This is a shorter presentation of my commentary on the Meno of 2018. The German translation is here accompanied by a Greek text.

Plato's confrontation with Dionysius I, the so-called “tyrant of Sicily,” became famous as a cautionary tale of the perils of offering unwelcome advice to a powerful prince. Within early modern England, this tale took on added currency in the context of humanists' ambitions to serve as counselors in the court of Henry VIII. The humanist scholar Thomas Elyot (1490–1546), who briefly and unsuccessfully served at Henry's court, re-created Plato's exchange with Dionysius I in his dramatic dialogue The Knowledge (...) Whiche Maketh a Wise Man (1533). In his dialogue, Elyot imagines Plato returning to Athens after his brief period of enslavement, where he meets the philosopher/rhetorician Aristippus. Aristippus challenges Plato by positing that Plato's dangerous words to Dionysius violated rhetorical tenets of propriety and timing. In the course of their extended exchange, two different versions of the rhetoric of counsel surface—one based on principles of philosophy and one based on strategic rhetoric. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Rhetoric of Philosophical Politics in Plato's Seventh LetterV. Bradley LewisThe name Syracuse has come to stand as an emblem of the problematic relationship between philosophy and politics. While the sources1 differ on specifics, we can be confident that Plato visited there at least three times between 387 and 362 B.C. On his first trip, during the reign of Dionysius I, he became acquainted with Dion, the tyrant's (...) brother-in-law. When the elder Dionysius died, Dion, a devotee of philosophy, apparently contrived for the old man's son, namesake, and successor to invite Plato back, believing that the young tyrant could be philosophically educated and convinced to lay down tyranny in favor of a new regime based on the rule of law. The plan was defeated, however, by a combination of Dionysius's dissolute life and opposition by Dion's enemies at court. Dion was exiled, and Plato returned to the Academy. Dion implored Plato to return to Syracuse on the basis of reports of Dionysius II's renewed resolution to take up philosophy and by the tyrant himself (who seems to have made some thinly veiled threats against the still-exiled Dion). Plato's second visit to Dionysius was no more successful than the first, however, and he considered himself fortunate to have escaped with his life. After a meeting at which Plato recounted the events of his final trip, Dion marshaled an expeditionary force, which included volunteers from the Academy, and set out to expel Dionysius II by violence. The effort succeeded, but the new regime was itself riven by faction, and Dion was assassinated in 353.2The principal legacy of this ill-starred episode is contained in the letters that have come down to us under the name of Plato, particularly those numbered seven and eight. Scholarly discussion of Plato's Seventh Letter has usually focused on three questions: the doctrinal content of the letter and its relationship to the doctrinal content of the dialogues; the character of the letter as an apologia for Plato's Syracusan activities; and the general authenticity of the letter. While the second of these questions focuses correctly [End Page 23] on the rhetorical character of the letter, it ignores the most obvious aspect, namely, the letter's explicit addressees: the friends and comrades of Dion, and their request for political advice. If we take this rhetorical element with sufficient seriousness, we will see that the content of the letter is fully consistent with the teachings of the political dialogues, a point that tells in favor of the authenticity of the letter. Specifically, a focus on the rhetorical character of the letter reveals that its content is determined mostly by what emerges as an effort by Plato to influence his correspondents by moderating their understandable desire for vengeance and thus to forestall further bloodshed and disorder in Syracuse. What is most important about the letter, then, is not so much its account of Plato's actions in Syracuse, but its unveiling of his intentions with respect to Dion's followers. It is not the philosophical-political blueprint, sketched vaguely in the Seventh Letter, that is most important,3 but the concrete effort to mitigate the passions of his correspondents. Read in this light, the letter becomes even more important, since it contradicts the popular image of Plato as a proponent of dangerous political utopianism and portrays a more subtle relationship between philosophy and politics.1. Dion's intentions, Plato's apologyTo the extent that the rhetoric of the letter has been treated, commentators have usually focused on Plato's (or whoever the author) defense of his own actions in Sicily.4 While there is certainly warrant for this approach, the most important fact about the letter concerns its intended audience, the "relatives and comrades of Dion."5 As Plato explains in the opening of the letter, these are the men who have sought not only his advice, but his cooperation in completing the political project halted by Dion's death at the hands of several of his other purported "allies."The most striking feature of the rhetorical structure is that, while the letter... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Rhetoric of Philosophical Politics in Plato's Seventh LetterV. Bradley LewisThe name Syracuse has come to stand as an emblem of the problematic relationship between philosophy and politics. While the sources1 differ on specifics, we can be confident that Plato visited there at least three times between 387 and 362 B.C. On his first trip, during the reign of Dionysius I, he became acquainted with Dion, the tyrant's (...) brother-in-law. When the elder Dionysius died, Dion, a devotee of philosophy, apparently contrived for the old man's son, namesake, and successor to invite Plato back, believing that the young tyrant could be philosophically educated and convinced to lay down tyranny in favor of a new regime based on the rule of law. The plan was defeated, however, by a combination of Dionysius's dissolute life and opposition by Dion's enemies at court. Dion was exiled, and Plato returned to the Academy. Dion implored Plato to return to Syracuse on the basis of reports of Dionysius II's renewed resolution to take up philosophy and by the tyrant himself (who seems to have made some thinly veiled threats against the still-exiled Dion). Plato's second visit to Dionysius was no more successful than the first, however, and he considered himself fortunate to have escaped with his life. After a meeting at which Plato recounted the events of his final trip, Dion marshaled an expeditionary force, which included volunteers from the Academy, and set out to expel Dionysius II by violence. The effort succeeded, but the new regime was itself riven by faction, and Dion was assassinated in 353.2The principal legacy of this ill-starred episode is contained in the letters that have come down to us under the name of Plato, particularly those numbered seven and eight. Scholarly discussion of Plato's Seventh Letter has usually focused on three questions: the doctrinal content of the letter and its relationship to the doctrinal content of the dialogues; the character of the letter as an apologia for Plato's Syracusan activities; and the general authenticity of the letter. While the second of these questions focuses correctly [End Page 23] on the rhetorical character of the letter, it ignores the most obvious aspect, namely, the letter's explicit addressees: the friends and comrades of Dion, and their request for political advice. If we take this rhetorical element with sufficient seriousness, we will see that the content of the letter is fully consistent with the teachings of the political dialogues, a point that tells in favor of the authenticity of the letter. Specifically, a focus on the rhetorical character of the letter reveals that its content is determined mostly by what emerges as an effort by Plato to influence his correspondents by moderating their understandable desire for vengeance and thus to forestall further bloodshed and disorder in Syracuse. What is most important about the letter, then, is not so much its account of Plato's actions in Syracuse, but its unveiling of his intentions with respect to Dion's followers. It is not the philosophical-political blueprint, sketched vaguely in the Seventh Letter, that is most important,3 but the concrete effort to mitigate the passions of his correspondents. Read in this light, the letter becomes even more important, since it contradicts the popular image of Plato as a proponent of dangerous political utopianism and portrays a more subtle relationship between philosophy and politics.1. Dion's intentions, Plato's apologyTo the extent that the rhetoric of the letter has been treated, commentators have usually focused on Plato's (or whoever the author) defense of his own actions in Sicily.4 While there is certainly warrant for this approach, the most important fact about the letter concerns its intended audience, the "relatives and comrades of Dion."5 As Plato explains in the opening of the letter, these are the men who have sought not only his advice, but his cooperation in completing the political project halted by Dion's death at the hands of several of his other purported "allies."The most striking feature of the rhetorical structure is that, while the letter... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 485-512.

