THE PURPOSE OF THIS NOTE IS TO SHOW THAT BOCHENSKI'S\nBELIEF THAT WE DO NOT FIND IN ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL WORKS THE\nPRINCIPLE OF THE TRANSITIVITY OF IDENTITY IS MISTAKEN. A\nPASSAGE IS CITED FROM THE SECOND BOOK, CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE\nOF THE "PRIOR ANALYTICS" WHERE ARISTOTLE EXPLICITLY STATES\nTHE LOGICAL PRINCIPLE WHICH BOCHENSKI THINKS IS MISSING\nFROM THE "ORGANON.".

This article explores the limits of introductory social justice education and the ways in which a social foundations course could expand and deepen the social justice lens of current and future educators. The authors, members of an introductory graduate-level Social Foundations course, discuss the limitations they realized in their previous social justice education courses, and the importance of courses that further student's understandings of the ever-evolving ways people enact and experience identity, power, and privilege. The authors identify three main pedagogical (...) and theoretical elements that advanced their social justice knowledge: examining theories for their potential to uncover or obscure lived experience; unpacking binary constructions of identity; and exploring the limits and possibilities of intersectional thinking. This article offers implications and suggestions for educators who seek to challenge and expand the social justice knowledge of future educators and administrators. (shrink)

In the Classical Quarterly, Vol. XXIII. i, pp. 7–10, Mr. Denniston attempts to revive the ancient and once honoured sport of gloss-chasing. But the day of that perilous pastime has gone, and this latest effort is perhaps less successful than some of its predecessors. In his notes on the De Elocution of Demetrius he hunts and traps the unwary ‘gloss’ in his net of criticism, but unfortunately the snare is faulty, and the ‘catch’ escapes. I propose to discuss each (...) of his suggested ‘glosses’ in his order, basing my arguments against his conclusions— on probabilities; on the usage of Demetrius in this work: § 271. καθλου δ νς λEεως τ σματα κα πκρισιν κα γνα παρει τ λοντι, μλιστα τ διαλελυμον, τοτ' στι δειντητα. (shrink)

In Vol. XXIIL, pp. 105–8, Mr. Lockwood criticizes some of the observations which I made in pp. 7–10 of the same volume. § 271. I ‘assume’ that τοτ' δετι δεινότητα explains ύπόκρισιν κα γνα and not τ διαλελυμένον, because ‘figures of speech in general’ cannot be said to ‘produce’ τ διαλελυμένον asyndeton, which is itself one of those figures; because, conversely, τ διαλελυμένον is not equivalent to δεινότης but a means of producing δεινότης. τ διαλελυμένον must, therefore, be nominative, not (...) accusative, and Professor Rhys Roberts' rendering, ‘lending especially the effect of abruptness, in other words of energy,’ cannot be right. The Professor himself is not happy with it, and adds in a note that ‘a better sense would be obtained by placing μάλιστα τ διαλελυμένον before πόκρισιν, i.e. “the figures of speech, and especially asyndeton.”‘ My excision gives the same sense. Orth, in his translation, omits the words τοτ' στι δεινότητα, and interprets as I do. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, I shall argue that Apollodorus of Athens, in his Chronica, dated Anaxagoras' arrival at Athens to 456/5, following Demetrius of Phalerum. Rejecting the divergent opinion of others, he also followed Demetrius' estimation of the Athenian period as having lasted 20 years, which makes 437/6 Anaxagoras' last year at Athens 1). In the second part I shall argue that the trial of Anaxagoras, about which no information survives in the remains of Apollodorus (...) but which is reported by several other sources, should probably be dated to 437/6. This second argument is independent of the first; both run counter to the view, still rather popular among historians of ancient philosophy, which favours a date for the trial either immediately preceding or even following upon the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, as well as to the communis opinio according to which the Athenian period lasted 30 years. What is common to both parts of this inquiry is a refusal to study the chronology of Anaxagoras' career in isolation. In part I, which is chiefly concerned with an analysis of the relevant passage in Diogenes Laertius qua specimen of Apollodorean reasoning, the problem is discussed against the background of Apollodorus' synchronistic matrices. In part II, the trial and the decree of Diopeithes which made it possible are studied in connection with the plot against Pericles and certain members of his circle.-A suggestion regarding the date of 'publication' of Anaxagoras' treatise will be appended to part II. (shrink)

