HOME . ABOUT US . CONTACT US HELP . PUBLISH WITH US . LIBRARIANS Search in or Explore Browse Publications A-Z Browse Subjects A-Z Advanced Search University of Cambridge SIGN IN Register | Why Register? | Sign Out | Got a Voucher? prev abstract next Two Approaches to Reading the Historical Descartes A Devout Catholic? Knowledge of The Mental Thought and Language Descartes as A Natural Philosopher Substance Dualism Notes Two Approaches to Reading the Historical Descartes Author: (...) Desmond M. Clarke DOI: 10.1080/09608780902986680 Publication Frequency: 5 issues per year Published in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 17, Issue 3 June 2009 , pages 601 - 616 John Cottingham: Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes's Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 40.00 (hb.). ISBN 978-0-19-922697-9 John Cottingham, in a new collection of essays, asks the question: 'what exactly did Descartes himself chiefly take himself to be doing?' (254). 1 While the question is relatively clear, and while it acknowledges implicitly that Descartes was probably doing a range of different things, the answer that is apparently proposed here emerges only on reading the whole collection. Cottingham distinguishes in Chapter 1 - which is a new, synoptic overview of what is discussed in the other chapters, all of which were previously published - between two approaches to reading Descartes. One is to see him as 'a dummy on which to drape various suspect doctrines (such as “Cartesian dualism”)' (3), which contemporary analytic philosophers have shown to be radically mistaken. Another approach is adopted by historians of ideas 'who make it their life's work to pay meticulous scholarly attention to the philosophical works of past ages' (3). Cottingham does not explicitly criticize either of these approaches, but he hints at situating his own as some kind of Aristotelian middle course between the two. Since the two reference points are dangerously close to straw men or what Cottingham calls 'extreme positions', the proposed middle way may simply combine elements of two approaches, each of which is entirely legitimate. I return to this question at the conclusion. In fact, many of these essays were intended to show (rightly!) that Descartes never held the philosophical positions that are often attributed to him. The interpretation of Karol Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II, provides a good example of how mistaken one can be: The Cogito ergo sum radically changed the way of doing philosophy … After Descartes, philosophy became a science of pure thought: all that is being- the created world, and even the Creator, is situated within the ambit of the Cogito, as contents of human consciousness. Philosophy is concerned with beings as contained in consciousness, and not as existing independently of it. (257) The only way to address such a caricature is to refer back to what Descartes actually wrote. Cottingham does precisely that, often quoting the original Latin or French texts. However, having shown successfully, by a close reading of the texts, that Descartes did not hold many of the views that are attributed to him, it still remains to say what Descartes did hold or teach about various philosophical problems that retain their perennial interest for us. This is how the question arises, intermittently, about what Descartes thought he was 'chiefly' doing, or what was his primary objective, in the course of an intellectual career that spanned three decades. However, the apparently legitimate desire to bring Descartes' intellectual endeavours into sharp focus may be frustrated by the evidence. His life and work manifestly lack the coherence or unity of purpose that one finds, for example, among many of his French or Dutch contemporaries. It is comparatively easy to 'read' the life of Gisbertus Voetius as that of an unwavering Calvinist theologian, to see Antoine Arnauld as a staunch and consistent theological defender of Port Royal, and even to interpret the obviously fragmentary contents of Pascal's unpublished notebooks (subsequently, the Penses) as an extended search for authentic religious faith, in opposition to what he perceived as the corruption of ecclesial structures. In contrast, Descartes' life reveals features that are difficult to integrate into a coherent pattern. He lived and published during a critical juncture in the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. Although baptized into the Catholic Church soon after his birth in the Loire district of France, he chose to live most of his life in the aggressively Calvinist United Provinces, in which other religious practices were officially (though often ineffectively) banned. Descartes may have adopted the motto from Ovid, at least early in his career: 'bene vixit qui bene latuit' (he lives well who conceals himself well), and he seems genuinely to have wished to avoid theological controversies. However, he engaged in very public controversies with so many of his contemporaries - including Hobbes, Gassendi, the French Jesuits (collectively) and Father Dinet (in particular), Voetius and the University of Utrecht, Regius, Fermat, Roberval, Revius and other theologians at Leiden - that one might conclude that his claimed preference for a quiet life was a disingenuous mask. 2 Descartes published four books during his lifetime, and wrote at least one other that he had intended to publish. The latter was his first major composition, Le Monde, which he suppressed when he heard about Galileo's condemnation by Rome in 1633. This was followed, in 1637, by Descartes' first book (also written in French), which he tried to publish anonymously by withholding his name from the title page: the Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison, & chercher la verit dans les sciences. Plus la dioptrique, les meteors, et la geometrie, qui sont des essais de cete methode. Four years later Descartes published the first edition (in Latin) of Meditationes de prima philosophia, in quibus Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstrator, which also included six sets of objections and replies. The Principia philosophiae appeared (in Latin) in Amsterdam in 1644, and was followed five years later by Les Passions de l'Ame (in French). 3 In parallel with these publications, Descartes carried on a very extensive correspondence over a thirty-year period (in both Latin and French), and preserved copies or drafts of his letters with a view to future publication. Given the range and variety of his interests, and the sheer volume of writings, published or otherwise, that have survived from his pen, one may be tempted to engage in a comparative evaluation, as Cottingham does, by selecting one of Descartes' books as his primary contribution to philosophy. Cottingham claims that the Meditations was Descartes''masterpiece' (44), 'the definitive statement of Descartes's philosophy' (45) and the 'definitive statement of his metaphysics' (68). He also describes the Meditations more narrowly as 'his metaphysical masterpiece' (259, 303) and, more broadly, as 'his philosophical masterpiece' (289), and he lists it with the Discours as one of Descartes' two 'masterworks' (280). The Principia offers some competition in this comparative judgement when it is described as 'the canonical presentation of his metaphysical views' (114), while 'the construction of a moral system … was the crowning aim of his philosophy' (231). Having pitched repeatedly for the Meditations as Descartes' primary text, Cottingham claims that its author was 'a devout Catholic' (215), that he was 'a devoutly religious philosopher' (256), and that he could not free himself 'from the influence of the long years of theological study he had dutifully completed at La Flche' (62). Accordingly, the Meditations should be read as 'in essence a work of theodicy' (220); 'what has pride of place in the construction of his philosophical system is … an appeal to God … the nature and existence of the Deity is something that lies at the very heart of his entire philosophical system' (255). Without quite saying so, there are hints here that Descartes was a devout Christian whose primary intellectual contribution was to write a work of metaphysics, in which God is central and in the course of which the author alternates between proving God's existence and contemplating God - the latter a seventeenth-century version of Bonaventure's Journey of the Soul to God. 'Descartes's attraction to a contemplative mode of philosophizing' (305) is reflected, in the Meditations, in 'the language of the soul's coming to rest in adoring contemplation of the light' (306). Cottingham also accepts the overwhelming evidence from Descartes' correspondence that he 'devoted most of his career not to metaphysics but to science' (108), although he quibbles elsewhere with those who adopt the shorthand term 'science' to describe part of what was called 'natural philosophy' in the seventeenth century (282). He also refers to the '(notoriously lame) argument for the essential incorporeality of the thinking self' in one of Descartes' masterworks (60), and he describes the 'strange, seemingly isolated world of his metaphysical meditations' (139), with its 'creaking ontology' (147), when read in isolation from the rest of his work as a natural philosopher. How should we read him, then, in the twenty-first century? A Devout Catholic? That Descartes was a devout Catholic is possible, unlikely and undecidable. He seems not to have studied theology at all while at school at La Flche, although he completed the pre-theology college cycle in the company of Jesuit students who then continued their studies in theology. Descartes consistently attempted to avoid public entanglement with religious and theological controversies, and said so frequently. 4 Given the alignments that prevailed at the time, both in France. (shrink)

