How can ethnic boundaries survive in contexts of legal racial equality and institutionalized ethnic mixing? Constructivist theories of ethnicity have long emphasized the fluidity, rather than the durability, of ethnic boundaries. But the fact that ethnic boundaries often endure—and even thrive—in putatively non-ethnic political contexts suggests the need for sustained attention to the problem of boundary persistence. Based on an ethnographic study of ethnic boundaries in the Turkish case, this article argues that the regulation of the domain of sexuality and (...) marriage can play a critical role in reproducing boundaries when political institutions neither acknowledge nor aid in the survival of ethnic diversity. Ultimately, the data provide substantial evidence that the transmission and internalization of informal rules of inter-ethnic sexual conduct are central to boundary maintenance. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉJe défends dans ce texte une version particulière de la position que Sharon Street a appelée le «constructivisme humien». J'esquisserai pourquoi je considère que ce constructivisme est préférable à la fois au réalisme moral et au constructivisme kantien sur le plan de la compréhension du statut ontologique des valeurs. Après avoir accepté de reconnaître le rôle des pressions de l’évolution dans l’émergence de la moralité, le constructivisme humien doit toutefois préciser le rôle de l'intersubjectivité historique dans l’évolution subséquente de la (...) morale. J'expliquerai aussi pourquoi je considère que l'intégration d'un volet cohérentiste au constructivisme permet d'atténuer les craintes concernant le caractère potentiellement non-cognitiviste des théories contextualistes. Enfin, j'esquisserai pourquoi l'idée d'un «espace des raisons morales» indépendant, à certains égards, de l'esprit humain est compatible avec le constructivisme humien. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivist Model Building: Empirical Examples From Mathematics Education” by Catherine Ulrich, Erik S. Tillema, Amy J. Hackenberg & Anderson Norton. Upshot: I concur with Ulrich et al. that second-order models can be powerful tools for investigating students’ mathematical learning. I argue for a role that a dynamic, learner-centered perspective on context could play in constructivist model building.

Metaethical constructivism is one of the main movements within contemporary metaethics – especially among those with Kantian inclinations. But both the philosophical coherence and the Kantian pedigree of constructivism are hotly contested. In the first half of this article, I first explore the sense in which Kant's own views might be described as constructivist and then use the resulting understanding as a guide to how we might think about Kantian constructivism today. Along the way, I hope to (...) suggest that a fairly diverse range of views within contemporary metaethics – including some without any explicit allegiance to Kant – may be thought of as pursuing a version of the resulting strategy. (shrink)

Over the past several decades, philosophers have grown to recognize the role played by frameworks and models in the construction of human knowledge. Further, they have paid increasing attention to the origins of knowing processes in social and historical contexts of human practical activities, and to social transformation of the frameworks over time. In a series of original essays by prominent philosophers, Constructivism and Practice advances the understanding of the role of construction and model creation, reflects on the relationship (...) of these models to social practices, and considers whether our modes of knowing themselves have a history. These questions are thoughtfully considered in the light of the 'historical epistemology' first developed by Marx Wartofsky. Contributions by Joseph Margolis; Tom Rockmore; Lisa Dolling; Jaakko Hintikka; Anton Alterman; Stephen Toulmin; Michel Paty; John Stachel; Gregg Horowitz; Michael Kelly; Tom Huhn; Barbara Savedoff; Saul Fisher; Sybil Schwarzenbach; John Pittman; Raphael Sassower; and MaryAnn Cutter. (shrink)

It is commonly held that the context with respect to which an indexical is interpreted is determined independently of the interpretation of the indexical. This view, which I call Context Realism, has explanatory significance: it is because the context is what it is that an indexical refers to what it does. In this paper, I provide an argument against Context Realism. I then develop an alternative that I call Context Constructivism, according to which indexicals (...) are defined not in terms of features of utterance situations, but rather in terms of roles that objects could play. (shrink)

Context: The current situation in philosophy of science includes central, ongoing debates about realism and anti-realism. The same question has been central to the theorising of radical constructivism and, in particular, to its implications for educational theory. However the constructivist literature does not make significant contact with the most important, mainstream philosophical discussions. Problem: Despite its overwhelming influence among educationalists, I suggest that the “radical constructivism” of Ernst Glasersfeld is an example of fashionable but thoroughly problematic doctrines (...) that can have little benefit for practical pedagogy or teacher education. My critique has a positive goal: it is important to understand why constructivism has generated such severe polarization and disputation. A symptom of the problem is the concern with the most abstruse and obdurate problems of philosophy that have no conceivable bearing on educational practice or anything else, for that matter. The diagnosis is confirmed by those pedagogical recommendations that are allegedly derived from radical constructivism that are touted as revolutionary but are platitudes of common sense. I suggest that, ironically, this observation itself provides some pedagogical insight. Method: The approach adopted for the topic is critical, philosophical analysis of the various claims and theses of radical constructivism in the light of philosophy of science and psychology. Results: The findings of the paper are that central theoretical claims of constructivism are couched in an unclear and unnecessary jargon that obscures the implausibility or banality of these claims. Implications: The value of the paper lies in providing an analysis and critique of central, influential claims of radical constructivism both in relation to issues in epistemology and also in relation to the alleged bearing of these claims on pedagogy. It is suggested that, contrary to the claims of radical constructivists, there are few if any implications for practice and applications. (shrink)