Among the difficulties in Propertius is the question whether to retain ‘cecinit’ in 3. 3. 7 or to adopt the conjecture ‘cecini’. Propertius dreamed that he was reclining upon Helicon in a grove by Hippocrene and that he was able to compose a Roman historical epic: Visus eram molli recubans Heliconis in umbra, Bellerophontei qua fluit umor equi, Reges, Alba, tuos et regum facta tuorum neruis hiscere posse meis, Paruaque tam magnis admoram fontibus ora Vnde pater sitiens Ennius ante bibit, (...) Et cecinit Curios fratres et Horatia pila Regiaque Aemilia uecta tropaea rate Victricesque moras Fabii pugnamque sinistram Cannensem et uersos ad pia uota deos Hannibalemque Lares Romana sede fugantes, Anseris et tutum uoce fuisse Iouem, Cum me Castalia speculans ex arbore Phoebus Sic ait… According to the paradosis 7–12 constitute a summary of Ennius' Annales. In that I case Propertius' failure to observe historical sequence is peculiar; nor is it defended securely by I supposedly parallel passages. More damaging, however, is that 8 must describe the triumph of L. Aemilius Paullus in 167, two years after the accepted date of Ennius' death. Hertzberg and Postgate claimed that it alludes to the defeat of Demetrius of I Pharos by a L. Aemilius Paullus in 219 ; this is unlikely for some of the same reasons as the rival theory of Butler and Barber, which has found many adherents, that it refers to the victory over Antiochus' navy by L. Aemilius Regillus at Myonnesus in 190. (shrink)

In the opening chapter of the Iudicium de Dinarcho Dionysius quotes a passage from the Περì μωνμων of Demetrius Magnes, mat the end of which come the words δ λξις ςτ το Δεινρχου κυρως θικ πθος κινοσα σχεδòν τ πικρí μóνον καì τ τóν το Δημοσθθενικο χαρακτρος λειπομνη το δ πιθανο καì κυρíιυ μηδν νδονσα. [I have deliberately omitted all punctuation marks, because the punctuation of this sentence is still doubtful, though I hope to suggest a possible interpretation of (...) its meaning at the end of this article.] Now there is nothing in this sentence or in the words preceding it to indicate beyond all possibility of doubt the precise meaning ofκυρíως θικ. And in such circumstances, to allow free play to personal prejudices regarding the significance of thephrase is more than dangerous. The whole problem of θικ λξις has been treated too cursorily. If one mentions the phrase to a non-professional student of Greek, who, however, has some acquaintance with the Attic orators, he immediately replies: ‘I suppose you mean the sort of thing you meet in Lysias.’ And he is to beexcused, because, after all, that is the predominant meaning of the term. But it has other senses, and therefore one must fight shy of vague statements like that of Finke, who, after quoting the above lines, comment: ‘Demetrius Magnus attribuit ei τν κυρíαν λξιν qua non sit Demosthene inferior’; or of Burgess, who enumerates qualities, ideas, and topics ‘of special value to the epideictic and court orators, ’ among which appears θοποια which he merely translates ‘impersonation or delineation of character, ’ without offering any further comment. Sandys talks of ‘the ethical warmth of colouring, by which the dullest details are lit up with a fresh life and interest.’ Gromska is even more vague (and seems almost to confuse θς and χαρακτρ: ‘Grammatici antiqui, qui de Hyperide tractabant, de eloquentiae eius genere disputabant, orationum Hyperidearum compositionem et θς respicientes, i.e. quantum in arte rhetorica et oratoria valeret, examinantes.’ In the hope, therefore, of being able to represent the difficulty inherent in these lines, and of attempting to remove it, or at any rate to shed a broader beam of light upon it than has been shed hitherto, I propose to review very briefly the fluctuations of meaning in the life of this phrase and its equivalents, as we find them used in the critical writings of the Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. (shrink)

