In this paper, we determine whether illegal hunting should be construed as a crime of dissent. Using the Nordic countries as a case study where protest-driven, illegal hunting of protected wolves is on the rise, we reconsider the crime using principles of civil disobedience. We invoke the conditions of intentionality, nonevasion, dialogic effort, non-violence and appeal to parameters of reasonable disagreement about justice and situate the Nordic illegal hunting phenomenon at a nexus between conscientious objection, assisted disobedience and everyday (...) resistance. This examination leads us to contend that the crime has heretofore received an inadequate response limited to punishment and deterrence. This contention finds support in the worsening predicaments of illegal hunting following harsh sanctions and stigmatization. Although hunters publicize injustices through their crimes, we find that killing wolves as a means to deliberative ends disqualifies hunters’ dissent as legitimate disobedience, creating an obligation of deliberative uptake on the part of society. Nonetheless, in a critical contribution to the field of criminal justice, we argue that it is instead the conditions of deliberative suboptimality experienced by hunters that create this obligation of uptake. Hence, in order to fulfill this obligation, we contend that the burden falls on regulatory agencies to better articulate the justifications for the policies that coerce hunters. We also advocate creating novel institutions to provide hunters with effective opportunities for contesting wildlife conservation directives. (shrink)

The paper, written for a research handbook, critically surveys some fundamental philosophical, historical, and doctrinal issues in the crime of aggression. The two introductory sections set the theoretical issues in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and explain the origins of criminalizing aggression under the heading of “crimes against peace.” Section 3 explores an ambiguity between aggression as first use of force and aggression as unprovoked use of force, while section 4 discusses the doctrinal distinction between acts of (...) aggression and wars of aggression. Sections 5 and 6 turn to the theory of aggression. Section 5 examines modern versus early modern just war theorists’ views of just cause. Section 6 explores various theories of what exactly makes aggressive war so evil that it belongs in the pantheon of core crimes, side by side with genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes. The basic question is whether aggression is fundamentally a crime against states, a crime against human rights, or a crime against peace itself. I reject the first, statist, version, and endorse the human rights version. I examine three versions of the view that aggressive war is fundamentally about its human costs: that aggressive wars lead to atrocities (Trainin); that aggressive wars lead more generally to unjustified killings (Dannenbaum); and that aggressive wars lead to both unjustified killings by the aggressor, and to unnecessary killings that include the justified killings of aggressors’ troops by defenders (Mégret). As for crimes against peace, I argue that this theory of aggression’s evils comes in two “flavors,” one of which has justly been criticized by postcolonial writers, and one of which I think is legitimate. The former originates in Judge Pal’s famous dissenting opinion in the IMTFE, and argues that criminalizing aggression is a move by colonial powers to freeze the oppressive status quo. The more legitimate version is that in an age of catastrophically destructive weapons, the risks of escalation in armed conflict –the threat that conflicts will spiral into world wars–are simply too great in human terms. Thus, the legitimate version of “crimes against peace” is part and parcel of the human rights analysis. The final sections break new ground. Section 7 considers whether aggression is solely a leadership crime. Everyone agrees that it would be wrong to punish ordinary soldiers for the crime of aggression launched by their leaders. The questions is why, and it is not easy to answer. Examining it brings us to a contemporary dispute over which leaders can be prosecuted: only those who control or direct the aggressive policies (as per the ICC’s Rome Statute), or others as well, who “shape or influence” the policy without necessarily directing it (as the customary rule used to be formulated). I argue against any narrowing of the leadership clause. Section 8 explores the “paradox of immunity”: Under the legal principle of sovereign immunity, apex leaders are immune from prosecution in the courts of another state. But under the narrow leadership clause, only apex leaders can be prosecuted. Here I argue for a surprising conclusion: that in fact there never was a customary rule of immunity for the crime of aggression. If so, the paradox of immunity disappears. This resolution also helps cut the Gordian knot of a current debate about whether a relatively small subset of states (the EU, perhaps) can form an aggression tribunal and call it “international.”. (shrink)

