The relation between primitive and derivative forces may be the hardest problem about the relation between Leibniz's physics and his metaphysics. He holds that derivative forces are modifications of primitive forces, but also that physical forces, which he classifies as derivative forces, belong to bodies, which are aggregates, whereas primitive forces belong to unextended perceiving substances and constitute their essence. This chapter addresses this problem, arguing that a major part of it can be solved on the supposition (...) that physical events are only phenomena, and hence ultimately determined by modifications of the primitive forces of perceiving substances. (shrink)

It is well known that Leibniz believes that the motion of bodies is caused by an internal force.1 Moreover, he distinguishes between two kinds of force that are associated with bodies, which he calls primitive and derivative forces respectively. My aim is to explain Leibniz’s account of the relation between these two kinds of force, and to address a puzzle that arises in connection with this relation. In fact Leibniz speaks of two different kinds of (...) class='Hi'>derivative force. The first, and most fundamental, kind of derivative force is the momentary tendency to move from one perception to another within a simple substance, or monad. Sometimes these are called “appetitions”.2 The second kind are the forces of bodies that are found in the mechanical explanations of Leibnizian Dynamics.3 We shall be concerned primarily with the latter in what follows. However, the derivative forces of monads will also play an important role in the discussion. As one might expect, Leibniz holds that derivative forces are derived from the primitive ones. This idea is more usually expressed in terms of the notion of modification. Thus, derivative forces are said to be “nothing but the modifications and results of primitive forces”4 and to “arise as shapes arise from modification of extension”.5 Here it is natural to assume that Leibniz understands the relation between primitive and derivative force in something like the way in which Descartes understood the relation between modes of extended and thinking substances and the substances themselves, namely as particular ways of being an extended or thinking thing that inhere in their subjects.6 Although this account of derivative forces as modifications of primitive forces may seem plausible at first, difficulties arise when we try to understand how it could apply to the derivative forces in Leibnizian bodies. For it seems to be in conflict with two further aspects of Leibniz’s philosophy. Both can be found in the following passage from a letter to De Volder of 1705.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:166 HUME'S INTEREST IN NEWTON AND SCIENCE Many writers have been forced to examine — in their treatments of Hume's knowledge of and acquaintance with scientific theories of his day — the related questions of Hume's knowledge of and acquaintance with Isaac Newton and of the nature and extent of Newtonian influences upon Hume's thinking. Most have concluded that — in some sense — Hume was acquainted with and (...) influenced by Newton's thought in particular and scientific thought in general. The genesis of this paper is the recent point of view put forward by Peter Jones which challenges the many permutations of this almost ritualistic standard line by removing Hume entirely from the Newtonian and the scientific scenes of thought. Jones argues that Hume knew less about Newton and science, and needed to know less about Newton and 2 science, than he believes is required by the above interpretation. Indeed, Jones argues that Hume's fundamental assumptions, which, according to Jones, derive ultimately from a form of Ciceronian humanism, drive a "wedge" between Newton's thought and that of 3 Hume. Even Hume's introductory remarks in the Treatise about his universal "science of man" are, for Jones, a declaration of independence from the materialistic trend (as Jones sees it) of Newtonian 4 science and not, as so many commentators have maintained — however tenuously or strongly evidence for linkage of Hume's project with Newtonian or scientific thought. Jones baldly argues that Hume totally lacked interest in science in general and in Newton and Newtonian science in particular. Following J. H. Burton's observation that Hume's work is surprisingly free from the "opinions" of contemporary scientists, 167 Jones states there is no evidence that Hume ever studied science at the University of Edinburgh or that he "pursued" scientific studies of any formal sort. Regarding Newtonian scientific thought, he emphasizes the paucity of specifically Newtonian scientific textbooks in the early eighteenth century 7 which might have been available for Hume to study and argues that nowhere in Hume's writings is there evidence of precise and detailed knowledge of Newton's science beyond what is available in Q Chamber's Cyclopaedia. Jones acknowledges that, in the Introduction to the Treatise, Hume utilizes a "general version" of Newton's "Regulae Philosophandi" from the beginning of Book III of Newton's Principia. Nevertheless, in Jones' view, Hume's fundamentally humanistic orientation separates him completely from g any Newtonian influence. Finally, according to Jones, Hume does not betray the least bit of knowledge of Newton's mathematics and its role in Newton's experimental methodology. On this evidence Jones grounds his central claim of Hume's "total lack of interest in contemporary science." What references there are to Newton and to science in Hume's works Jones finds "traceable to essentially literary predecessors such as Fontenelle or Montesquieu, or to standard works of theologians ] 2 or free-thinkers." The absence of clearly direct references to what Jones feels are scientific works results both from Hume's "total lack of interest in science" and from his commitment to a form of Ciceronian humanism which is "inimical" to what Jones finds to be the obvious materialistic tendencies of 13 science in the early modern period. Jones' account of the Ciceronian and French contexts of Hume's thought is excellent. But his claim that Hume had no interest whatsoever in science 168 is simply too strong and finally forces us to view science in Hume's day as equivalent to science in our own time, a manifestly anachronistic point of view. Throughout this paper, my argument will be conditioned by my view that Hume's interest in science cannot be separated from his epistemology or his religious scepticism. Hume's interest in science was precisely that of a man of letters of the eighteenth century vitally engaged in determining the proper use of scientific methodology in establishing the limits of the secular science of man once it has 14 been freed from the fetters of theology. Hume's interest in theological and epistemological issues inevitably gave rise to a strong interest on his part in the science of his day and in Newton's contributions... (shrink)

