La innovación aparece en el mundo de la empresa y, en general, en los ámbitos organizacionales, como demanda del sistema económico propio del capitalismo informacional y de su lógica imperante: la búsqueda del valor añadido. Y lo hace en concurso con lógicas culturales que han ido vaciando y desmontando al sujeto psíquico moderno. La iniciativa y la motivación han pasado de materia prima a producto altamente elaborado. Un producto que puede ser trabajado desde fuera del sujeto por las vías tradicionales, (...) o bien inserto en una autoconstrucción psicologizante. Este texto analiza la función psicocultural y el éxito de los libros de autoayuda junto con su “psico-ideología”. Si bien la cultura de la autoayuda tiene como horizonte todo tipo de ámbito de relación y todas las disposiciones, sentimientos y emociones, el artículo se ocupa del caso de la innovación, es decir, del análisis de la función de los libros de autoayuda destinados a convertir a la gente en innovadora y proactiva. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. and Pailos recovers classical logic, either in the sense that every classical inferential validity is valid at some point in the hierarchy ), or because a logic of a transfinite level defined in terms of the hierarchy shares its validities (...) with classical logic. Each of these logics is consistent with transparent truth—as is shown in Pailos —, and this suggests that, contrary to standard opinions, transparent truth is after all consistent with classical logic. However, Scambler presents a major challenge to this approach. He argues that this hierarchy cannot be identified with classical logic in any way, because it recovers no classical antivalidities. We embrace Scambler’s challenge and develop a new logic based on these hierarchies. This logic recovers both every classical validity and every classical antivalidity. Moreover, we will follow the same strategy and show that contingencies need also be taken into account, and that none of the logics so far presented is enough to capture classical contingencies. Then, we will develop a multi-standard approach to elaborate a new logic that captures not only every classical validity, but also every classical antivalidity and contingency. As a€truth-predicate can be added to this logic, this result can be interpreted as showing that, despite the claims that are extremely widely accepted, classical logic does not trivialize in the context of transparent truth. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

Semantic paradoxes pose a real threat to logics that attempt to be capable of expressing their own semantic concepts. Particularly, Curry paradoxes seem to show that many solutions must change our intuitive concepts of truth or validity or impose limits on certain inferences that are intuitively valid. In this way, the logic of a universal language would have serious problems. In this paper, we explore a different solution that tries to avoid both limitations as much as possible. Thus, we argue (...) that it is possible to capture the naive concepts of truth and validity without losing any of the valid inferences of classical logic. This approach is called the Buenos Aires plan. We present the logic of truth and validity, $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ based on the hierarchy of logics $$\textsf{ST}_{\omega }$$, whose validity predicate has the same semantic conditions as the material conditional. We argue that $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ is capable of blocking the problematic results while keeping the deductive power of classical logic as much as possible and offering an adequate semantic theory. On the other hand, one could object that it is not possible to reason with $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ because it is not closed under its logical principles. We respond to this objection and argue that the local characterization of validity shows how to make inferences using the logic $$\textsf{ST}_{\omega }$$. (shrink)

The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities, but not be the same logic.

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...) based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. (shrink)

I argue against Matthew Slater’s rejection of what he calls the grounding claim in his stable property cluster account of natural kinds. This claim states that the epistemic value of natural kinds depends on the existence of some ground to bind together a kind’s properties. Using two test cases from academic medicine, I show that grounds are genuinely explanatory of scientific epistemic practices and that the SPC account should not do without them in its philosophical analysis of natural kinds.

In this paper we develop a general representation theory for MV-algebras. We furnish the appropriate categorical background to study this problem. Our guide line is the theory of classifying topoi of coherent extensions of universal algebra theories. Our main result corresponds, in the case of MV-algebras and MV-chains, to the representation of commutative rings with unit as rings of global sections of sheaves of local rings. We prove that any MV-algebra is isomorphic to the MV-algebra of all global sections of (...) a sheaf of MV-chains on a compact topological space. This result is intimately related to McNaughton’s theorem, and we explain why our representation theorem can be viewed as a vast generalization of McNaughton’s theorem. In spite of the language used in this abstract, we have written this paper in the hope that it can be read by experts in MV-algebras but not in sheaf theory, and conversely. (shrink)

