Albert Carr’s contention that business and individual behavior within business can be understood through an analogy with a game of poker suffers from two central deficiencies. The first is conceptual: in his account, Carr slips between a discussion of games and a discussion of poker as thought they were interchangeable. However, “bluffing,” which is the only concept that Carr is interested in, is actually a mode of play, particular to a subset of games. The second deficiency is one of scale: (...) Carr’s account elides the difference between business understood as a practical domain and business understood from the standpoint of one of the participants or “players” within that domain. These two deficiencies are tacitly invoked by Norman Gillespie in his critique of Carr’s argument. However, Gillespie’s counter-claim – that business is a limited aspect of a more general ethical domain whose rules ought to be able to be shaped by its subjects – fails to pursue the conceptual shortcomings of Carr’s argument far enough. Beginning with Gillespie’s critique, this essay will use Gilles Deleuze’s image of the dice-throw (drawn from Heraclitus and Nietzsche) in order to argue that, 1) the concept of play is not synonymous with bluffing (the latter being only a limited aspect of the former); 2) the concept of play conceptualizes the always incomplete domain of ethics; 3) the incompletion of the ethical domain is not a function of relativism, but of the insufficiency of concepts to completely encompass empirical events; and 4) that business is a particular ethical domain circumscribed not by bluffing, but by a set of rules that overcodes moral evaluations with economic ones. (shrink)

The Dice Game of Shiva is the only book available that shows how the universe at all levels consists of a seamless interplay between matter and mind, as ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.2 (2000) 279-289 [Access article in PDF] Dice and Facie: Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 1.7.23 And 9.4.39 J. Bradford Churchill In his discussion of orthography in book 1 of his Institutio Oratoria Quintilian mentions several examples of archaic spelling conventions, among them a practice of the Elder Cato, which I present here with readings I shall propose and defend during the course of this essay: (...) Non Cato Censorius dicam et faciam dice et facie scripsit eundemque in ceteris quae similiter cadunt modum tenuit? (Inst. 1.7.23 5 Cato, Inc. Lib. fr. 55 Jordan, p. 90) Dice et facie is the reading of one manuscript (N); two other manuscripts (BH) have dicae et faciae; the other major manuscripts (APMS) have the similar but obviously corrupt dice et face. The vast discrepancies between the readings accepted by various editors demonstrate the need for a clarification of the evidence: dice et facie; 1 dicem et faciem; 2 dicae et faciae; 3. 4 The reading dicae et faciae found its way into the most recent edition, the Oxford Classical Text of Michael Winterbottom ([1970] 1989). A close examination of the evidence will confirm that this is not the correct reading. It is time to put to rest a good deal of needless controversy by showing that Cato and his contemporaries used a distinct first-person form in the future indicative of the third conjugation and that they usually or always spelled the active form without the final -m. The reading dice et facie accepted by Radermacher (1959), Fierville (1890), and Halm (1869, 367) should stand. [End Page 279]A century ago (1898) Moore argued, in a brief note influential enough to be cited in Winterbottom's apparatus, that behind Quintilian's citation as preserved lies an innovative orthographical practice not otherwise attested. Moore constructed his hypothesis on the assumption that the variants adduced were simply different ways of spelling the forms dicam and faciam. 5 Cato was not satisfied, Moore proposed, simply to follow the usual practice of the time and omit spelling the final -m, which was in many environments only partly articulated. Since the -m did, however, have some impact on the sound, Cato invented a new custom, turning M on its side at the end of the word to indicate the nasal quality of the final vowel. This anomalous symbol was preserved by Quintilian but later misconstrued as E. In this way Moore attempted to render the otherwise nonsensical forms dicae and faciae comprehensible as textual corruptions of Cato's innovation.Klotz (1931) dealt in greater depth with the problem, and although his solution is almost certainly inadequate, he touched on most of the evidence needed to solve it. Because Quintilian quotes Cato's archaic spelling convention again in book 9 (Inst. 9.4.39) in a discussion of sounds which are not spelled, Klotz conjectured (142) that Verrius Flaccus had quoted Cato as a precedent for his own practice of indicating the attenuated pronunciation of an elided final -m by writing only the first half of the letter. So, Klotz's argument continues, it was from Verrius Flaccus (GL 7.80) that Messala drew the example, and from him Quintilian derived the extant version. The "half-M" was misconstrued by Quintilian as E, and so the textual tradition preserves what he wrote: dicae et faciae.Both Moore and Klotz have read Quintilian too narrowly. Each of their arguments is predicated on the assumption (in Moore's case) or argument (in Klotz's) that Cato's forms were morphologically identical to Quintilian's dicam and faciam. They dismissed the possibility that Cato was spelling forms distinct from the classical counterparts listed by Quintilian. This is not a surprising dismissal: among the examples cited by Quintilian, these are the only ones which turn out (if the current argument is accepted) to have been morphologically distinct from the [End Page 280] classical "equivalents." Nevertheless, a careful examination of all the evidence, and in particular a close reading of the cognate passage... (shrink)

