The evidence most of us have for our beliefs on global climate change, the extent of human contribution to it, and appropriate anticipatory and mitigating actions turns crucially on epistemic trust. We extend trust or distrust to many varied others: scientists performing original research, intergovernmental agencies and those reviewing research, think tanks offering critique and advocating skepticism, journalists transmitting and interpreting claims, even social systems of modern science such as peer-reviewed publication and grant allocation. Our personal experiences and assessments of (...) evidential indicators themselves may be buttressed significantly by trust, not just in. (shrink)

This paper defends an ‘opt-out’ scheme for organ procurement, by distinguishing this system from ‘presumed consent’ (which the author regards as an erroneous justification of it). It, first, stresses the moral importance of increasing the supply of organs and argues that making donation easier need not conflict with altruism. It then goes on to explore one way that donation can be increased, namely by adopting an opt-out system, in which cadaveric organs are used unless the deceased (or their family) registered (...) an objection. Such policies are often labelled ‘presumed consent’, but it is argued that critics are right to be sceptical of this idea—consent is shown to be an action, rather than a mental attitude, and thus not something that can be presumed. Either someone has consented or they have not, whatever their attitude to the use of their organs. Thankfully, an opt-out scheme need not rest on the presumption of consent. Actual consent can be given implicitly, by one's actions, so it is argued that the failure to register an objection (given certain background conditions) should itself be taken as sign of consent. Therefore, it is permissible to use the organs of someone who did not opt out, because they have—by their silence—actually consented. (shrink)

Whole-genome analysis and whole-exome analysis generate many more clinically actionable findings than traditional targeted genetic analysis. These findings may be relevant to research participants themselves as well as for members of their families. Though researchers performing genomic analyses are likely to find medically significant genetic variations for nearly every research participant, what they will find for any given participant is unpredictable. The ubiquity and diversity of these findings complicate questions about disclosing individual genetic test results. We outline an approach for (...) disclosing a select range of genetic results to the relatives of research participants who have died, developed in response to relatives? requests during a pilot study of large-scale medical genetic sequencing. We also argue that studies that disclose individual research results to participants should, at a minimum, passively disclose individual results to deceased participants? relatives. (shrink)

If musical works are abstract objects, which cannot enter into causal relations, then how can we refer to musical works or know anything about them? Worse, how can any of our musical experiences be experiences of musical works? It would be nice to be able to sidestep these questions altogether. One way to do that would be to take musical works to be concrete objects. In this paper, we defend a theory according to which musical works are concrete objects. In (...) particular, the theory that we defend takes musical works to be fusions of performances. We defend this view from a series of objections, the first two of which are raised by Julian Dodd in a recent paper and the last of which is suggested by some comments of his in an earlier paper. (shrink)

Democracy is commonly associated with political equality and/or majority rule. This essay shows that these three ideas are conceptually separate, so the transition from any one to another stands in need of further substantive argument, which is not always adequately given. It does this by offering an alternative decision-making mechanism, called lottery voting, in which all individuals cast votes for their preferred options but, instead of these being counted, one is randomly selected and that vote determines the outcome. This procedure (...) is democratic and egalitarian, since all have an equal chance to influence outcomes, but obviously not majoritarian. (shrink)

Thanks to David Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), we all know how to handle indexicals like ‘I’. ‘I’ doesn’t refer to an object simpliciter; rather, it refers to an object only relative to a context. In particular, relative to a context C, ‘I’ refers to the agent of C. Since different contexts can have different agents, ‘I’ can refer to different objects relative to different contexts. For example, relative to a context cwhose agent is Gottlob Frege, ‘I’ refers to Frege; relative to (...) a context 0* whose agent is Alexius.. (shrink)

We characterize pairs of monotone generalized quantifiers Q1 and Q2 over finite domains that give rise to an entailment relation between their two relative scope construals. This relation between quantifiers, which is referred to as scope dominance, is used for identifying entailment relations between the two scopal interpretations of simple sentences of the form NP1–V–NP2. Simple numerical or set-theoretical considerations that follow from our main result are used for characterizing such relations. The variety of examples in which they hold are (...) shown to go far beyond the familiar existential-universal type. (shrink)

The current note clarifies why, in committees, the prior probability of a correct collective choice might be of particular significance and possibly should sometimes even be the sole appropriate basis for making the collective decision. In particular, we present sufficient conditions for the superiority of a rule based solely on the prior relative to the simple majority rule, even when the decisional skills of the committee members are assumed to be homogeneous.