"Rene Descartes is often called the 'Father of Modern Philosophy.' The profound controversies that his doctrines have engendered are alone sufficient to establish his eminence. Yet if he is to be paid a due respect, it is necessary to understand him on his own terms- to distinguish his doctrines from myriad notions labeled 'Cartesian.' The quest for certainty may be a constitutional imperative for every philosopher; in the case of Descartes it was an acknowledged passion. Thus there is (...) no more fitting approach to him than to study seriously his claims to having attained certainty regarding what he took to be the questions of metaphysics, namely, the questions of the existence of God and of the nature of the human mind."--The Preface. (shrink)

In late 1633, as Descartes was preparing _The World and Man _for publication, he learned that Galileo had been condemned by the Catholic Church for defending the motion of the earth. His reaction to the news was swift and powerful: as his own treatises also espoused the proposition deemed heretical, he canceled their publication. More than thirty years after Descartes had begun his project, these works were finally published, posthumously, both to acclaim and to controversy. Together, they (...) profoundly influenced the course of modern philosophy. This volume presents Roger Ariew’s clear and engaging translations of Descartes’s treatises, along with a general Introduction, describing the long road to publication, the reception of the works, and their significance. Appendices provide selections from Descartes’s correspondence on Galileo, Part V of the _Discourse on Method_, and a summary of Descartes’s _Description of the Human Body_. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Strategic Emergence of Cartesianism:Descartes, Public Controversy, and the Quarrel of UtrechtTyler J. ThomasBetween the years 1645 and 2005, the writings of René Descartes and the teaching of Cartesian philosophy were officially banned at Utrecht University. Although the ban had not been enforced in recent centuries, and was only questionably enforced in its immediate aftermath, this episode at a prominent university in the French philosopher's adopted (...) country rightly qualifies as one of the seventeenth century's most scandalous affairs. Despite the centrality of Cartesianism to "the quarrel," existing scholarship has not captured its full significance to the emergence of Cartesian philosophy. Even Jonathan Israel and Theo Verbeek, the two scholars who have contributed the most to our historical knowledge of the quarrel, tend to characterize its drama as an external annoyance brought upon Descartes because of peculiar features of the Dutch academic-religious landscape rather than an incident deliberately shaped by his own actions.1 [End Page 749]While it is undeniable that Descartes felt persecuted by his Dutch antagonists, this article argues that Descartes's involvement in, and ultimate responsibility for, the quarrel requires reassessment. Specifically, I argue that the quarrel incited certain political dangers associated with publication that Descartes had well anticipated at the outset of his public career. Descartes traced the root of these dangers to the institutional predominance of Scholasticism, which he viewed not only as an erroneous philosophical system but also as a set of principles and methods with pernicious sociopolitical effects. More explicitly than in his philosophical works, Descartes would reveal in the polemical documents of the quarrel his understanding of how the Aristotelian principles at the heart of Scholasticism sustained a class of intellectuals whose social status required the perpetual irresolution of philosophical controversy, which Descartes especially identified with the formal method of disputation practiced in the universities of Europe.Recognizing that he was in a public battle for the legitimacy of his philosophy and, after a certain point, for his own safety, Descartes would admit to employing an evolving publication strategy intended to prepare the intellectual grounds for the acceptance of his principles among the learned public. Ranging from Jesuit priests to Protestant ministers to university officials, Descartes's critics were almost uniformly alarmed by the apparent threat Cartesianism represented to the union of Aristotelianism and orthodox theology. Descartes himself believed that the social status of these officials determined their opposition to his philosophy, and the quarrel prompted him to reveal that the order of his publications and their forms were governed primarily by the need to subvert such hostilities. Moreover, in a letter exchange deserving more attention than it has yet received, Descartes would advocate the wider usage of certain writing techniques to neuter the objections of institutional gatekeepers.2 Even at this well-developed stage of Descartes studies, the extent to which the very appearance of the Cartesian writings was determined by such strategic considerations remains underappreciated. [End Page 750]Careful comparison of the developments of the quarrel with Descartes's own statements helps reveal the intimate relation he perceived between sociopolitical authority in seventeenth-century Europe and the philosophical practices of Scholasticism. His formative role in the quarrel thus merits reexamination not only as a pivotal moment in the emergence of Cartesian philosophy but also as an occasion for further questions regarding the status of the Cartesian writings as strategic documents, including their influence upon later public controversies.3 For these reasons, Descartes's account of his actions during the quarrel deserves a large audience among philosophers, political theorists, and intellectual historians interested in the conflicts that would eventually characterize the Enlightenment.4THE QUARREL UNFOLDS: JUDGMENT OF MARCH 1642In late 1641, almost immediately following publication of the Meditations, a dispute over Cartesian philosophy emerged among the theologians at Utrecht University. In March 1642, Gisbertus Voetius, a prominent Dutch Calvinist theologian and rector of the university, convinced the academic senate to issue a formal condemnation of Cartesian philosophy on three counts. The senate decreed:I. It is opposed to the traditional philosophy which universities throughout the world have hitherto taught on the best advice, and it undermines its foundations.II. Second, it turns away... (shrink)