In this article I want to clarify the text of one of the short maxims assigned to Pythagoras in the ancient tradition, which are known as symbola or acusmata. Before I turn to the acusma in question, it is important to understand the context in which it appears. It occurs in Chapter 17 of Book 4 of Aelian's Historical Miscellany. Aelian's work was written in the early third century a.d. in Rome, and is a ‘miscellaneous collection of anecdotes and historical (...) material’. It consists of short chapters, usually a page or less long, that are for the most part independent of one another. Chapter 17 of Book 4 is about a page long and is devoted to the sayings and doings of Pythagoras. There is no particular connection between it and the surrounding chapters, and it is clearly meant to stand on its own. The preceding chapter tells us that if we went to Callias for guidance he would turn us into drinkers, … if to Alcibiades, arrogant cheats, if to Demosthenes, orators, … if to Aristides, just men, … if to Socrates, wise men. The following chapter recounts an anecdote about Plato's arrival in Sicily and his reception by the tyrant Dionysius the Younger. The chapter that I am concerned with, Chapter 17, begins by asserting that Pythagoras taught that his ‘lineage was superior to that of ordinary mortals’. This is followed by a list of superhuman acts and traits of Pythagoras, for example his ability to be in Metapontum and Croton at the same time and his golden thigh. The second two-thirds of the chapter are then devoted to the miscellaneous teachings of Pythagoras. Most of these take the form of the brief taboos and maxims known elsewhere as symbola or acusmata, among which is the text on which I want to focus here. (shrink)

