This book examines the issue of rational cooperation, especially cooperation between people with conflicting moral commitments. The first part considers how the two main aspects of cooperation - the choice by a group of a particular cooperative scheme and the decision by each member to contribute to that scheme - can be understood as guided by reason. The second part explores how the activity of reasoning itself can take a cooperative form. The book is distinctive in offering an account of (...) what people can accomplish by reasoning together, of the role of deliberation in democratic decision making, and of the negotiation of the proper use of concepts. Presenting for the first time a detailed analysis of the general problem of cooperation and collective reasoning between people with different moral commitments, this book will be of particular interest to philosophers of the social sciences and to students in political science, sociology and economics. (shrink)

Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if an aggregation rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for an aggregation rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective rationality. It is shown that given the Arrovian axioms other than collective rationality, a dictatorship arises if and only if decisiveness coherence (...) is satisfied. Moreover, we introduce weak versions of decisive coherence and examine these implications. (shrink)

Individual rational action consists of (i) knowing what you want, (ii) taking proper steps to approach what you want as closely as possible, within the confines of the law. This one can learn, although some people are more skilled in it than others. Modern democracies are set up in such a way that they leave as much room as possible for individual rational action. Education for citizenship is sometimes taken to be: getting young citizens acquainted with the legal possibilities for (...) maximizing their individual interests. How about collective rational action? Game theory shows that if people engage in individual rational action, the common good suffers. This is known as ‘the tragedy of the commons’. It was also known in Antiquity: ”What is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it” (Aristotle). To understand the issues involved we will analyse the notions of ”common knowledge”, ”individual commitment” and ”collective intention”. (shrink)

Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such (...) an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for joint action.The people engaged in a game of strategy form a group, and the combination of their acts yields a collective act. If their collective act is rational, it constitutes a solution to their game. A theory of collective rationality yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium standard for cooperative games requires that agents pursue only incentives that provide sufficient reasons to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium-standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts.By extending the theory of rationality to groups, this book reveals the characteristics that make an act evaluable for rationality and the way rationality's evaluation of an act responds to the type of control its agent exercises over the act. The book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions. (shrink)

This book examines the issue of rational cooperation, especially cooperation between people with conflicting moral commitments. The first part considers how the two main aspects of cooperation - the choice by a group of a particular cooperative scheme and the decision by each member to contribute to that scheme - can be understood as guided by reason. The second part explores how the activity of reasoning itself can take a cooperative form. The book is distinctive in offering an account of (...) what people can accomplish by reasoning together, of the role of deliberation in democratic decision making, and of the negotiation of the proper use of concepts. Presenting for the first time a detailed analysis of the general problem of cooperation and collective reasoning between people with different moral commitments, this book will be of particular interest to philosophers of the social sciences and to students in political science, sociology and economics. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, (...) transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided. (shrink)

Collective rationality in its ordinary sense is rationality’s extension to groups. It does not entail efficiency by definition. Showing that it entails efficiency requires a normative argument. Game theorists treating cooperative games generally assume that collective rationality entails efficiency, but formulating the reasoning that leads individuals to efficiency, and verifying the rationality of its steps, presents challenging philosophical issues. This paper constructs a framework for addressing those issues and reaches some preliminary results about the (...) prospects of rational agents achieving efficiency in coalitional games. It concludes that only under strong idealizations does collective rationality entail efficiency. (shrink)

This paper contends that a Kantian universalizability constraint on theories of practical reason in conjunction with the possibility of collective rational agents entails the surprisingly strong conclusion that no fully agent‐relative theory of practical reason can be sound. The basic point is that a Kantian universalizability constraint, the thesis that all reasons for action are agent‐relative and the possibility of collective rational agents gives rise to a contradiction. This contradiction can be avoided by either rejecting Kantian universalizability, the (...) possibility of collective rational agents, or the tenability of a fully agent‐relative theory of practical reason; we cannot have all three. (shrink)