Why do American ghettos persist? Decades after Moynihan’s report on the black family and the Kerner Commission’s investigations of urban disorders, deeply disadvantaged black communities remain a disturbing reality. Scholars and commentators today often identify some factor―such as single motherhood, joblessness, or violent street crime―as the key to solving the problem and recommend policies accordingly. But, Tommie Shelby argues, these attempts to “fix” ghettos or “help” their poor inhabitants ignore fundamental questions of justice and fail to see the urban poor (...) as moral agents responding to injustice. (shrink)

Proponents of punishing states often claim that such punishment would not distribute to members of the state, and so it would not subject innocent citizens – those who did not participate in the crimes, or dissented, or even were among the victims – to guilt by association. This essay examines three features of state punishment that might be said not to distribute to citizens: it is burdensome, it is intentionally so, and it expresses social condemnation. Ultimately, I contend that (...) when a state is punished, the burdens do distribute to citizens as intended, condemning burdens – that is, as punishment. Thus the nondistribution of punishment thesis fails as a response to the guilt-by-association objection. (shrink)

This article analyzes whether state repression in post—civil war situations can be explained by dynamics associated with previous civil wars. It claims that in post—civil war situations the state can more easily resort to indiscriminate repression against social groups, relying on information related to the civil war. Two civil war dynamics are tested: preemptive indiscriminate violence to eliminate opposition by the defeated population and retaliation for crimes committed during the war. Using data from the first decade of the Francoist (...) regime in Spain, the author found that civil war dynamics, and not actual dissent, explain most of the country’s postwar violence. (shrink)

Philosophers have had surprisingly little to say about the concept of a victim although it is presupposed by the extensive philosophical literature on rights. Proceeding in four stages, I seek to remedy this deficiency and to offer an alternative to the two current paradigms that eliminates the Othering of victims. First, I analyze two victim paradigms that emerged in the late 20th century along with the initial iteration of the international human rights regime – the pathetic victim paradigm and the (...) heroic victim paradigm. Holocaust victims are quintessential instances of the pathetic victim paradigm. They are marked by passivity and innocence in the face of overpowering force and unspeakable humanly inflicted suffering. Aung San Suu Kyi is an exemplar of the heroic victim paradigm – prisoners of conscience, in Amnesty International’s terms. Because heroic victims face off against the repressive power of the state to fight injustice, they are by no means passive, but they must be innocent of wrongdoing – that is, they must use nonviolent means of dissent – to qualify as heroic victims. Second, I problematize the asymmetrical conceptions of innocence that underwrite the two victim paradigms. Whereas the pathetic victim paradigm identifies innocence with passivity, the heroic victim paradigm countenances agentic victims and adverts to a universalist, absolutist stance on the limits of the legitimate use of state power to ascribe innocence to heroic victims. Both conceptions of innocence are out of keeping with well established social and legal practices regarding what constitutes coercive force and innocent victimhood. Consequently, there is reason to be skeptical of the two victim paradigms. Third, I identify two kinds of human rights violations and two categories of victims that AI defends despite their failure to fit the two paradigms – women trafficked into sex work and prisoners on death row. In many cases, women forced to do sex work are not innocent girls who are ignorant of the trafficking system and who helplessly fall prey to smugglers. They are desperately poor women who for that reason are willing to take enormous risks to try to relieve their own and often their families’ deprivation and suffering. Although these women act nonviolently for irreproachable reasons, they lack the public political agendas that characterize heroic victims. Unless non-fulfillment of subsistence rights is recognized as a form of overpowering force that inflicts severe, avoidable suffering, these women do not qualify as pathetic victims either. The victim paradigms pose an even greater obstacle to recognizing that the death penalty is a human rights violation and that death row prisoners are victims. Because a jury concluded that these individuals committed heinous, violent crimes, they are excluded by the heroic victim paradigm. Only if death row prisoners can be proven (usually through DNA evidence) not to have committed the crimes for which they were convicted can these individuals qualify as pathetic victims. In the absence of any reason to believe that they are innocent and especially if they are unrepentant, they are widely regarded as brutal victimizers of others who deserve no sympathy for, let along relief from, the suffering they “brought on themselves.” Finally, I confront the Othering of victims that results from the two victim paradigms, which leads many victims to eschew the label, thereby opting out of human right discourse. I propose revisions in the victim paradigms that eliminate the real-world exclusions they sponsor as well as the Othering of victims of human rights abuses. In particular, I endorse greater attention to what people and the institutions they create do to other people, and I favor a presumption that unnecessary and severe humanly inflicted suffering is a human rights violation. Moreover, I reject the innocence criterion embedded in the two paradigms and urge that it be replaced by a burdened agency criterion. These modifications better align the concept of a victim with a realistic understanding of human subjectivity and agency and allow for a more capacious understanding of who is a bearer of human rights and under what conditions right-holders become victims of rights violations. (shrink)

