutiny, but until now their confluence has been little considered. This interdisciplinary collection of mostly unpublished papers is the first volume to remedy the deficit. The project grew out of a three-year inquiry into religious institutions undertaken by Yale University's Program on Non-Profit Organizations and sponsored (...) by the Lilly Endowment. The scholars who took part in this effort weree challenged to apply new perspectives to the study of religious organizations, especially that strand of contemporary secular organizational theory known as "New Institutionalism." The result was this groundbreaking volume, which includes papers on various aspects of such topics as the historical sources and patterns of U.S. religious organizations, contemporary patterns of denominational authority, the congregation as an organization, and the interface between religious and secular institutions and movements. The contributors include an interdisciplinary mix of scholars from economics, history, law, social administration, and sociology. (shrink)

Religion is among the most powerful factors shaping attitudes toward human reproductive cloning. This article explores this influence with both quantitative and qualitative data from a major online questionnaire study; Survey2001; that was sponsored by the National Geographic Society and the National Science Foundation. The interpretations offered in this article are based in the New Paradigm theory of religion; that stresses the capacity of religion to resist the secularizing influence of science. The controversy over cloning in part illustrates (...) the possibility of heated future conflict between religion and science. The views expressed here are those of the author; and do not necessarily reflect those of the journal's editors; nor of the two organizations that sponsoredSurvey2001. (shrink)

The ability of medical science to clone and perhaps even predetermine characteristics of certain species conflicts dramatically with many claims of the religious establishment. Opening with a description of various developments in plant, animal, and human genetics, Made in Whose Image? highlights the progress genetic research has achieved, its future promise, and its social impact. The developments are analyzed from the perspective of Christian ethics, as expounded by Roman Catholic and Protestant theorists, to give an overview of crucial ethical (...) issues. In reviewing the advances of genetic research, noted religion and ethics professor Thomas A. Shannon covers general ethical themes, such as the value of life, materialism, freedom, individuality, the concept of nature, and health and disease. In addition, he discusses problems in genetic engineering and misconceptions of the church. Shannon explores prenatal diagnosis, gene therapy, genes and behavior, freedom and responsibility, and the Human Genome Project. The book concludes with a powerful and groundbreaking methodological discussion of how to approach ethical problems in genetic engineering. (shrink)

Is it permissible to use a human embryo in stem cell research, or in general as a means for benefit of others? Acknowledging each embryo as an object of moral concern, Louis M.Guenin argues that it is morally permissible to decline intrauterine transfer of an embryo formed outside the body, and that from this permission and the duty of beneficence, there follows a consensus justification for using donated embryos in service of humanitarian ends. He then proceeds to show how this (...) justification commands assent even within moral and religious views commonly thought to oppose embryo use. Beneath his moral reasoning lies a carefully constructed metaphysical foundation incorporating accounts of the ontology of development, embryos, and species. He also incisively discusses nonreprocloning, reprocloning, ectogenesis, and related scientific frontiers. This compelling philosophical study will interest all concerned to understand virtue and obligation in the relief of suffering. (shrink)

Introduction. The article analyzes the problem of memory of the Great Patriotic War in the story “Quarry” by the Belarusian writer Vasil Bykov. The memory of the War, as the authors of the article demonstrate, has special qualities and characteristics for those who participated in it, for those who really want to remember the War and really remember it. The purpose of the study. The paper shows how it is possible to interpret the phenomenon of memory in mythological and (...) class='Hi'>religious modes based on the material of V. Bykov’s novel “The Quarry”. Methods. The article uses the phenomenological method of A. Augustine and M. Heidegger, which leads to the existential time series of the “inner man”, as well as the method of creative hermeneutics, which allows to trace stable semantic structures behind the artistic canvas of V. Bykov’s text. The scientific novelty of the research. The mythological aspect of memory returns the characters to the point and event of the “beginning”, in which the formation of an integral self-aware personality took place, into an ontological event constituting the foundation of human identification. Such an event is a tragic, existential event. This event remains relevant in memory, not transient, not disappeared, and determines the characteristics of the subjectmemory all his life. This aspect of memory is opposed to “historical time”, according to which the past has already passed in memory; one should live and think today-the present and the future. The religious aspect of the story’s memory, as interpreted by the authors of the article, lies in the importance of memory, which it has in overcoming the power of time. Based on Augustine’s analysis, proposed by him in Confessions, the authors bring together the logic of V. Bykov’s memory research in this story and the reasoning of Bishop Hippo. Results. Memory endows the events of the past with living qualities of the present time and, thus, memory as a “memory of the sacrifice-ransom”, on the one hand, constantly encourages a Christian believer to think about death, and on the other hand, it is also an instrument of victory over it. In the matter of salvation, a religious person must remember himself, his deeds/offenses, his loved ones, the sacrifice of those and the One who redeemed this life and life in general with his death. In popular culture, in the religious worldview, in the historical attitude to life, such an attitude to memory is denied and causes misunderstanding. Hence, the attitude to the memory of the War in V. Bykov’s work seems outdated, archaic and irrelevant, which the authors of this article disagree with. Conclusions. The authors of the article conclude that the position of the writer front-line soldier V. Bykov in relation to the memory of the War is the position of “paradoxical evidence” and this position allows the author to really, most reliably and psychologically accurately describe from the “inanimate world” that area of the dead, terrible, inhuman that War creates and produces. And it turns out that it is necessary to remember this and think about it in order to be truly alive. (shrink)

