This paper concerns a collection of rough-hewn flat stelae excavated from the precinct of Zeus Meilichios in Selinus, Sicily between 1915 and 1926, a majority with two heads or busts, one male and one female, carved at their tops. These crudely fashioned idols are unique in their iconography. They combine the flat inscribed Punic stela with the Greek figural tradition, with some indigenous features. Their meaning is totally obscure – especially since they lack any literary reference. No comparable monuments have (...) been found in ancient Mediterranean cult. The twin stelae were often set up above a collection of burnt rodent and bird bones, ashes, lamps, broken and burnt pottery and terracotta figurines, as a memorial of a sacrifice. The stelae were the objects of a gentilicial cult, similar to that posited for the inscribed “Meilichios stones” with which they shared the Field of Stelae of Zeus Meilichios. The theory advanced here interprets these diminutive stelae as the objects of domestic cult. It was customary in many parts of the ancient Mediterranean, from the Bronze Age down to the Roman period, to venerate household or family gods who protected the health and the wealth of the family. They were thought to embody the spirits of the ancestors and could at times be identified with the gods of the state religion. This divine couple whose effigies were dedicated in the Field of Stelae over a period of four centuries, into the third century, cannot be claimed as Greek or Punic deities. What these nameless protectors of the family were called we cannot say: Meilichios and Meilichia, Father and Mother, or Lord and Lady of the household? As the objects of such a personal domestic cult, their names might have differed with each family. (shrink)

Die Schutzgottheit der Stadt Mesambria war Apollon, dessen Epiklesen hier jedoch unbekannt sind. Ich bringe hier eine Argumentation zur Identifizierung einer solchen Epiklese. Apollon Agyeus, der Torhüter und Übelabwehrer, gilt als dorischer Gott der Einwanderung, Eroberung und Inbesitznahme. Der Agyeus wird auch mittels Steinsymbolen desselben Namens dargestellt . In Mesambria fehlt die unmittelbare Bezeugung des Agyeuskultes, es kommen aber Funde aus der Stadt Anchialos zur Hilfe. Diese, ursprünglich ein phrurion der ionischen Nachbarstadt Apollonia, wurde von Mesambria erobert und blieb in (...) der hellenistischen Zeit unter deren Herrschaft oder zumindest Einfluß. Die Kulte in Anchialos wiederspiegeln jene von Mesambria, wie angesichts des Kultes der Demeter Malophoros und jenem der ägyptischen Gottheiten gezeigt werden kann. Aus Anchialos sind Münzen mit der Darstellung des agyeus-Pfeilers bekannt. Das Vorkommen von Symbolen eines ausgesprochen dorischen Kultes läßt sich durch den Einfluß Mesambrias erklären, woraus hervorgeht, daß es den Kult des Apollon Agyeus auch dort gab.The main god of Mesambria was Apollo, whose cult epithets are however unknown here. I bring here arguments for the identification of one such epithet. Apollo Agyeus, the guardian of gates and repeller of evil, was also the Dorian god of immigration, conquest and occupation. The Agyeus was also represented by means of stone symbols of the same name . At Mesambria, the direct attestation of the Agyeus cult is lacking, but we can use discoveries from the city of Anchialos. This was initially a phrurion of the Ionian neighbour city of Apollonia; it was conquered by Mesambria and during the Hellenistic epoch it remained under Mesambrian rule or at least influence. The cults of Anchialos mirror those of Mesambria, as can be shown based on the cults of Demeter Malophoros and on the cult of the Egyptian gods. From Anchialos come coins with the image of the agyeus-pillar. The appearence of symbols of an explicitly Dorian cult can only be explained by the influence of Mesambria, which means that the cult of Apollo Agyeus was also present there. (shrink)