Why do humpback whales sing? This paper considers the hypothesis that humpback whales may use song for long range sonar. Given the vocal and social behavior of humpback whales, in several cases it is not apparent how they monitor the movements of distant whales or prey concentrations. Unless distant animals produce sounds, humpback whales are unlikely to be aware of their presence or actions. Some field observations are strongly suggestive of the use of song as sonar. Humpback whales sometimes stop (...) singing and then rapidly approach distant whales in cases where sound production by those whales is not apparent, and singers sometimes alternately sing and swim while attempting to intercept another whale that is swimming evasively. In the evolutionary development of modern cetaceans, perceptual mechanisms have shifted from reliance on visual scanning to the active generation and monitoring of echoes. It is hypothesized that as the size and distance of relevant events increased, humpback whales developed adaptive specializations for long-distance echolocation. Differences between use of songs by humpback whales and use of sonar by other echolocating species are discussed, as are similarities between bat echolocation and singing by humpback whales. Singing humpback whales are known to emit sounds intense enough to generate echoes at long ranges, and to flexibly control the timing and qualities of produced sounds. The major problem for the hypothesis is the lack of recordings of echoes from other whales arriving at singers immediately before they initiate actions related to those whales. An earlier model of echoic processing by singing humpback whales is here revised to incorporate recent discoveries. According to the revised model, both direct echoes from targets and modulations in song-generated reverberation can provide singers with information that can help them make decisions about future actions related to mating, traveling, and foraging. The model identifies acoustic and structural features produced by singing humpback whales that may facilitate a singer’s ability to interpret changes in echoic scenes and suggests that interactive signal coordination by singing whales may help them to avoid mutual interference. Specific, testable predictions of the model are presented. (shrink)

Vector logic is a mathematical model of the propositional calculus in which the logical variables are represented by vectors and the logical operations by matrices. In this framework, many tautologies of classical logic are intrinsic identities between operators and, consequently, they are valid beyond the bivalued domain. The operators can be expressed as Kronecker polynomials. These polynomials allow us to show that many important tautologies of classical logic are generated from basic operators via the operations called Type I and Type (...) II products. Finally, it is described a matrix version of the Fredkin gate that extends its properties to the many-valued domain, and it is proved that the filtered Fredkin operators are second degree Kronecker polynomials that cannot be generated by Type I or Type II products. (shrink)

State of art paper on the topic laws of nature, around the problem of identification what is to be a law of nature. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: the simple regularity theory, from Hume; the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis best systems theory; the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory of laws as relations among universals; Ellis’s essentialist theory; Cartwright’s theory of laws as ceteris paribus laws; the anti-reductionist theories of Lange, Maudlin and Carroll, the anti-realist theories of Mumford, (...) van Fraassen and Giere; etc. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has dramatically shown the level of interconnectedness of the human population, the direct relation between human health and the ecosystem, as well as the enormous ethical challenges required for a global response. Relatedly, society has been directly confronted by issues of ‘Global health,’ both in terms of awareness of health conditions and health systems resiliency all around the world, as well as in terms of governance of the worldwide response and its implications at national and local levels. (...) While Global health is often used as a cosmetic label for neocolonial approaches, it is really an interdisciplinary approach consisting of the interaction between globalization and the determinants of health. Thus, it involves the ecosystem and its transformation and implies a systemic ‘One Health’ decolonized approach in the definition of its strategies. The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the inequities and the limits of the current hegemonic Global health system governance; calling for ethics to provide a renewed, comprehensive, inclusive, and decolonized conceptualization of Global health. (shrink)

En este artículo se expondrá en primer lugar la crítica de Badiou sobre el sujeto humanista y su propio concepto de sujeto, un sujeto que está claramente inspirado en Lacan pero que va más allá de la subjetivación de la falta de este. Luego me dirigiré al colega de Badiou en el campo antihumanista, Slavoj Žižek, y su crítica lacaniana de Badiou. Se afirmará que es su interpretación diferente del Real lacaniano lo que explica la disputa subyacente entre ellos. Mientras (...) que el sujeto de Žižek es infundado, por otro lado, la concepción de Badiou de forzar lo Real confiere al sujeto un grado de consistencia que facilita la articulación de proyectos políticos específicos. (shrink)