The economic crisis is also a crisis for economic theory. Most analyses of the evolution of the crisis invoke three themes, contagion, networks and trust, yet none of these play a major role in standard macroeconomic models. What is needed is a theory in which these aspects are central. The direct interaction between individuals, firms and banks does not simply produce imperfections in the functioning of the economy but is the very basis of the functioning of a modern economy. This (...) book suggests a way of analysing the economy which takes this point of view. The economy should be considered as a complex adaptive system in which the agents constantly react to, influence and are influenced by, the other individuals in the economy. In such systems which are familiar from statistical physics and biology for example, the behaviour of the aggregate cannot be deduced from the behaviour of the average, or "representative" individual. Just as the organised activity of an ants’ nest cannot be understood from the behaviour of a "representative ant" so macroeconomic phenomena should not be assimilated to those associated with the "representative agent". This book provides examples where this can clearly be seen. The examples range from Schelling’s model of segregation, to contributions to public goods, the evolution of buyer seller relations in fish markets, to financial models based on the foraging behaviour of ants. The message of the book is that coordination rather than efficiency is the central problem in economics. How do the myriads of individual choices and decisions come to be coordinated? How does the economy or a market, "self organise" and how does this sometimes result in major upheavals, or to use the phrase from physics, "phase transitions"? The sort of system described in this book is not in equilibrium in the standard sense, it is constantly changing and moving from state to state and its very structure is always being modified. The economy is not a ship sailing on a well-defined trajectory which occasionally gets knocked off course. It is more like the slime described in the book "emergence", constantly reorganising itself so as to slide collectively in directions which are neither understood nor necessarily desired by its components. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 1, Page 205, March 2012.

McMahon's connections between collective reasoning and collective action are real and important. I suspect that they do not go deep enough, and that far more that we usually classify as individual is in fact collective.

This commentary extends the target article's useful concepts to consider collective instances of representational exchange. When groups collectively rationalize their actions, entire networks of beliefs and desires can be created and maintained in the form of shared moral narratives and system-justifying ideologies. These collective rationalization cases illustrate how adaptive advantages can come at the expense of the truth.

The impossibility results in judgement aggregation show a clash between fair aggregation procedures and rational collective outcomes. In this paper, we are interested in analysing the notion of rational outcome by proposing a proof-theoretical understanding of collective rationality. In particular, we use the analysis of proofs and inferences provided by linear logic in order to define a fine-grained notion of group reasoning that allows for studying collective rationality with respect to a number of logics. We (...) analyse the well-known paradoxes in judgement aggregation and we pinpoint the reasoning steps that trigger the inconsistencies. Moreover, we extend the map of possibility and impossibility results in judgement aggregation by discussing the case of substructural logics. In particular, we show that there exist fragments of linear logic for which general possibility results can be obtained. (shrink)

Reasoning may be defined as a deliberate effort to coordinate inferences so as to reach justifiable conclusions. Thus defined, reasoning includes collaborative as well as individual forms of cognitive action. The purpose of the present study was to demonstrate a circumstance in which collaborative reasoning is qualitatively superior to individual reasoning. The selection task, a well known logical hypothesis-testing problem, was presented to 143 college undergraduates-32 individuals and 20 groups of 5 or 6 interacting peers. The correct (falsification) response pattern (...) was selected by only 9% of the individuals but by 75% of the groups. The superior performance of the groups was due to collaborative reasoning rather than to imitation or peer pressure. Groups typically co-constructed a structure of arguments qualitatively more sophisticated than that generated by most individuals. The results support Piagetian and Habermasian views of peer interaction as a locus of rational social processes. (shrink)

We provide a brief introduction to this special issue on social dynamics and collective rationality, and summarize the gist of the papers collected therein.

There is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and, for each one of them, each individual in a group chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individual choices. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I characterize rationalizable collective choices.

Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrovian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enumerate the various factors that are responsible for the stability of the voluntary (...) association of free and rational individuals. Among other topics covered are an axiomatic characterisation of the concept of a rational choice, the simple majority decision rule and its extensions, the social choice implications of the concept of equity as nonenvy, the constrained majoritarian collective choice rules and the conflict between the Paretian ethics and the libertarian claims of individual rights. (shrink)

Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer (...) as a family’. One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers something other than what the family prefers. What, then, do the collective preferences of everyday understanding amount to? (shrink)

While Kant’s account of humankind’s rational progress has been widely discussed, his views about the way in which this progress might have begun and the circumstances surrounding this beginning have been largely neglected. Implicit in such an omission is the assumption that Kant does not say much about the very beginning of human history or that whatever he says is of little philosophical value. This paper challenges these assumptions. I reconstruct Kant’s account of the emergence of reason by looking at (...) his various conjectural and more literal remarks about our species’ transition from mere irrational animals into primitive human beings possessing a rudimentary form of rationality. Next, I show how this account fits with Kant’s broader view of humankind’s rational progress and its subsequent stages. By doing so, I elucidate Kant’s guidelines for achieving this progress in the future by unifying them with his regulative view of reason’s past. (shrink)