The death of Socrates gave birth to an industry of biographical literature which often took the form of a defence or prosecution , sometimes purporting to be the actual defence or prosecution conducted at his trial. Plato and Xenophon wrote works in his defence. Among his critics, one Polycrates had a certain notoriety. Lysias, Theodectes and Demetrius of Phalerum, orators and rhetoricians like Polycrates, were credited with further works of apology. There were doubtless many others. The aim of this (...) paper is to show that Xenophon wrote his Defence in the light of the rhetorical theory that required that a speaker utter words and thoughts appropriate πρεποντα to his character. (shrink)

If affirmative action and other ethnicity-based social programs are justified, then J. Angelo Corlett believes it is important to come to an adequate understanding of the nature of ethnicity in general and ethnic group membership in particular. In Race, Racism, and Reparations, Corlett reconceptualizes traditional ideas of race in terms of ethnicity. As he makes clear, the answers to the questions "What is a Native American?" or "What is a Latino?" have important implications for public policy, especially for those programs (...) designed to address historic injustices and economic and social imbalances among different groups in our society. Having supplanted "race" with a well-defined concept of ethnicity, the author then analyzes the nature and function of racism. Corlett argues for a notion of racism that must encompass not only racist beliefs but also racist actions, omissions, and attempted actions. His aim is to craft a definition of racism that will prove useful in legal and public policy contexts. Corlett places special emphasis on the broad questions of whether reparations for ethnic groups are desirable and what forms those reparations should take: land, money, social programs? He addresses the need for differential affirmative action programs and reparations policies—the experiences of different ethnic groups vary greatly. Arguments for reparations to Native and African Americans are considered in light of a variety of objections that are or might be raised against them. Corlett articulates and critically analyzes a number of possible proposals for reparations. (shrink)

How do thought and language manage to be 'about' aspects of the world? J. Robert G. Williams investigates how representation arises out of a fundamentally non-representational world, showing the explanatory relations between the representational properties of language, of thought, and of perception and intention.

Since Leibniz's time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized for violating the conservation of energy and momentum. Many dualist responses clearly fail. But conservation laws have important neglected features generally undermining the objection. Conservation is _local_, holding first not for the universe, but for everywhere separately. The energy in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries. Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of local conservation laws converges; it probably doesn't in reality. Energy conservation holds (...) if there is symmetry, the sameness of the laws over time. Thus, if there are time-places where symmetries fail due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail there and then, while holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars. Noether's converse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply symmetries. Thus conservation trivially nearly entails the causal closure of the physical. But expecting conservation to hold in the brain simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism. Hence Leibniz's objection begs the question. Empirical neuroscience is another matter. So is Einstein's General Relativity: far from providing a loophole, General Relativity makes mental causation _harder_. (shrink)

The question of the cognitive role of fictionality is this: what is the correct cognitive attitude to take to p, when it is fictional that p? We began by considering one answer to this question, implicit in the work of Kendall Walton, that the correct response to a fictional proposition is to imagine that proposition. However, this approach is silent in cases of fictional incompleteness, where neither p nor its negation are fictional. We argue that that Waltonians should embrace a (...) pluralistic account of the cognitive role of fictional incompleteness: in some cases of fictional incompleteness, we are permitted to resolve the incompleteness during our engagement with the target fiction, and in other cases, we are obliged not to resolve the incompleteness. But though pluralism is accommodated by Walton’s wider account of fictionality, it puts tension on his motivating idea that fictionality stands to the imagination as truth stands to belief. And so we develop a rival conception of the cognitive role of fictionality that is built around a different analogy: on this evidentialist approach, (known) fictionality stands to the imagination as evidence stands to credence. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe seminal work of David Marr, popularized in his classic work Vision, continues to exert a major influence on both cognitive science and philosophy. The interpretation of his work also co...