Neste artigo abordaremos o tema da intuição e o método intuitivo no pensamento de Henri Bergson, tendo por objetivo mostrar a partir de quais problemas tal método pôde surgir e quais dificuldades ele tenta solucionar em seu desenvolvimento no decorrer de determinados textos do filósofo francês. Para alcançar o problema da intuição em Bergson, teremos que tratar brevemente de temas fundamentais de sua filosofia, a saber, a duração e o tempo; a intuição interior e seu contato com o Eu profundo; (...) o ser como mobilidade e a cisão de Bergson com a metafísica antiga, clássica, que vê o imóvel como essencial e a mudança como acidental. Discorreremos também acerca da metafísica bergsoniana e da ciência simbólica como formas de conhecimento do absoluto, seja ele intuitivo-espiritual ou analítico-material. Por fim, abordaremos o problema da expressão da intuição ou, em outras palavras, da comunicação da duração em termos espaciais; a dificuldade da linguagem e da inteligência de dizer o ser movente e a proposta bergsoniana de solução deste impasse através da introdução da metáfora, das imagens e dos conceitos flexíveis. Com o intuito de atender nossos objetivos principais e explicitar as dificuldades acima apontadas – mostrando de que forma Bergson as contorna –, além de esclarecer o funcionamento do método e do conhecimento intuitivo, iremos nos basear nos seguintes textos de Bergson: “A Introdução da Metafísica” (1903), a conferência intitulada “A Intuição Filosófica” (1911) e as duas introduções de “O Pensamento e o Movente” (1922), onde esses conceitos aparecem ou pela primeira vez, ou tomando desenvolvimentos decisivos. (shrink)

Resumen Según la tesis principal de este artículo, para articular el alcance e interés del tema wittgensteineano de los parecidos de familia se requiere ver en él, no una respuesta a la pregunta por lo que sea un concepto en general, sino una propuesta de carácter metodológico. Dos preguntas orientan la parte central del texto: (1) ¿Qué significa “conceptos de parecidos de familia”? (2) ¿Cuáles serían los conceptos en cuestión? Con respecto a (1), intento mostrar que el término no es (...) unívoco: un primer sentido dice relación con el dictum de los “parecidos que se superponen y entrecruzan” (IF 67) y se diferencia de un segundo sentido asociado al tema de los “bordes borrosos” (IF 71). Con apoyo en esta distinción ofrezco una respuesta a (2): en el primer sentido del término, no existe ningún concepto de familia, mientras que de acuerdo con el segundo todos los conceptos lo son. En la parte final propongo reinterpretar el tema en clave metodológica. Afirmar que conceptos como los de lenguaje, comprender, pensar, etc., son conceptos de familia significa que la reflexión filosófica sobre ellos no pasa fundamentalmente por buscar definiciones; que tanto o más importante es la cuidada descripción de ejemplos paradigmáticos, como “centros de variación” (EPB 190). Abstract According to the main thesis of this article, in order to articulate the scope and interest of Wittgenstein’s family resemblances topic, we should see into it not an answer to the question what concepts in general are, but a methodological proposal. Two questions guide the central part of the text: (1) What does “family-resemblances concepts” mean? (2) What concepts fall within the corresponding class? Regarding (1) I try to show that “family-resemblances concepts” is not an unequivocal term: a first sense has to do with the dictum of “similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (IF 67) and is to be distinguished from a second sense associated with the topic of “blurred edges” (IF 71). This distinction lies behind the answer I offer to (2): in the first sense of the term, there is no family concept at all, while according to the second sense all concepts are of this kind. In the final part I propose a reinterpretation of the issue from a methodological perspective. To say that concepts like language, understanding, thinking, etc. are family concepts means that the philosophical reflection on them should not centre on the praxis of looking for definitions. As important ―maybe more important― as that it’s the careful description of paradigmatic examples, as “centers of variation” (EPB 190). (shrink)

There are a considerable number of logics that do not seem to share the same inferential principles. Intuitionistic logics do not include the law of the exclude.