The physical origin of inertial forces is shown to be a consequence of the local interaction of Dirac's real covariant ether model(1) with accelerated microobjects, considered as real extended particlelike solitons, piloted by surrounding subluminal real wave fields packets.(2) Their explicit form results from the application of local inertial Lorentz transformations to the particles submitted to noninertial velocitydependent accelerations, i.e., constitute a natural extension of Lorentz's interpretation of restricted relativity.(3) Indeed Dirac's real physical covariant ether model implies inertial forces if (...) one considers the real accelerated noninertial motions of general relativity, defined within the absolute local inertial frames associated with the observed local isotropy of the 2.7° K background microwave radiation.(4) Inertia thus appears as a necessary consequence of the real particle motions described by the E.d.B.B. formalism of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Leibniz portrays the most fundamental entities in his mature ontology in at least three different ways. In some places, he describes them as mind-like, immaterial substances that perceive and strive. Elsewhere, he presents them as hylomorphic compounds. In yet other passages, he characterizes them in terms of primitive and derivative forces. Interpreters often assume that the first description is the most accurate. In contrast, I will argue that the third characterization is more accurate than the other two. If that (...) is correct, Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics is even more radical than it initially seems: his ontology is best understood not as a substance-mode ontology but as a force ontology. At the metaphysical ground floor, we do not find substances that possess force; instead, we just find forces. Interpreting Leibniz as a force ontologist has far-reaching consequences. For instance, it requires us to reconsider the status of time in Leibniz’s system and to revise our understanding of appetitions and perceptions. (shrink)

De 1686 à 1758, soit pendant plus de soixante ans, les savants les plus éminents de l’époque, dont la Marquise Du Châtelet, participent au débat sur les forces vives ; faut-il mesurer la force par le produit de la masse et de la vitesse ( m.v, qu’on appelle aujourd’hui la quantité de mouvement) ou par le produit de la masse et du carré de la vitesse ( m.v 2 )? Or il est intéressant de souligner que, loin d’être une (...) simple dispute de mots, ce à quoi cherche à la réduire D’Alembert, cette querelle est avant tout une discussion sur les premiers principes et les principes dérivés : quels sont les principes fondateurs, quels sont les principes seconds? Notre propos est de montrer que D’Alembert, dans la position qu’il prend pour mettre fin au débat, a été fortement influencé et formé par les réflexions sur la physique que développe Émilie Du Châtelet (1706-1749), dans les Institutions de Physique parues en 1740. (shrink)

Orthodoxy has it that only metaphysically elite properties can be invoked in scientifically elite laws. We argue that this claim does not fit scientific practice. An examination of candidate scientifically elite laws like Newton’s F = ma reveals properties invoked that are irreversibly defined and thus metaphysically non-elite by the lights of the surrounding theory: Newtonian acceleration is irreversibly defined as the second derivative of position, and Newtonian resultant force is irreversibly defined as the sum of the component (...) forces. We think that scientists are happy to invoke metaphysically non-elite properties in scientifically elite laws for reasons of convenience, such as to simplify the equations and to make them more modular. On this basis, we draw a deflationary moral about laws themselves, as being merely convenient summaries. 1 Introduction2 Orthodoxy2.1 Orthodoxy stated2.2 Orthodoxy explained2.3 A worrisome commitment: Term objectivism3 The Loose View3.1 The argument from practice3.2 Finding the scientifically elite equations3.3 Diagnosing the metaphysically non-elite properties3.4 Situating our challenge4 Newtonian Mechanics4.1 Newtonian acceleration4.2 Newtonian resultant force4.3 A metaphysical discovery?5 Objections5.1 Metaphysically elite after all?5.2 Scientifically non-elite after all?5.3 But our world is not Newtonian!6 Consequences6.1 Consequences for the motivations for link6.2 Consequences for metaphysically elite properties6.3 Consequences for lawhood. (shrink)

We study the forcing operators on MTL-algebras, an algebraic notion inspired by the Kripke semantics of the monoidal t -norm based logic . At logical level, they provide the notion of the forcing value of an MTL-formula. We characterize the forcing operators in terms of some MTL-algebras morphisms. From this result we derive the equality of the forcing value and the truth value of an MTL-formula.

The notions of conservation and relativity lie at the heart of classical mechanics, and were critical to its early development. However, in Newton’s theory of mechanics, these symmetry principles were eclipsed by domain-specific laws. In view of the importance of symmetry principles in elucidating the structure of physical theories, it is natural to ask to what extent conservation and relativity determine the structure of mechanics. In this paper, we address this question by deriving classical mechanics—both nonrelativistic and relativistic—using relativity and (...) conservation as the primary guiding principles. The derivation proceeds in three distinct steps. First, conservation and relativity are used to derive the asymptotically conserved quantities of motion. Second, in order that energy and momentum be continuously conserved, the mechanical system is embedded in a larger energetic framework containing a massless component that is capable of bearing energy (as well as momentum in the relativistic case). Imposition of conservation and relativity then results, in the nonrelativistic case, in the conservation of mass and in the frame-invariance of massless energy; and, in the relativistic case, in the rules for transforming massless energy and momentum between frames. Third, a force framework for handling continuously interacting particles is established, wherein Newton’s second law is derived on the basis of relativity and a staccato model of motion-change. Finally, in light of the derivation, we elucidate the structure of mechanics by classifying the principles and assumptions that have been employed according to their explanatory role, distinguishing between symmetry principles and other types of principles (such as compositional principles) that are needed to build up the theoretical edifice. (shrink)

A rigorous ab initio derivation of the (square of) Dirac’s equation for a particle with spin is presented. The Lagrangian of the classical relativistic spherical top is modified so to render it invariant with respect conformal changes of the metric of the top configuration space. The conformal invariance is achieved by replacing the particle mass in the Lagrangian with the conformal Weyl scalar curvature. The Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the particle is found to be linearized, exactly and in closed form, by (...) an ansatz solution that can be straightforwardly interpreted as the “quantum wave function” of the 4-spinor solution of Dirac’s equation. All quantum features arise from the subtle interplay between the conformal curvature acting on the particle as a potential and the particle motion which affects the geometric “pre-potential” associated to the conformal curvature itself. The theory, carried out here by assuming a Minkowski metric, can be easily extended to arbitrary space-time Riemann metric, e.g. the one adopted in the context of General Relativity. This novel theoretical scenario appears to be of general application and is expected to open a promising perspective in the modern endeavor aimed at the unification of the natural forces with gravitation. (shrink)

