The "myside bias'' in evaluating arguments is an empirically well-confirmed phenomenon that consists of overweighting arguments that endorse one's beliefs or attack alternative beliefs while underweighting arguments that attack one's beliefs or defend alternative beliefs. This paper makes two contributions: First, it proposes a probabilistic model that adequately captures three salient features of myside bias in argument evaluation. Second, it provides a Bayesian justification of this model, thus showing that myside bias has a rational Bayesian explanation under certain conditions.

The my-side bias is a well-documented cognitive bias in the evaluation of arguments, in which reasoners in a discussion tend to overvalue arguments that confirm their prior beliefs, while undervaluing arguments that attack their prior beliefs. The first part of this paper develops and justifies a Bayesian model of myside bias at the level of individual reasoning. In the second part, this Bayesian model is implemented in an agent-based model of group discussion among myside-biased agents. The agent-based model is then (...) used to perform a number of experiments with the objective to study whether the myside bias hinders or enhances the ability of groups to collectively track the truth, that is, to reach the correct answer to a given binary issue. An analysis of the results suggests the following: First, whether the truth-tracking ability of groups is helped or hindered by myside bias crucially depends on how the strength of myside bias is differentially distributed across subgroups of discussants holding different beliefs. Second, small groups are more likely to track the truth than larger groups, suggesting that increasing group size has a detrimental effect on collective truth-tracking through discussion. (shrink)

This paper introduces a comprehensive logical framework to reason about threshold-driven diffusion and threshold-driven link change in social networks. It considers both monotonic dynamics, where agents can only adopt new features and create new connections, and non-monotonic dynamics, where agents may also abandon features or cut ties. Three types of operators are combined: one capturing diffusion only, one capturing link change only, and one capturing both at the same time. We first characterise the models on which diffusion of a unique (...) feature and link change stabilise, whilst discussing salient properties of stable models with multiple spreading features. Second, we show that our operators (and any combination of them) are irreplaceable, in the sense that the sequences of model updates expressed by a combination of operators cannot always be expressed using any other operators. Finally, we analyse classes of models on which some operators can be replaced. (shrink)

This paper is about the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. The most common approaches to this aspect are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another). These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a reasoner to believe a currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describing a situation of alethic maximality, (...) where a reasoner fulfills all the alethic norms and could be used as a standard of rationality (as they are, in fact, used in some of these approaches). I propose a function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as inputand returns a numeric alethic value. Then I use this function to define a notion of alethic maximality that is satisfiable by finite reasoners (reasoners with cognitive limitations) and does not present problems with blindspots. Function α may also be used in alethic norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that may be applied to finite reasoners and do not present problems with blindspots. A result of this investigation isthat the project of providing purely alethic norms is defective. The use of function α also sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the lottery and the preface paradoxes, and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection. (shrink)

This book is a highly original and provocative contribution to democratic theory.

Some general, programmatic points about informal logic are addressed. The informal approach to argument analysis faces serious foundational problems which have been recognized by its practitioners – but informal logic has yet to come together as a clearly defined discipline. Another problem is the dilemma of the dialectician (Sextus Empiricus): informal logic is either trivial or powerless on its own (field expertise is needed). According to Johnson and Blair the central notion in theory of argument is cogency which replaces soundness. (...) An argument is cogent if and only if (i) its premises are rationally acceptable, (ii) its premises are relevant to its conclusion and (iii) its premises provide sufficient reason to accept the conclusion. I propose to understand cogency as a broader notion that includes deductively valid inferences. The criteria of cogency are simply the basic ideals of scientific methodology which requires a respect for available evidence and “reasonable” inference, an awareness of alternatives and a willingness to modify or reject those beliefs that fail to conform to the evidence. Informal logic in the sense of elementary scientific methodology is concerned with proper reasoning and not with proper dialogue. Informal logic involves non-trivial argumentativeskills and abilities applied to the subject area and accessible to every normally intelligent and educated person. (shrink)

All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit logical omniscience, which is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the models could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the models would describe maximum rationality, (...) which a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences for epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In this paper, I present an argument to this conclusion and discuss its consequences, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'. (shrink)