In this paper, an account of rational social normative trust (RSNTR) and a context for rational trust (Y) will be offered and briefly argued. The account concerns a person’s trust in another person that he will perform a specific action. Rational social normative trust is conceived as the trustor’s accepting attitude vis-à-vis his dependence on the trustee. This is an attitude that the trustor acquires non-intentionally, because of his belief, due to their relationship of mutual respect, that he is entitled (...) to expect of the trustee, on social or (quasi-) moral normative grounds, that the trustee will intentionally gratify him by his action, and because of his belief that he will indeed do so at least in part in deference to his rights. The “trust context Y” involves the conditions for a situation where the trustor can rationally consider whether intentional gratification may be expected. Rational trust is distinguished from the more general technical concept of rational reliance by the presence of context Y and the trustor’s expectation of the trustee’s intentional gratification of the trustor. The trustor’s social normative expectation of the trustee’s intentional “acting with goodwill” towards him is the central belief of the trustor involved in rational social normative trust. This belief does not require the trustor’s belief of the trustee’s genuine attitude of goodwill towards the trustor. The account distinguishes social normative trust from predictive “trust” by the trustor’s socially grounded normative, as opposed to only predictive, expectation of the trustee’s intentional gratification of the trustor. Normative trust, and also predictive “trust,” are more than an evaluation of a person’s trustworthiness. In addition to expecting of the trustee and/or expecting that the trustee will intentionally gratify him, the trustor feels comfortable about being dependent on the trustee, and has an accepting attitude regarding his dependent position. Both in normative and predictive trust, the trustor may decide to depend, or to refrain from depending, on the trustee for an action. In the case of normative trust, the trustor genuinely trusts the person he decides to depend on, but in the case of predictive “trust,” his “trusting” is comparable to relying on some features of the trustee or the situation. “Deciding to trust” is to make a bet on someone – to act as if one trusted. The account of rational trust (RSNTR) will be applied to a case where the trustee is a collective agent. Criteria for collective agency is then added. Collective agency is discussed, mainly, in the light of Raimo Tuomela’s work. When the trustor is a collective, the criteria for collective agency should be satisfied for the trustor as well. (shrink)

The article discusses the implications of the well‐known discursive dilemma. The dilemma arises whenever a reasoned decision has to be taken by a collective decision‐maker and generates persistent contradiction between what is defined as collective reason and public opinion. Following Philip Pettit, I argue that collective reason is normatively preferable and that the role of existing constitutional institutions in contemporary democracies is to collectivise reason. However, this makes the frustration of popular will a systematic by‐product of any (...) well‐functioning political process. I argue that the only way out is if individual beliefs are subject to revision during cycles of public deliberations with the responsibility to lead this thrusted upon elected representatives. (shrink)

It is argued that full-blown cooperation needs collective goals in a strong sense satisfying the "Collectivity Condition". According to this condition, a collective goal ist of the kind that necessarily, due of the goal-holders acceptance of the goal as their collective goal, if it is satisfied for one of the goal-holders it is satisfied for all the others. Not only collective goals but also other group-factors (such as possibly institutionalngroupmoden preferences and utilities) are argued to be (...) relevant to rational cooperative solutions of collective action dilemmas. (shrink)

Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination (...) problem and the prisoner’s dilemma—are then considered. An explanation is given of how, when such a problem is interpreted in terms of the parties’ inclinations, a suitable collective intention resolves the problem for agents who are rational in a broad sense other than the technical sense of game theory. Key Words: rationality • collective action • collective intention • joint commitment. (shrink)