This article situates the emergence of cybernetic concepts in postwar French thought within a longer history of struggles surrounding the technocratic reform of French universities, including Marcel Mauss’s failed efforts to establish a large-scale centre for social-scientific research with support from the Rockefeller Foundation, the intellectual and administrative endeavours of Claude Lévi-Strauss during the 1940s and 1950s, and the rise of communications research in connection with the Centre d’Études des Communications de Masse (CECMAS). Although semioticians and poststructuralists used cybernetic discourse (...) critically and ironically, I argue that their embrace of a ‘textocratic’ perspective – that is, a theory of power and epistemology as tied to technical inscription – sustained elements of the technocratic reasoning dating back to these 1920s efforts to reform French universities. (shrink)

World War II research into cryptography and computing produced methods, instruments and research communities that informed early research into artificial intelligence and semi-autonomous computing. Alan Turing and Claude Shannon in particular adapted this research into early theories and demonstrations of AI based on computers’ abilities to track, predict and compete with opponents. This formed a loosely bound collection of techniques, paradigms, and practices I call crypto-intelligence. Subsequent researchers such as Joseph Weizenbaum adapted crypto-intelligence but also reproduced aspects of its antagonistic (...) precepts. This was particularly true in the design and testing of chat bots. Here the ability to trick, fool, and deceive human and machine opponents was a premium, and practices of agent abuse were admired and rewarded. Recognizing the historical genesis of this particular variety of abuse can help researchers develop less antagonistic methodologies. (shrink)

Socrates' account of recollection in the Phaedo has been the subject of much study, but little attention has been paid to the questions whether and how far his arguments address Simmias' claim that he needs to recollect and be reminded that learning is recollection . I shall argue that Socrates reminds Simmias by appealing to Simmias' experience of question-and-answer discussion in order to show him how in these discussions they are regaining forgotten knowledge, but have not yet completed this process.

Ian Little has been one of the most significant British contributors to economics in the post-war era. His contributions to Welfare Economics and Development Economics have been highly influential and well-regarded throughout the world. This book is a fascinating insight into the personal and intellectual development of Professor Little, containing both the most important articles of his working life and autobiographical chapters.

Galen in a celebrated passage remarks that there were three ‘choirs’, in early Greek medicine: the choirs of Cos, of Cnidus, and of Sicily. The word is vague and suggestive, and we do well to keep it so. If we look in the Hippocratic Corpus for schools of medical theory, with distinct sets of doctrine marked off clearly from the doctrines of rival schools, we shall be lucky indeed if we can find them, and, having found them, succeed in convincing (...) others of their existence. But we shall find, now and again, an individual voice proclaiming itself from among its impersonal surroundings with clarity and vigour: some treatises in the collection have their author's personality stamped on them as distinctly as on a work of art. (shrink)