What are mental states? When we talk about people’s beliefs or desires, are we talking about what is happening inside their heads? If so, might cognitive science show that we are wrong? Might it turn out that mental states do not exist? Mental fictionalism offers a new approach to these longstanding questions about the mind. Its core idea is that mental states are useful fictions. When we talk about mental states, we are not formulating hypotheses about people’s inner machinery. Instead, (...) we simply talk "as if" people had certain inner states, such as beliefs or desires, in order to make sense of their behaviour. This is the first book dedicated to exploring mental fictionalism. Featuring contributions from established authors as well as up-and-coming scholars in this burgeoning field, the book reveals the exciting potential of a fictionalist approach to the mind, as well as the challenges it faces. In doing so, it offers a fresh perspective on foundational debates in the philosophy of mind, such as the nature of mental states and folk psychology, as well as hot topics in the field, such as embodied cognition and mental representation. Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations essential reading for advanced undergraduates, postgraduates and professionals alike. (shrink)

In this introductory paper I sketch the tradition, several early aspects of which are discussed in the following essays and reviews. I introduce the main figures whose work initiated and maintained the sociological orientation in Hungarian philosophy thereby tracing its evolution. I suggest that its sociological outlook, if taken to be a characteristic tendency that gives Hungarian philosophy its distinctive flavour, provides us with the framework of a possible narrative about the history of Hungarian philosophy in the broader context of (...) Central European philosophy. This narrative, in turn, suggests a way of integrating the latter into the history of Western philosophy rather than restricting its scope to a handful of canonical works only. (shrink)

For Jerry Fodor, Hume’sTreatise of Human Natureis “the foundational document of cognitive science” whose significance transcends mere historical interest: it is a source of theoretical inspiration in cognitive psychology. Here I am going to argue that those reading Hume along Fodor’s lines rely on a problematic, albeit inspiring, construction of Hume’s science of mind. My strategy in this paper is to contrast Fodor’s understanding of the Humean mind (consonant with the widely received view of Hume in both cognitive science and (...) much of Hume scholarship) with an alternative understanding that I propose. I thereby intend to show that the received view of Hume’s science of mind can be fruitfully revised while critically engaging with Fodor’s contemporary appropriation. Consequently, I use this occasion to put forward a rather unorthodox interpretation of Hume’s theory in dialogue with Fodor as my guide. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to reconstruct David Hume's use of the label ?experimental? to characterise his method in the Treatise. Although its meaning may strike the present-day reader as unusual, such a reconstruction is possible from the background of eighteenth-century practices and concepts of natural inquiry. As I argue, Hume's inquiries into human nature are experimental not primarily because of the way the empirical data he uses are produced, but because of the way those data are theoretically processed. He (...) seems to follow a method of analysis and synthesis quite similar to the one advertised in Newton's Opticks, which profoundly influenced eighteenth-century natural and moral philosophy. This method brings him much closer to the methods of qualitative, chemical investigations than to mechanical approaches to both nature and human nature. (shrink)

I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component (...) of realism about folk psychology, and from this I separate realism about mental entities as an ontological commitment towards them. I point out that the two views are mutually independent, which provides the possibility of considering folk psychology as not being in cognitive competition with scientific psychology. At the end I make a tentative suggestion as to how to interpret the former in order to avoid this conflict. (shrink)

When there have been substantial failures by institutional leadership in their oversight responsibility to protect research integrity, the public should demand that these be recognized and addressed by the institution itself, or the funding bodies. This commentary discusses a case of research failures in developing genomic predictors for cancer risk assessment and treatment at a leading university. In its review of this case, the Office of Research Integrity, an agency within the US Department of Health and Human Services, focused their (...) report entirely on one individual faculty member and made no comment on the institution’s responsibility and its failure to provide adequate oversight and investigation. These actions missed an important opportunity to emphasize the institution’s critical responsibilities in oversight of research integrity and the importance of institutional transparency and accountability. (shrink)

Volume 32, Issue 6, December 2024, Page 1438-1447.