Álvarez J.F. (2016) Conflicts, Bounded Rationality and Collective Wisdom in a Networked Society. In: Scarafile G., Gruenpeter Gold L. (eds) Paradoxes of Conflicts. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning (Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Humanities and Social Sciences), vol 12. Springer, Cham -/- The adoption of an individualistic perspective on reasoning, choice and decision is a spring of paradoxes of conflicts. Usually the agents immerse in conflicts are drawn or modelled as rational individuals with targets well defined and full capabilities to (...) access to information, without both temporal limitations and perfect reasoning abilities to obtain their preferences are taken account. -/- However, other models of agent, in the bounded rationality perspective, could help to understand better the interrelationships. I adopt embedded argumentative reasoning processes as satisfying criteria to analyze the expert function in a new socio technical environment that has changed deeply the mechanism and tools to access and to aggregate information. The open access to information and institutional arrangements addressed towards team knowledge could offer other kind of tools to affront the conflict, even its possible benefits. -/- The “crowd expertise” is emerging as an actual possibility and it must be incorporated to affront with conflicts. The very possibility of obtaining knowledge generated by “many minds”, collective wisdoms, brings up a real challenge to the conservative or elitist conception of the masses, because masses now emerge as a smart collective user, with new mechanisms to select and produce quality knowledge. These new collective actions differ deeply from the traditional modes of social organization. A new mass society is emerging now as a hybrid one that breaks some conceptual traditional models, such as Ortega y Gasset’s ones, and induces a structured way of flourishing both new practices and new knowledge with transforming capabilities. (shrink)

Adolf Grünbaum is one of the giants of 20th century philosophy of science. This volume is the first of three collecting his most essential and highly influential work. The essays collected in this first volume focus on three related areas. They discuss scientific rationality-the problem of what it takes for a theory to be called scientific, and ask whether it is plausible to draw a clear distinction between science and non-science as was famously proposed by Karl Popper. They delve (...) into the debate between determinism and indeterminism, in both science and in the humanities. Grünbaum defends the position of the Humane Determinist, which then leads to a thorough criticism of the current theological approaches to ethics and morality-where Grünbaum defends an explicit Secular Humanism-as well as of prominent theistic interpretations of twentieth century physical cosmologies. The second volume is devoted to Grünbaum's writings on the Philosophy of Physics and Space-Time, and the third to his lectures on the Philosophy of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, including his 1985 Gifford Lectures, which are to be published for the first time. (shrink)

(1986). The Rationality of Collective Suicide. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 23-39.

The generation of value bubbles is an inherently psychological and social process, where information sharing and individual decisions can affect representations of value. Bubbles occur in many domains, from the stock market, to the runway, to the laboratories of science. Here we seek to understand how psychological and social processes lead representations (i.e., expectations) of value to become divorced from the inherent value, using asset bubbles as an example. We hypothesize that simple asset group switching rules can give rise to (...) aggregate behavior that resembles the irrational exuberance that can drive asset bubbles. Using an agent-based model we explore whether a simple switching rule can generate irrational exuberance, and systematically explore how communication between decision makers influences the speed and intensity of overvaluation. We show that rational and simple individual level rules combined with honest information sharing are sufficient to generate the collective overvaluation characteristic of irrational exuberance. Further, our results demonstrate that low fidelity in the exchange of value information leads to rapidly increasing expectations about value, even when no one is engaged in exaggerating their expectations for the assets they own. (shrink)

This volume collects the best and most influential essays on knowledge, rationality and morality that Stephen Stich has published in the last 40 years. The volume includes a new introductory essay that offers an overview of the papers and traces the history of how they emerged.

In order for traditional rational choice theory (RCT) to explain the production of collective action, it must be able to distinguish between two behaviorally identical possibilities: one, that all of the agents in a group are each performing behaviors in pursuit of a set of individual actions; and two, that all of those agents are performing those behaviors in pursuit of a collective action. I argue that RCT does not have the resources necessary to distinguish between these two (...) possibilities. RCT could distinguish between these possibilities if it were able to account for commitments. I argue that successful rational choice explanations of collective action appeal to commitments, and distinguish this way of explaining collective action from a general class of explanations called plural subject (or team reasoning) theories. (shrink)

Collective intentionality is of central importance in social ontology. In this paper, we will discuss its role in Searle’s understanding of social ontology and institutional reality. The first section of the paper will reconstruct Searle’s understanding of social ontology and his identification of necessary elements for constructing institutional reality. In this section, we will discuss the notions of imposition of function, of collective intentionality, and of constitutional rule. The second section will critically re-examine the notion of collective (...) intentionality. The third section will contrast Searle’s understanding of institutional reality with the one based on evolutionary game theory. Taking into account that Searle describes his position as naturalistic, the main task of this section will be to examine to what extent the alternative theory, also naturalistic in its character, can address certain problems, which remain insolvable in the framework of Searle’s theory. (shrink)