I raise some questions about differentiations between methods, checking methods, and appropriate methods in terms of their modal profiles. Melchior argues that there can be sensitive checking methods which are not safe. I try to show that such methods are epistemically deficient. I introduce restricted sensitivity (RS) and investigate its checking profile. RS with respect to a proposition _p_ requires that we consider more non-p worlds (not just the closest ones) but not those which are irrelevant (outside a sphere of (...) seriously possible worlds). Restrictedly sensitive methods (vacuously sensitive and strongly safe) based on the appropriate type of Bayesian reasoning might be sufficient for some kind of “modest” checking. Melchior defends a uniform account of checking based on insensitivity even in the case of necessary true propositions and he introduces the apparatus of impossible worlds. I argue that an unsatisfactory method for checking a necessary true proposition is a way of reaching a belief in the target proposition (different from the original one) which might easily not have delivered a true one. I also indicate some limitations of the idea that checking (and knowing) is essentially modal in character. (shrink)

Since Aristotle there are two main approaches in the explanation of begging the question (petitio): a dialectical mistake (an improper move in an argumentative dialogue) and an epistemic mistake. According to the latter begging the question is committed when the premises of an argument cannot be known independently of knowing the conclusion of the argument. Dialectical approaches use the notion of a commitment (acceptance, standpoint) and rules of dialogue as their basis. I propose a hybrid model, inspired by Jackson: the (...) rationale for introducing commitments and rules is epistemic. (shrink)

In this article I discuss the primacy that, following Sellars, Robert Brandom ascribes to the intersubjective and discursive space of reasons over all other processes in which the human mind is involved. I will compare Brandom’s perspective with that of the situated approach to the study of mind. At first, my aim is to show that the origin of intentionality has to be found in the sphere of sentience and the living body. Second, by comparing the enactivist account of language (...) that derives from the naturalization of Husserl’s phenomenology with the neo-pragmatist approach to the linguistic turn, I argue for a heuristic primacy owing to the linguistic practice of giving and asking for reasons. This allows me to reflect with a meta-philosophical approach on to what extent two families of views such as pragmatism and phenomenology, with their different variants, interact in the attempt to blend things together, i.e., nature and culture; mind and world; and what happens inside the human body and what happens outside it. (shrink)

Analyzing different works and in particular Habermas' reflection on Kant, the author reconstructs, first, his approach to international law and his political and legal cosmopolitanism. Second, he presents some critical observations on Habermas' cosmopolitanism in the context of his more general discursive theory of law and state. In this perspective, he discusses the problems of peace and of the role of the United Nations, the strategy of protection of human rights, and the question of world citizenship. He argues that Habermas' (...) cosmopolitanism is a radicalization of Kantian tradition based on a centralization of international power and a cosmopolitan law. Finally, he develops realist arguments in favour of a non‐globalistic conception of international law. (shrink)

Nietzsche est mort et c'est à nous à le faire vivre. Cet usage du texte n'est pas un retour à ce que Deleuze professait superbement : pour ce dernier, faire un enfant dans le dos (de Kant, de Bergson, voire de Nietzsche, même si Deleuze affirmait qu'avec ce dernier c'était l'inverse), c'était à la fois utiliser l'auteur pour lui faire dire ce qu'il n'avait explicitement pas dit, mais qui pouvait présenter un intérêt spéculatif, et, en même temps, dissimuler cet écart. (...) De fait, Deleuze disait "nous" ou "on", amalgamant ainsi sous le même pronom le commenté et le commentateur. Danilo Bilate, au contraire, revendique l'écart et le souligne tout au long de sa démonstration, rappelant ainsi sans cesse au lecteur que, s'il veut faire un enfant à Nietzsche, et si l'on nous permet de filer scabreusement la métaphore, c'est par-devant! Du même coup, là où Deleuze méprisait ouvertement toute philologie (jusqu'à ne pas même préciser les traductions utilisées), Danilo Bilate accorde à la terminologie nietzschéenne la plus grande attention. On interroge les textes pour ce qu'ils disent – car ils disent tout de même quelque chose par eux-mêmes si on veut bien les écouter. L'enfant qu'il s'agit de faire à Nietzsche en les écoutant est une éthique. Bertrand Binoche. (shrink)