This paper raises the question under what circumstances a plurality forms a set. My main point is that not always all things form sets. A provocative way of presenting my position is that, as a result of my approach, there are more pluralities than sets. Another way of presenting the same thesis claims that there are ways of talking about objects that do not always collapse into sets. My argument is related to expressive powers of formal languages. Assuming classical logic, (...) I show that if all plurality form a set and the quantifiers are absolutely general, then one gets a trivial theory. So, by reductio, one has to abandon one of the premiss. Then, I argue against the collapse of the pluralities into sets. What I am advocating is that the thesis of collapse limits important applications of the plural logic in model theory, when it is assumed that the quantifiers are absolutely general. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Natural languages can express some logical propositions that humans are able to understand. We illustrate this fact with a famous text that Conan Doyle attributed to Holmes: “It is an old maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”. This is a subtle logical statement usually felt as an evident true. The problem we are trying to solve is the cognitive reason for such a feeling. We postulate here that we (...) accept Holmes’ maxim as true because our adult brains are equipped with neural modules that perform naturally modal logical computations. (shrink)

The Benacerraf’s problem is a problem about how we can attain mathematical knowledge: mathematical entities are entities not located in space-time; we exist in spacetime; so, it does not seem that we could have a causal connection with mathematical entities in order to attain mathematical knowledge. In this paper, I propose a solution to the Benacerraf’s problem supported by the Quinean doctrines of naturalism, confirmational holism and postulation. I show that we have empirical knowledge of centres of mass and of (...) entities outside of our light cone and that these entities are inefficacious causality entities, at least,with us. At the end, I defend the existential knowledge of centres of mass and of entities outside of our light cone against the Eleatic principle of Cheyne that we only could attain existential knowledge of entities by a causal connection. (shrink)

En este trabajo, me propongo discutir la plausibilidad de la tesis de que es posible captar las características modales del concepto intuitivo de consecuencia a través de un concepto de consecuencia definido generalizando sobre interpretaciones. Desde mi perspectiva, las argumentaciones que han ofrecido aquellos que, como Ray, quieren salvar el salto de lo general a lo modal, mostrando que hay suficientes interpretaciones como para representar las características modales de la noción preteórica de consecuencia, poseen un mismo tipo de limitación. La (...) misma es producto de la imposibilidad de contar con una interpretación de los cuantificadores suficientemente general como para abarcar sin restricción contextual alguna, la totalidad de las interpretaciones. Al mismo tiempo, sostengo que estos problemas están emparentados con los límites expresivos propios de la estrategia que intenta ofrecer una teoría matemática precisa del concepto de interpretación por medio de algún tipo de cuantificación sobre estructuras (sean estas conjuntistas o no). Por eso, tales límites expresivos no tienen que ver especialmente con los rasgos modales propiamente dichos del concepto de consecuencia, sino con la cuantificación irrestricta que el análisis requeriría para ser adecuado. (shrink)

Note on Lacey's "The Constitutive Values of Science".

Voltaire teve um importante papel na disseminação do newtonianismo no continente europeu. Mas também ele foi responsável pela tentativa mais direta de estender a autoridade de Newton a outros temas filosóficos, além daqueles relativos à matemática e à física. O livro La Métahysique de Newton , publicado em 1740, é uma prova disso. Neste artigo, o livro de Voltaire é analisado a partir do contexto das polêmicas entre partidários de Newton e de Leibniz. Procura-se identificar nexos entre o projeto esboçado (...) no La Métaphysique e as especulações de Hume e de Kant sobre os problemas metafísicos da teoria newtoniana da gravitação universal. (shrink)

Belnap and Gupta have recently maintained that truth is a circular concept: its extension cannot be established without being previously hypothesized. This has led Yaqub to claim that the circular character in question cannot be made compatible with the thesis that semantic properties tlre supervenient ones. Belnap and Gupta have explicitly denied sitch a claim any plausibility. In this paper, I offir some new arguments in support of Yaqub 's position. Such arguments are based on an analysis of some aspects (...) of Belnap and Gupta's theory that, as for as I know, had not been considered before. (shrink)

Este ensayo propone las tesis siguientes. i) Se ha producido un cambio de conciencia de nuestro pasado filosófico en los últimos decenios. ii) A ello ha contribuido tanto la asimilación de la filosofía continental y anglosajona como la investigación sobre la filosofía española llevada a cabo en las universidades de Madrid, Granada, Murcia, Oviedo, Salamanca, entre otras. iii) La filosofía española tiene un futuro prometedor tanto en investigación como en docencia.

