String theory has played a highly influential role in theoretical physics for nearly three decades and has substantially altered our view of the elementary building principles of the Universe. However, the theory remains empirically unconfirmed, and is expected to remain so for the foreseeable future. So why do string theorists have such a strong belief in their theory? This book explores this question, offering a novel insight into the nature of theory assessment itself. Dawid approaches the topic from a (...) unique position, having extensive experience in both philosophy and high-energy physics. He argues that string theory is just the most conspicuous example of a number of theories in high-energy physics where non-empirical theory assessment has an important part to play. Aimed at physicists and philosophers of science, the book does not use mathematical formalism and explains most technical terms. (shrink)

It has been argued in Dawid that physicists at times generate substantial trust in an empirically unconfirmed theory based on observations that lie beyond the theory’s intended domain. A crucial role in the reconstruction of this argument of “non-empirical confirmation” is played by limitations to scientific underdetermination. The present paper discusses the question as to how generic the role of limitations to scientific underdetermination really is. It is argued that assessing such limitations is essential for generating trust in any (...) theory’s predictions, be it empirically confirmed or not. The emerging view suggests that empirical and non-empirical confirmation are more closely related to each other than one may expect at first glance. (shrink)

The current status of string theory is assessed quite differently by most of the theory’s exponents than by the majority of physicists in other fields. While the former tend to have a high degree of trust in string theory’s viability, the latter largely share a substantially more skeptical point of view. This article argues that the controversy can be best understood in terms of a paradigmatic rift between the two sides over their understandings of theory assessment. An attempt is made (...) to evaluate the two conflicting paradigms on their own terms. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute Vienna Circle, University of Vienna, Universtitätscampus Spitalgasse 2‐4, Hof 1, 1090 Vienna, Austria; e‐mail: richard.dawid@univie.ac.at. (shrink)

Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H (...) confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis. 1 Introduction2 The Conceptual Framework3 The No Alternatives Argument4 Discussion I: A Quantitative Analysis of the No Alternatives Argument5 Discussion II: The Number of Alternatives and the Problem of Underdetermination6 ConclusionsAppendix AAppendix B. (shrink)

In the absence of empirical confirmation, scientists may judge a theory's chances of being viable based on a wide range of arguments. The paper argues that such arguments can differ substantially with regard to their structural similarly to empirical confirmation. Arguments that resemble empirical confirmation in a number of crucial respects provide a better basis for reliable judgement and can, in a Bayesian sense, amount to significant \textit{non-empirical} confirmation. It is shown that three kinds of non-empirical confirmation that have been (...) specified in earlier work do satisfy those conditions. (shrink)

This article investigates the implications of string theory for the conception of scientific theory confirmation. The classical understanding of theory confirmation is based on the assumption that scientific theory building is underdetermined by the available empirical data. Several arguments are presented, which suggest a devaluation of this ‘principle of scientific underdetermination’ in the context of string theory. An altered conception of scientific progress emerges that is not based on the notion of theory succession.

String theory currently is the only viable candidate for a unified description of all known natural forces. This article tries to demonstrate that the fundamental structural and methodological differences that set string theory apart from other physical theories have important philosophical consequences. Focussing on implications for the realism debate in philosophy of science, it is argued that both poles of that debate face new problems in the context of string theory. On the one hand, the claim of underdetermination of scientific (...) theory by the available empirical data, which is a pivotal element of empiricism, loses much of its plausibility. On the other hand, the dissolution of any meaningful notion of an external ontological object destroys the basis for conventional versions of scientific realism. String theory seems to suggest an intermediate position akin to Structural Realism that is based on a newly emerging principle, to be called the principle of theoretical uniqueness. (shrink)

Bradley develops some theory of the linear opinion pool, in apparent contradiction to results of Dawid et al.. We investigate the sources of these contradictions, and in particular identify a mathematical error in Bradley that invalidates his main result.

We develop a mathematical and interpretative foundation for the enterprise of decision-theoretic (DT) statistical causality, which is a straightforward way of representing and addressing causal questions. DT reframes causal inference as “assisted decision-making” and aims to understand when, and how, I can make use of external data, typically observational, to help me solve a decision problem by taking advantage of assumed relationships between the data and my problem. The relationships embodied in any representation of a causal problem require deeper justification, (...) which is necessarily context-dependent. Here we clarify the considerations needed to support applications of the DT methodology. Exchangeability considerations are used to structure the required relationships, and a distinction drawn between intention to treat and intervention to treat forms the basis for the enabling condition of “ignorability.” We also show how the DT perspective unifies and sheds light on other popular formalisations of statistical causality, including potential responses and directed acyclic graphs. (shrink)

It is argued that the high degree of trust in the Higgs particle before its discovery raises the question of a Bayesian perspective on data analysis in high energy physics in an interesting way that differs from other suggestions regarding the deployment of Bayesian strategies in the field.