A question dating to Mardešić and Prasolov’s 1988 work [S. Mardešić and A. V. Prasolov, Strong homology is not additive, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 307(2) (1988) 725–744], and motivating a considerable amount of set theoretic work in the years since, is that of whether it is consistent with the ZFC axioms for the higher derived limits [Formula: see text] [Formula: see text] of a certain inverse system [Formula: see text] indexed by [Formula: see text] to simultaneously vanish. An equivalent formulation (...) of this question is that of whether it is consistent for all [Formula: see text]-coherent families of functions indexed by [Formula: see text] to be trivial. In this paper, we prove that, in any forcing extension given by adjoining [Formula: see text]-many Cohen reals, [Formula: see text] vanishes for all [Formula: see text]. Our proof involves a detailed combinatorial analysis of the forcing extension and repeated applications of higher-dimensional [Formula: see text]-system lemmas. This work removes all large cardinal hypotheses from the main result of [J. Bergfalk and C. Lambie-Hanson, Simultaneously vanishing higher derived limits, Forum Math. Pi 9 (2021) e4] and substantially reduces the least value of the continuum known to be compatible with the simultaneous vanishing of [Formula: see text] for all [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

The widespread and elaborate use of new financial instruments among corporate entities and financial institutions requires justification. It faces the charge of increasing both the level and complexity of risk in the financial system under the pretext of reducing it. It is a prodigious user of management resources and IT. It obscures the integrity of the nature of the non-financial user.It is not mere academic argument to question the ethics of certain instruments. Both in the US and the UK certain (...) forms of financial instrument are deemed too risky to be used by all and sundry. Other forms of instrument may be banned outright, even though many financial professionals will be perfectly capable of measuring the risk involved. The force of this attack is recognized in the financial industry. One defence frequently put forward is similar to that of the National Rifle Association in the US about guns. It is the users, not the product, that are the problem. “One misconception is that derivatives are risky instruments that are used for speculation. It is more accurate to say that derivatives are instruments that can be used to alter risk profiles”. The mere fact of an instrument existing is no reason to use it. The biggest advocates of exotic options are bankers. Practising Treasurers spend much time seeking to distinguish between the fascinating idea which the bank’s rocket scientist wants to try, and the derivative that will genuinely benefit the company. The fact that many of these instruments are harmful or spurious does not mean they should be banned, but neither does the absence of a ban make them ethical.The ethical question to ask for the non-financial corporation has to do with the proper balance of courage and prudence. Will this instrument enable the company to carry out its proper task with more focus and self-awareness, or is it an attempt to neutralize the proper risks that we are paid to take? For financial corporations the inevitable presence of derivatives poses two issues. First, are they intrinsically valuable or simply so complicated that no client could use them and monitor the new exposures involved? Secondly, will the active management of our positions created by this activity result in a change in the nature of our business, and if so, has this been clearly communicated to the world around?On reading this again I am once more struck by a remark made to me by a clergyman long before I was ordained. “What is an ethical Treasurer?” One of the major challenges in the field of financial ethics is the development of an adequate, and clearly communicated, measure of the intrinsic ethics of finance.This paper is not arguing that derivatives are wrong, but that they are powerful, and power needs monitoring and controlling. The events of October 1987 are often referred to as the meltdown of the markets. My clear memory is of the whole executive board of directors standing in my office gazing in awe at a Topic Screen as waves of red chased across the screen. The use of nuclear metaphors was apt. A system that seemed safe had assumed a life of its own. There is little doubt that derivatives fuelled the reaction. (shrink)

This paper describes Kant’s complex position on extension, showing how it emerges from the various ways in which he reacts to the views of Descartes, Locke, Newton, and Leibniz. Specifically, the paper argues that Kant’s views are closer to Leibniz’s than they are to those of Descartes, Locke, and Newton, insofar as Kant and Leibniz both reject the view that extension is a fundamental property, holding instead that it is explicable (at least in part) on the basis of more fundamental (...) forces. Kant disagrees with Leibniz, however, insofar as he rejects Leibniz’s distinctive commitments to certain metaphysical doctrines (such as pre-established harmony) and to active and passive primitive and derivative forces, opting, instead, for a Newtonian inspired conception of attractive and repulsive forces. In this way, the Critical Kant develops a hybrid position that attempts to make good use of aspects of both Leibniz’s and Newton’s accounts as he articulates his own distinctive position. (shrink)

Leibniz believed the ‘true concept of substance’ is found in ‘the concept of forces or powers’. Accordingly, he conceived monadic substances as metaphysically primitive forces whose modifications manifest both as monads’ appetitions and perceptions and as derivative forces in monads’ organic bodies. Relationships between substances, and in particular the ethical relationships that hold between rational substances, are also foregrounded by Leibniz’s concept of substances as forces. In section one, we discuss the derivative forces of bodies. In section two, (...) we consider monads’ perceptions and appetitions. Section three attends to ethical aspects of Leibniz’s account, focusing in particular on souls’ representative natures and the correspondence that obtains between perceptions in one and perceptions in all others. In section four, however, I argue that Leibniz’s commitment to the doctrine of the conservation of force makes it impossible for any one substance to pursue its own advantage by increasing its active force without there being a correlative disadvantageous decrease in the active force of substances elsewhere in the universe. While the reconciliatory proposals offered do not entirely remove the tension between Leibniz’s ethics and his physics, they do soften its severity and allow it to be regarded in a more positive light. (shrink)