Davies argues that the ontology of artworks as performances offers a principled way of explaining work-relativity of modality. Object oriented contextualist ontologies of art (Levinson) cannot adequately address the problem of work-relativity of modal properties because they understand looseness in what counts as the same context as a view that slight differences in the work-constitutive features of provenance are work-relative. I argue that it is more in the spirit of contextualism to understand looseness as context-dependent. This points to the general (...) problem—the context of appreciation is not robust enough to ground modal intuitions about objective entities. In general, when epistemology dictates ontology there is always a threat of anti-realism, scepticism and relativism. Davies also appeals to the modality principle—an entity’s essential properties are all and only its constitutive properties. Davies understands essentiality in a traditional way: a property P is an essential property of an object o iff o could not exist and lack P. Kit Fine has recently made a convincing case for the view that the notion of essence is not to be understood in modal terms. I explore some of the implications of this view for Davies’ modal argument for the performance theory. (shrink)

This volume articulates and develops new research questions and original insights regarding the philosophical dialogue between Hegel’s philosophy, his heritage, and contemporary phenomenology, including, among others, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur. The collection discusses methodological questions concerning the relevance of Hegel’s philosophy for contemporary phenomenology, addressing core issues revolving around the key concepts of history, being, science, subjectivity, and dialectic. The volume fills a gap in historiography, expanding the knowledge of the impact of Hegel's philosophy on contemporary philosophy and raising (...) new questions on the transformation of transcendental philosophy in post-Kantian philosophy. The contributions gathered in this volume shed new light on issues related to the problem of scientific method in philosophy, on the philosophy of history, as well as on the dimension of subjectivity. By providing critical insights into Hegel’s philosophy and contemporary phenomenology, the book opens up new research perspectives recommended to philosophers and scholars of different traditions, especially classical German philosophy, phenomenology, and history of Western philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, I adopt the problem of world-experience as a clue to tackling the issue of the transformation of Husserl’s phenomenology in the United States. Starting from Landgrebe’s article on the world as a phenomenological problem I distinguish those thinkers who see in Husserl’s treatment of the life-world the fundamental issue of phenomenology from those who, by contrast, describe phenomenology as an analysis of the given experience. Through a comparison between Farber and Schutz, I reflect on the ways to (...) conciliate the phenomenological method with a natural view of the world, and finally, referring to Gurwitsch’s perspective, I ask to what extent this sort of mundane phenomenology could deal with constitutive analyses. (shrink)

According to the article, Neurath's reflexive epistemology—expressed by the metaphor of the ship in need of reconstruction on the open sea—represents a philosophical alternative to the classical and contemporary forms of scientific realism and ethical cognitivism, including Popper's falsificationism. Against Quine's reductive interpretation of Neurath's boat argument as the basis for a 'naturalized epistemology,' the article maintains that the metaphor suggests the idea of an insuperable situation of linguistic and conceptual circularity. This prevents any attempt at self-foundation in scientific knowledge, (...) as well as in ethics and politics, and rules out any 'constructive philosophy' aiming to break circularity in pursuit of some methodological beginning. (shrink)

Analyzing Apel's proposal for positive tolerance in multicultural society, the author develops critical observations concerning, first, the distinction between negative and positive tolerance, second, the ethical foundation of positive tolerance and, finally, the semantic content of the notion.

I propose the notion of ‘epistemic sanity’, a property of parsimony between the holding of true but not false beliefs and the consideration of our cognitive limitations. Where ‘alethic value’ is the epistemic value of holding true but not false beliefs, the ‘alethic potential’ of an agent is the amount of extra alethic value that she is expected to achieve, given her current environment, beliefs, and reasoning skills. Epistemic sanity would be related to the holding of (true or false) beliefs (...) that increase the agent's alethic potential (relevant beliefs) but not of beliefs that decrease it (this is related to cognitive parsimony). Suspension of judgment, forgetting, and clutter avoidance are the main contributors to an agent's epistemic sanity, where this paper focuses on suspension. I argue that rational suspension favors the holding of true and relevant beliefs, which is not the case for the extremes of opinionation (no suspension) and skepticism (general suspension). In the absence of evidence, opinionated agents are often forced to rely on principles such as the principle of indifference, but suspension dominates indifference in terms of alethic value in some conditions. A rational agent would only find it beneficial to adopt skepticism if she considers herself to be an anti-expert about her entire agenda, but then ‘flipping’ beliefs maximizes expected alethic value in relation to skepticism. The study of epistemic sanity results in an ‘impure’ veritism, which can deal with some limitations of veritism (e.g., explaining the existence of false but relevant beliefs). (shrink)

Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book and accuracy arguments. These arguments assume that rationality requires agents to maximize practical or epistemic value in every doxastic state, which is evaluated from a subjective point of view (e.g., the agent’s expectancy of value). The accuracy arguments also presuppose that agents are opinionated. The goal of this paper is to discuss the assumptions of these arguments, including the measure of epistemic value. I have designed AI agents based (...) on the Bayesian model and a nonmonotonic framework and tested how they achieve practical and epistemic value in conditions in which an alternative set of assumptions holds. In one of the tested conditions, the nonmonotonic agent, which is not opinionated and fulfills neither probabilism nor conditionalization, outperforms the Bayesian in the measure of epistemic value that I argue for in the paper (α-value). I discuss the consequences of these results for the epistemology of rationality. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la noción de amor en la filosofía de Spinoza a través del Tratado de la reforma del entendimiento, el Tratado breve y la Ética. El amor en Spinoza debe contextualizarse en su fenomenología crítica de los afectos y su teoría del conocimiento. Así es posible mostrar que, para Spinoza, cómo se ama —activa o pasivamente— es más importante que una distinción normativa entre objetos de amor correctos o incorrectos. Esta interpretación sobre el amor en Spinoza es coherente (...) con las premisas éticas y el monismo ontológico de su filosofía, y con su afirmación de que el amor es también una actividad de la Sustancia. (shrink)

Metaphorical statements surprise us as literal falsehoods, but the interpretation reveals a special motive for the figurative use of the language. Donald Davidson objects to nonliteral meaning: “to suppose a metaphor can be effective only by conveying a coded message is like thinking a joke or a dream makes some statement which a clever interpreter can restate in plain prose.” Taking this remark as my starting point I analyze interpretative strategies for metaphors, jokes, riddles and counterfactual conditionals – all of (...) them involve an initial incongruity and most of them require a certain blending of two different domains. I suggest that the ability to interpret metaphors is based on our ability to apprehend a special cognitive content associated with metaphors. (shrink)

I discuss Smokrović’s work on the normativity of logic (Smokrović 2017, Smokrović 2018). I agree that the classical formal logic is not an adequate model for real-life reasoning. But I present some doubts about his notion of deductive logic and his proposal to model such reasoning in non-monotonic logic. No branch of formal logic by itself is likely to capture real-life inferential links (reasoned-inference). I use the logic of relevance as my case study and extend the pessimistic morals to modern (...) systems of non-classical logic. Finally, I propose a more lax conception of normativty: there is a connection between logical assessment in the broad sense (as sanctioned by the notion of cogency) and the evaluation and criticism of reasoning. (shrink)

The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views about declarative memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate representation causally connected to an earlier experience. In the simulation theory, remembering involves an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process. I investigate how to construe detailed versions of these theories that correctly classify memory errors as misremembering or confabulation. Neither causalists nor simulationists have paid attention to (...) memory-conjunction errors, which is unfortunate because both theories have problems with these cases. The source of the difficulty is the background assumption that an act of remembering has one target. I fix these theories for those cases. The resulting versions are closely related when implemented using tools of information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides us with insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors have a privileged position. (shrink)

In the present essay, I will compare Hegel’s and Husserl’s conceptions of the history of philosophy. I will show how Hegel and Husserl recast Kant’s idea of a philosophizing history of philosophy in two different ways. Both Hegel and Husserl share the conviction that reason unfolds itself in history. Nonetheless, whereas Hegel identifies the history of philosophy with the contingent manifestation of the self-actualization of the Idea, Husserl develops a critical history of ideas. On the one hand, Hegel conceives of (...) the history of philosophy as a complex whole and each determinate philosophy as interpreting a specific articulation of the logical deduction of thought-determinations. On the other hand, perhaps influenced by Windelband, Husserl appropriates the Kantian thesis according to which the objects of the history of reason represent specific constellations of problems. (shrink)