This chapter introduces several versions of mental fictionalism, along with the main lines of objection and reply. It begins by considering the debate between eliminative materialism (“eliminativism”) versus realism about mental states as conceived in “folk psychology” (i.e., beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). Mental fictionalism offers a way to transcend the debate by allowing talk of mental states without a commitment to realism. The idea is to treat folk psychology as a “story” and three different elaborations of this are reviewed. First, (...) prefix semantics paraphrases a sentence like ‘Biden believes that Trump lost’ as ‘According to folk psychology, Biden believes that Trump lost’, whereby ontological commitment to belief is avoided. Similarly, pretense theory suggests that we do not assert ‘Biden believes that Trump lost’, but only pretend to assert it. Third, affective theory proposes that such discourse is used in a metaphorical way to understand a person’s affective and dispositional states vis-a-vis the community. The main objections concern whether folk psychology has the features of storytelling, and whether mental fictionalism ends up being self-refuting. The chapter also recaps a less discussed fictionalist view about “qualia” or phenomenal states, and closes by summarizing the papers contained in the volume. (shrink)

In Mind as Metaphor, Adam Toon interprets folk psychological discourse metaphorically. Based on Kendall Walton’s theory of metaphor, he argues that folk psychology ought to be understood in terms of prop-oriented make-believe that relies on representationally essential metaphors. Toon insists that this fictionalist view of everyday mental talk preserves what we commonly think folk psychology can achieve: it does not only rationalize but explains behavior causally. In this paper, first we raise concerns about Toon’s characterization of folk psychology as metaphorical. (...) Then we proceed to show that representationally essential metaphors are incompatible with genuine causal explanation. And finally, we argue that no construal of mental fictionalism can preserve the epistemic virtues we commonly ascribe to folk psychological discourse. (shrink)

The paper attempts to reconstruct the intellectual frame- work of British liberal tradition focusing on two major problems of it, namely the problem of justice and that of political liberty. The liberal interpretation of justice is meant to tolerate all possible individual views of good life, consequently it cannot be established on one of them. This means that the interpretation of justice shouldn’t be derived from some philosophy, as any interpretation has its basis in the political tradition of modernity. Conse- (...) quently democracy always must have priority to philoso- phy (R. Rorty). On the matter of political liberty, Isaiah Berlin defends a “negative” concept of freedom, the freedom of choice without any pressure, while Ch. Taylor sustains the Positive one. The debate between defenders of negative and positive freedom seeks the answer for a question formulated for the first time by John Stuart Mill: why individuals - even if they are free - act usually rational? (shrink)

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant invokes the moral law as an underived fact of reason. The aim of this article is to explore the highly debated role of the fact of reason and the nature of this fact, which apparently defies the senses of actuality commonly associated with empirical facts and objective entities. Following David Sussman's interpretation, I argue that the fact of reason not only marks the abandonment of deduction of the moral law but illustrates that the (...) failure to ground the moral law does not undermine its unconditional authority. Therefore, I claim that rather than signifying a methodological maneuver to get out of the circle that Kant admits to be entrapped, it operates as immanent, dynamic and an aporetic facticity. This perspective allows seeing its heuristic function for keeping intact the aporia that structures morality and offers away of coming into the circle of morality. (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct the central concept of the young Lukács’s and Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, as they present it in their writings in the early decades of the twentieth century. I argue that this concept, namely Weltanschauung, is used to refer to some conceptually unstructured totality of feelings, which they take to be a condition of possibility of intellectual production, and this understanding is contrasted to an alternative construal of the term that presents it as logically structured, quasi-theoretical (...) background knowledge. This concept has Kantian reminiscences: it is a condition of possibility of intellectual production in general. The young Mannheim and Lukács rely on 'Weltanschauung' so understood as a phenomenon mediating between the facts of society and individual intellectual production and reception: it is seen as being conditioned by sociological facts and therefore as a historical and sociological category through which, and therefore indirectly, society enters into intellectual production. (shrink)