Proposals by the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) to use bomb disposal robots for deadly force against humans have met with widespread condemnation. Media coverage of the furore has tended, incorrectly, to conflate these robots with autonomous weapon systems (AWS), the AI-based weapons used in armed conflict. These two types of systems should be treated as distinct since they have different sets of social, ethical, and legal implications. However, the conflation does raise a pressing question: what _if_ the SFPD (...) had proposed using AWS for law enforcement purposes? This article argues that current debate on AWS takes place within a ‘killing paradigm’ that leaves us ill-placed to understand the implications of using autonomous force outside of armed conflict. This is because ‘lethality’ is taken as the paradigmatic form of harm, meaning that other harms are understood in a way that is derivative of lethal harm. The article calls for more research on how other sorts of goods, such as freedom from domination, are imperilled by the use of autonomous force. The article also suggests that bringing research on AWS into dialogue with the sorts of concerns that have typically motivated political theory—e.g. power, coercion, the state—provides a fruitful starting point for addressing these issues. (shrink)

What is the relation between philosophical theorizing and experimental data? A modest set of naturalistic assumptions leads to what I term the force-field puzzle. The assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science, as captured in Quine’s force-field metaphor, seems to push us simultaneously towards thinking that there have to be conceptual constraints upon how we interpret experimental data and towards thinking that there cannot be such conceptual constraints, because all theorizing must be accountable to data and observation. (...) The key to resolving the force-field puzzle is to take a more nuanced view of how conceptual constraints can be accountable to data and observation. This can be done by developing conceptual arguments in conjunction with interpretative frameworks for making sense of experimental evidence. This paper shows how attending to important differences between different types of mindreading yields tools for interpreting experimental and observational data in a manner consistent with a (conceptually derived) constraint that I have developed elsewhere. This is the first-order constraint that second-order thinking, or thinking about thinking, is only available to language-using creatures. (shrink)

Seeking to derive the manifestly qualitative world of objects and entities without recourse to fundamental categoricity or qualitativity, I offer an account of how higher-order categorical properties and objects may emerge from a pure-power base. I explore the possibility of ‘fields’ whose fluctuations are force-carrying entities, differentiated with respect to a micro-topology of curled-up spatial dimensions. Since the spacetime paths of gauge bosons have zero ‘spacetime interval’ and no time-like extension, I argue that according them the status of fundamental (...) entities would support a pure-power ontology. Such entities, circulating within self-sustaining micro-topological ‘networks’, feasibly maintain definite spatial configurations of conserved physical quantities, including energy-momentum. Perceived as time-like and massy, and representing fermionic entities, they give rise to the manifest world. (shrink)

It is shown how to define forcing semantics within metatheories not containing the power-set construction, in particular, how to construct exponents assuming only (a slightly strengthened form of) exponents in the metatheory. Some straightforward applications (consistency and independence results, and derived rules) are obtained for such systems.

The reason for physics’ failure to find a final theory of the universe is examined. Problems identified are: the lack of unequivocal definitions for its fundamental elements (time, length, mass, electric charge, energy, work, matter-waves); the danger of relying too much on mathematics for solutions; especially as philosophical arguments conclude the universe cannot have a mathematical basis. It does not even need the concept of number to exist. Numbers and mathematics are human inventions arising from the human predilection for measurement. (...) Following Aristotle, a single fundamental cause is proposed to explore the efficacy of using pure non-mathematical philosophy to explain the universe, contrary to current quantum physical views. The cause is taken as Time, which is then defined, surprisingly leading automatically to a definition of a three-dimensional space answering the question into what can a universe be placed (space before space seems non-sensical). This enables the philosophical arguments to derive a universal rule giving clear-cut descriptions (definitions) of force (both gravitational and electromagnetic), motion, energy, and particles. The formation of atomic nuclei and atomic properties together with an unexpected role for neutrinos follow. In particular, a Popper-test can be prepared by introducing the concept of measurement to allow the philosophy arguments to be tested in another discipline - mathematics. The solution agrees with human physical observations to a remarkable degree of accuracy, automatically explaining and predicting values for Planck’s and the fine-structure constants. Although mathematical, it is included as confirming the efficacy of philosophy in attaining a final theory. (shrink)

The origin of the eukaryotic cell nucleus and the selective forces that drove its evolution remain unknown and are a matter of controversy. Autogenous models state that both the nucleus and endoplasmic reticulum (ER) derived from the invagination of the plasma membrane, but most of them do not advance clear selective forces for this process. Alternative models proposing an endosymbiotic origin of the nucleus fail to provide a pathway fully compatible with our knowledge of cell biology. We propose here an (...) evolutionary scenario that reconciles both an ancestral endosymbiotic origin of the eukaryotic nucleus (endosymbiosis of a methanogenic archaeon within a fermentative myxobacterium) with an autogenous generation of the contemporary nuclear membrane and ER from the bacterial membrane. We specifically state two selective forces that operated sequentially during its evolution: (1) metabolic compartmentation to avoid deleterious co‐existence of anabolic (autotrophic synthesis by the methanogen) and catabolic (fermentation by the myxobacterium) pathways in the cell, and (2) avoidance of aberrant protein synthesis due to intron spreading in the ancient archaeal genome following mitochondrial acquisition and loss of methanogenesis. BioEssays 28: 525–533, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