In the present essay I would like to explore the different meanings of the emotion named Schadenfreude from a perspective integrating Plato’s and Aristotle’s moral philosophy with the analyses of phenomenological anthropologists such as Scheler, Plessner and Blumenberg. In the first half of my essay I will focus on Aristotle’s distinction between, on the one hand, a pleasure at another’s misfortune which does not necessarily obstruct pity in the opposite position and provides relief from indignation, and a malicious pleasure at (...) another’s misfortune understood as the opposite of envy. In the second half of the essay I will examine the link between the joy involved in Schadenfreude and laughter by asking whether and to what extent this contemplative emotion contributes to the emergence of a theoretical attitude. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo busca investigar possíveis significações da palavra “imagem”, que se depreendam dos textos de Deleuze sobre as artes, através de uma pesquisa filológica que respeita a cronologia de suas obras. Essa noção de imagem, fundamental para a Estética, aparece em seus comentários sobre Proust, o cinema, Bacon e Beckett, principalmente, seja com o uso do termo “imagem”, seja com os termos “signo” e “ideia”, àquele correlatos. Assim, verifica-se um vácuo na década de 70, de modo que, se a (...) noção de signo é estudada na década anterior, ao tratar de Proust, e a de ideia, em Diferença e repetição, o tema “imagem” é retomado nas duas décadas subsequentes com toda a intensidade, ao abordar a pintura de Bacon, o universo cinematográfico e a obra teatral e televisiva de Beckett.: The present article seeks to investigate possible meanings of the word “image” that can be deduced from Deleuze’s writings on the arts, respecting the chronology of his works. The notion of image, which is fundamental to aesthetics, appears in Deleuze’s comments on Proust, the cinema, Bacon, and Beckett, whether with the use of the term “image” or with the correlated terms “sign” and “idea”. Thus, there is found in Deleuze’s writings a vacuum in the 1970’s: the notion of sign is studied in the previous decade when dealing with Proust and the notion of idea in Difference and repetition, and the theme of image is intensely taken up again in the following two decades in dealing with Bacon’s painting, the cinematographic universe, and Beckett’s theater and television work. (shrink)

Um argumento recorrente contra a liberalização do aborto parte do pressuposto de que, desde o momento da fertilização, seres humanos são indivíduos (no sentido de serem algo que necessariamente ocorre em uma entidade apenas). Nesse artigo, argumento que esse não é um caso a partir da possibilidade de geminação monozigótica e do fato de identidades serem necessárias. Defendo as premissas do argumento e discuto as possíveis interpretações de sua conclusão. Argumento que a interpretação completa da conclusão desse argumento está em (...) concordância com a conclusão de um argumento semelhante, que parte de noção de organismo. -/- ENGLISH: A common pro-life argument assumes that humans are individuals (in the sense that they necessarily occur in one entity only) from the moment of fertilization. In this paper, argue that this is not the case because of the possibility of monozygotic twinning and the necessity of identities. I will defend the premises of the argument and discuss the possible interpretations of its conclusion. I argue that the correct interpretation of the conclusion of this argument is in agreement with the conclusion of a similar arguments from the notion of organism. (shrink)

The debate on compatibility of fate with human responsibility lasted for five hundred years of the Stoic school and it is still with us in terms of contemporary discussions of the compatibility of determinism and free will. Chrysippus was confronted with the standard objection: It would be unjust to punish criminals “if human beings do not do evils voluntarily but are dragged by fate.” Chrysippus uses the famous illustration of the cylinder and cone, which cannot start moving without being pushed. (...) However, when this has happened, from then on the cylinder rolls and the cone spins by their own nature. I explore the cylinder analogy and its modern relevance from the perspective of thought experiments. I argue that it helps us isolate the main causal factor (the locus of responsibility and agency) and insulate this factor from the rest of the causal history and causal background. The cylinder/cone analogy is a compatibilistic tool, a kind of “mental distillation” in which we separate in imagination those aspects (causal factors) which are relevant for moral responsibility from those which are not. I suggest, somehow anachronistically, but in line both with contemporary compatibilism and Chrysippian views on causal structure of agency that the actions of an agent are “fated” from the theoretical point of view, but they are up to her from the practical point of view. (shrink)