This study highlights various totalitarian and undemocratic practices in which Bangladesh’s current Awami League-led coalition regime engages. It shows that since its inception in early 2009, the regime has tried to mobilize and manipulate public support from within through—among other means—creating the discourse of “war crimes” and to obtain international support through the discourse of “Islamism” and terrorism. Although “a secular plan” to combat and replace “Islamism” may soothe the nerves of many in the international community, its deployment in (...) Bangladesh has paradoxically produced a dangerous culture of disappearances and extrajudicial killings, infringements on freedom of speech and the stifling of dissenting voices, and the interception of opposition programs and the torture of opposition leaders and activists. The regime has also made a mockery of the law and the country’s judicial system. Many commentators believe that the country’s law courts are now simply an extension of the regime’s political clout. In these circumstances, political repression continues unabated, and victims of persecution are left with inadequate legal recourse. In the name of combating “Islamic terrorism,” Bangladesh’s ruling regime has resorted to a reign of terror that is in many respects tantamount to what we know as fascism. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to set out the contours for a pedagogy of dissent, i.e., a pedagogical approach to religion that recognizes the role of dissent in bridging the conventional antagonism between religious and LGBTQ concerns for education. Seán Henry begins it with the view that a pedagogy conducive to this kind of work can be engaged with if the relation between education and religion is framed in radically conservative terms. From here, Henry inquires into the (...) pedagogical commitments necessary for dissent as a mode of bridge-building to occur. These commitments are (1) an orientation toward remembrance, understood less in terms of a commonality of religious identity and more in terms of a “structural condition of the present”; and (2) an embodied attention to the proximity of the other. The paper concludes with some thoughts on the nature of the pedagogical content that could be helpful in enacting these commitments. Henry suggests that pedagogies of dissent require theological content that (1) reworks past traditions, without justifying or downplaying their shortcomings; and (2) is explicit in its rejection of heteronormativity through a sensitivity to the lived experiences of LGBTQ people. (shrink)

Crimes of Reason brings together expanded and updated versions of some of Braude’s best previously published essays, along with new essays written specifically for this book.

Whereas ordinary legal documents are deployed as text documents for human consumption, AI & Law focuses on tackling the challenges surrounding the development of legal ontologies to assign meaning...

Results of studies that cast doubt on the safety of genetically modified crops have been published since the first GM crop approval for commercial release. These ‘alarming studies’ challenge the dominant view about the adequacy of current risk assessment practice for genetically modified organisms. Subsequent debates follow a similar and recurring pattern, in which those involved cannot agree on the significance of the results and the attached consequences. The standard response from the government—a reassessment by scientific advisory bodies—seems insufficient to (...) bring the debate to a satisfactory closure. The recurrence of the same debate every time an alarming study is published shows that science alone cannot solve the problem. We believe that further analysis is needed to investigate if and how we can prevent this repetitive cycle that creates frustration amongst all stakeholders. In this paper, we analyse the dynamics behind discussions which occur following alarming studies. We will use a selection of representative alarming GMO case studies to underpin our claim that it is likely that there will be a permanent difference in view of opinion that cannot be solved with more data or new facts. The current strategy of more research is a pitfall that is unlikely to solve this issue. Instead, the focus of the GM crop discussion should shift towards managing permanent different viewpoints and providing a platform for a broader conversation on agriculture and food production. (shrink)