At the core of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals lies his ‘derivation’ of the categorical imperative: his attempt to establish that, if there is a supreme principle of morality, then it is this imperative. Kant's argument for this claim is one of the most puzzling in his corpus. The received view, championed by Aune and Allison, is that there is a fundamental gap in the argument, which Kant elides by means of a simple but deadly confusion, thus robbing (...) the argument of all validity. We will here contest the received view, as well as Korsgaard's alternative interpretation of the argument. In place of these positions we will offer a reconstruction of the derivation which reveals its coherence and force. We will show that it illuminates some interesting grounds for rejecting certain candidates, including a utilitarian principle, for status as the supreme principle of morality. While certainly not free of all defects, the argument will be shown to be far more powerful and interesting than it has commonly been held to be. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, the protagonist of his most famous book, can be regarded as a philosopher who works towards becoming a sage—something that, towards the end of the narrative, ultimately seems to happen. Over the course of the account, he travels between his lonely cave and human society several times, walking up and down a mountain. In this article, I focus on how Nietzsche describes those walks using language that breaks with Cartesian dualism through its employment of such expressions as (...) “lead-drop thoughts.” As a systematic frame of reference intended to support the analysis of these descriptions, I make use of Antoni Kempinski’s concept of energetic-informational metabolism. Then, motivated by the preceding observations, I outline the philosophico-therapeutic hypothesis of a human transformation taking place as a two-phase procedure: (1) replacing the view of Cartesian dualism with what I call the “theatre of forces,” and (2) “de-selfing” the stage, or regarding this theatre as impersonal. Finally, reaching out to a Buddhist philosophical conception of the impersonal, I consider the possibility of a metaphysics entirely derived from sensations. (shrink)

This study explores the historical concept of ether within the framework of modern theoretical physics by deriving Maxwell’s equations that incorporate magnetic monopoles from the Navier-Cauchy equation with stress couples. We demonstrate that the elastomechanical interpretation of electromagnetism not only revitalizes the ether concept but also provides a coherent theoretical foundation for understanding electromagnetic phenomena. This interpretation reveals a significant link between mechanical properties and electromagnetic behaviors, for example, the charge of fundamental particles, such as electrons, is inherently connected to (...) rotational dynamics within the elastomechanical medium. Additionally, we introduce the magnetic monopole as a critical component of our framework, showing how it is associated with mass flux and volume changes in the medium, thus contributing to the dynamics of particle generation. Our findings highlight the profound interplay between elastodynamics, classical electromagnetism, and contemporary concepts in physics, paving the way for new epistemological perspectives. This research underscores the potential for integrating diverse physical theories to foster innovative developments in theoretical physics, challenging traditional views and inviting further exploration of the fundamental forces that govern the universe. (shrink)

We present a formal derivation of the Mino–Sasaki–Tanaka–Quinn–Wald (MSTQW) equation describing the self-force on a (semi-) classical relativistic point mass moving under the influence of quantized linear metric perturbations on a curved background space–time. The curvature of the space–time implies that the dynamics of the particle and the field is history-dependent and as such requires a non-equilibrium formalism to ensure the consistent evolution of both particle and field, viz., the worldline influence functional and the closed- time-path (CTP) coarse-grained effective (...) action. In the spirit of effective field theory, we regularize the formally divergent self-force by smearing the local part of the retarded Green’s function and employing a quasi-local expansion. We derive the MSTQW–Langevin equations describing the perturbations of the particle’s worldline about its semi-classical trajectory resulting from interactions with the quantum fluctuations of the linear metric perturbations. Finally, we demonstrate that the quantum fluctuations of the field could, in principle, leave imprints on gravitational waveforms expected to be observed by gravitational interferometers, thereby encoding information about tree-level perturbative quantum gravity. (shrink)

This article asks how military ethics should respond to adversaries deliberately conducting hostilities below the threshold of war. Three options are considered: a novel, limited force paradigm; an expanded hostilities paradigm, i.e., within the law of armed conflict; and an international law enforcement paradigm derived primarily from human rights law. None is problem-free. Mindful of under-deployed classic just war reasoning arguments for discrimination between vices opposed to peace, this article argues against an expanded hostilities paradigm and shows that the (...) retributive, ‘equilibrium of justice’ test used sometimes to support such an expansion is necessary but not sufficient. It explains the need for further examination of whether/how Aquinas and his interpreters can/should conceive of actions under the paradigm of war occurring against non-state actors. (shrink)

In _The World Computer_ Jonathan Beller forcefully demonstrates that the history of commodification generates information itself. Out of the omnipresent calculus imposed by commodification, information emerges historically as a new money form. Investigating its subsequent financialization of daily life and colonization of semiotics, Beller situates the development of myriad systems for quantifying the value of people, objects, and affects as endemic to racial capitalism and computation. Built on oppression and genocide, capital and its technical result as computation manifest as racial (...) formations, as do the machines and software of social mediation that feed racial capitalism and run on social difference. Algorithms, derived from for-profit management strategies, conscript all forms of expression—language, image, music, communication—into the calculus of capital such that even protest may turn a profit. Computational media function for the purpose of extraction rather than ameliorating global crises, and financialize every expressive act, converting each utterance into a wager. Repairing this ecology of exploitation, Beller contends, requires decolonizing information and money, and the scripting of futures wagered by the cultural legacies and claims of those in struggle. (shrink)

We address a long-standing debate over whether classical magnetic forces can do work, ultimately answering the question in the affirmative. In detail, we couple a classical particle with intrinsic spin and elementary dipole moments to the electromagnetic field, derive the appropriate generalization of the Lorentz force law, show that the particle's dipole moments must be collinear with its spin axis, and argue that the magnetic field does mechanical work on the particle's elementary magnetic dipole moment. As consistency checks, we (...) calculate the overall system's energy-momentum and angular momentum, and show that their local conservation equations lead to the same force law and therefore the same conclusions about magnetic forces and work. We also compute the system's Belinfante-Rosenfeld energy-momentum tensor. (shrink)