Explores the impact of Enlightenment philosophers in Scotland on the development of sociology The first collection to look at the significance of the Scottish Enlightenment for sociological thought, this book explores how and what sociological ideas were developed during this period. It also analyses how the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment would emerge and develop in subsequent traditions of sociology. Scottish Enlightenment thinkers developed and refined a descriptive-explanatory approach and methodology to explore social and economic processes, an approach that was (...) different from the normative and justificatory aspirations of 17th- and 18th-century social and political philosophies. This distinct contribution of the Scottish Enlightenment is frequently overlooked, even if some of its central figures - Adam Ferguson, David Hume, Adam Smith, to name but three - are acknowledged as important forerunners of contemporary social sciences. This book offers both a synoptic perspective on individual contributions and a connective view of theoretical achievements that are otherwise typically treated in isolation. Tamás Demeter is Professor of Philosophy at the Corvinus University of Budapest and Senior Research Fellow at the HUN-REN Research Centre for the Humanities, Budapest. (shrink)

In Opticks, Newton notes that by following the method of analysis and synthesis, ’the bounds of moral philosophy will also be enlarged’. Hume’s Treatise fulfills this vision, albeit with significant caveats. The chapter argues: 1) Hume’s affinity with Newton is primarily methodological, and Hume’s project is closer to the Queries of Opticks than to the Principia. 2) For Hume, moral philosophy is an experimental study of moral beings qua moral beings which results in ‘an anatomy of the mind’ embodying an (...) epistemic ideal closer to Scottish philosophical chemistry than to any kind of mechanical philosophy. 3) Hume primarily inquires into qualitatively different active principles of human nature that explain why humans function as they do. 4) The knowledge that Hume’s project offers can be used normatively. 5) Thus, in Hume’s hands the boundaries of moral philosophy are enlarged. Yet, being entirely secular, it was not what Newton had envisioned. (shrink)

In my paper, I try to summarize Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the method of political thinking, following them through their genesis. My fundamental assumption is that although she had been preoccupied with the issue before (at least from 1957), she became more seriously interested in it after the controversy following the publication of the Eichmann volume. It is generally known that Arendt believed to have found the pattern for the method of political thinking in Kant’s third critique, the one about (...) judgment; more precisely in the Kantian description of the reflective judgment. This served as a pattern for Arendt for what she sometimes called representative thinking or opinion. If, on the other hand, we examine Arendt’s referring thoughts in their genesis we also come to realize why that was the case. In my opinion, Arendt looked in Kant’s work for a form of political thinking that remained impartial, in other words, it was not committed to one political cause or another, yet did not break its relations to politics, remaining entirely political. (shrink)

[Under contract with CUP, in preparation] What is a mind? Is it possible for a computer or other machine to have a mind? And how would we know? Mental fictionalism offers a new approach to these timely questions. Its central idea is that mental states (thoughts, beliefs, desires) are useful fictions. When we talk about mental states, we should be seen as merely speaking “as if” humans (and perhaps other creatures or even artifacts) had such states, in order to make (...) sense of their behavior. -/- This book is unique in presenting and defending three versions of mental fictionalism in a single volume (prefix-semantical mental fictionalism, pretense mental fictionalism, and affective storyism). The authors are three of the world’s most prominent proponents (respectively) of each variety: T. Parent (Nazarbayev University), Adam Toon (University of Exeter), and Tamás Demeter (Corvinus University of Budapest). The book essentially pits these different varieties of mental fictionalism against each other, allowing the reader to size them up. In the process, fresh perspectives are offered on foundational matters in the philosophy of mind, such as the nature of mental states and folk psychology, as well as hot topics such as embodied cognition, animal cognition, consciousness, and AI. -/- UPDATE: The chapter on prefix-semantical mental fictionalism is available upon request; write to nontology "at" gmail. (shrink)

Mathematics for Hume is the exemplary field of demonstrative knowledge. Ideally, this knowledge is a priori as it arises only from the comparison of ideas without any further empirical input; it is certain because demonstration consist of steps that are intuitively evident and infallible; and it is also necessary because the possibility of its falsity is inconceivable as it would imply a contradiction. But this is only the ideal, because demonstrative sciences are human enterprises and as such they are just (...) as fallible as their human practitioners. According to the reading suggested here, Hume develops a radical sceptical challenge for mathematics, and thereby he undermines the knowledge claims associated with demonstrative reasoning. But Hume does not stop there: he also offers resources for a sceptical solution to this challenge, one that appeals crucially to social practices, and sketches the social genealogy of a community-wide mathematical certainty. While explaining this process, he relies on the conceptual resources of his faculty psychology that helps him to distinguish between the metaphysics and practices of mathematical knowledge. His account explains why we have reasons to be dubious about our reasoning capacities, and also how human nature and sociability offers some remedy from these epistemic adversities. (shrink)