The article presents the main results of theoretical review on the study of the phenomenon of affect and definition, classification, legal aspects of affective states, as well as the results of statistical processing of data on crimes in the state of affect are provided in Kazakhstan for the last 5 years according to the provided statistical data from the database of the General Prosecutor's Office of the CLSaSA (Committee on Legal Statistics and Special Accounts) of the RK. The relevance (...) of this study is the study of the phenomenon of affect in Kazakhstan, as well as the processing of statistical data on affective suicide, as little-studied and not sufficiently developed phenomena. It is important to note the difference in approaches to understanding the term physiological affects (PA), which actually has no direct analogue in the English-language bibliography. In some respects, the concept of an "irresistible impulse" based on passion corresponds to it. Both conditions can significantly affect a person's behavior and their ability to control their actions, while both can serve as mitigating circumstances in law. At the same time, physiological affect is usually short-lived and characteristic of sane individuals, while an irresistible impulse can be a chronic condition associated with a mental disorder. Subsequent research may be devoted to the issues of comparing the two above concepts from a forensic perspective. (shrink)

I hold that we could justifiably criminalize some threats, on account of the fact that issuing them renders one more likely to commit a crime. But I also point out that if we criminalize some threat-issuing, we will de facto criminalize some warning-issuing, which is unjust. So we ought not to criminalize any threat-issuing. Instead, we should criminalize rendering oneself more likely to commit a crime. This would allow us to punish all the threat-issuers we should want to punish. It (...) would also force us to punish some warning-issuers, but we would not be punishing them for their warning-issuing. (shrink)

Within Critical Management Theory as well as Critical Theory the possibility of individuals resisting taken for granted power asymmetries remains a highly debated subject. Intensified corporate culture programs seem to imply that within the sphere of labor, worker dissent is loosing ground. Based on a large interview material of critical cases, this notion is challenged. The interviewees mainly represent white-collar employees who spend more than half of their working hours on private activities. Studying the objectives and political ambitions behind (...) their extensive recalcitrance reveals a range of intentional structures that result in the same activity: time appropriation. First, time appropriation may be the effect of framed dissent ; a dissent intertwined with politically framed indignation. Second, the recalcitrance may spring from direct dissent in which personal indignation is the driving force whereas political formulations are not as prominent. Third, the activity of not doing your work while at work can be the effect of withdrawal in which case there is no motive other than avoiding work. Fourth, time appropriation may also be a (sometimes involuntary) consequence of adjustment : This occurs when the employee does not receive enough work assignments to fill the working day. I conclude by suggesting that the processes and leaps between these layers of dissent should be further studied. (shrink)

Terrorist organisations have increased and widened in Iraq in particular and the world in general in recent years. People have suffered a lot from these terrorist organisations due to their thirst for killing innocent civilians. The study aims to convey the suffering of innocent Iraqis caused by terrorist acts to the world. In order to achieve the aim, the research adopted Barthes’s framework to analyse the selected photographs. The researchers have selected iconic photographs for the analysis. The photographs are taken (...) from the main websites of the local, Arabic, and foreign media. The study found out that terrorism is the brutal enemy of all Iraqi societies including Sunnis, Shia, Kurds, Christians, and Yazidis. This research is a clear example that shows the world the extent of the suffering, pain, and fear Iraqi people are facing because of terrorism. (shrink)

In their efforts to apportion blame and channel retaliatory action in the post September 11 world, scholars and pundits alike have used a series of rhetorical techniques to great effect, manufacturing an image of Islam, the proverbial Other, that is highly conducive to the needs of liberal democracies but hardly a reflection of any one of the many 'authentic' Islams. This has largely been achieved by ignoring the many differences within the Islamic movement and asserting that social identities are based (...) on a stable, uniform kernel that moves unchanged throughout history and across the globe. This inevitably results in caricatures that have many uses; in portraits of dissenting groups it tends towards demonization. In this wide-ranging essay--which considers a variety of discursive sites, from contemporary film and art to the War on Terror--a scholar of religion asks the reader to consider how the classifications we use to name and thereby negotiate our social worlds--foremost among them the classification religion itself--are implicitly political and are being wielded in the public arena to carry out generally undisclosed/under analyzed social work. (shrink)

