The new field of judgment aggregation aims to merge many individual sets of judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a single collective set of judgments on these propositions. Judgment aggregation has commonly been studied using classical propositional logic, with a limited expressive power and a problematic representation of conditional statements ("if P then Q") as material conditionals. In this methodological paper, I present a simple unified model of judgment aggregation in general logics. I show how many realistic decision problems can (...) be represented in it. This includes decision problems expressed in languages of classical propositional logic, predicate logic (e.g. preference aggregation problems), modal or conditional logics, and some multi-valued or fuzzy logics. I provide a list of simple tools for working with general logics, and I prove impossibility results that generalise earlier theorems. (shrink)

In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected proposi- tions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert know- ledge on, or particularly affected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen's 'liberal paradox'. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the (...) unanimity principle, whereby unanimously accepted propositions are collectively accepted. The inconsistency can be avoided if individual judgments or rights satisfy special conditions. (shrink)

The new …eld of judgment aggregation aims to …nd collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide (...) propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic. (shrink)

Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. (...) When applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is effectively dictatorial. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers of biology have endorsed views about random drift that, we will argue, rest on an implicit assumption that the meaning of concepts such as drift can be understood through an examination of the mathematical models in which drift appears. They also seem to implicitly assume that ontological questions about the causality of terms appearing in the models can be gleaned from the models alone. We will question these general assumptions by showing how the same equation (...) — the simple 2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 — can be given radically different interpretations, one of which is a physical, causal process and one of which is not. This shows that mathematical models on their own yield neither interpretations nor ontological conclusions. Instead, we argue that these issues can only be resolved by considering the phenomena that the models were originally designed to represent and the phenomena to which the models are currently applied. When one does take those factors into account, starting with the motivation for Sewall Wright’s and R.A. Fisher’s early drift models and ending with contemporary applications, a very different picture of the concept of drift emerges. On this view, drift is a term for a set of physical processes, namely, indiscriminate sampling processes. (shrink)

Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log-likelihood-ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom (Epistemic Monotonicity) which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not be (...) a vote for an alternative, it may be any type of input, for instance a subjective degree of belief or probability of the correctness of one of the alternatives. The case of a profile of subjective degrees of belief is particularly appealing, since here no parameters such as competence parameters need to be known. (shrink)

The Christian does not live in a vacuum, says the author, but in a world of government, politics, labor, and marriage. Hence, Christian ethics cannot exist in a vacuum what the Christian needs, claims Dietrich Bonhoeffer, is concrete instruction in a concrete situation. Although the author died before completing his work, this book is recognized as a major contribution to Christian ethics. The root and ground of Christian ethics, the author says, is the reality of God as revealed in (...) Jesus Christ. This reality is not manifest in the Church as distinct from the secular world such a juxtaposition of two separate spheres, Bonhoeffer insists, is a denial of God's having reconciled the whole world to himself in Christ. On the contrary, God's commandment is to be found and known in the Church, the family, labor, and government. His commandment permits man to live as man before God, in a world God made, with responsibility for the institutions of that world. (shrink)

Chalmers' anti-materialist arguments are an interesting twist on a well-known argument form, and his naturalistic dualism is exciting to contemplate. Nevertheless, we think we can save materialism from the Chalmerian attack. This is what we do in the present paper.

Die Prinzipienbegrundungsfrage bzw. die einen Verbindlichkeitserweis erfordernde Frage "Was gilt?" verweist auf unsere grundlegende Mitverantwortung fur die im High-tech-Zeitalter bedrohte Menschheitszukunft. Um jene - zugleich hochpolitische - Prinzipienfrage geht es in diesem Diskurs- und Verantwortungsbuch: zunachst in Dietrich Bohlers einfuhrendem Essay, sodann in den acht Diskursen zwischen Jon Hellesnes, Gunnar Skirbekk, Hans Lenk, Alberto Damiani, Sebastian Hopfl, Vittorio Hosle, Thomas Rusche und Dietrich Bohler, der auf diese antwortet. Drei kritisch wurdigende Essays zu Hans Jonas' und Karl-Otto Apels Verantwortungsdenken (...) pointieren schliesslich die Aktualitat der Zukunftsethik. (shrink)

In this book, Marc Raphael Dietrich sheds light on a critical yet politically practicable notion of cosmopolitanism which centers on the individual and is framed by a set of universal principles, thus providing valuable alternative insights on the Crimea and Donbas conflict.

Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It offers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A different strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one’s beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given (...) set of beliefs in the first place. We offer an account of rational belief formation that closes some of the gap between Bayesianism and its reason-based alternative, formalizing the idea that an agent can have reasons for his or her (prior) beliefs, in addition to evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian sense. Our analysis of reasons for belief is part of a larger programme of research on the role of reasons in rational agency (Dietrich and List, Nous, 2012a, in press; Int J Game Theory, 2012b, in press). (shrink)

There are many possible ways to approach the topic of educational theory and critique. One could inquire into the meaning of critical phenomena and subject-matter in practical education and instruction, investigate the various forms of critique with the goal of determining the extent to which they assist in clarifying pedagogical action, or one could ask: ‘What is meant by critical educational research?’ and ‘How do the various approaches to this topic relate to one another?’. This article inquires into the relationship (...) between critique and negativity. Such a distinction is relevant for the practical, theoretical and research-oriented use of the various forms and subject matters of critique. This analysis of their relationship aims to clarify how the structure of human learning connects to that of pedagogical action; and, additionally, how the theoretical guidelines and orientation for pedagogical action relate to scientific analyses and research in education in a way that is productive. Distinctions made in thought, judgement and action are not simply delimiting positive characteristics. Such distinctions are at once mediated by the relations of knowledge and ignorance, ability and inability. Although ignorance and inability can be transformed into positive knowledge and ability, they are not superseded in the process. Ignorance and inability are, on the contrary, constitutive elements of learning. The possibility for transitions from ignorance and inability to knowledge and ability—a possibility that itself presupposes knowledge and ability—point to a form of negativity within the process of education (Bildung). This form of negativity relates to the human ability to learn (Bildsamkeit) and provides the definitive basis of human learning. A form of negativity constitutive of learning processes leads to one that grounds pedagogical processes. Pedagogical efficacy is mediated by a double negativity, comprised of both a universal and a particular form of negativity. The relation of negativity to learning and pedagogical efficacy, with specific reference to educational research studies on teaching and learning processes, is considered. A form of educational research that operates beyond fundamentalist criticisms—that is to say, criticisms based on unshakeable beliefs—and utilises issues arising from a pluralisation of critique to confront the pluralism of critical positions, is considered. The article closes with reflections on the relation between the Critical and the Uncritical. (shrink)

While the importance of social norms for shaping and transforming communities is uncontested, their nature and normativity are controversial. Most recent theorists take social norms to arise if members hold certain attitudes, such as expectations on others, perhaps along with certain behaviours. Yet attitudes do not create norms, let alone social norms or social normativity. Social norms are instead ‘made’: through a social process. Social norming processes are special communication processes, often non-verbal and informal. We present different versions of a (...) process-based account of social norms and social normativity. The process-based view brings social norms closer to legal norms, as processes represent social ‘acts’, just as laws and contracts arise through acts rather than mere attitudes, for instances acts of voting or signing. (shrink)

Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...) We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states. (shrink)

Does pre-voting group deliberation improve majority outcomes? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Formal results and simulations confirm this. But we identify four systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing Failure 1. Our analysis recommends deliberation that (...) is 'participatory', 'neutral', but not necessarily 'equal', i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but might privilege some persons. (shrink)

In a single framework, I address the question of the informational basis for evaluating social states. I particularly focus on information about individual welfare, individual preferences and individual (moral) judgments, but the model is also open to any other informational input deemed relevant, e.g. sources of welfare and motivations behind preferences. In addition to proving some possibility and impossibility results, I discuss objections against using information about only one aspect (e.g. using only preference information). These objections suggest a multi-aspect informational (...) basis for aggregation. However, the multi-aspect approach faces an impossibility result created by a lack of inter-aspect comparability. The impossibility could be overcome by measuring information on non-cardinal scales. (shrink)