David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature is arguably the best candidate for the first ever overarching attempt at a descriptive-explanatory science of the mind. This paper characterizes the key tenets of Hume’s undertaking and situates its central features in the context of then-contemporary science. According to the present argument, Hume’s science of man provides a chemical-organismic account of mental functioning that fits an intellectual environment dominated by post-Newtonian natural philosophy.

This study explored the unique effect of fathers’ parenting behaviors and the quality of co-parenting described as the degree of consistency between paternal and maternal parenting behaviors on children’s academic self-efficacy. The power of both pancultural parenting behaviors and specific parenting controlling behaviors that are relatively common in Turkish culture in predicting academic self-efficacy was tested. A total of 1,931 children completed measures of parenting behaviors and academic self-efficacy in math and literature courses in their school. Overall, girls reported higher (...) levels of literature self-efficacy, whereas boys reported higher levels of math self-efficacy. Compared to boys, girls perceived higher levels of positive parenting behaviors from both their fathers and mothers. The results of the regression analyses showed that, whereas father warmth had stronger effects on boys’ math self-efficacy, mother warmth had stronger effects on girls’ literature self-efficacy. Examination of the effects of co-parenting quality demonstrated that children with positively consistent parents reported the highest level of academic self-efficacy, whereas those having negatively consistent parents had the lowest level of academic self-efficacy. Analyses on inconsistent co-parenting, however, yielded compensatory effects, which were similar to positively consistent parents, and deterioration effects, which were similar to negatively consistent parents depending on the gender of parent and child, domain of parenting behavior, and academic efficacy. This study contributed to the current literature by showing the unique role of fathers over and beyond mothers, and confirmed the importance of positive parenting and parenting consistency in promoting children’s academic efficacy. Cultural and practical implications of the findings were discussed. (shrink)

This special issue includes papers authored by Sean Morris, Tudor M. Baetu, Tamás Demeter, Dan O’Brien, Barbara Vetter, Daniel Dohrn, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Barry Loewer, Aaron Segal, Miren Boehm, Vera Matarese, Stefanie Rocknak, Rachel Cohon, David Mark Kovacs, and Michael Esfeld.

In this paper, I introduce a prominent classical scholar, József Balogh, whose work can be read as a significant contribution to the historiography of ancient, and in some sense modern, philosophy. Following a summary biography, I sketch the relevance of Balogh''s interpretation of Augustine. I draw some analogies between his and Eric Havelock''s treatment of the problems in ancient philosophy, and argue that the obvious similarities between them have a common origin, namely the perspective of the orality/literacy chasm which both (...) treated, in connection with their research into Augustine and Plato, as crucial. Subsequently, I show how the problem of reading aloud, which Balogh was the first to treat systematically, has acquired significance in some current debates in philosophy. (shrink)