I defend a causal reductionist account of the nature of rates of change like velocity and acceleration. This account identifies velocity with the past derivative of position and acceleration with the future derivative of velocity. Unlike most reductionist accounts, it can preserve the role of velocity as a cause of future positions and acceleration as the effect of current forces. I show that this is possible only if all the fundamental laws are expressed by differential equations of the (...) same order. Consideration of the continuity of time explains why the differential equations are all second order. This explanation is not available on non-causal or non-reductionist accounts of rates of change. Finally, I argue that alleged counterexamples to the reductionist account involving physically impossible worlds are irrelevant to an analysis of the properties that play a causal role in the actual world. 1 Background2 Grounding3 Causation4 The Proposal5 Why No Third Derivatives?6 Why Any Derivatives?7 Counterexamples? (shrink)

The measurement of force is based on a formal law of additivity, which characterizes the effects of two or more configurations on the equilibrium of a material point. The representing vectors (resultant forces) are additive over configurations. The existence of a tight interrelation between the force vector and the geometric space, in which motion is described, depends on observations of partial (directional) equilibria; an axiomatization of this interrelation yields a proof of part two of Newton's second law of (...) motion. The present results (which were derived from a curious and deep isomorphism between force measurement and trichromatic color measurement) yield a kind of subunit, which needs to be incorporated into more complete axiomatizations of mechanics that would fulfill the Mach-Kirchhoff program. (shrink)

We give characterizations for the sentences "Every $\Sigma^1_2$-set is measurable" and "Every $\Delta^1_2$-set is measurable" for various notions of measurability derived from well-known forcing partial orderings.

In this paper, I want to discuss the recent attempts by Professor John R. Searle to cast doubt on the traditional empiricist distinction between fact and value. Searle's first attack on this distinction was made in 1964 in his now classic article, “How to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’.” In that paper, he presented what he claimed to be a counter-example to the thesis that statements of fact may not entail statements of value. Searle's argument aroused much controversy and inspired many (...) attempted refutations, but Searle apparently found none of these convincing, for a few years later he published a revised version of his paper as the last chapter of his book, Speech Acts. The new version includes his replies to many of the objections which had been made to his thesis up to that time. It also includes, in the main body of the book, a theory of language which is supposed to provide the theoretical underpinning explaining why his original paper presents a genuine counter-example to the position he is attacking. It is the Speech Acts version of Searle's thesis which I want to consider here. (shrink)

Many believe that the world exists without a cause or reason. Most of them reject an explanation for the whole concrete world because they accept the traditional idea that concrete existence comes only from things that concretely exist. But I provide reasons for thinking that the world might be actual as a result of a feature that is not concrete but abstract. I begin by outlining ideas that some followers of the Platonic Theory of Forms have developed about whether actuality (...) of something can be explained by its possibility. Next, I show that many who think they reject all paths for explaining actuality by abstract facts about possibilities in fact follow such paths. The question of why there exists anything concrete might be answered not by saying that the world exists reasonlessly, but by following some such paths: Having a certain nature for something concrete can turn its possibility into its actuality. Still, we might in the end be forced to accept that the world exists without any reason. (shrink)

Rape of women by men might be generated either by a specialized rape adaptation or as a by-product of other psychological adaptations. Although increasing number of sexual partners is a proposed benefit of rape according to the “rape as an adaptation” and the “rape as a by-product” hypotheses, neither hypothesis addresses directly why some men rape their long-term partners, to whom they already have sexual access. In two studies we tested specific hypotheses derived from the general hypothesis that sexual coercion (...) in the context of an intimate relationship may function as a sperm competition tactic. We hypothesized that men’s sexual coercion in the context of an intimate relationship is related positively to his partner’s perceived infidelities and that men’s sexual coercion is related positively to their mate retention behaviors (behaviors designed to prevent a partner’s infidelity). The results from Study 1 (self-reports from 246 men) and Study 2 (partner-reports from 276 women) supported the hypotheses. The Discussion section addresses limitations of this research and highlights future directions for research on sexual coercion in intimate relationships. (shrink)

Heinrich Hertz dedicated the last four years of his life to a systematic reformulation of mechanics. One of the main issues that troubled Hertz in the customary formulation of mechanics was a "logical obscurity" in the notion of force. However, it is unclear what this logical obscurity was, hence it is unclear how Hertz took himself to have avoided it. -/- In this paper, I argue that a subtle ambiguity in Newton's original laws of motion lay at the basis (...) of Hertz's concerns; an ambiguity which led to the development of two slightly different notions of force. I then show how Hertz avoided this ambiguity by deriving a unitary notion of force, thus dispelling the obscurity that lurked in the customary representation of mechanics. (shrink)