According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson’s argument only applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other version, which resembles the form in which the argument was initially presented by Putnam and Boyd, remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show that it is valid. Finally, (...) we demonstrate that the use of subjective priors is consistent with the realist implication of the NMA and show that a core worry with respect to the suggested form of the NMA can be dispelled. (shrink)

The subjective Everettian approach to quantum mechanics presented by Deutsch and Wallace fails to constitute an empirically viable theory of quantum phenomena. The decision theoretic implementation of the Born rule realized in this approach provides no basis for rejecting Everettian quantum mechanics in the face of empirical data that contradicts the Born rule. The approach of Greaves and Myrvold, which provides a subjective implementation of the Born rule as well but derives it from empirical data rather than decision theoretic arguments, (...) avoids the problem faced by Deutsch and Wallace and is empirically viable. However, there is good reason to cast doubts on its scientific value. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine Jizang’s theory of knowledge and truth in terms of contemporary philosophy. Firstly, I present the main areas of Madhyamaka thought, especially those concerning human knowledge and cognition, enunciated in Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartani. Secondly, I raise the issue of the acceptance of Madhyamaka in the area of Chinese thought, which provides us with the question of the inception and development of the sānlùn zōng – the Three Treatises School. Thirdly, I expound the main points (...) and key notions of Jizang’s philosophy: the crucial concepts of the “refutation of erroneous views as the illumination of right views” and “the Four Levels of the Two Kinds of Truth”. I try to explicate and develop these ideas in terms of modern epistemology, which in the first instance is related to the Münschausen trilemma. (shrink)

We discuss the proposal by Sebens and Carroll to derive the Born rule in Everettian quantum mechanics from a principle they call ‘ESP-QM’. We argue that the proposal fails: ESP-QM is not, as Sebens and Carroll argue, a ‘less general version’ of an independently plausible principle, ESP, and can only be motivated by the empirical success of quantum mechanics, including use of the Born rule. Therefore, ESP-QM cannot have the status of a meta-theoretical principle of reasoning and provides no viable (...) basis for deriving the Born rule. (shrink)

Some people endorse a view called incompatibilism, which states that free will is incompatible with determinism. No free action could possibly be determined, they think. More informatively, incompatibilists think it is impossible that someone’s freely acting be causally guaranteed to happen by things that occur before she freely acts. Some people hold a view called libertarianism, which states both that incompatibilism is true and that someone actually performs a free action. Other people reject incompatibilism. They hold to compatibilism, which is (...) the view that it is possible that previous happenings in the world could absolutely causally guarantee—that is, could cause in a deterministic way—that someone freely acts. In this chapter, I argue that libertarianism is, for the time being at least, the most sensible view. (shrink)

In response to a collection of essays in Jonathan Kvanvig's (1996) Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, Alvin Plantinga notices that certain Gettier-style examples undermine his (1993b) canonical account of epistemic warrant as delineated in Warrant and Proper Function. In hopes to clarify how his account survives Gettier's purchase, he (1996; 2000) argues that a belief has warrant sufficient for knowledge only when produced in a favorable cognitive mini-environment. In Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga (2000) (...) specifies a condition required for a cognitive mini-environment's favorability. I argue that this condition falls prey to counterexample. Then I investigate a possible solution, which I reason fails as well. (shrink)

Sometimes you make a choice. Whether or not you made it was up to you. The choice was free. But how can this be? A scientific view of the world may leave no room for free choice. Free will literature continually explodes. Yet experts still focus on control or on a power to do otherwise. Sadly, they neglect another intuitive feature of free will: being an underived source or ultimate originator. When acting freely, one is a self-determined, self-directed, sole author (...) of change. Surprisingly, though the literature is replete with this pre-theoretic feature of free will, virtually no one makes rigorous use of it when constructing arguments. Equipped with fresh research, this book contends that agent-causation—currently an unpopular theory—deserves serious reconsideration. Only agent-causation accounts for ultimate origination, and popular objections fail under rigorous scrutiny. This book is tightly argued. It challenges and deepens recent advances in free will scholarship made by Peter van Inwagen, Robert Kane, Carl Ginet, Randy Clarke, Stewart Goetz, Tim O’Connor, and others. (shrink)