This article examines types of abductive inference in Hegelian philosophy and machine learning from a formal comparative perspective and argues that Robert Brandom’s recent reconstruction of the logic of recollection in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit may be fruitful for anticipating modes of collaborative abductive inference in human/A.I. interactions. Firstly, the argument consists of showing how Brandom’s reading of Hegelian recollection may be understood as a specific type of abductive inference, one in which the past interpretive failures and errors of a (...) community are explained hypothetically by way of the construction of a narrative that rehabilitates those very errors as means for the ongoing successful development of the community, as in Brandom’s privileged jurisprudential example of Anglo-American case law. Next, this Hegelian abductive dynamic is contrasted with the error-reducing backpropagation algorithms characterizing many current versions of machine learning, which can be understood to perform abductions in a certain sense for various problems but not (yet) in the full self-constituting communitarian mode of creative recollection canvassed by Brandom. Finally, it is shown how the two modes of “error correction” may possibly coordinate successfully on certain types of abductive inference problems that are neither fully recollective in the Hegelian sense nor algorithmically optimizable. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MIND FORMING AND MANUDUCTIO IN AQUINAS* MARIE I. GEORGE St. John's University Jamaica, New York QUINAS'S CONCERN for pedagogy is plain from his explicit discussions of the subject, the most noteworthy of which is found in the preface to the Summa Theologiae. His qualities as a teacher of beginning students have been brought out by numerous modern authors, among whom are Josef Pieper,1 who underlines both Thomas's ability to (...) arouse wonder and his use of ordinary language intelligible to all, and James Weisheipl,2 who points out that Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle reveal a concern for the neophyte who is trying to comprehend the relation between faith and reason. One important aspect of Aquinas's teaching on pedagogy generally does not get the attention it merits, however, and this is the need for ' manuductio.' 3 ' Manuductio ', or ' xeipaywv£a ' (literally, 'leading by the hand') is an expression which Aquinas *This paper was read at the Sixteenth International Conference on Patristic, Mediaeval, and Renaissance Studies, Villanova University, Pennsylvania, September 1991. 1 Cf. Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas (New York: Pantheon Books, 1962)' c. 8. 2 Cf. James Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas d'Aquino (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 281. 3 This article drew much of its inspiration from the works of Msgr. Maurice Dionne, a thinker who both elaborated upon and consciously implemented Aquinas's teachings on this subject. Cf. especially: Initation a la logique, ed. Yvan Pelletier (Ste-Foy, Quebec: L'Institut Apostolique Renaissance inc., 1976), and La N ecessite de la logique en regard de chacune des vertus intellectuelles, ed. Louis Brunet, vol. 1 (Quebec: Societe d'Etudes Aristoteliciennes 1980), hereafter cited as La N ec. 201 202 MARIE I. GEORGE adopts from Dionysius.4 It is a word that has different but related meanings in the moral, intellectual, and spiritual orders. Our intention is to elucidate the thomistic doctrine of ' leadingby -the-hand ' in the context of intellectual education, or ' mind forming,' discussing its nature, its necessity, and its place in the global picture of human knowing as outlined by Aquinas. We will begin by delineating in general what manuductio is by comparing two key passages, the first of which is to be found in the Summa Theologiae: The teacher leads the students from what is already known to knowledge of things unknown in two ways. First, by putting before him certain aids or instruments which his intellect uses in order to acquire science ; for example, when he presents him with some less universal proposition which nevertheless the student is able to judge from things already known; or when he proposes to him some sensible examples, or similitudes, or opposites, or some other things of this sort, from which the intellect of the learner is ' led by the hand ' (manuducitur) to the knowledge of a truth previously unknown to him. The other way [the teacher leads the student] is when he strengthens the intellect of the learner... inasmuch as he proposes the order of principles to conclusions to the student, who perhaps by himself would not have so much ability to put things together (virtutem collativam) that from the principles he could deduce the conclusions. And therefore it is said in Posterior Analytics. Bk. I, that 'demonstration is a syllogism making one know '. And through this mode the one who demonstrates makes the listener know.5 4 Cf. In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Ezpositio (Turin: Marietti, 1950), where St. Thomas comments on the following phrase from Dionysius (p. 14) : "E1r ailT7]11 a11a"Yoµe110J11 a11aTaTtX7/ xe1pa"YOJ1lla" ("ad ipsam sursum actorum suscitative manuductio "). The commentary reads (p. 17, # 48) : "Further, it is necessary that man progress to better things; and as to this, he says fifthly ' suscitative manuductio sursum actorum ' i.e., those things which go up, that is, make progre"ss, 'ad Ipsam ', namely to the Divinity. [The expression] 'suscitative' manuductio, however, is used because not only can one give a helping hand to those wanting to make progress, but one can even stimulate or urge [people] to progress." All translations are my own. Cf. also Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 27, art... (shrink)

The author recollects the significant landmarks in the institute's development, which coincides with and reflects the history of the country over the past eighty years.