A plethora of normative conservation concepts have recently emerged, most of which are ill-defined: biological diversity, biological integrity, ecological restoration, ecological services, ecological rehabilitation, ecological sustainability, sustainable development, ecosystem health, ecosystem management, adaptive management, and keystone species are salient among them. These normative concepts can be organized and interpreted by reference to two new schools of conservation philosophy, compositionalism and functionalism. The former comprehends nature primarily by means of evolutionary ecology and considers Homo sapiens separate from nature. The latter comprehends (...) nature primarily by means of ecosystem ecology and considers Homo sapiens a part of nature. Biological diversity, biological integrity, and ecological restoration belong primarily in the compositionalist glossary; the rest belong primarily in the functionalist glossary. The former set are more appropriate norms for reserves, the latter for areas that are humanly inhabited and exploited. In contrast to the older schools of conservation philosophy, preservationism and resourcism, compositionalism and functionalism are complementary, not competitive and mutually exclusive. As the historically divergent ecological sciences—evolutionary ecology and ecosystem ecology—are increasingly synthesized, a more unified philosophy of conservation can be envisioned. (shrink)

Part intellectual autobiography and part exposition of complex yet contemporary economic ideas, this lively conversation with renowned scholar and public intellectual Kenneth J. Arrow focuses on economics and politics in light of history, current events, and philosophy as well. Reminding readers that economics is about redistribution and thus about how we treat each other, Arrow shows that the intersection of economics and ethics is of concern not just to economists but for the public more broadly. With a foreword by Amartya (...) Sen, this book highlights the belief that government can be a powerful force for good, and is particularly relevant in the current political climate and to the lay reader as well as the economist. (shrink)

Measurement realism, the view that measurement targets quantitative attributes and that not all attributes are quantitative, has come under attack both from metrologists and philosophers. In this paper, I take a close look at two influential arguments against measurement realism: the argument from obsolescence and the argument from coordination. I concede that these arguments do challenge the epistemological position traditionally taken by measurement realists, but argue that the metaphysical core of measurement realism survives the challenge posed by these arguments. This (...) metaphysical core is vital to maintaining a clear and ambitious standard for successful measurement. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

Head transplantation fits within the broader conceptual space occupied by transhumanists and others who seek to extend the lives of human beings indefinitely. It is reasonable to reflect on whether, under what circumstances, and in what ways human immortality would be good. In this paper, I disambiguate the ways in which immortality might be considered a human good and then argue that immortality is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for objective meaning in life. I also argue that mortality is not (...) a necessary condition for objective meaning in life. (shrink)

This paper will develop the concept of semiogenesis – a process of novel sign generation – and how instances of this process, such as agency, relate to their built environment and beyond. Section two will build on Hoffmeyer’s discussion of swarms, specifically the idea of overlapping swarms and its manifestation in the creation of termite mounds, in order to introduce three types of structure. Building upon this real-world example explored in section two, the third section will present a heuristic for (...) semiogenesis: a neuromorphic dynamic system model grounded in information and thermodynamic theory. Through the lens of this heuristic model, the penultimate section will more rigorously characterize the similarities and differences between termite and human agency in their respective built milieus. (shrink)

First published in 1952, British Empirical Philosophers is a comprehensive picture of one of the most important movements in the history of philosophic thought. In his introduction, Professor A. J. Ayer distinguishes the main problems of empiricism and gives a critical account of the ways in which the philosophers whose writings are included in this volume attempted to solve them. Editors Ayer and Raymond Winch bring together an authoritative abridgement of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding ; Bishop George Berkeley’s (...) Principles of Human Knowledge ; almost the entire first book of David Hume’s Treatise Concerning Human Nature ; and extracts from Thomas Reid’s Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man and John Stuart Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. (shrink)