Muammar b. Abbād al-Sulamī (d.215/830) was one of the most influential figures of his time in terms of recognizing things and making sense of the changes in the universe, which occupies an important place in Islamic thought. Muammar, who was a Basra Mu'tazilite, appears especially with his naturalistic ideas. What makes him stand out is that he also embraced atomism. Although the atomist conception was of foreign origin, the theologians revised it according to their theological views. This view was also (...) presented as a proof of God’s constant activity in the universe. Muammar, who also defined substance, body and accident, which are the basic concepts of kalam cosmology, influenced other theologians, especially with his definition of body. For Muammar, things have a nature. The body creates its accidents as a result of its own nature. Ultimately, in his thought, it is God who gives this nature to the body. Therefore, he accepts that the functioning of the universe takes place within the framework of the laws that God has set in the universe. This idea of Muammar’s about the nature of bodies is actually to demonstrate that the universe functions in a tremendous way in this way. The concept of māna, which is based on Muammar’s thought, occupies an important place at this point. With this concept, which is identified with the understanding of nature, he aimed to exclude the essence of God from the beings. In his view, this concept is also active when it comes to God’s attributes. For him, that’s why God is the wise and the powerful by means of the knowledge and the power that He possesses through the māna. According to Muammar, māna means cause. He argues that the separation of a moving object from an immobile object is the result of a māna. Therefore, objects are also differentiated from each other through a māna. A māna can exist with a māna, which brings forth the idea of the infinity of māna. However, the infinity of māna does not mean the infinity of things. Muammar’s most criticized point is the nature of objects and the fact that they undergo change as a result of this nature, that is, they create their accidents. In this case, the concept of continuous re-creation, which is generally accepted in theology, does not fit Muammar’s system. For Muammar, there is a system based on cause and effect. Although there are criticisms that this relationship he defended belongs to a strict determinist approach, in fact, it can be said that he was concerned with excluding God from situations that take place on the plane of time and space, such as movement and change. Compared to other contemporary theologians who held naturalistic views like him, Muammar’s justification of nature on the basis of māna sets him apart from the others. (shrink)

This paper sketches a recently emerging divide between two interpretations of Hume's methodology and philosophy of science. On the first interpretation Hume relies on an inductive methodology and provides a (Newtonian) dynamic theory of the mind, and his philosophy of science reflects this methodology. On the second, Hume relies on inferences to the best explanation via comparative analysis of instances, and offers an anatomy of the mind relying on a chemical and organic imagery. The paper also aspires to lean the (...) reader's sympathies toward the latter interpretation while outlining some of its potential consequences for the character of Hume's psychology, the limits of associationism, and his empiricism. (shrink)

I argue that, despite recent attempts, the strong program in the sociology of knowledge cannot be applied as a general method of inquiry in the history of ideas. My main point is that its methodological commitments only allow the strong program to be fruitful in those fields of knowledge whose content can be given by truth conditions. But even in these fields sociological questions can be asked that are not sensitive to truth conditional content. In these cases, as I argue, (...) a hermeneutic method is more promising. (shrink)

This piece defends the distinction I have drawn in my "Two Kinds of Mental Realism" against criticism put forward in János Tőzsér's "Mental Realism Reloaded".

Mehmet Kaplan ve Nihad Sâmi Banarlı’nın kültürel kimlikle ilgili görüşlerini inceleyen bu çalışma yakın dönem Türk tarihinde kültürel kimlik düşüncesinin değişim sürecinin anlaşılmasına katkı sunmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçla 1940’lardan 1980’lere uzanan ve birer seçki niteliği taşıyan, Mehmet Kaplan’ın Kültür ve Dil, Nihad Sâmi Banarlı’nın ise Türkçenin Sırları adlı eserlerine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışmada Türkiye’de kimlik ve kültürle ilgili tartışmalar üzerinde kısaca durulmakta; Kaplan ve Banarlı’nın çalışmalarında kültürün konumundan söz edilmektedir. Ardından literatürden hareketle kültür ve kimlik kavramları ele alınmakta; Kaplan ve Banarlı’nın Türkiye’nin (...) kültürel kimliği algısı tartışılmaktadır. Kaplan ve Banarlı’nın kültürel kimlikte dil ve edebiyata nasıl yer verdikleri dil, edebiyat ve kültür birlikteliği; Türkçe ve diğer diller; dilde tasfiyecilik ile edebî simalar ve Yahya Kemâl başlıkları altında incelenmektedir. Her iki yazarın da dil ve edebiyatı kültüre eşdeğer gördüğü, Türkçenin geleceği için geçmişinin iyi bilinmesi gereğine dikkat çektiği ifade edilmektedir. Kaplan ve Banarlı’nın dilde tasfiyecilikle ilgili görüşleri ise Atatürk’ün dile yaklaşımının süregelen etkileri, dile yönelik yanlış tutumların eleştirisi ve dile yaklaşımda sağlıklı olan yöntemin tespiti bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. Mehmet Kaplan ve Nihad Sâmi Banarlı’nın Türk diline ve Türk edebiyatına sahip çıkarak Türk kültürel kimliğini korumanın mümkün olduğunu düşündükleri gösterilmekte; incelenen eserlerin devlet kurumları, siyasetçiler, toplumun geneli ve özelde gençleri muhatap alarak harekete geçirmeyi hedeflediği iddia edilmektedir. (shrink)