R??SUM???? travers l?????tude de la correspondance philosophique entre Descartes et Henry More, je souhaiterais montrer que les th??mes centraux en sont la consid??ration de la nature de l???espace et le statut de l???infini, bien que la pol??mique aborde??galement le probl??me ontologique de la distinction entre l?????tendue et la pens??e, et les questions physiques de la n??gation du vide et de l???atomisme. More rejette l???hypoth??se cart??sienne d???un univers ind??fini, qu???il consid??re??tre une mani??re d??tourn??e de postuler le caract??re infini de l???univers, (...) ce qui revient?? attribuer tout autant l???infinit???? la mati??re qu????? Dieu, d???o?? le fait que Descartes soit un mat??rialiste selon Henry More. ABSTRACT The correspondence between Descartes and More covers a diversity of each author???s fundamental philosophical views. Their polemics range over not only general aspects of physics, but also extend to cosmology and theology. On the one hand, we have God as infinite and His creation as indefinite for Descartes; on the other hand, God as extant, ubiquitous and omnipresent, and His creation as limited for Henry More. It is this last problem that constitutes the focus of my essay, strictly speaking??? the problem of the universe as infinite. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the comparison of two types of proofs in mathematical practice, the methodological differences of which go back to the difference in the understanding of the nature of mathematics by Descartes and Leibniz. In modern philosophy of mathematics, we talk about conceptual and formal proofs in connection with the so-called Hilbert Thesis, according to which every proof can be transformed into a logical conclusion in a suitable formal system. The analysis of the arguments of the (...) proponents and opponents of the Thesis, “conceptualists” and “formalists”, is presented respectively by the two main antagonists – Y. Rav and J. Azzouni. The focus is on the possibility of reproducing the proof of “interesting” mathematical theorems in the form of a strict logical conclusion, in principle feasible by a mechanical procedure. The argument of conceptualists is based on pointing out the importance of other aspects of the proof besides the logical conclusion, namely, in introducing new concepts, methods, and establishing connections between different sections of meaningful mathematics, which is often illustrated by the case of proving Fermat’s Last Theorem (Y. Rav). Formalists say that a conceptual proof “points” to the formal logical structure of the proof (J. Azzouni). The article shows that the disagreement is based on the assumption of asymmetry of mutual translation of syntactic and semantic structures of the language, as a result of which the formal proof loses important semantic factors of proof. In favor of a formal proof, the program of univalent foundations of mathematics In. Vojevodski, according to which the future of mathematical proofs is associated with the availability of computer verification programs. In favor of conceptual proofs, it is stated (A. Pelc) that the number of steps in the supposed formal logical conclusion when proving an “interesting” theorem exceeds the cognitive abilities of a person. The latter circumstance leads the controversy beyond the actual topic of mathematical proof into the epistemological sphere of discussions of “mentalists” and “mechanists” on the question of the supposed superiority of human intelligence over the machine, initiated by R. Penrose in his interpretation of the Second Theorem of Goedel, among whose supporters, as it turned out, was Goedel himself. (shrink)

본 논문은 데카르트의 코기토 개념에 대한 알키에와 게루의 논쟁을 중심으로 데카르트 철학의 의미를 규명한다. 알키에는 코기토에서 존재와 사유를 실체와 핵심적 속성으로서 구분하는 반면, 게루는 존재와 사유가 근본적으로 동일하다는 입장을 표명한다. 알키에는 사유로 환원되지 않는 존재의 체험을 강조하고 게루는 지성을 본성으로 갖는 코기토에 의해 단일한 이성적 체계가 구축된다고 본다. 알키에의 관점은 나와 신의 존재가 논리적 차원이 아니라 형이상학적 발견이라는 점을 강조함으로써 우리의 유한성을 직시할 수 있도록 해주는 반면, 존재와 사유, 그리고 형이상학과 과학을 지나치게 구분함으로써 학의 수립을 위한 데카르트의 기획을 약화시킨다. 게루는 (...) 존재를 사유와 일치시킴으로써 데카르트의 학문 수립 기획에 부합하는 해석을 제시하는 장점이 있지만, 진리의 추구 과정에서 획득된 확실성을 인식론적 차원과 존재론적 차원으로 구분함으로써 결국 신의 진실성이 코기토의 존재를 보증한다고 주장한다. 이는 영원한 진리의 창조자 개념을 평가절하하고 이성적 체계의 위상을 과도하게 부각시킨다는 단점이 있다. 본 논문은 코기토가 사유를 통해 자신의 존재 및 사물에 대한 견고한 확실성을 획득하지만, 이런 확실성이 학의 체계로 발전되기 위해서는 코기토의 존재가 아닌, 이미 획득된 진리의 확실성을 보증해주는 신의 개입이 필요하다는 입장에 서있다. 결국 코기토는 유한한 지식의 확실성을 무한자로부터 보증 받아야 하는 실존적 주체로서 형이상학과 과학의 접점이다. (shrink)