The prospect of replication of human beings through genetic manipulation has engendered one of the most controversial debates about reproduction in our society. Ideology is clearly influencing the direction of research and legislation on human cloning, which may present one of the greatest existential challenges to the meaning of creation. In this article, I argue that, in view of the possibility that human cloning and other emerging technologies could enhance physical and cognitive abilities, there is a need for (...) a different way of thinking about life, new technologies and creation. New scientific discoveries require a shift in the way psychology takes responsibility to help individuals and society. Today, psychology needs to follow the progress that humans are taking toward a transhuman stage of development as a transition to a later posthuman stage. (shrink)

Starting as a scientific presentation of the phenomenon of cloning, in which etymology, the definitions and some already classical examples are emphasized, this paper actually focuses on a less discussed perspective in nowadays debates on cloning. Thus, the paper aims at showing which are (if any) the mythical-religious structures of cloning, certainly without ignoring the social consequences, the advantages and disadvantages and the juridical effects of cloning. Discussing Mircea Eliadeís novella Les trois graces, the purpose (...) of explaining the subtle reactivation of ancient mythical-religious phantasms by the means of a contemporary scientific experiment such as cloning is reached. (shrink)

Leading scholars examine religious and philosophical dimensions of the Chinese classic known as the Daodejing or Laozi.

This paper is concerned with the centrality of aspect seeing in Wittgenstein's philosophy, with some analogies between religious beliefs and aspect seeing, and with the implications of these analogies for the question of the justification of religious beliefs. If belief in God is neither a hypothesis nor a regular perceptual belief but rather a type of aspect seeing, then the kinds of proofs and justifications that are applicable to it would have to engage the non-believer in a manner (...) that would help her experience the dawning of a new aspect. This is why the standard philosophical proofs for theism, even when accepted as valid, are likely to be unsuccessful in bringing about faith. (shrink)

The relevance of the study of the problem of Christian axiology is due to the growing interest in religion and the associated change in world outlook and values ​​in contemporary Ukrainian society. The study of religious values ​​is caused by the urgent problem of finding universal moral values ​​of social development and clarifying the content, structure and nature of their functioning. The scientific study of religious values ​​is also relevant because this problem is closely linked to the value (...) aspects of political life. Christian values ​​are one of the most important factors influencing the formation and development of Ukrainian culture. (shrink)

This article discusses foundations and particularities of the complex approach to researches of processes and phenomena of reception of inogenetic cultural and religious elements. Based on the conception of "comprehending questioning", which, according to Martin Heidegger, is a "ground" for understanding, the author builds a methodologic scheme of the complex approach, which serves to provide a sufficient heuristical minimum in perception of referred subject of research by searching for the answers to the basic issues of scientific philosophical interest. Emphasizing (...) the role of the subject as an efficient cause in processes of cultural-religious syncretism the author focuses on importance of research of his intentions which is expressed verbally, graphically or actively. This task necessitates to differentiate exterior and interior aspects of process or phenomenon being studied. Representing a subjective world as an original place for implementation of syncretization the author gives reasons for expediency of the research of worldview paradigms and dominating idea of subject of reception using not only motivational-targeted analysis but also existential one. A complex research of subject's world relationship, his ontological, epistemological, axiological and praxeological affirmations and social, economic, political and cultural environment enhances the understanding of exogenous and endogenous factors which develop his extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Based on the interpretation of cultural norms, principles and imperatives, various degrees of subjects' readiness to accomplish or maintain receptions of inogenic elements allow to identify an analytical category of subjective "bounds of inclusivity" and make it possible to develop three-part classification of receptions, highlighting its separational, alternation and fusional types. Taking into consideration that receptions often operate as no final goal but as an implementer of more extensive plans of achieving one or another goal, the author also offers to distinguish strategy and tactics of receptions. Therefore, a process of reception is presenting as consisting of a range of aspects or steps, the consideration of which constitutes the content of suggested methodological "algorithm" for researching the processes and phenomena of reception of inogenic cultural or religious elements within the framework of the complex approach to research. (shrink)