Living organisms are exposed to numerous influencing factors. This holds also true for their infrastructures that are processing and transducing information like endocrine networks or nerval channels. Therefore, the ability to compensate for noise is crucial for survival. An efficient mechanism to neutralise disturbances is instantiated in form of parallel complementary communication channels exerting antagonistic effects at their common receivers. Different signal processing types share the ability to suppress noise, to widen the system’s regulation capacity, and to provide for variable (...) gains while leaving the transferred signal to a large extent unchanged. (shrink)

We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values, and intentions. We define three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions like preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome's programme 'rationality through reasoning', we formally characterize how you can (...) (not) become more logical by reasoning. Our analysis connects rationality with logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology. (shrink)

We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate boundedly rational (...) and sophisticatedly rational choice. Since properties can be recombined in new ways, it also offers resources for predicting choices in unobserved contexts. (shrink)

In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there (...) are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006), Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010a). (shrink)

To renowned Buddhologist Heinz Bechert, Buddhist modernism was a manifestation of religious revivalism applied to the context of post-colonial society, bearing the following features which are relevant for the current discussion, amongst others: (1) an emphasis on Buddhism as a philosophy, rather than a creed or a religion; (2) an emphasis on ‘activism’ and setting great store by social work; (3) the claim by modernists that Buddhism has always included a social component described as a philosophy of equality…and that a (...) Buddhist society must be democratic; (4) the emergence of Buddhist nationalism; (5) a strong tendency towards the reassertion of women’s rights in contemporary Buddhism and attempts and actions taken to restore the order of nuns; (6) the emergence of a new type of Buddhist syncretism, viz., the combination of various Buddhist traditions (comp. 213-214, Bechert’s Obituary, 2011). (shrink)

After a time of theoretical condemnation common sense as well as academic curiosity have rediscovered again the all-permeating powers of narration. Narrativity and culture are, this is a conviction grounding this essay, closely interwoven. But from this doesn’t follow that narration has to be seen as a guardian of general order. On the contrary, if we contemplate the appearance of narratives in everyday life and in literature we may detect differences but also affinities in subverting common beliefs. Yet, literary narrations (...) tend to work in their own way through what in philosophical discourse is reduced to conceptualizing. The topics dealt with in this essay include Schiller’s substantiation of aesthetic awareness and Goethe’s narrative response; the great master-narratives of the 20th century: Proust, Joyce and Beckett; and the question, what an advanced art of narration can contribute to an experience which is yearning to break open the iron cage of traditions in thought as well as in literary invention. (shrink)

We prove that a finitely generated group is context-free whenever its Cayley-graph has a decidable monadic second-order theory. Hence, by the seminal work of Muller and Schupp, our result gives a logical characterization of context-free groups and also proves a conjecture of Schupp. To derive this result, we investigate general graphs and show that a graph of bounded degree with a high degree of symmetry is context-free whenever its monadic second-order theory is decidable. Further, it is shown that the word (...) problem of a finitely generated group is decidable if and only if the first-order theory of its Cayley-graph is decidable. (shrink)

Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, (...) which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy. (shrink)

This paper examines three cases of the clash between science and philosophy: Zeno’s paradoxes, the Frame Problem, and a recent attempt to experimentally refute skepticism. In all three cases, the relevant science claims to have resolved the purported problem. The sciences, construing the term broadly, are mathematics, artificial intelligence, and psychology. The goal of this paper is to show that none of the three scientific solutions work. The three philosophical problems remain as vibrant as ever in the face of robust (...) scientific attempts to dispel them. The paper concludes by examining some consequences of this persistence. (shrink)

The logic L (Qu) extends first-order logic by a generalized form of counting quantifiers ("the number of elements satisfying... belongs to the set C"). This logic is investigated for structures with an injectively ω-automatic presentation. If first-order logic is extended by an infinity-quantifier, the resulting theory of any such structure is known to be decidable [6]. It is shown that, as in the case of automatic structures [21], also modulo-counting quantifiers as well as infinite cardinality quantifiers ("there are χ many (...) elements satisfying...") lead to decidable theories. For a structure of bounded degree with injective ω-automatic presentation, the fragment of L(Qu) that contains only effective quantifiers is shown to be decidable and an elementary algorithm for this decision is presented. Both assumptions (ω-automaticity and bounded degree) are necessary for this result to hold. (shrink)