From 1683 to 1685 Arnauld engaged in a controversy with Malebranche over the nature of ideas. While the occasion for the dispute was a disagreement over grace, the focus was the account of ideas given in Malebranche’s Search After Truth. Arnauld published his Des vraies et des fausses idées in 1683, and this was followed by a response from Malebranche in 1684 and a response by Arnauld shortly afterward. In his criticism of Malebranche, Arnauld claimed to be reacting not (...) just for himself, but for Descartes as well, and so a look at the controversy and the reasons given for the conflicting claims will, I believe, help in understanding Descartes’ own difficult remarks on ideas. (shrink)

Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and (...) his philosophical importance redeemed. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the controversy between Henry More and René Descartes on the indefinite extension of the world. I provide a new reading of Descartes’ famous final answer of 15 April 1649. I read the entire debate in the terms of a disagreement concerning the epistemological status of the necessity of our judgement about the extension of the universe. Accordingly, the disagreement on the infinity of the world constitutes a case of a more general disagreement (...) on the nature of the necessity of the theorems of Cartesian Physics. In particular, as concerns Descartes’ last reply, I argue that his assertion that a finite world is contradictory should be interpreted as a reply to More’s claim that the thesis of the infinity of the world, in so far as it cannot be grounded on the identity between matter and extension, does not express a logical necessity. Descartes’ assertion of the logical impossibility of a finite world, far from being, as it has always been read, a concession he made under the pressure of More’s objections, expresses the more radical element of the entire debate about the extension of the universe. (shrink)

Descartes and William Harvey engaged in a polite dispute about the cause of the heart's motion. Descartes saw the heart's motion of passive; Harvey saw it as active. I criticize three prominent explanations for Descartes' opposition to Harvey's theory. I argue that Descartes found Harvey's model to be inconsistent with mind-body dualism and this was the reason he opposed it.

This is a collection of Paul Hoffman's wide-ranging essays on Descartes composed over the past twenty-five years. The essays in Part I include his celebrated "The Unity of Descartes' Man," in which he argues that Descartes accepts the Aristotelian view that soul and body are related as form to matter and that the human being is a substance; a series of subsequent essays elaborating on this interpretation and defending it against objections; and an essay on Descartes' (...) theory of distinction. In the essays in Part II he argues that Descartes retains the Aristotelian theory of causation according to which an agent's action is the same as the passion it brings about, and explains the significance of this doctrine for understanding Descartes' dualism and physics. In the essays in Part III he argues that Descartes accepts the Aristotelian theory of cognition according to which perception is possible because things that exist in the world are also capable of a different way of existing in the soul, and he shows how this theory figures in Descartes' account of misrepresentation and in the controversy over whether Descartes is a direct realist or a representationalist. The essays in Part IV examine Descartes' theory of the passions of the soul: their definition; their effect on our happiness, virtue, and freedom; and methods of controlling them. (shrink)

The philosopher Donald Davidson has argued in an influential article, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” that there is no intelligible basis on which to distinguish between conceptual schemes that Kuhn and Feyerabend have treated as incommensurable or incompatible. He concludes that, given the underlying methodology of interpretation of speech behavior, we cannot be in a position to judge that others have concepts or beliefs radically different from our own. Thus, he adds, we cannot talk meaningfully about the (...) existence of conceptual schemes. I offer a historical rejoinder to Davidson, focusing on the famous seventeenth-century debate between Descartes and Gassendi regarding the use of the first-person pronoun. I show that, in this particular debate, their failure to translate the pronoun “I” was so basic and fundamental a failure that, although it turned on just one word, it forced Gassendi to question the longstanding Renaissance humanist principle of the intertranslatability of all natural languages. Could the Gassendi-Descartes debate similarly challenge Davidson’s assertion of the intertranslatability of all natural languages and his consequent denial of the existence of conceptual schemes? (shrink)

"[Goodbye, Descartes] is certain to attract attention and controversy..a fascinating journey to the edges of logical thinking and beyond." -Publishers Weekly Critical Acclaim for Keith Devlin's Previous Book Mathematics: The Science of Patterns "A book such as this belongs in the personal library of everyone interested in learning about some of the most subtle and profound works of the human spirit." -American Scientist "Devlin's very attractive book is a well-written attempt to explain mathematics to educated nonmathematicians. the basic (...) ideas are presented in a clear, concise, and easily understood manner. Highly recommended." -Choice "[Devlin] has found an interesting way of exhibiting how mathematics is unified. the author's presentation is a tour de force." -Mathematical Reviews A Selection of the Newbridge Library of Science and Reader's Subscription. (shrink)

Descartes's Fictions traces common movements in early modern philosophy and literary method. Emma Gilby reassesses the significance of Descartes's writing by bringing his philosophical output into contact with the literary treatises, exempla, and debates of his age. She argues that humanist theorizing about poetics represents a vital intellectual context for Descartes's work. She offers readings of the controversies to which this poetic theory gives rise, with particular reference to the genre of tragicomedy, questions of verisimilitude or plausibility, (...) and the figures of Guez de Balzac and Pierre Corneille. Drawing on what Descartes says about, and to, his many contemporaries and correspondents embedded in the early modern republic of letters, this volume shows that poetics provides a repository of themes and images to which he returns repeatedly: fortune, method, error, providence, passion, and imagination, for instance. Like the poets and theorists of his age, Descartes is also drawn to the forms of attention that people may bring to his work. This interest finds expression in the mature Cartesian metaphysics of the Meditations, as well as, later, in the moral philosophy of his correspondence with Elisabeth of Bohemia or the Passions of the Soul. This volume thus bridges the gap between Cartesian criticism and late-humanist literary culture in France. (shrink)

I discuss Descartes’ metaphysics of selfhood, and relevant parts of contemporary philosophy regarding the first person. My two main concerns are the controversy that surrounds Descartes’ conception of conscientia, mistranslated as ‘consciousness’, and his conception of selfhood and its essential connection to conscientia. ‘I’-thoughts give rise to the most challenging philosophical questions. An answer to the questions concerning the peculiarities of the first person, self-identification and self-ascription, is to be found in Descartes’ notion of conscientia. His (...) conception of selfhood insightfully informs his conception of personhood. I offer a unified account of selfhood, conscientia, the first person, and personhood anchored in the self’s authority of reason and autonomy of freedom. (shrink)