Everyone knows what David Lewis' possible worlds are, what role they play in his account of possibility and necessity, and Saul Kripke's criticisms. But what, instead, are Kripke's possible worlds, and what role do they play in his account of possibility and necessity? The answers are not so obvious. Recently, it has even been claimed that, contrary to what is standardly assumed, Kripke's approach to modality has not always been consistently metaphysical. In particular, an interpretation of the famous passage in (...) the preface to Naming and Necessity with Kripke's discussion of the dice example has been put forward, according to which he purports there to clarify the modal notions in terms of that of possible world, model-theoretically construed, in a way which is reminiscent of Carnap's. In this paper, I shall point out some internal difficulties of this interpretation, and offer a different one, according to which in the dice passage Kripke is trying, consistently with his metaphysical approach, to legitimize the technically useful notion of possible world starting from modal notions, to be accounted for in another way (arguably, in an essentialistic framework). My final goal, however, will be philosophical elucidation rather than mere exegesis. Indeed, I am interested in shedding some light on what possible worlds might possibly be, if something like Kripke's metaphysical approach is on the right track. (shrink)

You should rather play hide-and-seek against someone who cannot predict where you hide than against someone who can, as the article illustrates in connection with a high-stakes example. Causal Decision Theory denies this. So Causal Decision Theory is false.

For evolutionary biologists, the concept of chance has always played a significant role in the formation of evolutionary theory. As far back as Greek antiquity, chance and "luck" were key factors in understanding the natural world. Chance is not just an important concept; it is an entire way of thinking about nature. And as Curtis Johnson shows, it is also one of the key ideas that separates Charles Darwin from other systematic biologists of his time. Studying the concept of chance (...) in Darwin's writing reveals core ideas in his theory of evolution, as well as his reflections on design, purpose, and randomness in nature's progression over the course of history.In Darwin's Dice: The Idea of Chance in the Thought of Charles Darwin, Curtis Johnson examines Darwin's early notebooks, his collected correspondence, and most of his published writing to trace the evolution of his ideas about chance in evolution. This proved to be one of Darwin's most controversial ideas among his reading public, so much so that it drew hostile reactions even from Darwin's scientific friends, not to mention the more general reader. The firestorm of criticism forced Darwin to forge a retreat, not in terms of removing chance from his theory--his commitment to it was unshakable--but in terms of how he chose to present his theory. Briefly, by changing his wording and by introducing metaphors and images, Darwin succeeded in making his ideas seem less threatening than before without actually changing his views. Randomness remained a focal point for Darwin throughout his life. Through the lens of randomness, Johnson reveals implications of Darwin's views for religion, free will, and moral theory. Darwin's Dice presents a new way to look at Darwinist thought and the writings of Charles Darwin. (shrink)

Is democracy a gift economy—that is, one essentially distinct from, and opposed to, reduction to transactional exchanges such as those typical in a market economy? Beginning with a case study of success, this paper considers the role of scaleable effects in destabilizing the relationship between merit and reward. This opens up the question of how the general issue of “title” functions in larger systems of merit and reward, crucially including politics. Pursuing Jacques Rancière’s insights concerning hatred of democracy, we can (...) begin to see the importance of “the drawing of lots” in mechanisms of political legitimation—the paradoxical “title which is no title,” which might just be the gift we democrats are looking for. (shrink)