We survey a variety of possible explications of the term “Individual Risk.” These in turn are based on a variety of interpretations of “Probability,” including classical, enumerative, frequency, formal, metaphysical, personal, propensity, chance and logical conceptions of probability, which we review and compare. We distinguish between “groupist” and “individualist” understandings of probability, and explore both “group to individual” and “individual to group” approaches to characterising individual risk. Although in the end that concept remains subtle and elusive, some pragmatic suggestions for (...) progress are made. (shrink)

The universal acceptance of atomism in physics and chemistry in the early 20th century went along with an altered view on the epistemic status of microphysical conjectures. Contrary to the prevalent understanding during the 19th century, on the new view unobservable objects could be ‘discovered’. It is argued in the present paper that this shift can be connected to the implicit integration of elements of meta-empirical theory assessment into the concept of theory confirmation.

We provide a philosophical reconstruction and analysis of the debate on the scientific status of cosmic inflation that has played out in recent years. In a series of critical papers, Ijjas et al. have questioned the scientificality of the current views on cosmic inflation. Proponents of cosmic inflation have in turn defended the scientific credentials of their approach. We argue that, while this defense, narrowly construed, is successful against Ijjas et al., the latter's reasoning does point to a significant epistemic (...) issue that arises with respect to inflation. A broadening of the concept of theory assessment is needed to address that issue in an adequate way. (shrink)

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest systematyczny namysł i próba oceny badań Dariusza Kuboka nad krytycyzmem, związanych z monografią Krytycyzm, sceptycyzm i zetetycyzm we wczesnej filozofii greckiej, która problematyzuje krytycyzm z perspektywy filozoficznej i prezentuje nowy paradygmat interpretacyjny wczesnej filozofii greckiej. Artykuł składa się z trzech części. Pierwsza przybliża część dorobku publikacyjnego Polskiego Badacza, będącego drogą do jego głównego dzieła. Druga omawia problem, metodę i strukturę opus magnum. Trzecia poddaje ocenie badania, a także ich znaczenie z perspektywy filozoficznej oraz ogólnohumanistycznej.

This article is an attempt of representing St. Augustine's struggle against the greatest problems of Christian ethics, namely, the problem of evil. After the introduction of the philosophical grounds of the problem, we will turn to the outline of the way the Bishop of Hippo has gone through in the quest of the rational explanations for the existence of evil. An analysis of Augustine's works has shown that he lost his hope to find any sensible answer to this question with (...) the lapse of time, and abandoned himself to an almost blind faith. The Saint leaves us all by ourselves with this anxious question about evil. (shrink)

In this introduction we accomplish two things. First, we attempt to get clear about what we mean by the term 'free will'. Second, we introduce a philosophical puzzle known as the metaphysical problem of free will.

David Lewis [1973] offers a possible worlds approach to a theory of counterfactuals. He attempts to specify necessary and sufficient conditions according to which a given counterfactual is true or false. This MA Thesis surveys Lewis's theory of counterfactuals in detail. Although for the most part I defend Lewis's account from several objections, in the final chapter I reason that his theory is susceptible to skepticism, which threatens any philosophical theory that relies on Lewis's theory to distinguish between non-paradigmatically true (...) and false counterfactuals. As for the more sympathetic portion of my project, while I show how Lewis's canonical account cannot handle some paradigmatically false counterfactuals--viz., those containing true components--I try to repair his analysis in the spirit of Alan Penczek [1997]. I then discuss Lewis's extension or enhancement to his original theory, which he gives in order to foil an objection advanced by Kit Fine [1975] and Jonathan Bennett [1984]. Finally, I outline and raise several worries inherent in Bennett's rival theory. As for the less then sympathetic section of this paper, I exploit arguments put forward by G. Lee Bowie [1979] as well as by Daniel Krasner and Mark Heller [1994], which are designed to undermine any systematic procedure to circumscribe Lewis's crucial three-place comparative similarity relation between possible worlds. (shrink)