In chapter 6 of Attempts , Gideon Yaffe defends the thesis that it is “possible to attempt crimes of negligence” ( 2010 , p. 173). I am persuaded that he is right about this, provided that “attempt crimes of negligence” is read as (potentially misleading) shorthand for “attempt to bring it about that we commit crimes of negligence.” But I find certain parts of his defense unpersuasive. My discussion of those parts of his argument motivates the following (...) thesis: Not only can one attempt to bring it about that one commits a crime of negligence, but the attempt can be successful as well. (shrink)

One of the best-known fragments of a lost Greek drama is Critias' fr. 43F19 Snell, an extended rhesis from the play Sisyphus in which the protagonist narrates how once upon a time human life was squalid, brutal, and anarchistic; as a remedy men devised Law and Justice; this expedient served to check open wrongdoing but did not hinder secret crimes; then some very clever man hit upon the idea of inventing gods and the notion of divine retribution; thus secret (...) criminality was stopped by fear of the gods. The prevalent understanding of Critias' motives is largely determined by the commonest interpretation of this fragment. Some authorities think the notion of divine justice as merely a human device designed to serve a socially utilitarian purpose is Critias' own invention; others regard this passage as wholly or in part a réchauffé of the ideas of others, such as Protagoras, Democritus, or Diagoras of Rhodes. With few exceptions, it has until recently been thought that Critias was, if not a sophist himself, at least a cynical disciple of Machtpolitik who differed from similar thinkers such as Thrasymachus and Callicles only in that he translated ideas similar to those these figures are made to express in the pages of Plato into brutal political action. A handful of authorities have dissented from this view on the grounds that it is dangerous to attribute to a playwright sentiments placed in the mouths of his stage-characters . Recently the prevalent interpretation of fr. 19 Sn. has been subjected to additional criticism in two articles by German writers that may well be harbingers of a major reappraisal – long overdue, in the present writer's opinion – of Critias' beliefs. (shrink)

The work of Galileo has been strangely neglected in the English-speaking world. His trial by the Roman Inquisition has always had notoriety, but has hitherto been seriously known only through the English translation from the German of Karl von Gebler’s brilliant study, Galileo Galilei and the Roman Curia. Although Galileo is, above all men, the founder of the modern scientific age, his chef d’oeuvre, the Dialogues on the Two Great Systems of the World, has been practically unknown to English readers; (...) the English translation of 1661 by Thomas Salusbury being exceedingly rare. (shrink)

One such term is “the international community.†The literal sense is reasonably clear; the U.N. General Assembly, or a substantial majority of it, is a fair first approximation. But the term is regularly used in a technical sense to describe the United States joined by some allies and clients. (Henceforth, I will use the term “Intcom,†in this technical sense.) Accordingly, it is a logical impossibility for the United States to defy the international community. These conventions are illustrated well enough (...) by cases of current concern. (shrink)

Results of studies that cast doubt on the safety of genetically modified crops have been published since the first GM crop approval for commercial release. These ‘alarming studies’ challenge the dominant view about the adequacy of current risk assessment practice for genetically modified organisms. Subsequent debates follow a similar and recurring pattern, in which those involved cannot agree on the significance of the results and the attached consequences. The standard response from the government—a reassessment by scientific advisory bodies—seems insufficient to (...) bring the debate to a satisfactory closure. The recurrence of the same debate every time an alarming study is published shows that science alone cannot solve the problem. We believe that further analysis is needed to investigate if and how we can prevent this repetitive cycle that creates frustration amongst all stakeholders. In this paper, we analyse the dynamics behind discussions which occur following alarming studies. We will use a selection of representative alarming GMO case studies to underpin our claim that it is likely that there will be a permanent difference in view of opinion that cannot be solved with more data or new facts. The current strategy of more research is a pitfall that is unlikely to solve this issue. Instead, the focus of the GM crop discussion should shift towards managing permanent different viewpoints and providing a platform for a broader conversation on agriculture and food production. (shrink)