Context: In spite of its advantages and its ability to make valid responses to objections, radical constructivism is not mainstream. Problem: Extolling the virtues of radical constructivism and responding logically to the objections does not work. We know this from the evidence of many attempts. Our theoretical stance, radical constructivism, also suggests this approach is not likely to have much influence on realists. We cannot transmit understanding in the signals with which we attempt to communicate. How (...) can we in radical constructivism enable those outside of RC to understand our explanation of human knowing? Method: Examine our understanding of radical constructivism itself, because it is an explanation of how, why and under what circumstances people change their understandings of their experiential worlds. Results: We must find ways to direct the attention of others to situations that they cannot explain with their existing understanding of the world. Then we must create conditions conducive to their revising and testing new understandings for fit with the evidence of their experience. Implications: Since radical constructivism is a theory of human knowing, it tells us how humans develop knowledge, hence it is an answer to the questions central to this special issue. This answer is not one to be used to win in debates with realists. Radical constructivism gives us an answer to the problem of engaging realists in understanding our position, but strategies consistent with radical constructivism are not easily carried out. Developing and executing such strategies is the work at hand. (shrink)

A recurrent challenge in applied ethics concerns the development of principles that are both suitably general to cover various cases and sufficiently exact to guide behavior in particular instances. In business ethics, two central approaches—stockholder and stakeholder—often fail by one or the other requirement. The author argues that the failure is precipitated by their reliance upon “universal” theory, which views the justification of principles as both independent of their context of application and universally appropriate to all contexts. The author (...) develops a contextual interpretation of “constructivism” as an alternative approach, and argues that this alternative meets the above challenge. (shrink)

Context: Using radical constructivism, society can be considered from the perspective of asking the question, “Who conceives of society?” In Luhmann ’s social systems theory, this question itself is considered as a construct of the communication among reflexive agents. Problem: Structuration of expectations by codes operating in interhuman communications positions both communicators and communications in a multi-dimensional space in which their relations can be provided with meaning at the supra-individual level. The codes can be functionally different and symbolically (...) generalized. Method: More than Luhmann, I focus on the hypothetical status of the communication of meaning and the uncertainty involved. Meaning can be communicated because of reflexivity in interhuman communications; meaning cannot be observed. Results: The communication of denotations between semantic domains can generate “horizons of meaning” as reflexive orders that remain structurally coupled to individual minds. This elusive order contains a trade-off between “organization” at interfaces integrating expectations at each moment of time, and the potential of further differentiation among symbolically generalized codes of communication in a “self-organization” over time. Implications: One can model the coding in the communication of meaning as latent variables that evolve as an implication of the interacting intentions and expectations. The structure of expectations can be visualized and animated using semantic maps. The self-organizing horizons of meaning operate in a multidimensional space different from the network topology, and at another pace, since meaning is provided to events from the perspective of hindsight. Constructivist content: This perspective of the radical constructedness of social reality transforms the status of agency and organization in sociological theorizing from a source of change to a resource of communicative competencies and reflexive performativity. (shrink)

Context: Radical constructivism prioritises the processes by which people make sense of their experience and people construct different worlds based on their individual experiences. Problem: It ….

Context: It is beyond doubt that RC has received a great deal of attention in educational studies and learning theory. But overall, the current situation seems to be rather ambivalent in view of the blurring of the various strands in constructivist discourses and the different ways of distinguishing and foregrounding constructivist positions. Correspondingly, there is a wide range of claims, from the claim that (radical) constructivism represents a mainstream endeavor to attributions of its being outdated, self-refuting or irrelevant. (...) Purpose: The paper seeks to sound out the ambivalent situation of (radical) constructivism between “all” and “nothing” by examples of attributions of meaning to constructivist positions in academic everyday life and by challenging both prevalent criticisms of systemic-constructivist pedagogy and widespread broad classifications in learning theory. Method: The article critically reflects on (1) one-sentence “destructions” of constructivist positions, (2) Pongratz’s criticism of systemic-constructivist pedagogy, and (3) the threefold classification of the world of learning, i.e., behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism. Results: Both the current criticism of constructivism as a mainstream endeavor and evolutionary suggestions provided by the threefold classification are criticized. Although some constructivist concepts and distinctions are widely accepted today, often these achievements are not recognized as being rooted in constructivist discourses. Implications: As far as mainstreaming constructivism might be related to power politics, selling the “real thing,” and joining the ranks of truth-oriented Isms, it would not appear to be a desirable endeavor for those who rely on viability, circular foundations, relativist philosophy, and relationalist approaches. Nevertheless, clarifications of power relations and the interplay between constructivist analyses of politics and the politics of constructivism might contribute to overcoming the diffuse popularity of constructivist thought towards a better understanding of constructivist contributions to solution oriented, meaningful ways of dealing with urgent problems. (shrink)

Context: Structural design education in architecture is typically conceived as a scientific subject taught in a lecture format and based on a transactional view of learning. This approach misses opportunities to contribute to and integrate with design-studio-based architectural education. Problem: How can radical constructivism inform a design-based pedagogy of structural design in the context of large cohorts of Chinese learners? Method: The paper outlines how radical constructivist and second order cybernetic perspectives are reflected in an alternative educational (...) approach to structural design. This approach encourages students’ individual learning while negotiating constraints deriving from large cohorts as well as the educational expectations of Chinese learners. Results: Teaching outcomes as well as students’ comments show successes in engaging students in adopting a more personal and active attitude in their learning. Students appreciate and praise learning grounded in experience as well as collaborative, peer-led learning. Challenges remain in establishing a more dialogical learning situation and in supporting individual students’ learning in large student cohorts. Implications: Limitations arise from the constraints imposed by large cohorts, limited manpower and an institutional preference for teaching towards written examinations. The research and teaching development presented are ongoing. This paper may inform educators in the fields of architecture and engineering as well as, more generally, educators who seek to develop their teaching based on a radical constructivist epistemology in the context of large cohorts. Constructivist content: The teaching approach presented links a radical constructivist perspective based on Ernst von Glasersfeld’s work with second-order cybernetics in the context of design-based education. The paper discusses challenges and opportunities for this approach in the context of large cohorts of Chinese learners. (shrink)