Özet Kuzey Kıbrıs emek piyasası üzerine yapılan çalışmalar, toplumsal cinsiyet temelli mesleki ayrışmayı kadının işgücüne düşük katılımını etkileyen en önemli sebeplerden biri olarak tespit etmiştir. Bu çalışma 11 yıl içerisinde bu tespitten yola çıkarak Kuzey Kıbrıs emek piyasasındaki mesleki ayrışmanın büyüklüğünü, zaman içerisindeki değişimini ve bu değişimin kaynaklarını araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.Ayrışma, Hanehalkı İşgücü Anketi verileri kullanılarak 9 ana mesleki grup için genel, kırsal ve kensel bölgelerde ölçülmüştür. Çalışma bulguları, tüm bölgelerde toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı mesleki ayrışmanın yüksek ve yaygın olduğunu göstermiştir. İndeksin (...) ayrıştırılması artan ayrışmanın temel sebebinin net ayrışmadan, yani bireysel meslekler içindeki kadın erkek oranında meydana gelen değişmeden, kaynaklandığını göstermiştir. Yüksek ve yaygın olan mesleki toplumsal cinsiyet ayrışmasının, emek piyasasının kadın ve erkek meslekleri olarak katmanlaşmasına sebep olduğu, bunun da kadının meslek grupları arasında hareketinin kısıtlanmasına yol açarak işgücüne katılımını olumsuz etkilediği sonucuna varılmıştır. (shrink)

Conflicting Values of Inquiry explores how certain non-epistemic values had been turned into epistemic ones, how they had an effect on epistemic content, and how they became ideologies of knowledge playing various roles in inquiry and application throughout early modern Europe.

In the present paper I sketch three genres of sociology of knowledge and trace their roots to Marx and Marxist literature while reconstructing two causal and one hermeneutic strand in this context. While so doing the main focus is set on György Lukács and György Márkus and their interpretation of Marx’s contribution to sociologically minded theories of knowledge. As a conclusion I point out that Marx-inspired sociologies of knowledge are more sensitive to the relation of larger-scale social and historical processes (...) than to the actual practices of knowledge production, and that recent developments in science studies tend to integrate larger- and smaller-scale sociological sensitivities. (shrink)

Ethical conduct is an essential component in research, especially in medical research. Statistical methods for design and analysis are powerful research tools if used properly. Abuse of these principles and methods are just as unethical as other laboratory or clinical misconduct. Inadequate research design can produce worthless results and thus wastes effort and valuable resources. For clinical research, patient resources are wasted. Inappropriate analysis of data can also produce misleading results and conclusions. For clinical research, inferior therapy might be given (...) to patients as a consequence. These ethical concerns can have implications for and affect the individuals responsible for the statistical design and analysis. Examples are provided which illustrate some possible abuses and inappropriate pressures. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein repeatedly called religion and faith “madness”, “folly”, etc. However, this does not mean that he considered it irrational or meaningless. Rather, he saw in it a way of thinking and speaking, a “language-game”, that was not explicitly rational, but nevertheless meaningful, and in which there were “entirely different connections” than normal between individual statements. Nor can the language of faith be regarded as conventional, according to Wittgenstein, even if approached from the point of view of the nature of (...) the statements it contains. If, for example, we think that theological statements are factual statements (as if they refer only to existing things or objects), then this language immediately becomes meaningless. The aim of my study is to analyze the “grammar” of this language (the language of faith or religion), using Wittgenstein’s notes from different times, paragraphs of his published works, comments made during university lectures, etc., and to describe the correct use of words in it. (shrink)