Progress in elementary particle physics in recent decades has changed the status of the visible phenomena in the context of scientific research. Empiricist positions in philosophy of science, which put particular emphasis on the pre-eminence of the visible regime, are affected by this development. In spite of its less radical claims, constructive empiricism turns out to run into more serious problems than straightforward instrumentalism. The constructive empiricist’s emphasis on the scientist’s aims makes it essential for her to provide a satisfactory (...) motivation for scientific inquiry. This, however, seems difficult to achieve on an empiricist basis in the case of elementary particle physics. (shrink)

It is argued that the evolution of fundamental microphysics throughout the twentieth century is characterised by two interrelated developments. On the one hand, the experimental signatures which confirm theoretical statements are moving towards the fringes of the phenomenal world and, at the same time, leave increasingly wide spaces for entirely theoretical reasoning with little or no empirical interference. On the other hand, assessments of limitations to scientific underdetermination gain importance within the theoretical process.

W 1957 r. powstało Towarzystwo Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich (TRZZ), którego celem było przybliżanie informacji na temat ziem leżących na wschód od Odry i Nysy Łużyckiej, które przyłączono do Polski po II wojnie światowej. Towarzystwo od 1959 r. posiadało swoją filię w Wyższej Szkole Pedagogicznej, a od 1967 r. także w Wyższej Szkole Inżynierskiej w Opolu. Skupieni w nich studenci uczestniczyli m.in. w wykładach i konferencjach poświęconych kwestii przed- i powojennych związków ziem zachodnich z polskością oraz problemowi dążeń RFN i ich (...) sojuszników do przywrócenia tych terenów zwierzchności niemieckiej. Studenci organizowali także wyjazdy i imprezy rozrywkowe. Działalność obu kół studenckich wygasła w 1970 r., po tym jak rozwiązano TRZZ. (shrink)

Archaeologists have been interested in Hollywood films for a few decades. What basically interested them was the theme of how cinema misperceives the practice of archaeology and its object of study (the past). In this paper I focus on How to Train Your Dragon (2010), 3-D animated film about Vikings for children. A film is always already a meta-film. Every film is, to use Hegelian distinction, a story in itself, presents more or less coherent story. At the same time, a (...) film is for itself, a meta-film, a meta-story which reflects on and encapsulates a more general context part of which is a particular film. In this paper both levels are scrutinised with regard to How to Train Your Dragon. My attention is paid especially to the ideological aspects of the film which presents a story about some vision of the past. It is an attempt of showing how archaeology, or more generally, the past is used to mask and stage at the same time elements of contemporary politics. (shrink)

Although Karl Jaspers was not a practicing Christian, a religion has always been a very important part of his considerations. The philosopher rejected the truth of revelation, but believed that faith can be very important part of human life. What we call “philosophy of religion” in Jaspers thought is not reflection about religious revelation, but consist of inquires about faith in that revelation. Author tried to ascertain if on the ground of Jaspers’s philosophy, religion, not being true in scientific sense, (...) can be true in other sense and if so – what sense of truth would it be. In wider perspective the question is: what “the truth of religion” means? Author shows similarities and dissimilarities between religious faith and Jaspers' concept of philosophical faith. (shrink)

Odczytywanie filozoficznego przedsięwzięcia Locke’a przede wszystkim jako krytyki kartezjańskiego natywizmu przysłania zwykle napięcia, jakimi obciążona jest myśl Anglika, oraz skutkuje przemilczeniem sporej części stojących za nią motywów. Choć nie zamierzam w prezentowanym tekście całkowicie zerwać z tą popularną wykładnią, chciałbym zaproponować ujęcie wolne od właściwych jej uproszczeń. Dzięki temu możliwe będzie ukazanie złożoności stosunku filozofii Locke’a do podstawowych idei natywizmu, wydobycie sprzecznych interesów, które Locke chciałby dzięki swojej refleksji pogodzić, oraz zasygnalizowanie w zakończeniu znaczenia wypracowanych przez niego rozwiązań dla późniejszych (...) form antropologicznego dyskursu. (shrink)

