Ontology, the ideas we have about the nature of reality, and epistemology, our concepts about how to gain knowledge about the world, are interdependent. Currently, the dominant ontology in science is a materialist model, and associated with it an empiricist epistemology. Historically speaking, there was a more comprehensive notion at the cradle of modern science in the middle ages. Then “experience” meant both inner, or first person, and outer, or third person, experience. With the historical development, experience has come to (...) mean only sense experience of outer reality. This has become associated with the ontology that matter is the most important substance in the universe, everything else—consciousness, mind, values, etc., —being derived thereof or reducible to it. This ontology is insufficient to explain the phenomena we are living with—consciousness, as a precondition of this idea, or anomalous cognitions. These have a robust empirical grounding, although we do not understand them sufficiently. The phenomenology, though, demands some sort of non-local model of the world and one in which consciousness is not derivative of, but coprimary with matter. I propose such a complementarist dual aspect model of consciousness and brain, or mind and matter. This then also entails a different epistemology. For if consciousness is coprimary with matter, then we can also use a deeper exploration of consciousness as happens in contemplative practice to reach an understanding of the deep structure of the world, for instance in mathematical or theoretical intuition, and perhaps also in other areas such as in ethics. This would entail a kind of contemplative science that would also complement our current experiential mode that is exclusively directed to the outside aspect of our world. Such an epistemology might help us with various issues, such as good theoretical and other intuitions. (shrink)

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.

In this paper, I show the complementarity of foundationalism and coherentism with respect to any efficient system of beliefs by means of a distinction between two types of proposition drawn from an analogy with an axiomatic system. This distinction is based on the way a given proposition is acknowledged as true, either by declaration (F-proposition) or by preservation (C-proposition). Within such a perspective, i.e., epistemological complementarism, not only can one see how the usual opposition between foundationalism and coherentism is (...) irrelevant, but furthermore one can appreciate the reciprocal relation between these two theories as they refer to two separate epistemological functions involved in the dynamics of constituting and expanding an epistemic system. (shrink)

Cet article a pour objectif de mettre en lumière les dynamiques complexes qui sous-tendent la réorganisation des liens familiaux suite à l’annonce de la transidentité chez des jeunes. Ce travail s’étaye sur une recherche doctorale en psychologie fondée sur une approche complémentariste (Devereux, 1955), intégrant des perspectives sociologiques et psychanalytiques, ainsi que sur les pratiques cliniques des auteures avec les jeunes trans et leurs familles. Ces réflexions soulignent l’importance de la dimension de la perte et de son élaboration, ainsi que (...) la manière dont les liens familiaux et communautaires se réajustent et se réinventent autour du processus de transition. (shrink)

To the authors’ knowledge, not much has been said or done in African philosophical circles with regard to providing a theoretical framework from which the discrimination against African women with disabilities can be addressed. In this article, the authors show how such a framework can be grounded in Innocent Asouzu’s complementarism. Their contention, one grounded in this framework, is that this discrimination has its roots in an isolationist, elitist, and exclusivist mindset/metaphysics. The authors further argue that one way to (...) overcome this problematic mindset is to replace it with one that views each individual human being as a missing link of reality, that is, a complementary philosophy. The hope is that with this replacement the gaze that subconsciously views women living with disability as a group that is distinguishable from other human beings will be summarily abandoned. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of chapters about contemporary issues within African philosophy. They are issues African philosophy must grapple with to demonstrate its readiness to make a stand against some of the challenges society faces in the coming decade such as xenophobia, Afro-phobia, extreme poverty, democratic failure and migration. The text covers new methodical directions and there is focus on the conversationalist, complementarist and consolationist movements within the field as well as the place of the Indigenous Knowledge System.The collection (...) speaks to African philosophy’s place in intellectual history with coverage of African Ethics and African socio-political philosophy. Contributors come from a variety of different backgrounds, institutions and countries. Through their innovative ideas, they provide fresh insight and intellectual energy. The book appeals to philosophy students and researchers. (shrink)

In this essay, I critically engage with Aribiah Attoe’s new book on African Metaphysics, Groundwork for a New Kind of African Metaphysics: The Idea of Predeterministic Historicity, by reflecting on some of the philosophical issues that it provokes. Attoe contests some basic assumptions undergirding the philosophical approach to metaphysics within the African episteme in this book. His contestation leads him to a materialistic conception of reality in African metaphysics. While noting the original contribution of Attoe’s book, such as singular (...) class='Hi'>complementarism, and predeterministic historicity, I identify and discuss some issues in the book that deserve critical philosophical engagement. (shrink)