El artículo presenta una arqueología conceptual y al mismo tiempo una crítica de lo que el autor llama el "globalismo jurídico". El autor se refiere a la línea de pensamiento filosófico y teórico jurídico que se podría remontar a la obra Zum ewigen Frieden de Kant. Esta línea se desarrolló en nuestro siglo, primero, en la construcción teórico-jurídica de Hans Kelsen y después, en Italia, en el "pacifismo jurídico" de Norberto Bobbio. Esta posición está también presente en la cultura angloamericana (...) contemporánea (los Western globalists) y es defendida, en la cultura alemana, por Jürgen Habermas. La crítica del autor se concentra en dos aspectos del "globalismo jurídico": en primen lugar, se crítica la concepción racionalista y normativista del derecho a la que el iusglobalismo nos remite y que atribuye al derecho una eficacia regulativa de los fenómenos sociales que éste en la realidad no alcanza a garantizar; en segundo lugar, se denuncia el prejuicio etnocéntrico de una cultura jurídica que, al mismo tiempo que elabora un proyecto de unificación del mundo, se muestra indiferente respecto a tradiciones culturales, políticas y jurídicas distintas de la occidental. (shrink)

L’article est un examen critique de l’œuvre de Cornelius Castoriadis. Tout au long de sa vie, aussi bien par l’histoire des idées que par l’étude des situations socio-historiques, sa préoccupation centrale a toujours été d’établir le caractère créateur de l’action humaine. Mais dans sa réhabilitation intellectuelle de la création, Castoriadis donne en dernière instance le primat aux dimensions psychiques sur les dimensions sociales. C’est ce parcours et les principales conséquences sociologiques qu’il induit qui retiendront notre attention. Son œuvre permet à (...) la fois de souligner les limites d’une vision déterministe de l’action, et les insuffisances d’une perspective prométhéenne d’analyse de la vie sociale.The article is a critical study of Cornelius Castoriadis’s work. All his life, due to the history of ideas as well as the study of sociohistorical situations, his main concern has always been to establish the creative nature of human action. Yet in his intellectual rehabilitation of creation, Castoriadis finally favours psychic dimensions over social dimensions. This article focuses on this evolution and on its main sociological consequences. His work allows us to underline the limits of a determinist vision of action and the shortcomings of a promethean analysis of social life. (shrink)

Backtracking counterfactuals are problem cases for the standard, similarity based, theories of counterfactuals e.g., Lewis. These theories usually need to employ extra-assumptions to deal with those cases. Hiddleston, 632–657, 2005) proposes a causal theory of counterfactuals that, supposedly, deals well with backtracking. The main advantage of the causal theory is that it provides a unified account for backtracking and non-backtracking counterfactuals. In this paper, I present a backtracking counterfactual that is a problem case for Hiddleston’s account. Then I propose an (...) informational theory of counterfactuals, which deals well with this problem case while maintaining the main advantage of Hiddleston’s account. In addition, the informational theory offers a general theory of backtracking that provides clues for the semantics and epistemology of counterfactuals. I propose that backtracking is reasonable when the state of affairs expressed in the antecedent of a counterfactual transmits less information about an event in the past than the actual state of affairs. (shrink)

A teoria minimalista da verdade consiste em todas as instâncias do esquema 'φ é verdadeira sse φ' e na afirmação de que nossa aceitação (primitiva) dessas instâncias é suficiente para explicar nossas atitudes em relação a todas sentenças envolvendo ‘verdade’. Filósofos têm apontado que o minimalismo tem dificuldades em explicar nossas atitudes em relação a generalizações envolvendo ‘verdade’ bem como em lidar com instanciações contraditórias do esquema para sentenças paradoxais (ex. paradoxo do mentiroso). Proponentes do minimalismo apresentam soluções para esses (...) problemas. Nesse artigo, argumento que essas soluções entram em conflito, analiso algumas estratégias para resolver esse conflito e concluo que o minimalismo não pode evitar conflitos desse tipo mantendo seu caráter minimalista. ENGLISH: The minimalist theory of truth consists in all the instances of the schema 'φ is true iff φ' and in the claim that our primitive acceptance of these instances explains our attitudes in relation to propositions involving truth. Philosophers point that minimalism has difficulties in explaining our attitudes in relation to generalizations involving truth and with the contradictory instances of the schema for paradoxal sentences (e.g. the liar). Minimalists present solutions to these problems. In this paper, I argue that these solutions conflict with each other. I analyze some strategies to resolve this conflict. I conclude that minimalism cannot avoid the conflict maintaining it minimalist character. (shrink)