The demise of the scholastic worldview and the rise of the mechanistic one may give the impression of a parallel demise of the scholastic explanatory framework. In this paper, I argue that this impression is wrong. To this end, I first outline Descartes’ representative and particularly sharp mechanistic criticism of the scholastic notion of explanation. Deploying conceptual machinery from contemporary philosophy of science, I then suggest a reconstruction of the scholastic notion that is immune to Descartes’ criticism. Based (...) on this reconstruction, I reinterpret the dispute between Descartes and the scholastics as one that concerns the extent of two legitimate conceptions of explanation. Finally, I outline a contemporary dispute within cognitive neuroscience that reflects the Cartesian-scholastic one as thus reinterpreted, thereby showing that aspects of the world may well require a scholastic-like approach for their explanation. The aim of this paper, then, is to shed light on a most important philosophical-cum-scientific historical controversy from a modern perspective, but also to highlight the deep historical roots of a related contemporary dispute. Based on this, the paper also seeks to draw a substantial philosophical conclusion concerning the issue under dispute in both controversies. (shrink)

This paper examines Descartes' controversial theory of the creation of eternal truths and the views of modality attributed to Descartes in recent interpretations of it. It shows why attempts to make Descartes' view intelligible by distinctions of different kinds of modality fail to do justice to his theory, which is radical indeed without being incoherent or involving universal possibilism or irrationalism. Descartes' opposition to traditional rationalist views of modality, it suggests, can be seen instead as foreshadowing (...) contemporary views prefixed, logical structure of reality or of the divine intellect. (shrink)

There is a popular view that Descartes and Pascal were antagonists. I argue instead that Pascal was a Cartesian, in the manner of other Cartesians in the seventeenth century. That does not, of course, mean that Pascal accepted everything Descartes asserted, given that there were Cartesian atomists, for example, when Descartes was a plenist and anti-atomist. Pascal himself was a vacuuist and thus in opposition to Descartes in that respect, but he did accept some of the (...) more distinctive and controversial aspects of Cartesianism, including his mechanistic philosophy and the consequent view that animals are automata. (shrink)

Descartes famously endorsed the view that (CD) God freely created the eternal truths, such that He could have done otherwise than He did. This controversial doctrine is much discussed in recent secondary literature, yet Descartes’s actual arguments for CD have received very little attention. In this paper I focus on what many take to be a key Cartesian argument for CD: that divine simplicity entails the dependence of the eternal truths on the divine will. What makes this argument (...) both important and interesting is that Descartes’s scholastic predecessors share the premise of divine simplicity but reject the CD conclusion. To properly understand Descartes, then, we must determine precisely where he diverges from his predecessors on the path from simplicity to CD. And when we do so we obtain a very surprising result: that despite many dramatic prima facie differences, there is no substantive difference between the relevant doctrines of Descartes and the scholastics . Or so I argue. (shrink)

Descartes' enormously influential Meditations seeks to prove a number of theses: that God is a necessary existent; that our minds are equipped to track truth and avoid error; that the external world exists and provides us with information to preserve our embodiment; and that minds are immaterial substances. The work is a treasure-trove of views and arguments, but there are controversies about the details of the arguments and about how we are supposed to unpack the views themselves. This Companion (...) offers a rich collection of new perspectives on the Meditations, showing how the work is structured literally as a meditation and how it fits into Descartes' larger philosophical system. Topics include Descartes' views on philosophical method, knowledge, scepticism, God, the nature of mind, free will, and the differences between reflective and embodied life. The volume will be valuable to those studying Descartes and early modern philosophy more generally. (shrink)

The view that animals are thoughtless brutes was the subject of considerable controversy during the seventeenth century. Locke clearly perceived his own position to differ substantially from that of Descartes. Historians usually credit Locke with an anti-Cartesian view of the nature of animals and with setting the vogue in France for a concept of soul that differentiated people and animals only in degree. According to Bayle, for example, "Locke has declared himself against those who will not attribute reason (...) to beasts." In this paper I show that Locke does not attribute reason to beasts, that his ontological position does not differ in great detail from Descartes' and does not differ in its social consequences for animals. I argue that the major differences between Descartes and Locke on the question of animal consciousness are for the most part linguistic. (shrink)

In this book Clarke offers an interesting spin on Descartes: rather than see him simply as a substance dualist who offers a very poor account of the mind, Clarke sees him as a scientist pushing scientific explanation of the mind as far as it will go, and only exiting that path as a substance dualist when explanation has reached its limits. In this light Descartes comes out as an impressively successful thinker rather than as a blatantly poor one. (...) Clarke is much to be commended for this reorientation of the bigger picture; but this book is even more to be commended for its detailed and thorough account of the various elements of Descartes’s theory of mind. In being nearly a compendium of Descartes’s views about various mental phenomena, as well as including sketches of some of the resulting controversies about these views, Clarke’s book will be of interest both to scholar and novice alike. (shrink)

'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F in the right way' is a premise in an obvious reconstruction of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats. 'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F or with something at least as good as an F' is the only controversial premise in Descartes' argument for the existence (...) of God. Putnam's principle entails Descartes', which suggests that we should enquire after better versions of Putnam's proof. I present three variations and conclude that Putnam's semantic theory does not have anti-sceptical consequences. In contrast, given Descartes' cognitive situation, he was perfectly justified in accepting the soundness of his argument for the existence of God. (shrink)