Although living conditions have improved throughout history, protest, at least in the last few decades, seems to have increased to the point of becoming a normal phenomenon in modern societies. Contributors to this volume examine how and why this is the case and argue that although problems such as poverty, hunger, and violations of democratic rights may have been reduced in advanced Western societies, a variety of other problems and opportunities have emerged and multiplied the reasons and possibilities for protest.

In this paper, I summarize and object to the “deep-self” view of moral responsibility as laid out by Susan Wolf in “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility.” My objection centers on how our intuitions regarding crimes of passion conflict with the conclusions drawn by the deep-self view. I then proceed to sketch out three possible responses which can be made by an adherent to the deep-self view and make my recommendations on how such adherents should proceed in further understanding (...) moral responsibility. (shrink)

Many have argued that allowing and encouraging public avenues for dissent and critical evaluation of scientific research is a necessary condition for promoting the objectivity of scientific communities and advancing scientific knowledge . The history of science reveals many cases where an existing scientific consensus was later shown to be wrong . Dissent plays a crucial role in uncovering potential problems and limitations of consensus views. Thus, many have argued that scientific communities ought to increase opportunities for dissenting (...) views to be heard and taken seriously. Such opportunities are necessary for both limiting the influence .. (shrink)

The shooting bias hypothesis aims to explain the disproportionate number of minorities killed by police. We present the evidence mounting in support of the existence of shooting bias and then focus on two dissenting studies. We examine these studies in light of Biddle and Leuschner’s “inductive risk account of epistemically detrimental dissent” and conclude that, although they meet this account only partially, the studies are in fact epistemically and socially detrimental as they contribute to racism in society and to (...) a social atmosphere that is hostile to science as scholars working on issues of racism come under attack. We emphasize this final point via recourse to Kitcher’s “Millian argument against the freedom of research.”. (shrink)

Systematic killing has long been associated with some of the darkest episodes in human history. Increasingly, however, it is framed as a desirable outcome in war, particularly in the context of military AI and lethal autonomy. Autonomous weapons systems, defenders argue, will surpass humans not only militarily but also morally, enabling a more precise and dispassionate mode of violence, free of the emotion and uncertainty that too often weaken compliance with the rules and standards of war. We contest this framing. (...) Drawing on the history of systematic killing, we argue that lethal autonomous weapons systems reproduce, and in some cases intensify, the moral challenges of the past. Autonomous violence incentivizes a moral devaluation of those targeted and erodes the moral agency of those who kill. Both outcomes imperil essential restraints on the use of military force. (shrink)

Summary In the trial of Galileo there is a small but significant discrepancy between the text of his condemnation by the Holy Office and the text of his recantation, which has been generally overlooked or ignored. The offence that he was required to recant was more serious than the one of which he had been found guilty. The most plausible explanation seems to be that the two texts were drawn up independently of each other by the Inquisitors and the Pope (...) respectively, and that the latter wished to deal more harshly with Galileo than the former. There is some independent evidence for this supposition. (shrink)

The article provides an outline of the basic principles and conditions of criminalisation of interferences with others’ property rights in the context of a specific context: a liberal, social democratic state, the legitimacy of which depends primarily on its impartiality between moral doctrines and the fair distribution of liberties and resources. I begin by giving a brief outline of the conditions of political legitimacy, the place of property and the conditions of criminalisation in such a state. With that framework in (...) place, I argue that interferences with others’ property rights should be viewed as violations of political duties stemming from institutions of distribution. I then discuss three implications of this view: the bearing of social injustice on the criminal law treatment of acts of distributive injustice; the expansion of criminalisation over the violation of distribution-related duties, which are considered criminally irrelevant under moral conceptions of criminalisation; and, finally, the normative significance of the modus operandi. (shrink)