I argue that recollection, in Plato's Meno , should not be taken as a method, and, if it is taken as a myth, it should not be taken as a mere myth. Neither should it be taken as a truth, a priori or metaphorical. In contrast to such views, I argue that recollection ought to be taken as an hypothesis for learning. Thus, the only methods demonstrated in the Meno are the elenchus and the hypothetical, or mathematical, method. What Plato's (...) Meno demonstrates, then, is that we cannot be philosophers if we fail to make use of the mathematician's hypothetical method. (shrink)

The fabula praetexta is a category of Roman drama about which we are poorly informed. Ancient testimonia are scanty and widely scattered, while surviving fragments comprise fewer than fifty lines. Only five or six titles are firmly attested. Scholarly debate, however, has been extensive, and has especially focused on reconstructing the plots of the plays.1 The main approach has been to amplify extant fragments by fitting them into a plot taken from treatments of the same episode in later historical sources (...) such as Livy, Dionysius, or Plutarch.2 This method was extended by Mommsen and others in their efforts to identify new titles and plots by isolating passages in the historians which seem written in a dramatic style, and could therefore be interpreted as derivations from historical plays.3 Such a line of approach is both risky and subjective. It is based on the desire to recover a lost genre, which modern scholars feel must or should have existed. It is tempting to imagine that the Romans would have encouraged a thriving national theatre on historical themes. Such a genre, it is argued, would have been influential in shaping the average Roman's view of past events and the treatment of famous episodes by later historians.4 The conclusions reached have virtually no basis in the ancient sources we actually have. The result is largely a fiction created by the scholarly imagination. (shrink)

The goal of this chapter is to describe recollective memory and give an account of some of the characteristics of this form of human memory. I take recollective memory to be the type of memory that occurs when an individual recalls a specific episode from their past experience. I start with this very loose definition because a large part of this chapter consists of an attempt to work out a more detailed and analytic description of this form of memory.

Recollection is central to the epistemology of Plato’sMeno. After all, the character Socrates claims that recollection is the process whereby embodied human souls bind down true opinions (doxai) and acquire knowledge (epistêmê). This paper examines the exchange between Socrates and Meno’s slave to determine (1) what steps on the path to acquiring knowledge are part of the process of recollection and (2) what is required for a subject to count as having recollected something. I argue that the key to answering (...) these questions is to get clear on the kind of process recollection is supposed to be. In particular, I argue that recollection is a process akin to the kind of process Aristotle calls “changes” (kinêseisor incompleteenergeiai). The key feature of such processes is that they aim at an end beyond themselves and are not complete until that end comes about. In the case of recollection, the end is knowledge, but inferior mental states, such as false opinion, puzzlement (aporia), and true opinion can come about because of a process of recollection without making it the case that the subject has recollected anything. I argue that this interpretation provides a textually supported and philosophically coherent understanding of Socrates’ conception of recollection. (shrink)

Three experiments investigated level of processing effects on a variety of direct and indirect memory tasks, in the context of a processing theory of dissociations. Subjects studied words in five encoding conditions and received one of ten memory tests. In Experiment 1, four tests previously classified as conceptual showed a robust LOP effect, as did a direct perceptual test of graphemic cued recall. An indirect perceptual word fragment completion test was unaffected by LOP. Experiment 2 showed that a new indirect (...) version of a graphemic cued test was not affected by LOP. In Experiment 3, guided by a generation/recognition model, we constructed three new direct tests in which subjects identified words that were graphemically, phonologically, or semantically similar to studied words. The three tests differed in their sensitivity to study conditions, but LOP had no effect in any case, despite the involvement of deliberate conscious recollection. Contemporary explanatory frameworks couched as dichotomies do not provide an adequate account of the results. It seems necessary instead to specify the types of information activated by each encoding condition, the types of information required by each test, and how encoding and retrieval processes are modified by task instructions. (shrink)

Should one use philosophy in service of religion? I argue that Dionysius the Areopagite gives a negative answer to this question. The relevant text is Dionysius’ Letter 7, in which he explains why he does not use philosophy to attack Greco-Roman paganism. Philosophy, according to Dionysius, is something divine. In fact, in Letter 7 he goes so far as to identify philosophy with what St. Paul calls the “wisdom of God.” As a result, philosophy should not be (...) treated as a tool to be used in service of anything, even the true religion, which Dionysius of course identifies with Christianity. In order to elucidate Dionysius’ position, I provide a detailed account of how he understands philosophy, religion (thrêskeia), and use (chraô). (shrink)