In this paper I provide an epistemological context for Artificial Life projects. Later on, the insights which such projects will exhibit may be used as a general direction for further Artificial Life implementations. The purpose of such a model is to demonstrate by way of simulation how higher cognitive structures may emerge from building invariants by simple sensorimotor beings. By using the bottom-up methodology of Artificial Life, it is hoped to overcome problems that arise from dealing with complex systems, (...) such as the phenomenon of cognition. The research will lead to both epistemological and technical implications. The proposed ALife model is intended to point out the usefulness of an interdisciplinary approach including methodological approaches from disciplines such as Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science, Theoretical Biology, and Artificial Life. I try to put them in one single context. The epistemological background which is necessary for this purpose comes from the ideas developed in both epistemological and psychological Constructivism. The model differs from other ALife approaches— and is somewhat radical in this sense—as it tries to start on the lowest possible level, i.e. avoids several a priori assumptions and anthropocentric ascriptions. Due to this characterization, the project may be alternatively viewed as testing the complementary relationship between epistemology and methodology. (shrink)

Nursing and nurses rely upon qualitative research to understand the intricacies of the human condition. Acknowledging the subjective nature of reality and commonly founded in a constructivist epistemology, qualitative approaches offer opportunities for uncovering insights from the perspective of the individual participants, the insider's view, and the construction of representations that maintain an intimacy with the subject's realities. Debate continues, however, about what is needed for a qualitative construction to be considered an authentic understanding of a subject's realities. Authenticity in (...) the context of qualitative research has been described as entailing consideration of a number of well‐trodden dimensions: fairness, ontological, educative, catalytic and tactical. Taking these dimensional requirements as key, this paper argues that authenticity may not always be as well‐developed through some of the standard practices in qualitative research as perhaps expected. In particular, qualitative understandings of authenticity stress that participants should not be merely reported on but instead should be dynamically involved in and changed by the constructions and interpretations of data developed throughout the research process. As this paper illustrates, such engagements appear problematic for qualitative research approaches that are beholden to designative commitments in the context of language and meaning‐making and which tend to prioritise commonality and generality at the expense of individual authenticity. An alternative qualitative approach, Hermeneutic Constructivism, is proposed as better able to achieve the requirements of the dimensions of authenticity. As outlined, this approach is well‐placed to present an understanding of human experience through a genuinely expressivist approach and transcends the stress upon the common or the general that can be pervasive and problematic. (shrink)

Context: There is still no detailed defence of Goodman’s starmaking constructivism against the objection Boghossian presented in his 2006 book, Fear of Knowledge. Problem: I defend Goodman’s constructivism against the problem of stuff raised by Boghossian, that is, that constructivism requires unconstructed stuff and thus cannot explain all features in the world. Method: I argue that there is a way out for constructivists when they face the problem of stuff. Constructivists can choose to accept a constructivist-friendly (...) worldview and the problem of stuff does not hold in this worldview. Goodman already provides hints for such a worldview in his works. I articulate the worldview in detail and argue that it does not have obvious faults. Results: I show that starmaking constructivism does not have the problem of stuff at least under a certain tenable worldview. Implications: The constructivist-friendly worldview and related novel ideas could be used to defend starmaking constructivism against other objections in Boghossian’s book and is helpful in answering other philosophical questions such as the mind-matter problem and modality. Constructivist content: This article may contribute to reviving Goodman’s starmaking constructivism. (shrink)

Context: This paper outlines how radical constructivist theory has led to a particular methodological technique, developing second-order models of student thinking, that has helped mathematics educators to be more effective teachers of their students. Problem: The paper addresses the problem of how radical constructivist theory has been used to explain and engender more viable adaptations to the complexities of teaching and learning. Method: The paper presents empirical data from teaching experiments that illustrate the process of second-order model building. Results: (...) The result of the paper is an illustration of how second-order models are developed and how this process, as it progresses, supports teachers to be more effective. Implications: This paper has the implication that radical constructivism has the potential to impact practice. Key Words: Second-order model, radical constructivism, teaching, mathematics education. (shrink)

Context: Constructivist epistemology is not a doctrinal set of clear and consistent theses and assumptions but a movement full of tensions, with minimally integrated lines of discussions. Problem: This situation explains why it is so difficult to come up with a general definition of constructivist epistemology that could serve as a starting point to study its several research programs systematically and comparatively. Method: We compare the constructivist epistemologies of Jean Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana, and Niklas Luhmann regarding (...) tensions between knowledge/reality and individual/society. Results: Our comparison leads to a general definition of constructivist epistemology as a heterogeneous movement problematizing certain dualities - such as subject/object, knowledge/reality, or individual/society - that have been shown to be central for epistemological inquiry. We argue that such dualisms can be used as dimensions for critical analysis, comparison, and discussion among the different research programs, and that, at the same time, they would allow us to analyze the general strategies characterizing such programs. The comparative and critical analysis of the programs by way of the aforementioned tensions results in an organized presentation highlighting their convergences, divergences, and singularities. (shrink)