In this article I criticize the non-consequentialist Weighted Lottery (WL) solution to the choice between saving a smaller or a larger group of people. WL aims to avoid what non-consequentialists see as consequentialism's unfair aggregation by giving equal consideration to each individual's claim to be rescued. In so doing, I argue, WL runs into another common objection to consequentialism: it is excessively demanding. WL links the right action with the outcome of a fairly weighted lottery, which means that an agent (...) can only act rightly if s/he has actually run the lottery. In many actual cases, this involves epistemic demands that can be almost impossible to meet. I argue that plausible moral principles cannot make such extreme epistemic demands. (shrink)

This article argues that hegemonic cosmopolitan narrativity fails to frame a complex cosmopolitan normativity. The hegemonic cosmopolitan narrative celebrates a mobile selfhood merely hospitable to the encountered, mobile diversity that comes ashore. A recent educational-theoretical ‘refugee-crisis’ initiative serves as an illustration of the normative shortcomings of the new cosmopolitanism. The implicit normativity of the dominant cosmopolitan narrativity is, I claim, politically too weak to cover the normative surplus of a more critical cosmo-politics. Cosmopolitanism should be recast to make higher ethico-political (...) demands on the global self and world for the cultivation of neglected ecological and relational sensibilities. (shrink)

When the fuzzy indeterminacy of quantum mechanics overthrew the orderly world of Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein and Erwin Schrödinger were at the forefront of the revolution. Neither man was ever satisfied with the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, however, and both rebelled against what they considered the most preposterous aspect of quantum mechanics: its randomness. Einstein famously quipped that God does not play dice with the universe, and Schrödinger constructed his famous fable of a cat that was neither alive (...) nor dead not to explain quantum mechanics but to highlight the apparent absurdity of a theory gone wrong. But these two giants did more than just criticize: they fought back, seeking a Theory of Everything that would make the universe seem sensible again. In Einstein’s Dice and Schrödinger’s Cat, physicist Paul Halpern tells the little-known story of how Einstein and Schrödinger searched, first as collaborators and then as competitors, for a theory that transcended quantum weirdness. This story of their quest—which ultimately failed—provides readers with new insights into the history of physics and the lives and work of two scientists whose obsessions drove its progress. Today, much of modern physics remains focused on the search for a Theory of Everything. As Halpern explains, the recent discovery of the Higgs Boson makes the Standard Model—the closest thing we have to a unified theory— nearly complete. And while Einstein and Schrödinger failed in their attempt to explain everything in the cosmos through pure geometry, the development of string theory has, in its own quantum way, brought this idea back into vogue. As in so many things, even when they were wrong, Einstein and Schrödinger couldn’t help but get a great deal right. (shrink)

(2000). Of loaded dice and heated arguments: Putting the Hansen?Michaels global warming debate in context. Social Epistemology: Vol. 14, No. 2-3, pp. 109-127.

Science has made a mighty advance since it originated in ancient Greece more than 2500 years ago. Yet we still live in Plato's cave today; we think everything around us moves continuously, but continuous motion is merely a shadow of real motion. This book will lead you to walk out the cave along a logical and comprehensible road. After passing Zeno's arrow, Newton's inertia, Einstein's light, and Schrodinger's cat, you will reach the real world, where every thing in the universe, (...) whether it is an atom or a ball or even a star, ceaselessly jumps in a random and discontinuous way. In a famous metaphor, God does play dice with the universe. Discovering motion is not continuous but discontinuous and random is like finding the Earth is not at rest but moving. The new discovery may finally solve Zeno's paradoxes and the quantum puzzle, and it will lead to a profound shift in our world view. (shrink)