Background Voluntary assisted dying became lawful in Victoria, the first Australian state to permit this practice, in 2019 via the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic). While conscientious objection by individual health professionals is protected by the Victorian legislation, objections by institutions are governed by policy. No research has been conducted in Victoria, and very little research conducted internationally, on how institutional objection is experienced by patients seeking assisted dying. Methods 28 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 32 family caregivers and (...) one patient about the experience of 28 patients who sought assisted dying. Participants were interviewed during August-November 2021. Data from the 17 interviews (all with family caregivers) which reported institutional objection were analysed thematically. Results Participants reported institutional objection affecting eligibility assessments, medication access, and taking the medication or having it administered. Institutional objection occurred across health settings and was sometimes communicated obliquely. These objections resulted in delays, transfers, and choices between progressing an assisted dying application and receiving palliative or other care. Participants also reported objections causing adverse emotional experiences and distrust of objecting institutions. Six mediating influences on institutional objections were identified: staff views within objecting institutions; support of external medical practitioners and pharmacists providing assisted dying services; nature of a patient’s illness; progression or state of a patient’s illness; patient’s geographical location; and the capability and assertiveness of a patient and/or caregiver. Conclusions Institutional objection to assisted dying is much-debated yet empirically understudied. This research found that in Victoria, objections were regularly reported by participants and adversely affected access to assisted dying and the wider end-of-life experience for patients and caregivers. This barrier arises in an assisted dying system that is already procedurally challenging, particularly given the limited window patients have to apply. Better regulation may be needed as Victoria’s existing policy approach appears to preference institutional positions over patient’s choice given existing power dynamics. (shrink)

This book fills that gap, providing an in-depth analysis of Foucault's thought as it pertains to a range of different legal themes, such as: the opposition between 'law' and 'the juridical'; the problem of moral and legal judgment; the ...

Some of the problems that Harry Collins has faced in his general framework for theorizing tacit and explicit knowledge are, I will argue, due to an inadequate formulation of the problem. It is this inadequacy that has led to pseudo-problems regarding the ‘tacit’ in general. What-is-more, the vehicle for his theory as objectified in ‘strings’ is symptomatic of the problem that his division of tacit and explicit faces. I will argue that the philosophy of Martin Heidegger will give us adequate (...) conceptual tools to re-think Collins’ general framework, to help us understand the origins of these problems, and possibly indicate a way to solve them. To which ends I suggest that either the tacit Collins has in mind is either not truly tacit or it is not tacit enough. (shrink)

Utilitarianism directs us to act in ways that impartially maximize welfare or utility or at least aim to do that. Some find this view highly compelling. Others object that it has intuitively repugnant results; that it condones evildoing and injustice; that it is excessively imposing and controlling; that it is alienating; and that it fails to offer meaningful practical guidance. In this 'Little Debates' volume, James Lenman argues that utilitarianism's directive to improve the whole universe on a cosmic time scale (...) is apt to lead it down a path of imperious moral overreach. Lenman further maintains that the project ultimately shipwrecks upon an extreme lack of epistemic humility in framing the determinants of what is morally right and wrong beyond the limits of what we can ever hope to know. Utilitarianism thus leaves us morally clueless. In contrast, Ben Bramble seeks to develop and defend an original form of utilitarianism, less vulnerable than other, more familiar versions to a number of important objections (including those raised by Lenman). Bramble's form of utilitarianism aims to avoid other unappealing results by presenting it as a claim about what we have the most reason to do and not as a theory of right action (which Bramble urges we should understand quite differently by referencing what would motivate virtuous people). The two authors debate various forms of this longstanding ethical theory, arguing for very different conclusions, in a way that is sure to leave readers with new views of their own moral thoughts and lives. Key Features: Focuses on one of the dominant ethical theories debated by moral philosophers today Clearly written, free of jargon and technicality, highly accessible to students Accessibly addresses questions of great importance to anyone wishing to grow in understanding of human moral life Provides a glossary of key terms that are bolded in the main text Includes section summaries that give an overview of the main arguments and a comprehensive bibliography for further reading Important issues discussed include: welfare; value; right action; virtue; impartiality; obligations to non-human animals; the badness of human extinction; the happiness of future people; the ethics of climate change; the long term future; and the moral significance of the limits to what we can know. (shrink)

This article contends that close attention to music/language analogies allows us to perceive how language attempts to gain an understanding of its own cognitive nature. The article does so by closely reading Paul de Man's ‘The Rhetoric of Blindness’, an essay in which de Man suggests that a detailed look at the analogies between musical and linguistic structures made by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Essay On the Origin of Languages helps reveal how literary criticism becomes ‘blind’ to its own metaphysical (...) presuppositions. Scrutinizing the terms on which de Man engages Rousseau, the article argues that surface inconsistencies in de Man's use of musical concepts reveal a deeper pattern of ‘deafness’ which turns his notion of ‘empty’ subjectivity against itself. It concludes with some suggestions for how we might further develop the study of music/language analogies, a subject that has the potential to invigorate our understanding of the non-conceptual aspects of linguistic meaning. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. If critical theory is to challenge capitalism’s corrosive commodification of labor and nature, then it should renew a sense of labor as a real bodily power with an internal telos, along the lines of an Aristotelian normativity of praxis. Recent thought however either rejects normativity altogether, or pits normative praxis against labor uncritically reduced to its commodification. Habermas’s work provides an exemplary case of the latter. While he rightly found the ‘production paradigm’ of (...) normativity problematic, his acceptance of the reified form of labor as total led to a severe divorce of praxis from the emerging contents of the body and nature. Although Aristotle also separated praxis from poiesis, his thought nevertheless harbors views of their dialectical integration without falling into the problematic production paradigm. Here the normativity of praxis emerges from poiesis understood non-reductively as the form of the self-organizing body already transforming nature and itself toward higher interactions. (shrink)