The epistemological problem of the truth of memory cannot be resolved without establishing a clear distinction between recollection and phantasy. Husserl’s position in this regard is both paradoxical and compelling. It is paradoxical because Husserl repeats his antiskeptical intention many times; but nevertheless in his phenomenology, recollection and phantasy are almost completely identical. Perhaps no philosopher has so radically approached the experience of remembering and the experience of fantasizing as Husserl. But at the same time, the recognition of this fundamental (...) similarity is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to avoid empiricist misunderstandings and thus approach the problem of the distinction between recollection and phantasy in a much more persuasive way than the traditional one. In this paper, I will first try to show how and why Husserl approaches recollection and phantasy. Then I will try to show how it is possible to establish a clear distinction between these two phenomena without misunderstanding the possibility of false memory. (shrink)

The volumes under review are of immense value, because they convey to the modern reader how and why one of the most important Renaissance Platonists, Marsilio Ficino, came to regard the writings of one late ancient Platonist, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, as central to the history of ancient Platonism. The philosopher nowadays known as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is the author of four treatises composed in Greek in the late fifth or the sixth century CE: On the Divine Names, On (...) the Celestial Hierarchy, On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, On Mystical Theology. In addition, ten of his letters have survived. The acquired prefix ‘pseudo’ derives from the circumstance that, from the sixth to the fifteenth century.. (shrink)

I ask whether the Recollection argument commits Socrates to the view that our only source of knowledge of the Forms is sense perception. I argue that Socrates does not confine our presently available sources of knowledge to empirically based recollection, but that he does think that we can't begin to move towards a philosophical understanding of the Forms except as a result of puzzles prompted by the shortfall of particulars in relation to the Forms, and hence that our awareness of (...) the Forms is first prompted by sense-perception. This leaves open the possibility that once that critical awareness of the Forms is established, further reflection at a conceptual level may lead to continued recollection and learning without further input from the senses, and that this approach is what is recommended for the more advanced philosopher. Hence the position endorsed by Socrates in the Phaedo, recommending that the philosopher get in training for death, fleeing as far as is possible from the bodily senses which only distract, is consistent with the position on sense perception in the Recollection argument. The senses are treated as a necessary prompt to reflection, not because they provide our best source of knowledge, but because we start life tied to the senses and believing their objects important. (shrink)

Forest Recollections: Wandering Monks in Twentieth Century Thailand. Kamala Tiyavanich. University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 1997, xxi, 410 pp. Cloth, $49.00; pbk, $29.95, £24.95. ISBN 0-8248-1768-0/1781-8.

This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical claim—the ‘doctrine of ineffability’—intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces Denys and Feyerabend’s common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part two examines Denys’ arguments for the ‘ineffability’ of God as presented in On the (...) Divine Names . Part three then explores how Feyerabend imported Denys’ account of divine ineffability into his own metaphysics to provide a novel argument for epistemic pluralism. Part four explains the significance of an appreciation of Dionyius’ influence for our understanding of Feyerabend. I conclude that Denys was a significant and neglected influence upon the later Feyerabend. (shrink)

According to an interpretation that has dominated the literature, the traditional interpretation as I call it, the recollection argument aims at establishing the thesis that our learning in this life consists in recollecting knowledge the soul acquired before being born into a body, or thesis R, by using the thesis that there exist forms, thesis F, as a premise. These entities, the forms, are incorporeal, immutable, and transcendent in the sense that they exist separately from material perceptibles, which in turn (...) are related to them through participation and by being caused by them in some sense. But the properties of transcendence, immutability and incorporeality are sufficient to signal forms, and so the thesis that there exist forms claims that there exists entities with at least these three properties. In the first section of this paper, I argue that strong textual and more general exegetical reasons suggest that the traditional interpretation is mistaken. Furthermore, this interpretation, as I argue in the second section, fails to credit Plato with a proper argument for recollection. In section III, I present an alternative account of the argument for R in the "Phaedo". At the same time I defend a more general interpretation according to which the metaphysical doctrine Plato offers in the "Phaedo" represents a natural continuation of the philosophical position that stands at the centre of the dialectical conversations we find in the shorter Socratic dialogues. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V VI VII.