Most of us believe everything happens for a reason. Whether it is "God's will","karma", or "fate," we want to believe that nothing in the world, especially disasters and tragedies, is a random, meaningless event. But now, as never before, confident scientific assertions that the world embodies a profound contingency are challenging theological claims that God acts providentially in the world. The random and meandering path of evolution is widely used as an argument that God did not create life.Abraham's Dice (...) explores the interplay between chance and providence in the monotheistic religious traditions, looking at how their interaction has been conceptualized as our understanding of the workings of nature has changed. This lively historical conversation has generated intense ongoing theological debates, and provocative responses from science: what are we to make of the history of our universe, where chance and law have played out in complex ways? Or the evolution of life, where random mutations have challenged attempts to find purpose within evolution and convinced many that human beings are but a "glorious accident"? The enduring belief that everything happens for a reason is examined through a conversation with major scholars, among them holders of prestigious chairs at Oxford and Cambridge Universities and the University of Basel, as well as several Gifford lecturers, and two Templeton prize winners. Organized historically, Abraham's Dice provides a wide-ranging scientific, theological, and biblical foundation to address the question of providence and divine action in a world shot through with contingency. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of a dice model as a framework for describing a class of probabilistic relations. We investigate the transitivity of the probabilistic relation generated by a dice model and prove that it is a special type of cycle-transitivity that is situated between moderate stochastic transitivity or product-transitivity on the one side, and Lukasiewicz-transitivity on the other side. Finally, it is shown that any probabilistic relation with rational elements on a three-dimensional space of alternatives which possesses (...) this particular type of cycle-transitivity, can be represented by a dice model. The same does not hold in higher dimensions. (shrink)

Perhaps 20% of known animal species are haplodiploid: unfertilized haploid eggs developinto males and fertilized diploid eggs into females. Sex determination in such haplodiploid species does not rely on a difference in heteromorphic sex chromosome composition but the genetic basis has been elucidated in some hymenopteran insects (wasps, sawflies, ants, bees). In these species, the development into one sex or the others depends on an initial signal whether there is only one allele or two different alleles of a single gene, (...) thecomplementary sex determiner(csd), in the zygotic genome. The gene has been most‐recently identified in the honey bee and has been found to encode an arginine serine‐rich (SR) type protein. Heterozygosity generates an active protein that initiates female development while hemizygosity/homozygosity results in a non‐active CSD protein and default male development. I will discuss plausible models of how the molecular decision of male and female is made and implemented. Comparison to hierarchies of dipteran insects suggests that SR‐type protein has facilitated the differentiation of sex‐determining systems and hierarchies. BioEssays 26:1131–1139, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Einstein wrote his famous sentence "God does not play dice with the universe" in a letter to Max Born in 1920. All experiments have confirmed that quantum mechanics is neither wrong nor “incomplete”. One can says that God does play dice with the universe. Let quantum mechanics be granted as the rules generalizing all results of playing some imaginary God’s dice. If that is the case, one can ask how God’s dice should look like. God’s (...) class='Hi'>dice turns out to be a qubit and thus having the shape of a unit ball. Any item in the universe as well the universe itself is both infinitely many rolls and a single roll of that dice for it has infinitely many “sides”. Thus both the smooth motion of classical physics and the discrete motion introduced in addition by quantum mechanics can be described uniformly correspondingly as an infinite series converges to some limit and as a quantum jump directly into that limit. The second, imaginary dimension of God’s dice corresponds to energy, i.e. to the velocity of information change between two probabilities in both series and jump. (shrink)

What lessons are there yet to learn from the works of Homer and Hesiod for political life? These ancient texts vividly illustrated an ethic which insisted that one must strive to maintain a consistent character against a chaotic world and one’s own inconstant human nature. This essay, therefore, recovers a long dismissed conception of the world, as well as a notion of virtue that was cultivated to steel one’s self against the tragic turns of radical, ironic chance that are always (...) a possibility in a kosmos sprung from chaos. (shrink)

His disagreements with them were philosophical. Just as he rejected their claim that experimental results in quantum mechanics implied that nothing exists unless it is being observed by a conscious human being, so also he disagreed with their claim that these results implied that the so-called “deterministic” philosophy of Newtonian mechanics was false.

This paper presents a number of objections to the characterization of Foucault as a "eurocentric", “occidentalist” thinker. It shows how Foucault proceeds by space-time cuts while never assuming the exemplarity of the topographies he is studying. Far from seeking to affix the seal of the universal on the analyses he proposes of specified objects, he insists on the singularities of the operations he studies, of the "dark acts" on which he works. Foucault is a "eurocentric" thinker only in a purely (...) tautological sense, as he scored his research and fieldwork in a European space, which is not a presumption as to the particular value of those topographies but represents thevconditions of possibility that, at the time of his research, are his own. He has insteadvconsistently attempted to highlight the non-exportability of the conclusions he drawsvfrom his research and has applied himself to move in the field of knowledge and in hisvown methods of problematising. He remains, moreover, the one who, amongvcontemporary philosophers, emphasized with more insistance the reason for thevhistoricity of truth, a pattern that moves him away from all the common prejudicesvabout eurocentric and occidentalist “universalism”. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a reconstruction of the onto-cosmological perspective of Plato’s Timaeus and suggest an interpretation of it in the light of some contemporary approaches to ontology and logic, i.e. “ontological sequentialism” and “fuzzy logic”, attempting to use the categories and language of present-day ontology and logic to examine from a different point of view some aspects of the Timaeus onto-cosmology and of its logical scaffolding.