Context: To speak of constructivism -- and in particular of radical constructivism -- in education is to place oneself on a field which, like any other academic field, is the scene of tensions, debates, and indeed battles. While such controversies are, predictably enough, fought out between the partisans of constructivism and those defending other theses, they are also fought out between the constructivists themselves, as a number of group works have brought out (e.g., Steffe & Gale (...) 1995; SRED 2001). In other words, constructivists do not express their views in unison whenever there is a question on the development of knowledge (an individual or collective matter?), the underpinnings of knowledge (be they of a psychological, sociological or other type) or, as humorously noted by Quale (2007), that "sin" which is said to consist in the relativist mode of questioning or critique authorized by constructivism. Purpose: In this paper, we would like to contribute to this discussion and to this plurality of ways of embedding oneself in constructivism, in particular by bringing out (as was so acutely shown by Ernst von Glasersfeld 1987a, 1995, 2007) that while constructivism offers a basis on which to revisit the question of knowledge, its contributions nevertheless extend well beyond this single preoccupation. By reincorporating "the properties of the observer" into his or her discourse as well as the conditions, stakes and issues surrounding the utterance in question, in short, by reincorporating the question of power into the utterance-making, constructivism also provides a basis for revisiting the "Great Divides" -- that is, the (unequal) relationships between the various forms of knowledge as well as the (unequal) modes of evidence and authority that accompany these relations. Method: Through an examination of three topics, that is the "racism" of intelligence, the Semmelweis affair, and the question of endogenous knowledge, we will attempt to explicate various insights afforded by constructivism. Conclusion: So doing, we will show that radical constructivism, in its recognition of the plurality of possible modes of description and explanation, contributes to a form of epistemological democracy. (shrink)

Context: Radical constructivism claims that we have no final truth criteria for establishing one ontology over another. This leaves us with the question of how we can come to know anything in a viable manner. According to von Glasersfeld, radical constructivism is a theory of knowledge rather than a philosophy of the world in itself because we do not have access to a human-independent world. He considers knowledge as the ordering of experience to cope with situations in (...) a satisfactory way. Problem: Von Foerster and Krippendorff show that the central goal of a constructivist theory of knowing must be to find a way of putting the knower into a known that is constructed so as to keep the knower, as well as the knowing process, viable in practice. Method: The conceptual and philosophical analysis of present theories and their necessary prerequisites suggests that such foundation for viable knowing can be built on the analysis of what the ontological prerequisites are for establishing viable observing, cognition, communication and observer-communicators, and communication media and vehicles. Results: The moment an observer chooses to accept his/her own embodied conscious presence in this world as well as language, he/she must accept other humans as partly independently existing conversation partners; if knowledge and knowing has to make sense, he/she must also accept as prerequisites for our observation and conversation a pre-linguistic reality from which our bodies come and which our conversation is often about. Furthermore, we can no longer claim that there is a reality that we do not know anything about: From being here in conversation, we know that the world can produce more or less stable embodied consciousnesses that can exchange and construct conceptual meanings through embodied conversations and actions that last over time and exist in space-time and mind, and are correlated to our embodied practices. We can also see that our communication works through signs for all living systems as well as in human language, understood as a structured and progressively developed system of communication. The prerequisite for this social semiotic production of meaning is the fourfold “semiotic star of cybersemiotics,” which includes at least four different worlds: our bodies, the combination of society, culture and language, our consciousness, and also an outer nature. Implications: The semiotic star in cybersemiotics claims that the internal subjective, the intersubjective linguistic, our living bodies, and nature are irreducible and equally necessary as epistemological prerequisites for knowing. The viable reality of any of them cannot be denied without self-refuting paradoxes. There is an obvious connectedness between the four worlds, which Peirce called “synechism.” It also points to Peirce’s conclusion that logic and rationality are part of the process of semiosis, and that meaning in the form of semiosis is a fundamental aspect of reality, not just a construction in our heads. Erratum: The paper erroneously refers to “pleroma.” The correct term is “plemora.” . (shrink)

Context: Ernst von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism has been very influential in education, particularly in mathematics and science education. Problem: There is limited guidance available for educational researchers who wish to design research that is consistent with constructivist thinking. Von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism, together with the theoretical perspectives outlined by constructivist educational researchers such as Guba and Lincoln, can be considered as a source of guidance. Method: The paper outlines a constructivist knowledge framework that could be adopted for (...) educational research. The discussion considers how judgement of what counts as knowledge could be made, and how the set of procedures chosen could enable the researcher to represent the findings of the inquiry as knowledge. Results: An argument is made for researchers to explicate the criteria for judging an inquiry. Each criterion can then be linked to the standards to be reached and the techniques for generating data. The joint satisfaction of criteria and techniques for a constructivist inquiry creates conditions that indicate the “trustworthiness” or “authenticity” of an educational research study. Implications: The illustration of how a constructivist inquiry could be judged recognises how the contribution of von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism can be used to inform the practice of educational research. Constructivist content: The argument presented in the paper links to radical constructivism and suggests ways in which it can be applied in the context of educational research. (shrink)

This article challenges the assumption underlying most education reforms that constructivism is politically neutral and intrinsically democratic. It makes this argument by examining the curriculum reform in Spain during the 1980s and 1990s in light of the neoliberal politics that the country was experiencing at that time. This study employs the poststructuralist analytical lens of governmentality developed by Foucauldian scholars. Accordingly, it claims that, the psychological version of constructivism adopted by the official curriculum reform failed to deliver promises (...) for democracy because it was crafted within the same neoliberal political rationality that redefined the terms of government in the late 1980s, a redefinition that decontextualized the learner from his/her social context and adopted the logic of the market. (shrink)

Context: Epistemologically, constructivism has reached its goals, particularly by emphasizing the idea of participatory observation, circularity, and the fact that construction is based on experience. However, rather than research, the main occupation of constructivists and second-order cyberneticians seems to lie in making the case for their epistemological idea, which has been exhausted in many aspects. Purpose: To counteract this exhaustion and an increasingly apparent lack of energy, it is argued that constructivism requires a dedicated field of research, (...) a field where it would be possible to test constructivist concepts empirically and thus go beyond mere theoretical discourse. Method: Based on a review of basic constructivist premises and a critical examination of the field of empirical phenomenological research, the article connects their respective findings. Results: The article proposes that empirical research on lived experience requires a constructivist epistemological foundation and might therefore be a logical continuation of constructivist endeavours. In such a way, both fields might benefit considerably. Not only would constructivism acquire an empirical tool for testing its ideas, such a partnership might also provide empirical phenomenology with a more suitable epistemological platform than the realism-based research framework of cognitive science (of which it has become an integral part. The possibilities and problems of introducing empirical research into constructivism are also discussed. Implications: The article presents an opportunity to re-think the role and future of constructivism. It suggests educating a new generation of constructivist researchers whose principal goal would be the attempt to study lived human experience. That could also open a path to the experimental grounding of many constructivist insights. (shrink)