I hope to show how Plato’s doctrines in these dialogues are meant to resolve questions in moral theory, by contrasting the theory of recollection, and the theory of desire, with Socratic theories of moral knowledge and motivation. These views of Socrates are parts of his general conception of virtue and moral knowledge as a craft ; I will outline the doctrines which belong to this general conception, and suggest some reasons why one of these doctrines leads Socrates to another. First (...) I will point to an important conflict between the theory of recollection in the Meno and Socratic views on moral knowledge, and to a further conflict between the account of desire in the Symposium and Socratic views on motivation. We will find that these two points of conflict are connected, and that Plato connects them in the Phaedrus. My aim is to present a plausible way of understanding certain Platonic doctrines; in the space available here I cannot argue for all the claims I make, but I hope the general picture will seem interesting enough to deserve more detailed defense or refutation. (shrink)

456 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 of reflection about rhetorical practices that I suspect Aristotle was trying to elicit in his own time and that Garver is trying to elicit in his. DAVID J. DEPEW California State University, FuUerton Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999. Pp. xvi + 3oo. Cloth, $8o.oo. The importance of doctrines found in the Latin translations of the late fifth-century Greek works of pseudo-Dionysius the (...) Areopagite for the formation of the theologi- cal and philosophical thought of Thomas Aquinas is obvious to anyone well-versed in the texts of Aquinas. However, it is by no means obvious how Aquinas read, under- stood, and transformed the Christian Neoplatonic theology of this apparent disciple of Proclus or Damascius so as to make it an integral part of his understanding of God and creation. O'Rourke rightly conceived his task as twofold: first, the texts of Dionysius must be properly understood; second, the interpretation and use of these by Aquinas can itself be assessed and appreciated in its own thirteenth-century con- text. In the first part of the book he examines the question of knowledge of God, with one chapter devoted to Dionysius and a second devoted to Aquinas's use of "Dionysian Elements" in discovering God. Part Two examines their teachings on the "Transcendence of Being and Good" in chapters 3 and 4. Part Three contains three chapters on the "Unity.. (shrink)

In this well-known passage of his Antiquitates Romanae, Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes how Romulus and his companions seized and married the Sabine virgins. Romulus justifies his actions by stating that this method of acquiring wives was a Greek custom:Dionysius' report of a Greek tradition adopted by Romulus is rather enigmatic. It has previously been noted that this passage bears similarity to passages of Plutarch and in particular his description of the Spartan marriage ceremony. This Spartan marriage ceremony does (...) bear some relation to the situation being described by Dionysius in that the women are captured before being married, but other elements of the ceremony—the bride having her hair cut off and being taken in a darkened room—are quite out of place here and would appear to be a peculiarly Spartan tradition. As Plutarch was writing some time after Dionysius, it is not possible for Dionysius to be making a parallel with the ceremony as decribed by Plutarch, but he may have had access to a common source about that ceremony, now lost. However, I would like to suggest that there is another well-known source which may have been the source of the Greek tradition referred to in Dionysius 2.30 that is connected to neither Plutarch nor marriage. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Forest Recollections: Wandering Monks in Twentieth-Century ThailandSulak SivaraksaForest Recollections: Wandering Monks in Twentieth-Century Thailand. By Kamala Tivavanich. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997. 410 pp.History and anthropology professors at Cornell University were very impressed with this Ph.D. dissertation written by a student of Southeast Asian history at this prestigious institution. And rightly so, for Forest Recollections is a valuable study of twentieth-century wandering ascetics in northeast Thailand.The author includes (...) minibiographies of Ajaan Man Phurithat (1871–1949) and nine of his disciples, who also are now no longer in this world. The nine, all ethnic Laotians from the Isaan, are Waen Sujinno, Dun Atulo, Fan Ajaro, Thet Thetrangsi, Li Thammatharo, La Khempatato, Cha Photiyan, Juan Kulachettho, and Wan Uttamo. Her account of the lives of these holy men is woven into a history of Siam, beginning in the middle of the Fifth Reign as King Chulalongklon implemented a series of sweeping reforms, including centralization of the bureaucracy. The increase of central authority over outlying regions of the kingdom had a direct impact on the Sangha (the community and hierarchy of Buddhist Monks) and the forest tradition (which is a fusion of Buddhism, animism, and local customs that had been practiced for centuries). The book provides a background account of how regional Buddhist traditions were affected by various Sangha reforms in the twentieth century and is divided into three sections: forest communities prior to 1957; the “forest-invasion” [End Page 235] period (1957–1988); and the “forest-closure” period (1989 to the present).For centuries, wandering monks had acted as both physical and spiritual healers for villagers they encountered on their travels. The changing political situation, however, resulted in wandering monks being co-opted and used by the elite. In the name of development, monks endorsed the construction of dams and wide modern roads, the wearing of Buddhist amulets, and the erection of ever more elaborate temple buildings. Many were eventually to lose the influence they had once exerted over rural people. With the notable exception of Ajaan Man Phurithat, however, most of them did not realize the very real threat posed to their way of life by an increasingly powerful centralized administration.Tiyavanich has utilized Thai-language sources extensively, an effort that is hardly matched by any previous Western scholar. But despite the excellent research and the obvious care she took in writing her dissertation, Tiyavanich has failed to fully grasp the complexity of the Sangha order and the reality of the wandering monks themselves. What we get instead is a wide-angle portrait that lacks depth. It is rather unfortunate, for example, that she did not interview wandering monks who are still alive, such as Ajaan Maha Bua and Ajaan Viriyang, or foreign-born monks who are practicing in this same tradition, such as Pannavaddho Bhikkhu (of English birth) and Ajaan Sumedho Bhikkhu (an American). Some important figures have been left out, too. There is no mention, for instance, of Ajaan Bunnag, and this is a great pity for his life story reflects the failed attempts of a wandering monk to gain independence from the centralized power of the state. Conservationist monk Phra Prajak Khuttajitto gets only a brief mention, and even the world-famous Buddhadasa Bhikkhu receives scant attention. If the author had been acquainted with the Sekiya Dhamma group of monks or if she had ever read Sanitsuda Ekachai’s excellent Seed of Hope, her account would have been strengthened. Another weakness is that her English spellings of Thai Buddhist names for monks are often not true to their Pali origins.Nonetheless, reservations aside, Forest Recollections is to be commended because it provides a lucid introduction to an influential Buddhist tradition, which may now well be on its way out, to those with little or no background knowledge of the subject.Sulak SivaraksaSanti Pracha Dhamma InstituteCopyright © 1999 The University of Hawai’i Press... (shrink)