Recently, mental strength education requires to change in a way that establishes a military value system suitable for a liberal democracy while facing the need to strengthen mental strength in response to unpredictable security situations. The key to fulfilling these twofold objectives lies in the fact that there is a positive correlation between the enhancement of a soldier’s democratic awareness and intangible force. Therefore, it is of great importance to emphasize the concept of ‘citizen in uniform’ as one of (...) the central military values. However, this concept has one problem before its use in military mental strength in which the orders of the military status and the orders of the civic seem heterogeneous and even conflicting. This study aims to dissolve the internal tension of this concept through a new philosophical interpretation of citizens in uniform, freedom, people and state, thereby providing the foundation for establishing for establishing new military values and enhancement of mental force. To this end, it examines the explanation of the current curriculum regarding these concepts first and diagnoses its several problems (II). The current curriculum presents a brief explanation of the compatibility of civil rights and military obligations but does not resolve the conflict between the two. A new understanding of them is possible by introducing Hegelian insights in Philosophy of Rights (III). From Hegel's point of view, freedom is not the mere absence of coercion but a capacity for self-determination. Freedom is difficult to realize wholly at the level of an isolated individual, and it calls for an ethical community to give it a specific form. A state that is the best entity in humanity is the supreme unit that defines individual freedom and identity. Then it naturally derives that national defense is one of the supreme missions directly related to the freedom and identity of its people. A re-description of the contents of the curriculum based on these insights can conceptually resolve the aforementioned problem and even strengthen its arguments (IV). The state and the people are in a more essential correlation than previously depicted, and liberal democratic values such as freedom, human rights and welfare are proved as constitutive of a state itself. The superiority of liberal democracy, which the current textbook attempts to prove, also becomes transparent. Finally, military duties do not conceptually conflict with civil freedom but are considered as a form of it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 29.4 (1999) 40-57 [Access article in PDF] Bogeyman: Benedict Anderson's "Derivative" Discourse Andrew Parker Between life and death, nationalism has as its own proper space the experience of haunting. There is no nationalism without some ghost. -Jacques Derrida, "Onto-Theology of National-Humanism" Writing a mere decade ago about Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, Timothy Brennan noted that "with the exception of some recent sociological works which use literary theories, (...) it is rare in English to see 'nation-ness' talked about as an imaginative vision--as a topic worthy of full fictional realization.... Even in the underrepresented branch of Third World English studies, one is likely to find discussions of race and colonialism, but not the 'nation' as such" [47]. If these sentences appear astonishing today--if over the past ten years we seem to have done little else but regard the nation as an imaginative construction--our sense of surprise may help to register how rapidly and profoundly Anderson's work has transformed the nature of literary and cultural studies. Viewing the modern nation primarily as an anthropological rather than political category, one that has less inherently to do with ideologies than with kinship, gender, and religion, Anderson argues in Imagined Communities for the irreducibility of material-cultural practices (what he memorably termed "print-capitalism") in creating and sustaining the "imagined community" of a nation whose citizens maintain "deep attachments" to each other in the absence of face-to-face contact: "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" [6]. Part of what makes such communities national, Anderson suggests, is a shared experience of simultaneity modeled on the spatio-temporal organization of newspapers and novels, for "these forms provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the nation" by furnishing their reader-consumers with a "complex gloss on the word 'meanwhile'" [25]. The "old-fashioned novel" especially, through its distinctive structures of address and omniscient point of view, becomes in this schema a "device" for generating a sociologically complex world populated by characters who, even though they "may be largely unaware of each other," nevertheless move together "calendrically through homogeneous, empty time"--a world, in short, that may be considered "a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily up (or down) history" [25-26]. As Jonathan Culler aptly summarizes in his contribution to this issue, Anderson thus takes the novel to be "a precondition for the nation" [24], "a formal condition of imagining the nation--a structural condition of possibility" [37]. Such strong emphasis on the novel as "a force for imagining the communities that are nations" certainly helps to explain why Imagined Communities so swiftly and pervasively became doxa in literary study--even if, as Culler elaborates, some of Anderson's readers have mistaken his argument for a stronger if less defensible [End Page 40] version that sees the novel as "a force in shaping or legitimating the nation" [37].While Anderson's analogy between novel and nation has been put by literary critics to a multitude of creative uses, what has been acknowledged much less commonly is that his literary interests are by no means exhausted by the paradigm for which he is best known. 1 The very title of his most recent book is, significantly as we shall see, a translated quotation from a novel, and he returns repeatedly for insights into the politics of literary form not only to Walter Benjamin but to certain exemplary "nationalist" novelists, José Rizal and Pramoedya Ananta Toer first and foremost. Where The Spectre of Comparisons is unusual in containing chapter-length readings of literary works (several of them reprinted from the earlier Language and Power), Imagined Communities was no stranger to detailed discussions of fiction. We may be struck, in fact, by the extent to which Anderson's theoretical and historical studies locate themselves persistently over time with reference to "literature... (shrink)

This book explores repetition in contemporary performance and spectatorship. It offers an impassioned account of the ways in which speech, movement and structures repeat in performances by Pina Bausch, Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker, Lone Twin Theatre, Haranczak/Navarre and Marco Berrettini. It addresses repetition in relation to processes of desire and draws attention to the forces that repetition captures and makes visible. What is it in performances of repetition that persuades us to return to them again and again? How might we (...) unpack their complexities and come to terms with their demands upon us? While considering repetition in relation to the difficult pleasures we derive from the theatre, this book explores ways of accounting for such experience of theatre in memory and writing--back cover. (shrink)

We present a simple and completely model-theoretical proof of a strengthening of a theorem of Ajtai: The independence of the pigeonhole principle from IΔ0. With regard to strength, the theorem proved here corresponds to the complexity/proof-theoretical results of [10] and [14], but a different combinatorics is used. Techniques inspired by Razborov [11] replace those derived from Håstad [8]. This leads to a much shorter and very direct construction.

ArgumentAccording to a long-standing interpretation which traces back to Max Jammer'sConcepts of Force(1957), Ruggiero G. Boscovich would have developed a concept of force in the tradition of Leibniz's dynamics. In his variation on the theme, basic properties of matter such as solidity or impenetrability would be derived from an interplay of some “active” force of attraction and repulsion that any primary element of nature (“point of matter” in Boscovich's theory) would possess. In the present paper I discuss (...) many flaws of this interpretation and argue for an alternative point of view, according to which the crucial aspect in the development of Boscovich's natural philosophy is his early definition of forces as “mathematical determinations” to have a certain state of motion. This is consistent with a Newtonian background and has as its epistemological consequence a certain agnosticism about the nature of forces and a “mathematical neutralism” (mathematics as a neutral tool, allowing for a plurality of interpretations). (shrink)

We study the dynamics of a vortex in superfluid He4. This is carried out by deriving the effective Lagrangian for the center of the vortex by starting with the time-dependent Ginzburg-Landau formalism. From the resultant equation of motion for a vortex, we arrive at a novel aspect for the Magnus force which has long been known in fluid dynamics. This force has a geometric origin and is expected to occur in other form of condensates such as vortex excitations (...) for quantum Hall fluids or ferromagnets. We also consider the force of non geometric origin, the pinning force coming from the impurity. (shrink)