Most realist theories of legitimacy are internalist theories, meaning that they regard legitimacy as a function of how subjects view their own rulers. However, some realists seek to qualify their internalism by holding that legitimacy is not simply a matter of whether subjects accept their rulers’ exercise of power. According to one such view, legitimacy requires that rulers’ power be ‘acceptable’ to subjects, in the sense that it can be justified on the basis of values that they accept. Call this (...) acceptability internalism. In this article, I argue that realists should reject acceptability internalism. I first argue that acceptability internalism has the disadvantage of separating the concept of legitimacy from the interests of rulers. I then consider two arguments in favour of acceptability internalism, and argue that both should be rejected. (shrink)

This article studies the monotonicity behavior of plural determinersthat quantify over collections. Following previous work, we describe thecollective interpretation of determiners such as all, some andmost using generalized quantifiers of a higher type that areobtained systematically by applying a type shifting operator to thestandard meanings of determiners in Generalized Quantifier Theory. Twoprocesses of counting and existential quantification thatappear with plural quantifiers are unified into a single determinerfitting operator, which, unlike previous proposals, both capturesexistential quantification with plural determiners and respects theirmonotonicity (...) properties. However, some previously unnoticed factsindicate that monotonicity of plural determiners is not always preservedwhen they apply to collective predicates. We show that the proposedoperator describes this behavior correctly, and characterize themonotonicity of the collective determiners it derives. It is proved thatdeterminer fitting always preserves monotonicity properties ofdeterminers in their second argument, but monotonicity in the firstargument of a determiner is preserved if and only if it is monotonic inthe same direction in the second argument. We argue that this asymmetryfollows from the conservativity of generalized quantifiers innatural language. (shrink)

Wat is betekenis? -- Betekenissystemen -- Metafysica: terug naar de bron.

A number of authors criticise opt-out (or ‘deemed consent’) systems for failing to secure valid consent to organ donation. Further, several suggest that mandated choice offers a more ethical alternative. This article responds to criticisms that opt-out does not secure informed consent. If we assume current (low) levels of public awareness, then the explicit consent secured under mandated choice will not be informed either. Conversely, a mandated choice policy might be justifiable if accompanied by a significant public education campaign. However, (...) if this entitles us to assume that members of the public are informed, then an opt-out system would also be justified in the same circumstances. The alleged advantages of mandated choice seem to rest on an unfair comparison, between mandated choice with a public education campaign and an opt-out system without one. While it may be that some countries with opt-out systems should do more to inform their publics, I see no reason to assume that this cannot be done. Indeed, advocates of mandated choice seem committed to thinking it possible to raise awareness. If opt-out systems adopt the same methods, such as writing to every individual, this should also address concerns about whether consent is informed. (shrink)

The stakeholder model of the firm (SMF) was originally conceived as a theory of strategic management, intended to remedy the biases of the stockholder model. As the model became more normative, it effectively turned into a theory of business ethics. This paper reproduces material focusing on the contribution of Professor Ed Freeman to stakeholder theorizing. These portions were extracted from a longer manuscript which argues that: 1. SMF generated a series of new questions which constitute some of the defining problems (...) of business ethics at present; yet 2. its inherent company-centered perspective prevents it from resolving these defining problems. (shrink)

This paper addresses the phenomenon of judicial greatness by developing a general concept of greatness and applying it to law. Under the view offered in the paper, greatness is connected to theoretical or methodological diversification. When applied to adjudication, this means that great judges are revered because they successfully make a prima facie case for their novel adjudicative methods. This is not a judicial duty but rather a voluntary project. However, once a judge succeeds in making such a prima facie (...) case, he is exempt from other judicial duties. This thesis challenges many theories of judicial duty, which do not allow normative room for supererogatory actions in law. The paper demonstrates these claims by discussing two paradigmatic great judges – Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Holmes. (shrink)

In the regime of Anglo-American tort law, every person has a responsibility to comport him- or herself with “due care” in going about day-to-day activities so as not to imperil the health, safety, or general welfare of others. The gold standard for determining what constitutes due care in any particular situation is what a reasonable person, similarly situated, would do. Determinations of due care are necessarily fact specific. Nevertheless, the general objective is to strike an appropriate balance between an unrealistically (...) high standard of caution and one that fails to take into account the known or foreseeable risks of any human endeavor. The same standard applies to individuals regardless of their age, gender, race, and level of education or economic status. The standard also applies to fictional “persons” such as corporations. The usual or prevailing custom and practice in an industry or occupation may provide relevant evidence of what constitutes “due care” in the activities common to it, but that evidence can be effectively overcome or rebutted by competent, credible evidence that the custom and practice either diverges from what it has been asserted to be or that the custom and practice is itself unsafe or otherwise poses an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Until quite recently, a singular exception to this general principle of tort law was made for the medical profession. We will consider this exception in the next section. (shrink)