At the beginning of the "Phaedrus", Socrates distinguishes between two kinds of people: those who are more complex, violent and hybristic than the monster Typhon, and those who are simpler, calmer and tamer (230a). I argue that there are also two distinct types of Eros (Love) that correlate to Socrates’s two kinds of people. In the first case, lovers cannot attain recollection because their souls are disordered in the absence of self-knowledge. For the latter, the self-knowledge of self-disciplined lovers renders (...) them capable of recollecting the Forms by ordering their souls naturally. (shrink)

Interpretations of recollection in the "Phaedo" are divided between ordinary interpretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all, and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4). Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who recollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars (...) to Forms (74a5-7). I provide a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argument. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which constitutes the argument for the Theory of Recollection from the ordinary learning which is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to Forms is the reasoning by which we see, as philosophers, that we must recollect. At the same time, we must also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wants to explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as the origin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the "Phaedo", recollection has ordinary learning as its immediate explanandum, and philosophical learning as its ultimate explanandum. (shrink)

Which are "innate" but "unnoticed" point–as is usually held–to the platonic doctrine of recollection or to some other source? my argument is two- pronged: negatively i argue that aristotle is not describing his hearers as impeded by plato's notion of recollection; the other, positive, that he is describing a misunderstanding of his own quite different doctrine of nous in the minds of his hearers. I show that the two elements of the aporia fit the teaching of aristotle on nous found (...) in "de an." Iii, 5, 430a15 and the "generation of animals" b, 3, 736b27-28. Names mentioned: merlan, jaeger, nuyens, h.d.p. Lee, ross, robinson, grene, randall, mckeon, aubenque, klein, and j. Owens. (shrink)

Starohelenska etika nosila je u svom predanju protivrjecan odnos u razumjevanju vrline kao kljucnog pojma na kojem se zasniva polis i politika. Na izostravanju i objelodanjavanju ove protivrjecnosti umnogome je doprinjela sofistika koja je mjerilom racionalnosti uocavala ona filosofski nedovoljno razjasnjena mjesta u starohelenskoj slici svijeta. Da bi razrjesio protivrjecnost nastalu iz nacelnog tradicionalnog stava da se vrlina ne moze nauciti i stava da je vrlina povezana sa znanjem, Platon uvodi u razmatranje pojam sjecanja. Sjecanje postaje sredisnja tacka u Platonovom (...) prevazilazenju navedene protivrjecnosti. Razmatraju se dva oblika sjecanja, ono koje je univerzalno ali i time samo potencijalno dato, i ono koje je djelatno i koje vodi do teorije ideja koja odredjuje sta jeste vrlina. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179049. (shrink)