The recent studies on the relations between humanism or humanists and jurisprudence convince that Reneaissance, especially in XVIth century, when the national states began to raise, belonged to the periods of increased interest in the issue of law. Although Erasmus was not a layer, nor he introduced in any of his works a complete theory of law, he maintained close relations with many leading theoreticians of the law and jurists and sometimes spoke in the legal discussions of his age. Among (...) hist most important works concerning the matter of law were: Institutio principis Christiani, Ratio seu Methodus verae theologiae, Christiani matrimonii institutio, De interdicto esu carnium and Ecclesiastes. In the paper I’m going to concentrate on this latter work, in which Erasmus discusses the significance of preaching, preacher and widely understood Christian rhetoric. In the Ecclesiastes Erasmus touches the law subject with the special emphasis on historical character of law and relations between the divine law, the law of Christ and the law of Nature. After a short discussion about his understaning of law I will concentrate on the essential differentiation between the letter of law and the spirit of law, and I will point at proposed by Erasmus ways of introduction of law into human life. Erasmus, on the one hand, escaped a rigidity and abstraction of law and, on the other, he neutralised an aspect of the coercion of law. In his solution Erasmus appreciated the political dimension of preaching and acknowledged preacher as a more important guide of the people, than ruler. I’m going to interpret the Erasmian concept of preaching as an rhetorical mean of introduction of law in analogical way to “introduction” proposed by Plato in his Nomoi. (shrink)

The philosophy of Confucius has often been accused of lacking classical definitions of its core concepts. However, as I shall argue, Confucius systematically used nonclassical definitions—to be precise, operational ones. The notion of operational definition comes from Percy Bridgman’s The Logic of Modern Physics and means that the definiendum is defined by a set of operations that results in determining the meaning of the term in question. In the case of Confucian argumentation, operational definitions are mostly nominal and, in contrast (...) to unambiguous methods of measurement, also context-dependent. This results in there being various yet not mutually inconsistent definitions of one term, and in “paradigmatic examples” playing a crucial role. As I show, this mode of defining things had major implications for the content of Confucius’ thought. In fact, many of its forms could be traced back to other Chinese philosophers, including those of non-Confucian provenance. (shrink)

The paper provides a presentation and motivation of the concept of non-empirical theory confirmation. Non-empirical theory confirmation is argued to play an important role in the scientific process that has not been adequately acknowledged so far. Its formalization within a Bayesian framework demonstrates that non-empirical confirmation does have the essential structural characteristics of theory confirmation.

Scholars in diverse academic disciplines discuss the ways in which evidence is conceived, used, and manipulated in their own fields. They explore the possibilities for cross-disciplinary fertilisation and ask if it is possible or desirable to develop general multidisciplinary criteria and methods for studying and handling evidence.

Author: Lipski Dawid Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE’S PHILOSOPHY SYSTEM (Władysława Tatarkiewicza analiza systemu filozofii Arystotelesa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 521-534 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE’S Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The paper attempts to present and critique the original analysis of Aristotle’s philosophy system, especially the layout and meaning of basic concepts in this system, which was performed by Władysław Tatarkiewicz in his (...) dissertation. The author, trying to conceive the overall philosophy of Aristotle through analysis of its key concepts, advanced thesis that Aristotle’s philosophical views on the “science of being” do not form a single compact system, but rather a plural and multi-layered model, in which each of the individual “layers” has an appropriate system of concepts. Although this diversity causes certain pluralism of principles within the system, there is one point – νοũς, which remains the principle uniting the whole order. It is the guarantor of order, unity of the system, but at the same time it also allows differences of entities. Divine νοũς becomes the last word in metaphysics. Keywords: Władysław Tatarkiewicz, metaphysics of Aristotle’s. (shrink)

The discovery of the Higgs particle required a signal of 5σ significance. The rigid application of that condition is a convention that disregards more specific aspects of the given experiment. In particular, it does not account for the characteristics of the look elsewhere effect in the individual experimental context. The paper relates this aspect of data analysis to the question as to what extent theoretical reasoning should be admitted to play a role in the assessment of the significance of empirical (...) data. (shrink)

In this paper I analyse the problem of free will and determinism as it pertains to the Austrian School of Economics. I demonstrate that despite the fact they subscribe to the concept of causality,...

String theory has by now maintained a highly influential position in high energy physics for more than a quarter of a century. The present article analyses the reasons for the considerable trust exponents of string theory have in their theory even though it has neither found empirical confirmation nor a complete formulation up to this point. It is argued that this trust can be understood in terms of an emerging new conception of theory assessment that relies strongly on the identification (...) of limitations to the underdetermination of scientific theory building. The second part of the paper makes the point that another conspicuous element of string theoretical reasoning, the prominent role of the notion of a final theory, can be understood in terms of this altered notion of theory assessment as well. (shrink)