Adriaan van Roomen published an outline of what he called a Mathesis Universalis in 1597. This earned him a well-deserved place in the history of early modern ideas about a universal mathematics which was intended to encompass both geometry and arithmetic and to provide general rules valid for operations involving numbers, geometrical magnitudes, and all other quantities amenable to measurement and calculation. ‘Mathesis Universalis’ (MU) became the most common (though not the only) term for mathematical theories developed with that aim. (...) At some time around 1600 van Roomen composed a new version of his MU, considerably different from the earlier one. This second version was never effectively published and it has not been discussed in detail in the secondary literature before. The text has, however, survived and the two versions are presented and compared in the present article. Sections 1–6 are about the first version of van Roomen’s MU the occasion of its publication (a controversy about Archimedes’ treatise on the circle, Sect. 2), its conceptual context (Sect. 3), its structure (with an overview of its definitions, axioms, and theorems) and its dependence on Clavius’ use of numbers in dealing with both rational and irrational ratios (Sect. 4), the geometrical interpretation of arithmetical operations multiplication and division (Sect. 5), and an analysis of its content in modern terms. In his second version of a MU van Roomen took algebra into account, inspired by Viète’s early treatises; he planned to publish it as part of a new edition of Al-Khwarizmi’s treatise on algebra (Sect. 7). Section 8 describes the conceptual background and the difficulties involved in the merging of algebra and geometry; Sect. 9 summarizes and analyzes the definitions, axioms and theorems of the second version, noting the differences with the first version and tracing the influence of Viète. Section 10 deals with the influence of van Roomen on later discussions of MU, and briefly sketches Descartes’ ideas about MU as expressed in the latter’s Regulae. (shrink)

The idea of self-knowledge divides naturally into two parts in accordance with the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. I know myself and I know things about myself. The latter I know partly from self-acquaintance, partly from the behavior, especially linguistic, of others, and partly from each of these. All aspects of self-knowledge are controversial, so I shall concentrate in this paper on the question of self-acquaintance. My purpose is both philosophical and historical. It is commonly believed (...) that Hume and Descartes held diametrically opposed, or at least strongly contrasting, views regarding self-acquaintance since Hume is regularly ridiculed for his denial of ability to discover his own Self whereas it would occur to no one to ascribe that same view to the author of the Meditations. In this paper I shall argue that contrary to appearances these two philosophers either held the same position or Descartes occupied the more agnostic extreme; and also that the position usually ascribed to Hume is, when properly understood, both correct and of fundamental philosophical significance. Part of my reason for selecting Hume and Descartes for analysis and comparison is to show thereby that the thesis of this paper is true independently of the rationalist/empiricist schism in philosophy. (shrink)

How could we acquire knowledge of a world that would be the work of an omnipotent creator? We reconstitute, in the light of the famous but controversial Cartesian theory of the "creation of eternal truths", the modal structure of such a world and seek to reconstitute analytically which epistemology should correspond to it. We then wonder if it is indeed such an epistemology that we find in the Meditations and Principles of Descartes.

Both in his time, and still now, the name of Descartes has been linked with Pelagianism. Upon close investigation, however, the allegations of Pelagianism and the evidence for them offer very slim pickings. Whether Descartes was a Pelagian is a theological question; the argument here will be that a consideration of Descartes’s claims cited as Pelagian nonetheless promises a better philosophical understanding of his views on the will and other, related matters.After an introduction to Pelagianism (sec.1), the (...) most prominent source nowadays for its connection with Descartes is seen to be Arnauld, the master critic of the period, who as a Jansenist was especially sensitive to any sign of Pelagianism (sec.2). Historically, however, the more important source was the Dutch theologian Revius, whose allegation of it against Descartes ignited a long and widespread controversy (sec.3). Just as Pelagianism might be seen as a “topos in which the Dutch anti-Cartesian literature was concentrated,”1 so a topos for the Pelagian controversy itself might be the biblical text alluded to by Descartes in the fourth Meditation, according to which man is created in the image and likeness of God, most so, according to Descartes, with respect to the will (sec.4). Another way to frame the issue, of particular philosophical interest, then, is the infinity of the Cartesian will, explored more recently by Grimaldi (sec.5). Another recent publication, by Scribano, sets out its origins in a way that shows how complex the Dutch debate really was both in terms of partisanship and philosophical relevance (sec.6). The issues raised by the connection of Descartes to Pelagianism tend to be orthogonal, breeding confusion; so, at the end below, a brief catalogue of the theological views relevant to Descartes’s claims will be given, based on the results of this investigation (sec.7). (shrink)

Discussions of the account of judgment offered in the Fourth Meditation tend to focus on its role in Descartes' epistemology and his response to skepticism. The main focus of the Fourth Meditation is the true and the false, and it completes the discussion conducted in the Second and Third Meditation about truth and falsity and the proper use of the truth rule. This chapter summarizes Descartes' view of the nature of judgment before examining more closely the account of (...) the will unfolding in the Fourth Meditation, and the kind of indifference Descartes appeals to in defending his controversial doctrine of free choice. Descartes' problematic account of the will and its freedom is developed in an epistemological and theodical context, the aim being to warrant the truth rule and, perhaps even more importantly, to draw a line between God's and our own responsibility for our cognitive errors. (shrink)

In early modern times it was not uncommon for thinkers to tease out from the nature of God various doctrines of substantial physical and metaphysical import. This approach was particularly fruitful in the so-called beast-machine controversy, which erupted following Descartes’ claim that animals are automata, that is, pure machines, without a spiritual, incorporeal soul. Over the course of this controversy, thinkers on both sides attempted to draw out important truths about the status of animals simply from the (...) notion or attributes of God. Automatists – led by Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Dilly – developed six such arguments, appealing to divine justice, providence, economy, glory (twice) and wisdom, while opponents to animal automatism developed two arguments, appealing to divine wisdom and goodness. In this article I shall examine the substance of all eight of these arguments, along with their origins, patronage, and variations, and the objections they elicited from opponents, with the aim of determining their suitability for use in contemporary debates about animal sentience and consciousness, and hence their relevance for contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

The international debate on the animal machine was initiated by the preface that the Dutch philosopher and later professor of medicine Florentius Schuyl in 1662 added to his Latin translation of Descartes’ Treatise on Man. Schuyl defended the animal machine in reaction to the vehement attacks, mostly in the vernacular, against the philosophy of Descartes in the Dutch Republic in the 1650s, wherein the theory of the animal machine had become one of the flashpoints. These polemics were part (...) of a power struggle, not a quest for philosophical truth. Schuyl focused on the points that had appeared as controversial in these debates: biblical exegesis, arguments from common sense, and to some extent physiology, but ignored wider philosophical questions. Questions about the soul and human uniqueness came to the fore only when his work was picked up in a new context, the international republic of letters. Schuyl's preface is therefore an interesting example of knowledge taking shape by circulation. (shrink)