Context: Constructivist teachers who find themselves working within an educational system that adopts a realist epistemology, may find themselves at odds with their own beliefs when they catch themselves paying closer attention to the knowledge authorities intend them to teach rather than the knowledge being constructed by their learners. Method: In the preliminary analysis of the mathematical learning of six low-performing Year 7 boys in a Maltese secondary school, whom one of us taught during the scholastic year 2014-15, we (...) constructed a conceptual framework which would help us analyze the extent to which he managed to be sensitive to constructivism in a typical classroom setting. We describe the development of the framework M-N-L as a viable analytical tool to search for significant moments in the lessons in which the teacher appeared to engage in what we define as “constructivist teaching” during mathematics lessons. The development of M-N-L is part of a research program investigating the way low-performing students make mathematical sense of new notation with the help of the software Grid Algebra. Results: M-N-L was found to be an effective instrument which helped to determine the extent to which the teacher was sensitive to his own constructivist beliefs while trying to negotiate a balance between the mathematical concepts he was expected to teach and the conceptual constructions of his students. Implications: One major implication is that it is indeed possible for mathematics teachers to be sensitive to the individual constructions of their learners without losing sight of the concepts that society, represented by curriculum planners, deems necessary for students to learn. The other is that researchers in the field of education may find M-N-L a helpful tool to analyze CT during typical didactical situations established in classroom settings. (shrink)

Context: The paper is a selective survey of radical constructivist (RC) research that relates to education. Problem: Over the past 40 years there have been developments in the research reviewed. Earlier work was often concerned with conceptual clarification and showing different ways children and teachers think, whereas recent work is more systemic and applied. Method: Research with educational implications done by the author and colleagues is surveyed. This survey shows how RC influenced research in a variety of psychological domains (...) including attitudes to different others, science education, and teacher professional development. Results: While initial work by the author in this area focussed on conceptual clarification, the more recent work is classroom-based, with implications for educational practice in schools. The final part of the paper on research by colleagues emphasises how teachers might work together in schools and the broader school system. Implications: RC plays a significant role in national curricula as a theoretical approach to facilitating diversity in schools and empowering children in their education. There is an urgent need to focus on student learning. The work on educational applications cited provides important insights into the resolvable problems of enabling genuine learning communities. Constructivist Content: The paper addresses theoretical clarification, variations in children’s concepts about different others, inclusion, and implementation of educational programmes that use RC frameworks. (shrink)

In this essay, I provide normative guidelines for developing a philosophically interesting and plausible version of social constructivism as a philosophy of science, wherein science aims for social-epistemic values rather than for truth or empirical adequacy. This view is more plausible than the more radical constructivist claim that scientific facts are constructed. It is also more interesting than the modest constructivist claim that representations of such facts emerge in social contexts, as it provides a genuine rival to the scientific (...) axiologies of scientific realists and constructive empiricists. I further contrast my view with positions holding that the aims of science are context dependent, that the unit of normative analysis is the scientific community, and that the aims of science are non-epistemic social values. (shrink)

: Interactive constructivism and its implications for education will be introduced in four steps. (1) The context of the approach and its relation to other constructivist developments will be discussed. (2) I will examine essential pragmatic criteria in the tradition of John Dewey that are relevant for interactive constructivism. (3) More decisively than Dewey interactive constructivism launches a meta-theoretical distinction between observers, participants, and agents. (4) Communication as a chief dimension of education can be analyzed out (...) of three perspectives: the symbolic, the imaginative, and the real. Educators must recognize that their interaction with learners includes great demands not only in practical application/implementation but also in theoretical reflection. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to contribute to the meta-theoretical and methodological discussions that are taking place in the context of the political turn of animal ethics. More precisely, it seeks to answer Robert Garner’s objection to the idea that Rawlsian constructivism is an interesting framework to develop animal political theory. I sustain, specifically, that his critiques are based on an inadequate understanding of constructivism and its relationship to contractual arguments. By elucidating the true nature of (...) this position, the objection loses all of its strength. (shrink)

Traditional methods of teaching professional nursing ethics in the classroom have translated into limited success in clinical practice. Students don’t perceive an integration of ethics education in practical clinical settings, while educators grapple with a lack of perceived ‘excellence of moral character’ in their students when they are taught intellectual virtues and theoretical wisdom in the classroom that they do not see demonstrated in the clinical setting. Also traditionally, emphasis in ethics teaching has tended to focus on the nurse-patient relationship, (...) while less attention has been paid to nursing in a more inter/intra professional or global context. The purpose of using constructivist theory and concept-based learning strategies to teach junior level nursing students ethics was to present implications for nurse educators that will help them foster/improve their student’s critical thinking, and increase their mastery and global integration of the complex abstract concepts associated with professional nursing ethics. (shrink)