This paper engages in the debate between cultural modernists and cultural traditionalists concerning the importance of cultural fidelity as faced by African people via globalization and its alleged homogenizing tendency. Central to this debate is the issue of cultural truths and its use, that is, development. The paper therefore argues that African peoples do not need to “essentialize” their cultures. This is because the “truths about reality” with which they intend to employ in this quest for development are not exclusive (...) to any particular cultural society. The implication of the foregoing is the paper’s insistence that Africans adopt a complementarist attitude in their determination for cultural fidelity. It maintains that this attitude will make Africans avail themselves of ideas from elsewhere. Ultimately, the paper posits that this new disposition of Africans to their cultures and those of non-African societies will set her beleaguered states on a solid developmental trajectory. (shrink)

I distinguish two kinds of contribution that have been made by recent minimalist accounts of joint action in philosophy and cognitive science relative to established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “complementarists” seek to analyze a functionally different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “constitutionalists” seek to expose mechanisms that make performing joint actions possible, without taking a definite stance on which functional characterization (...) of joint action is the appropriate one. I elucidate the contrasting methodological underpinnings of these minimalist research programs in accordance with Bechtel and Richardson’s account of the heuristics of decomposition and localization as a research strategy for the study of complex systems. (shrink)

Identifying cognition in general with propositional knowledge exposes the cognitive value of literature to abiding skepticism. This chapter argues that German romanticism has generated two competing views of the relation between literature and the overtly truth-seeking disciplines. One is a legacy of skepticism and antirealism that is powerless to give a positive account of literary value. The other is a complementarist legacy emphasizing literature’s cognitive priority to and its role as the cognitive fulfillment of discursive knowledge. This tradition offers important (...) resources to aesthetic cognitivism for articulating and defending the value of literature and the institutions that support it. (shrink)

Gareth Evans was first to express the idea that our perceptual experience is more detailed than what our concepts possess and this brings in the idea of nonconceptualism. The nonconceptualist claims that creatures without conceptual ability can be in a content-bearing state since they do not possess concept, memory or linguistic ability. Concepts are the constituents of those intentional contents that are the complete truth-evaluable contents of judgment and belief. This paper examines the possibility of nonconceptual content in human perception (...) and considers the complementarism of conceptualism and nonconceptualism as a more viable basis for explaining human perception. This synthesis, the paper suggests, overcomes the epistemological deficiencies inherent in any unilateral approach to understanding the nature, character, and process of cognition thereby providing a more comprehensive understanding of the human cognitive process. (shrink)

Les jeunes « radicalisés » sont confrontés à des mouvements de questionnements internes et externes, comme grand nombre d’adolescents, sur leur filiation, leur identité. Leur engagement dans cet horizon guerrier s’inscrit autour de menaces psychiques inexorables face à des impensés dans leur histoire individuelle et collective. Appuyé par une méthodologie complémentariste, l’article analyse la situation de deux jeunes hommes confrontés à des reviviscences traumatiques de non-dits familiaux et la réactivation de mouvements internes et externes non maîtrisables. Malgré la tentative de (...) maîtriser ces menaces, la radicalité semble renvoyer à une violence sociale et politique menaçante. (shrink)

L’article interroge la trajectoire psychique d’une patiente infertile qui réclame de choisir sa donneuse d’ovocytes elle-même, en ligne, comme cela peut se faire à l’étranger. L’hypothèse retenue consiste à interpréter sa démarche comme un contre-investissement de la position passive de réception qu’implique un don d’ovocytes au profit d’une logique d’emprise, de marchandisation et de dévalorisation de la donneuse d’ovocytes. Un fantasme sous-jacent nous paraît émerger de l’étude d’un cas clinique : « cracher sur la main qui me donne ». À (...) travers un panorama du don d’ovocytes aux États-Unis, l’auteur s’interroge également sur les limites de la rhétorique du don et de l’altruisme en matière de don de gamètes. Sa méthodologie du cas unique s’appuie sur une approche complémentariste qui fait appel à des données sociologiques et économiques. (shrink)

Although many philosophers of religion have claimed support for continuing to live with paradoxes in theology from the existence of basic paradoxes in scientific theory, few have probed the validity of this claim. This monograph fills the gap. After a useful chapter surveying the current status of the wave-particle theories in physics and Bohr's principle of complementarity, Austin abstracts from the discussion the idea of complementary models and uses this to propose a "complementarist interpretation" of paradoxes in religion. This he (...) favors over the "paradox-minimizing approach" and the "sui generis interpretation" found in such writers as Bochenski and G. E. Hughes, on the one hand, and Pseudo-Dionysius and classical Indian mystics, on the other. The former approach fails to do justice to the element of mystery in religion while the latter makes too much of it. In his account of the latter, Austin relies especially on Ninian Smart's Reasons and Faiths, the theses of which are rather uncritically adopted as the key to understanding religious discourse. Regrettably, Austin has to depend on secondary sources in his treatment of Indian thought and this makes his handling of it less masterly than his discussion of contemporary physics. Likewise, the concept of "model" needs more critical scrutiny than is possible here if it is to serve a subinterest of the book in the status of theology as a "science." But generally the work is replete with qualifications and illustrations and is a welcome addition to the literature on religion and science.—C. P. S. (shrink)