푸앵카레는 첫 번째 철학 저작 「데카르트와 라이프니츠의 역학 원리에 관한 노트」(1880)에서 데카르트주의자들과 라이프니츠 사이의 활력 (vis viva) 논쟁을 논한다. 이 논쟁에 대한 관심은 이후 역학적 에너지 보존법칙과 열역학의 두 법칙에 대한 해석, 나아가 푸앵카레 철학의 핵심 요소인 원리 및 법칙 개념의 정립으로 이어진다. 이를 통해 푸앵카레는 활력 논쟁을 데카르트의 운동량(mv)과 라이프니츠의 활력(mv²) 사이의 단순한 대립 구도를 넘어 기계론적 고전역학과 열역학 사이의 긴장, 그리고 전자에서 후자로의 전환에 관한 논의로 확장한다. 나아가 데카르트의 패배와 라이프니츠의 승리로 규정한 기존의 과학사 및 철학사 기술에서 벗어나 (...) 데카르트의 보존 관념을 복권한다. 본고에서는 우선 데카르트와 라이프니츠의 관련 논의들을 개괄하고, 푸앵카레가 이 논쟁을 어떻게 재구성했으며. 이것이 논쟁의 역사와 푸앵카레의 철학에서 어떤 의미를 가지는지 고찰한다. (shrink)

rené descartes famously and explicitly rejects appeals to final causes in natural philosophy, suggesting that such appeals depend on knowledge of God’s inscrutable ends.For since I now know that my own nature is very weak and limited, whereas the nature of God is immense, incomprehensible and infinite, I also know without more ado that he is capable of countless things whose causes are beyond my knowledge. And for this reason alone I consider the whole kind of causes, customarily sought (...) from an end, to be totally useless in physics; there is considerable rashness in thinking myself capable of investigating God’s ends.1This rejection did not go unnoticed nor without controversy. In the Fifth.. (shrink)

Descartes' allusions, in the Meditations and the Principles, to the individual moments of duration, has for some years stirred controversy over whether this commits him to a kind of time atomism. The origins of Descartes' way of treating moments as least intervals of duration can be traced back to his early collaboration with Isaac Beeckman. Where Beeckman (in 1618) conceived of moments as (mathematically divisible) physical indivisibles, corresponding to the durations of uniform motions between successive impacts on (...) a body by microscopic particles, Descartes was able to give a mathematical treatment of the problem of fall in which moments were rendered mathematical minima of motion that were necessarily devoid of extension. This achievement, coupled with his innovation of conceiving force as instantaneous tendency to motion, subsequently led him to disdain Beeckman's discretist physics with its extended indivisible moments. Nevertheless, he was not able to eradicate a fundamental tension in his philosophy between force as a quantity of motion, and force as an instantaneous tendency to motion. For by his principles, action, motion, quantity of motion, and indeed existence, all require some minimal interval of duration. This explains his need to refer to moments as least conceivable parts of duration, and this is what has given rise to the impression that he supposed duration to be composed of such parts, contrary to his commitment to continuous creation. (shrink)

It has not been sufficiently emphasized that there existed two kinds of modification theory of colours, Aristotle's modification theory and Descartes-Hook's modification theory. This seems to have caused some confusion in the interpretation of the optical controversy between Newton and Hooke in 1672. The aim of the present paper is to prove that these two kinds of modification theory really coexisted, and on that basis to present a new interpretation of the optical controversy of 1672. The characteristics (...) and the historical role of each of these theories will be described. Newton's colour theory was formed under the influence of Aristotle's modification theory, which had been disseminated through the work of an English Gassendist, Walter Charleton. Newton's optical theories were created not only under the influence of Descartes, as we have been often told, but also under the conspicuous influence of corpuscular philosophers. (shrink)

In 1628, Harvey published his blood circulation theory, which triggered questionings by Riolan and Descartes at several levels: metaphysical, physiological, anatomical, institutional. The blood controversy tackles various conceptions of life that refer to various metaphysical backgrounds (Aristotelician, Cartesian or Neoplatonic), several kinds of relationships between natural philosophy and theology (compatibility, strict distinction, a balance between the two), distinct representations of the human body (dynamic, mechanic, aesthetic). It illustrates a point in time when medicine reforms and reorganizes its epistemic (...) style and its rationality in order to explain the complexity of the body’s fabric. (shrink)

The topic of this dissertation is a discussion of the seventeenth century debate between Descartes and Locke over innate ideas. I propose a novel approach to the study of this debate. I argue that their disagreement over innate ideas is directly related to their differing views of how the content of ideas is determined and of what counts as having an idea in the mind. Approaching the controversy between Descartes and Locke from this perspective has allowed me (...) to conclude that Descartes' nativist argument prevail over Locke's arguments to the contrary. ;I begin the discussion, in Chapter One, by examining the anti-nativist arguments offered by Locke in Book I of his Essay concerning Human Understanding and by clarifying the nature of Descartes' dispositional nativism. I conclude that since Locke's arguments rely on a principle whose denial is implied by Descartes' Dispositional Nativism, his arguments at best beg the question against Descartes. I suggest then that discussion of the controversy between Descartes and Locke should shift to the arguments they provide, respectively, for and against the awareness principle. ;In Chapter Two, I argue that Locke's argument for the awareness principle is to be found in the empiricism of Book II of his Essay and, hence, that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I are question-begging since they presuppose the very empiricism they aim to prove. ;In Chapters Three and Four, I argue that Descartes' argument for the denial of the awareness principle is to be found in his rationalist theory of idea-individuation according to which the content of ideas is determined by an intellectual and implicitly known presentation of the object. ;In the final chapter, I argue that Descartes' arguments for nativism are a version of what is known in the literature as "Poverty-of-the-Stimulus Arguments" and conclude that, interpreted this way, they have an edge over Locke's anti-nativist arguments. I contend that whereas Locke's argument for the awareness principle depend on an empiricist theory of idea individuation that assumes that principle, Descartes' argument for the denial of the awareness principle depends on a rationalist theory of idea individuation that argues for the denial of that principle. (shrink)