This thesis provides a restatement of Kantian constructivism, with the aim of avoiding some of the objections and clearing up some of the ambiguities that have haunted previous versions of the view. I restate Kantian constructivism as the view that morality’s normativity has its source in the form of second-personal reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning in which we engage when we address demands person-to-person. By advancing a position about the source of moral normativity, Kantian constructivism addresses (...) a metaethical question, albeit one that is distinct from the questions that many traditional metaethical positions, such as moral realism, focus on. Kantian constructivism has an advantage over competing views of the source of moral normativity when it comes to answering the so-called Normative Question, which I interpret as the question of why we are rationally required to do what we take to be our moral obligation. Kantian constructivism can answer this question because, unlike its competitors, it does not conceive of practical reason as a receptive faculty that is determined by external inputs. Instead, it regards the very form of second-personal reasoning as grounding the fact that morality is normative, thus explaining morality’s rational authority. Although second-personal reasoning is fundamentally distinct from the merely first-personal mode of reasoning that we must engage in insofar as we are agents, all those agents whom we would ordinarily consider bound by moral obligations seem to engage in it. Indeed, although it involves irreducibly second-personal notions, such as accountability and the authority to address legitimate demands, second-personal reasoning is not to be mistaken for a social practice. Instead, it can be applied to purely self-regarding contexts, such as that of committing oneself to a personal project and thereby holding oneself accountable for pursuing it, as well as to interactions with others. (shrink)

Context: The interest of communication scholars in constructivism is fuelled by the need to radically rethink the theoretical assumptions that have governed most media and communication research for the past three or four decades. Problem: On at least two points, constructivism poses difficulties that need to be overcome by scholars of communication. These are the attitudes of many radical constructivists towards “reality” and the constructivist position with regard to “society.” The article seeks to clarify the constructivist position (...) with regard to social interaction and society by determining how successful communication among individuals is possible, despite their cognitive autonomy. Method: In order to contribute to a discussion about the current situation in communication and media studies, the article takes up the author’s argument that communication cannot be understood unless models describing it are centred on the individual. Based on this conceptualisation, considerations about the ontological assumptions of constructivism and the constructivist position with regard to social interaction are revisited. Results: It is argued that cognition is not pure self-reference; society cannot be considered simply as an individual construct; self-organisation also occurs at the supra-individual level, where shared knowledge and socio-cultural meanings emerge in the operatively closed motion of the successive communicative elements. Implications: Clarifying the constructivist position with regard to society can contribute to innovative theory building and research in communication science, and in the social sciences more broadly. (shrink)

Context: Radical Constructivism is an issue that deeply divides the cognitive science community: most researchers reject it, but an increasing number do not. Problem: Constructivists stress that our knowledge starts from experience. Some (“ontic” constructivists) deny the existence of a mind-independent world, while others (“radical” constructivists) claim merely that, if such a world exists, we can know nothing about it. Both positions conflict with scientific realism. It is not clear that the conflict can be resolved. Method: This paper (...) uses philosophical argument to ask whether constructivism can be rationally preferred over realism in science. Results: Ontic constructivism cannot be disproved by any knock-down argument. Nevertheless, it is irrational to accept it, because it ignores the strategy of “inference to the best explanation”: realism is the best explanation of the successes of science. Radical constructivism, too, fails to explain these successes. Some radical constructivists have tried to offer theories more sympathetic to realism. For instance, Ernst von Glasersfeld sees science as a coherent ordering of experience, and appeals to Piagetian psychology as support. There are close similarities. But Piaget was also caught in a constructivist anti-realism, despite his attempt to evade it. Implications: The constructivist’s claim that scientific concepts and theories are generated by human minds is correct. But this important insight should not be used to deny realism, which is the best explanation of the many undeniable successes of science and engineering. (shrink)

Context: At present, we lack a common understanding of both the process of cognition in living organisms and the construction of knowledge in embodied, embedded cognizing agents in general, including future artifactual cognitive agents under development, such as cognitive robots and softbots. Purpose: This paper aims to show how the info-computational approach (IC) can reinforce constructivist ideas about the nature of cognition and knowledge and, conversely, how constructivist insights (such as that the process of cognition is the process of (...) life) can inspire new models of computing. Method: The info-computational constructive framework is presented for the modeling of cognitive processes in cognizing agents. Parallels are drawn with other constructivist approaches to cognition and knowledge generation. We describe how cognition as a process of life itself functions based on info-computation and how the process of knowledge generation proceeds through interactions with the environment and among agents. Results: Cognition and knowledge generation in a cognizing agent is understood as interaction with the world (potential information), which by processes of natural computation becomes actual information. That actual information after integration becomes knowledge for the agent. Heinz von Foerster is identified as a precursor of natural computing, in particular bio computing. Implications: IC provides a framework for unified study of cognition in living organisms (from the simplest ones, such as bacteria, to the most complex ones) as well as in artifactual cognitive systems. Constructivist content: It supports the constructivist view that knowledge is actively constructed by cognizing agents and shared in a process of social cognition. IC argues that this process can be modeled as info-computation. (shrink)

Context: The advent of a general artificial intelligence mechanism that learns like humans do would represent the realization of an old and major dream of science. It could be achieved by an artifact able to develop its own cognitive structures following constructivist principles. However, there is a large distance between the descriptions of the intelligence made by constructivist theories and the mechanisms that currently exist. Problem: The constructivist conception of intelligence is very powerful for explaining how cognitive development takes (...) place. However, until now, no computational model has successfully demonstrated the underlying mechanisms necessary to realize it. In other words, the artificial intelligence (AI) community has not been able to give rise to a system that convincingly implements the principles of intelligence as postulated by constructivism, and that is also capable of dealing with complex environments. Results: This paper presents the constructivist anticipatory learning mechanism (CALM), an agent learning mechanism based on the constructivist approach of AI. It is designed to deal dynamically and interactively with environments that are at the same time partially deterministic and partially observable. CALM can model the regularities experienced in the interaction with the environment, on the sensorimotor level as well, as by constructing abstract or high-level representational concepts. The created model provides the knowledge necessary to generate the agent behavior. The paper also presents the coupled agent environment system (CAES) meta-architecture, which defines a conception of an autonomous agent, situated in the environment, embodied and intrinsically motivated. Implications: The paper can be seen as a step towards a computational implementation of constructivist principles, on the one hand suggesting a further perspective of this refreshing movement on the AI field (which is still too steeped in a behaviorist influence and dominated by probabilistic models and narrow applied approaches), and on the other hand bringing some abstract descriptions of the cognitive process into a more concrete dimension, in the form of algorithms. Constructivist content: The connection of this paper with constructivism is the proposal of a computational and formally described mechanism that implements important aspects of the subjective process of knowledge construction based on key ideas proposed by constructivist theories. (shrink)