The recent debates concerning divine action in the context of quantum mechanics are examined with particular reference to the work of William Pollard, Robert J. Russell, Thomas Tracy, Nancey Murphy, and Keith Ward. The concept of a quantum mechanical “event” is elucidated and shown to be at the center of this debate. An attempt is made to clarify the claims made by the protagonists of quantum mechanical divine action by considering the measurement process of quantum mechanics in detail. Four possibilities (...) for divine influence on quantum mechanics are identified and the theological and scientific implications of each discussed. The conclusion reached is that quantum mechanics is not easily reconciled with the doctrine of divine action. (shrink)

More than a purely philosophical problem, straddling the ambivalent terrain between necessity and impossibility, contingency seems to have become today the very horizon of our everyday life. Often used as a synonym for the precariousness of working conditions under neoliberalism, for the unknown threats posed by terrorism, or for the uncertain future of the planet itself, contingency needs to be calculated and controlled in the name of the protection of life. The overcoming of contingency is not only called upon to (...) justify questionable mechanisms of political control; it serves as a central legitimating factor for Enlightenment itself. In this volume, nine major philosophers and theorists address a range of questions around contingency and moral philosophy. How can we rethink contingency in its creative aspects, outside the dominant rhetoric of risk and dangerous exposure? What is the status of contingency-as the unnecessary and law-defying-in or for ethics? What would an alternative "ethics of contingency"-one that does not simply attempt to sublate it out of existence-look like? The volume tackles the problem contingency has always posed to both ethical theory and dialectics: that of difference itself, in the difficult mediation between the particular and the universal, same and other, the contingent singularity of the event and the necessary generality of the norms and laws. From deconstruction to feminism to ecological thought, some of today's most influential thinkers reshape many of the most debated concepts in moral philosophy: difference, agency, community, and life itself. Contributors: Étienne Balibar, Rosi Braidotti, Thomas Claviez, Drucilla Cornell, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Viola Marchi, Michael Naas, Cary Wolfe, Slavoj Žižek. (shrink)

This essay is an array of several taxonomies of values which bear on medicine. The first is a rather low-level list of types of values, meant to be adequate to observational data collection about human valuing. It proceeds to a discussion of levels of valuing so that senses of higher and lower values are articulated. Next, it offers a consideration of intrinsic versus extrinsic and of fundamental versus domestic (or mediating, enabling) values, along with the notions of a practice and (...) virtues. Finally it offers an analysis of clusters of value types along the lines of personal values, social values and professional values acting as interlocking force fields affecting the judgments, reactions and decisions of persons working in health care. In addition to the anticipated elucidation contained in the dialectic, two conclusions are intended: (1) the topic of values in medicine is staggeringly complex, and (2) a medical career is in the best sense a tragic fate in that a noble calling is doomed to many failures because of an inability to reconcile conflicts of values as much as because techniques cannot accomplish everything. (shrink)

El presente texto busca mostrar los diferentes “usos” que se aparejan a la expresión “filosofía latinoamericana”. El objetivo de este análisis no es determinar si alguno de ellos es más o menos correcto, si uno es más o menos adecuado, sino simplemente de poner de manifiesto que la expresión “filosofía latinoamericana” tiene distintos usos y que cada uno de ellos remite a diferentes problemas filosóficos.