This article provides an analysis of Johannes Clauberg’s intentions in writing his Logica vetus et nova (1654, 1658). Announced before his adherence to Cartesianism, his Logica was eventually developed in order to provide Cartesian philosophy with a Scholastic form, embodying a complete methodology for the academic disciplines based on Descartes’ rules and a medicina mentis against philosophical prejudices. However, this was not its only function: thanks to the rules for the interpretation of philosophical texts it encompassed, Clauberg’s Logica was (...) meant to provide a general hermeneutics designed to put an end to the quarrels raised by the dissemination of Cartesianism. Such quarrels, according to Clauberg, were caused by the misinterpretation of Descartes’ texts in Revius’ Methodi cartesianae consideratio theologica (1648) and Statera philosophiae cartesianae (1650) and in Lentulus’ Nova Renati Descartes sapientia (1651), which criticized the apparent lack of a logical theory in Descartes’ philosophy and its supposed inconsistencies. Clauberg answers their criticisms by giving a clear account of Descartes’ logical theory and by undermining the interpretative criteria they assumed, in light of a general theory of error. Polemics over Cartesian philosophy, in this way, favored the development of a comprehensive Cartesian methodology for academic disciplines and of the first hermeneutics for philosophical texts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.1 (2005) 1-19 [Access article in PDF] God's Immutability and the Necessity of Descartes's Eternal Truths Dan Kaufman Descartes's doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths (henceforth "the Creation Doctrine") has been thought to be a particularly problematic doctrine, both internally inconsistent and detrimental to Descartes's system as a whole. According to the Creation Doctrine, the eternal truths, such (...) as the truths of mathematics and those concerning true and immutable natures, are freely created by God.1 The Creation Doctrine has led several scholars to think that Descartes held (or was committed to) the view that the eternal truths are not necessary truths; in fact, there are no necessary truths if Descartes is correct.2 [End Page 1]In fact, however, Descartes held both of the following.The eternal truths are freely created by God.The eternal truths are necessarily true.That Descartes held (1) is uncontroversial; in fact, it is the characteristic thesis of his Creation Doctrine. However, his commitment to (2) is more controversial. I believe the controversy surrounding (2) arises precisely because Descartes' acceptance of (1) is so uncontroversial. That is, some have thought that his acceptance of (1) eliminates any possibility of accepting (2). This view is mistaken. In several texts, it is clear that Descartes believes that the eternal truths are necessarily true; this is especially noticeable in the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland (AT IV 118; CSMK 235). The task, then, is to account for the necessity of the eternal truths within the confines of the Creation Doctrine; that is, to explain the fact that (2) is true, given that (1) is true.3 Unfortunately, Descartes says precious little about this issue. To make matters worse, there is a scarcity of treatments of this issue in the literature; and the literature that does address this issue tends to treat it quickly and vaguely, perhaps recognizing the difficulty of addressing it in any detail. In this paper, I attempt to remedy this unfortunate situation.I begin by examining the most prominent interpretation of Descartes's explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths: the Immutability Interpretation.4 This interpretation is given by Margaret Osler and most prominently by Edwin Curley.5 According to this interpretation, the eternal truths are necessarily true because they are created by God, and God's will is immutable. I will show that this interpretation is incorrect: It is either too weak to explain the necessity of the eternal truths or it is too strong in that it would commit Descartes to necessitarianism, [End Page 2] a view he does not hold.6 I also show that some suggestions for salvaging the Immutability Interpretation fall short. In the final section I present an alternative interpretation. My interpretation has a firm basis in Descartes's texts, does not have the shortcomings of the Immutability Interpretation, and has several virtues of its own. 1. Immutability Before examining the role, if any, that God's immutability actually plays in Descartes's explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths, it may be helpful to have a working account of God's immutability. To be immutable is not merely to be unchanging, but rather to be unable to change. That is: I1: x is immutable iff x is essentially unchanging.7We must recognize, however, that there are extrinsic and relational properties that a thing may acquire or lose without any real change in the thing; that is, there are so-called Cambridge changes that something may undergo without thereby being mutable. For example if x is five feet tall at t and x is five foot five at some later time t´, then x has really changed; but if x is not an uncle at t and x is an uncle at some later time t´, then x has not really changed in virtue of acquiring this property. The idea is that there are some properties which are, to use Edward Wierenga's and Nicholas Wolterstorff's term, "change... (shrink)

The impression we are often given by historians of philosophy is that the readiness of medieval philosophers to appeal to authorities, such as The Bible, the Church, and Aristotle, was not shared by many early modern philosophers, for whom there was a marked preference to look for illumination via experience, the exercise of reason, or a combination of the two. Although this may be accurate, broadly speaking, it is notable that, in spite of the waning enthusiasm for deferring to traditional (...) authorities, appeals to scripture remained commonplace in the work of early modern philosophers. In order to understand the philosophers of the early modern period, the philosophies they developed, and the debates they fought, we need to understand how they used scripture. This paper is intended to contribute to this desideratum by examining how scripture was used by those who engaged in a particular debate within natural philosophy, the so-called beast-machine controversy of the 17th and 18th centuries. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that commentators have missed a significant clue given by Descartes in coming to understand his 'ontological' proof for the existence of God. In both the analytic and synthetic presentations of the proof throughout his writings, Descartes notes that the proof works 'in the same way' as a particular geometrical proof. I explore the significance of such a parallel, and conclude that Descartes could not have intended readers to think that the argument consists (...) of some kind of intuition. I argue that for Descartes the attribute of existence is a 'second-order' attribute that is demonstrated to belong to the idea of God on the basis of 'first-order' attributes. The proof, properly understood, is in fact a demonstration. Having brought to light the geometrical parallels between the ontological and geometrical proofs, we have new evidence to resolve the 'intuition versus demonstration' controversy that has characterized much of the discussion of Descartes's ontological argument. (shrink)