Purpose: In the paper, I discuss how Ernst Glasersfeld worked as a scientist on the project, Interdisciplinary Research on Number (IRON), and explain how his scientific activity fueled his development of radical constructivism. I also present IRON as a progressive research program in radical constructivism and suggest the essential components of such programs. Findings: The basic problem of Glasersfeld's radical constructivism is to explore the operations by means of which we assemble our experiential reality. Conceptual analysis is (...) Glasersfeld's way of doing science and he used it in IRON to analyze the units that young children create and count in the activity of counting. In his work in IRON, Glasersfeld first conducted a first-order conceptual analysis of his own operations that produce units and number, and then participated in a second-order analysis of the language and actions of children and inferred the mental operations that they use to produce units and number. Further, Glasersfeld used Piaget's concept of equilibration in the context of scheme theory in a second-order analysis of children's construction of number sequences and of more advanced ways and means of operating in the traffic of numbers. Research Implications: The scientific method of first- and second-order conceptual analysis transcends our work in IRON and it is applicable in any radical constructivist research program whose problem is to explore the operations by means of which we construct our conceptions. Because of the difficulties involved with introspection, conducting second-order conceptual analyses is essential in exploring these operations and it involves analyzing the language and actions of the observed. But conceptual analysis is only a part of the research process because the researchers are by necessity already involved in creating occasions of observation. The "experimenter" and the "analyst" can be the same person or they can be different people. Either case involves intensive and sustained interdisciplinary thinking and ways of working if the research program is to be maintained over a substantial period of time as a progressive research program. (shrink)

Context: Maturana’s published corpus is vast, and his publications span multiple venues, formats, and languages. For these and other reasons, the corpus is as complex as it is daunting in its scale. Problem: Over the last two decades, bibliographic data on Maturana’s publications had proliferated in terms of available resources, scope of coverage, and accessibility. However, as of 2011 the degree of accessibility was not matched by the inclusiveness, detail, and accuracy of the relatively few dedicated bibliographies upon which (...) most such resources relied. It had become time to update, consolidate, and better validate the core bibliographic data. Method: The five most comprehensive electronic bibliographies were merged and collated. The merged listing was then validated using the available evidence and a three-tiered set of evaluation criteria. Finally, the resultant merged and validated listing was augmented with previously unrecorded entries and data, subject to the same evidentiary constraints and evaluation criteria pertaining to the validation phase. Results: None of the five bibliographies in the starting set was comprehensive. All five contained ambiguities, missing details, discrepancies, and outright errors. The updated and consolidated listing presented here is the largest, most comprehensive, and most accurate compiled to date. Implications: The resultant bibliography offers a more complete and more reliable reference resource to both veteran Maturana scholars and newcomers to his work than previously existing bibliographies. (shrink)

Context: Johnson argues that because radical constructivism requires social constraints and therefore ontological assumptions, it is no different from constructive realism, which is comparatively mainstream. Results: While the distinction between these approaches appears slim, our concepts are not independent of us, and may need to change in spite of established traditions. Implications: Perhaps radical constructivism cannot be mainstream because it is essentially concerned with epistemological origins of concepts and consequently is not practical enough for the received consensus.

Context: Most constructivist discourse is situated at the philosophical-conceptual level, where arguments appeal to the intuition of the reader, while formal-computational models have only been taken into account to a very limited degree so far. Problem: Two types of problems need to be addressed: Synthetically, can constructivist concepts be turned into actual computational implementations? Can these be further conceptual developments in constructivist theory as such, or are they just an application thereof? Conceptually, does the notion of computation square with (...) constructivist approaches at all? Method: Paradigmatically, we discuss the meaning of “computational” in cognitive agents that comply with constructivist concepts. Also, we summarize the contributions. Results: From a constructivist point of view, the concept of “computational model” is ambiguous and depends on whether it is used in the sense of the computational(ist) theory of mind or simply as a tool. Implications: The insights presented in the contributions to this special issue point in the direction of a computational extension of constructivist approaches as well as a constructivist extension to computational approaches. However, while many of the questions we posed were discussed in the contributions and open peer commentaries, some of them were largely neglected and thus are subject to further discussion. (shrink)

Context: A number of objections that are frequently raised in the literature against radical constructivism, including: the charge of solipsism, allegations of self-refutation, social and moral reservations, and the accusation that RC cannot explain the success of science. Problem: These four objections are sought to be refuted. Results: 1. Solipsism is only troublesome against the background of a realist ontological perspective. 2. The truth-value of any proposition is only defined relative to some ontological context, thus self-refutation, as (...) constituting a logical problem, does not arise. 3. Any ethical argumentation derives from one’s own personal views on ethical matters: their construction being a personal responsibility such that no one else can tell a person how to construct the “right ethics.” 4. In the relativist ontology of radical constructivism, a scientific theory is regarded as a model imposed on natural phenomena; its success is due to the capabilities of its constructor/scientists. Implications: It is found that the objections are based on an (overt or tacit) adoption of the antithetical viewpoint of scientific realism. In other words, radical constructivism is being criticised for not promoting a realist ontology. (shrink)