A long-standing common-law policy holds that anyone may lawfully use force to repel or arrest a criminal threatening property, and a fortiori that force may be used to defend one’s own property. But there are limits to these powers. In cases where some amount of violence is justified but excessive force is used, some common-law jurisdictions will deny any defence to murder. Killing through excessive force is neither justified nor excused. Other jurisdictions will allow a partial (...) defence, excusing from the fullest penalty and reducing the offence to manslaughter or unlawful homicide, on the ground that the actor should be punished for a grievous miscalculation. By analyzing the relationships between persons and property and investigating the historical development of self-help doctrines, the principles defining excessive force here may be reduced to four. First, property cannot easily be conceived as a value worth protecting by force where there is no accompanying threat to the person. Second, the law may nonetheless see a presumptive identity between an owner’s person and his property which is external to his person, so that violent defence of property becomes justified even without a threat to bodily or personal safety. Third, intentionality and purpose play an important role in attributing legal blame for excessive force in protecting property, and the test of allowable quantum of force is not objective. Finally, the legal and ethical issues are transformed when we move from individual to collective property. Judgments concerning state and international legality regarding excessive force may derive only limited guidance from the contours of criminal law and private law. Yet, much of international conflict today is carried out by private actors who do not wear uniforms or wrap themselves in the shield of state immunity, and the domestic legal dimension thus begins to have purchase on issues of excessive force in war and communal conflict. (shrink)

While principle-based ethics is well known and widely accepted in psychiatry, much less is known about how decisions are made in clinical practice, which case scenarios exist, and which challenges exist for decision-making. Protocols of the central ethics committee responsible for four psychiatric hospitals over 7 years (N=17) were analysed. While four cases concerned suicide risk in the case of intended hospital discharge, the vast majority (N=13) concerned questions of whether the responsible physician should or should not initiate the use (...) of coercion in patients lacking mental capacity. The committee’s recommendations were non-uniform. Forced feeding and electroconvulsive therapy were endorsed in each one case. In two cases of intermittent loss of capacity due to heavy drinking or intermittent severe suicidal ideation, a self-binding contract was recommended and the use of coercion was considered as justified for a very limited period. In all other cases, most of which involved involuntary treatment, the use of coercion was not endorsed. Without exception, the recommendations were accepted with relief by the physicians and their treatment teams, who feared liability in the event of harm to the patient. Eventually, a model of a decision algorithm was derived from the ethical arguments in the protocols. (shrink)

While temporal preparation has frequently been examined through the manipulation of foreperiods, the role of force level during temporal preparation remains underexplored. In our study, we propose to manipulate mental training of attentional control in order to shed light on the role of the force level and autonomic nervous system in the temporal preparation of an action. Forty subjects, divided into mental training group (n = 20) and without mental training group (n = 20), participated in this study. (...) The influence of the attentional control and force levels on the autonomic nervous system were measured using the skin conductance response and the heart rate variability; the accuracy of the motor responses was measured using a method derived from machine learning. Behaviorally, only the mental training group reinforced its motor and attentional control. When using short foreperiod durations and high force level, motor and attentional control decreased, consistent with the dominant sympathetic system. This resulted in an increased anticipation rate of responses with a higher reaction time compared to the long foreperiods duration and low force level, in which the reaction time significantly decreased, with enhancement of the expected force level, showing consistency with the dominant parasympathetic system. Interestingly, results revealed a predictive relationship between the sympathovagal balance and motor and attentional control during the long foreperiods and low force level. Finally, results demonstrate that attentional mental training leads to the reinforcement of interactions between the autonomic nervous system and attentional processes which are involved in the temporal preparation of a force task. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the meaning of the use of force for military professionals by analyzing the US Navy’s Crossing the Line ceremony. Ambiguity surrounds the initiation ritual for crossing the equator onboard naval warships, especially as it comes to its form prior to the late 1990s. All the while, the US Navy has maintained that the ceremony is part of a long tradition for teaching the values of honor, commitment and courage. Inspired by Max van Manen’s approach (...) to phenomenological writing ([1984]. “Practicing Phenomenological Writing.” Phenomenology + Pedagogy 2 (1): 36–69; [2016]. Writing in the Dark: Phenomenological Studies in Interpretive Inquiry. London: Routledge), I explicate the idea that the ceremony, in its former form, did indeed teach the value of honor, but through inversion, acting out the worst possible behavior imaginable for military professionals in the form of a black mass, while the ceremony in its current form teaches the value of individual dignity as a professional obligation. The inquiry concludes with a reflective stance of honor and dignity as moral principles for enabling and constraining the use of force. Derived from the experience of a particular military practice, the stance also has general significance, helping navigate the line between thoughtlessness and thoughtful actions within a social framework, not unlike the just war tradition. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the meaning of the use of force for military professionals by analyzing the US Navy’s Crossing the Line ceremony. Ambiguity surrounds the initiation ritual for crossing the equator onboard naval warships, especially as it comes to its form prior to the late 1990s. All the while, the US Navy has maintained that the ceremony is part of a long tradition for teaching the values of honor, commitment and courage. Inspired by Max van Manen’s approach (...) to phenomenological writing ([1984]. “Practicing Phenomenological Writing.” Phenomenology + Pedagogy 2 (1): 36–69; [2016]. Writing in the Dark: Phenomenological Studies in Interpretive Inquiry. London: Routledge), I explicate the idea that the ceremony, in its former form, did indeed teach the value of honor, but through inversion, acting out the worst possible behavior imaginable for military professionals in the form of a black mass, while the ceremony in its current form teaches the value of individual dignity as a professional obligation. The inquiry concludes with a reflective stance of honor and dignity as moral principles for enabling and constraining the use of force. Derived from the experience of a particular military practice, the stance also has general significance, helping navigate the line between thoughtlessness and thoughtful actions within a social framework, not unlike the just war tradition. (shrink)