This book casts new light on the process that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led to a profound transformation in the study of nature with the emergence of mechanistic philosophy, the new mixed mathematics, and the establishment of the experimental approach. It is argued that modern European science originated from Hellenistic mathematics not so much because of rediscovery of the latter but rather because its “applied” components, namely mechanics, optics, harmonics, and astronomy, and their methodologies continued to be transmitted (...) throughout the Middle Ages without serious interruption. Furthermore, it is proposed that these “applied” components played a role in their entirety; thus, for example, “new” mechanics derived not only from “old” mechanics but also from harmonics, optics, and astronomy. Unlike other texts on the subject, the role of mathematicians is stressed over that of philosophers of nature and the focus is particularly on epistemological aspects. In exploring Galilean and post-Galilean epistemology, attention is paid to the contributions of Galileo’s disciples and also the impact of his enemies. The book will appeal to both historians of science and scientists. (shrink)

Nesse artigo, investigo três casos de erros de memória obtidos em laboratório como forma de avaliar as principais teorias da memória : teoria causal e simulacionismo. De maneira geral, a teoria causal afirma que alguém lembra de algo somente se sua lembrança está numa relação causal adequada com uma experiência anterior daquilo que é lembrado. No simulacionismo, essa relação não é necessária. Os casos de erros de memória investigados são DRM, “perdido no shopping” e erro de conjunção de conteúdo. Esses (...) casos são difíceis para a teoria causal, especialmente em sua versão direta, mas não para o simulacionismo. Minha hipótese é a de que essa dificuldade se deve especificamente ao critério causal adotado. ENGLISH: I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not necessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, “lost in the mall”, and memory -conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of the causal requirement. (shrink)

Putnam’s semantic argument against the BIV hypothesis and Sosa’s argument against dream skepticism based on the imagination model of dreaming share some important structural features. In both cases the skeptical option is supposed to be excluded because preconditions of its intelligibility are not fulfilled (affirmation and belief in the dream scenario, thought and reference in the BIV scenario). Putnam’s reasoning is usually interpreted differently, as a classic case of deception, but this feature is not essential. I propose to interpret BIV’s (...) utterances as cases of reference failure best captured by truth-value gaps. Both anti-skeptical strategies are then vulnerable to the same type of objections (how do we know what state we are in or how do we know what kind of language do we speak). (shrink)

How to accommodate the possibility of lucky true beliefs in necessary (or armchair) truths within contemporary modal epistemology? According to safety accounts luck consists in the modal proximity of a false belief, but a belief in a true mathematical proposition could not easily be false because a proposition believed could never be false. According to Miščević modal stability of a true belief under small changes in the world is not enough, stability under small changes in the cognizer should also (and (...) primarily) be considered. I argue for a more traditional modal reliabilism based on the critical question: how easy is it for a belief to be false, given the way it was formed? A belief (a priori or a posteriori) is then agent-lucky when based on a specific method which might easily lead to a false belief in the target proposition. Miščević suggests a unifying approach in terms of virtue epistemology. It seems to me that this approach, if successful, will undermine the project that he started with: formulate an anti-luck condition in the frame of a modal theory of luck. (shrink)

The consequence argument of van Inwagen is widely regarded as the best argument for incompatibilism. Lewis’s response is praised by van Inwagen as the best compatibilist’s strategy but Lewis himself acknowledges that his strategy resembles that of Lehrer. A comparison will show that one can speak about Lehrer-Lewis strategy, although I think that Lewis’s variation is dialectically slightly stronger. The paper provides a response to some standard objections of incompatibilists to the Lehrer-Lewis reply.