Context: Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic social systems is increasingly receiving attention in the scholarly dispute about constructivism. Problem: The paper explores the transition from Kant’s “transcendental/empirical” to Luhmann’s “system/environment” distinction to provide a deepened understanding of Luhmann’s constructivist approach. Method: Luhmann’s construction of reality via the system/environment distinction is discussed with respect to preceding concepts provided by philosophical and system/cybernetic scholars such as Kant, Husserl, Piaget, von Glasersfeld, von Foerster, and Maturana & Varela. The innovativeness of Luhmann’s approach (...) is then critically evaluated. Results: Luhmann’s contribution to constructivism is innovative only in the context of his stringent theory architecture of autopoietic meaning-based systems. Implications: The text is a contribution to the positioning of this approach as part of the philosophical and systems/cybernetics constructivist heritage. (shrink)

Context: Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, poses challenges for teaching and learning insofar as the integration of various participating disciplines requires a reflective approach, considering and making explicit different epistemological attitudes and hidden assumptions and premises. Only few curricula in cognitive science face this integrative challenge. Problem: The lack of integrative activities might result from different challenges for people involved in truly interdisciplinary efforts, such as discussing issues on a conceptual level, negotiating colliding frameworks or sets of (...) premises, asking profound questions challenging one’s own paradigm, and differences in terminologies, as well as from the “personal” challenge of realising one’s own limits of knowledge and, hence, the need to trust in another person’s expertise. This implies that the proposed curriculum structure provides an “epistemic laboratory”: a space for experiencing and negotiating, as well as constructing different viewpoints in a trustful setting. Approach: A newly-designed interdisciplinary cognitive science curriculum is presented that is based on a constructivist epistemology. We suggest that a careful construction of the learning space is a necessary requirement. The MEi:CogSci curriculum is designed and structured in such a way that enables didactical measures that allow for collaborative construction of meaning by discussing concepts, methods and terminologies and also hidden assumptions. Findings: The experience with four cohorts of students has shown that a truly interdisciplinary approach to cognitive science demands a different attitude towards knowledge as well as towards teaching and learning on both sides: the teacher and the student. The research orientation promotes an understanding of knowledge as something that is actively constructed, rendering the role of the teacher that of a co-learner rather than a transmitter of knowledge, thereby also changing the responsibility of students. (shrink)

Context: Metaphysics of perception explores fundamental questions regarding the structure and status of the perceived world or appearance(s. By virtue of perception, the apparent world comes to existence. This, however, does not mean that the apparent world is a projection of mind, that it exists “in the head.” Implications: PL-metaphysics reconciles realism with constructivism. As such, it might be considered either an alternative to constructivism or an improvement and completion of this position. Constructivist content: The article refers (...) to non-Cartesian movements in contemporary philosophy, including radical constructivism, enactive and embodied cognition. Keywords: Perception, metaphysics, radical constructivism, realism, appearance, Jerzy Perzanowski, Plato, Gottfried Willhelm Leibniz, Ernst von Glasersfeld. (shrink)

Context: The theory of radical constructivism offers a tool for the evaluation of knowledge in general: especially with regard to its epistemic and ontological character. This applies in particular to knowledge that is non-cognitive, such as, e.g., ethical convictions. Problem: What impact can radical constructivism have on the topic of ethics? Specifically, how can ethical issues be resolved within a radical-constructivist epistemic approach? Method: I extend the theory of radical constructivism to include also items of non-cognitive (...) knowledge. This makes it possible to discuss ethical issues, which are non-cognitive, in a constructivist epistemic and ontological perspective. Some arguments against this conception of “strictly personal ethics” are discussed. Results: Radical constructivism is neutral on ethical issues, and thus cannot be invoked to endorse any particular ethical position. However, this causes no problem for the theory: the individual knower will construct her own ethical values and convictions, as part of her store of non-cognitive knowledge, in interaction with her environment (including other individuals. Hence ethical values cannot be argued in cognitive terms; and this elevates the knower into a position of personal responsibility with respect to ethical issues. Constructivist content: I focus on the role played by radical constructivism in the approach to cognitive vs. non-cognitive knowledge. The construction of knowledge (of any kind) emerges as a strictly personal enterprise. For instance, in the context addressed here, constructed non-cognitive knowledge forms a basis for the individual knower’s ethical position. (shrink)

Context: The main problem is the rather marginal status of radical constructivism within its core domains of brain research, cognition and learning. Problem: The basic goal is to provide a short history of radical constructivism and its institutionalization processes. Additionally, the article specifies critical conditions that should be met in order for radical constructivism to become a mainstream endeavor. Method: The main methods used are those of comparative historical research. Results: The main results lie in the (...) specification of missing elements that have blocked radical constructivism becoming a mainstream endeavor. Implications: The paper might serve as a common reference for necessary steps to be taken over the following years in order to move radical constructivism out of its current weak position. (shrink)

The practice-dependent approach to global justice makes a welcome attempt to steer a course between egalitarian liberal cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and statism and nationalism, on the other. In so doing, it seeks to reconcile the universality of justice with the particular role principles of justice play within the context of different social practices. In this paper, I argue, however, that the “practice turn” in theorising about justice has not gone far enough, either methodologically or substantively. Methodologically, it (...) is necessary to move beyond the residual positivism of the practice-dependent approach to an interpretive approach that takes account of the reflexive, developmental nature of social practices. Substantively, focusing on the reflexivity of social practices, and particularly practices of reflexive constitution-making, provides a framework for a republican approach to international justice concerned with reconciling Kant’s idea of the universality of justice with the emphasis on popular sovereignty of Rousseau and Hegel. (shrink)

Scientific practice is a type of social practice, and every enterprise of knowledge in general exhibits important social dimensions. But should the fact that scientific practice is born out of and tied to the collaborative efforts of the members of a social group be taken to affect the products of these practices as well? In this paper, I will try in to give an affirmative answer to this question. My strategy will be to argue that the aim of science is (...) partially determined by a socio-historical context and that this aim, together with the available background knowledge, stands behind a methodology that is responsible for empirically and aim-adequate theoretical results. (shrink)