In Institutio oratoria 1,7,23 and 9,4,39 Quintilian quotes a somewhat idiosyncratic Catonian spelling for dicam and faciam. The manuscripts offer for the first passage both dicae / faciae and dice / facie as variants, whereas the second passage is corrupt, but in all probability has to be emended according to 1,7,23. Recently James Bradford Churchill and Wolfram Ax have advocated the spellings with -e. In contrast, this paper first argues on the basis of a thorough analysis of the two (...) passages for the readings dicae and faciae, which Quintilian believed Cato the elder to have written; secondly it is likely that Cato indeed had used these forms to render the weakened pronunciation of m, which sounded (as we may presume) like a weak e (something like a schwa) to him. Obviously, the exact pronunciation must remain uncertain. (shrink)

Dungeons Dragons gamers exemplify Aristotle's claim that “no one would want to live without friends”. One might even see gaming as an attempt to find friends and build that political community of which Aristotle says friendship is the root. The really interesting thing about gamers is that, as they play Dungeons Dragons, they at one and the same time build bonds between their characters and between each other as players. The trajectory of these bonds often mirrors the trajectory of friendships (...) we find in epic fantasy literature where the characters, at first suspicious of each other, in the end have developed true friendships and established peaceful kingdoms where chaos had reigned before. Aristotle's philosophy of friendship can help us to understand this development. Dungeons Dragons players know a lot about friendship and the value of friendship in a person's life, despite the popular depiction of gamers. (shrink)

The idea that the Creator has a plan for creation is deeply rooted in the Christian notion of Providence. This notion seems to suggest that the history of creation must be the execution of the providential plan of God. Such an understanding of divine providence expects science to confirm that cosmic history is under supernatural guidance, that evolution is therefore oriented toward a goal—to bring forth human beings, for example. The problem is, however, that science finds evidence for neither supernatural (...) guidance nor teleology in nature. To address this problem, I understand Niels H. Gregersen to suggest that God is involved in the creative process. The reason science cannot demonstrate God's supernatural guidance of evolution is that the Creator structures the process from within. Gregersen argues that God is involved in the process of creation by changing the overall probability pattern of evolving systems.In my view, such a model of how God interacts with creation is supported neither by orthodox Christianity nor by modern science. After a critique of Gregersen's argument and a brief history of the relationship between Christianity and science, I shall suggest an alternative. It is that the freedom of creation to create itself is implicit in the fundamental dogma of Christianity that God is love. (shrink)

Este escrito presenta el tema del cuerpo y de la corporeidad en la Scienza nuova de Vico, confrontando las dos interpretaciones, que la autora opone, de Alberto M. Damiani y de Giuseppe Patella.Palabras clave: Vico, cuerpo, corporeidad, A. Damiani, G. Patella.This paper focusses on the subject of body and embodiment in Vico’s Scienza nuova, by confronting the interpretations of Alberto M. Damiani and Giuseppe Patella.Keywords: Vico, body, embodiment, A. Damiani, G. Patella.

Is it possible that the most famous critic of quantum mechanics actually invented most of its fundamentally important concepts? -/- In his 1905 Brownian motion paper, Einstein quantized matter, proving the existence of atoms. His light quantum hypothesis showed that energy itself comes in particles (photons). He showed energy and matter are interchangeable, E = mc2. In 1905 Einstein was first to see nonlocality and instantaneous action-at-a-distance. In 1907 he saw quantum “jumps” between energy levels in matter, six years before (...) Bohr postulated them in his atomic model. Einstein saw wave-particle duality and the “collapse” of the wave in 1909. And in 1916 his transition probabilities for emission and absorption processes introduced ontological chance when matter and radiation interact, making quantum mechanics statistical. He discovered the indistinguishability and odd quantum statistics of elementary particles in 1925 and in 1935 speculated about the nonseparability of interacting identical particles. -/- It took physicists over twenty years to accept Einstein’s light-quantum. He explained the relation of particles to waves fifteen years before Heisenberg matrices and Schrödinger wave functions. He saw indeterminism ten years before the uncertainty principle. And he saw nonlocality as early as 1905, presenting it formally in 1927, but was ignored. In the 1935 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper, he explored nonseparability, which was dubbed “entanglement” by Schrödinger. The EPR paper has gone from being irrelevant to Einstein’s most cited work and the basis for today’s “second revolution in quantum mechanics.” -/- In a radical revision of the history of quantum physics, Bob Doyle develops Einstein’s idea of objective reality to resolve several of today’s most puzzling quantum mysteries, including the two-slit experiment, quantum entanglement, and microscopic irreversibility. (shrink)