La Lógica y la Filosofía de la ciencia constituyen disciplinas centrales en la filosofía de nuestro siglo. Y, aunque insuficientemente divulgadas entre el gran público en nuestro país, su peso específico en los ambientes académicos e investigadores va aumentando de día en día. Este volumen de homenaje a R. Carnap y H. Reichenbach, figuras centrales en la conformación de la filosofía de la ciencia, recoge las principales intervenciones de investigadores españoles y extranjeros en un encuentro que, en su honor, se (...) celebró a finales del año 1991. Incluye asimismo muestras significativas de investigaciones que se están realizando en España en la actualidad en los campos de la lógica clásica y multivariada. La teoría de la argumentación, la teoría de la probabilidad, la filosofía de la ciencia en general y en particular, la filosofía de la economía. Finalmente, debido al fallecimiento en aquel año de una de las personalidades más importantes de la filosofía española, J. Ferrater Mora, se incluye un pequeño homenaje que recuerda tanto el talante del filósofo como su obra. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es evaluar la importancia de los líderes africanos en la política exterior de sus países. A partir de una revisión comprehensiva de literatura especializada, se evidencia la intrascendencia en África de los marcos teóricos tradicionales del análisis de política exterior, los cuales se basan principalmente en la experiencia diplomática de las grandes potencias. En el contexto de los países africanos, por el contrario, la unidad decisoria final no está institucionalizada, por lo cual la visión de (...) mundo de los líderes se transforma en prácticamente la única referencia para la fijación de la estrategia internacional y el interés nacional. (shrink)

Resumo: A indústria da informação é um dos mais importantes ramos das atividades humanas na civilização moderna, orientando as decisões governamentais, a publicidade, as estratégias das empresas, enfim, abrangendo toda a produção de riqueza e bem estar no mundo atual. Quem hoje pode passar sem informação? Profissionalmente em qualquer atividade, o mais simples homem do campo é atento ao noticiário do seu rádio de pilha para verificar, por exemplo, a previsão do tempo, bem como o mais moderno executivo de uma (...) grande empresa, decidindo a estratégia da mesma, precisa de informação. É mister ressaltar que a busca de informação sempre foi, através dos tempos, uma necessidade preponderante das civilizações, mas o fato a ser destacado, a partir dos anos 50 do nosso século, é que a informação, com o advento do computador, se tomou muito mais ágil, precisa e dinâmica. Num mundo onde antes a informação fluía lentamente, com o computador e mais com a telemática - simbiose das tecnologias de informática e comunicação - o uso da informação ganha uma dinâmica nunca antes pensada. [...] Palavras-chave: informática; indústria da informação; mundo atual. (shrink)

This discussion paper is a reply to Stathis Psillos’ paper “Induction and Natural Necessities” :327–340, (2017), published in this journal. In that paper, he attempts to refute David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of induction. To accomplish this desideratum, he proposes that the best explanation for our observed regularities is a sort of “best before date” necessity. That is, necessary connections may break down and are not by default timeless. He develops arguments against my :67–82, (2014) defence of the necessitarian (...) solution regarding a previous paper by Beebee :504–527, 2011.. He alleges that best before date necessity is no worse than timeless necessity; his proposal does not imply any further inductive generalisation to timeless necessity; and inductive inferences are justified. In this discussion paper, I provide arguments against these three claims. (shrink)

O termo Ecosofia evoca a necessidade de se pensar uma nova relação entre o homem e o meio ambiente a partir de um paradigma pós-cartesiano, uma vez que sob a égide do cartesianismo subscreveu-se uma forma de dominação sobre a natureza onde a última se apresenta como “serva” do homem. Tal expressão remonta ao pensamento do ambientalista norueguês Arne Naess, fundador do movimento conhecido como Deep Ecology, o qual, entre outras características, estabelece que o problema da ecologia está além de (...) um único campo de estudos, envolvendo o esforço coletivo de diferentes áreas, uma vez que se trata de um tema de responsabilidade de todos. Diversos pensadores podem ser incluídos no desenvolvimento daquele conceito, indo de Rousseau a Félix Guattari, a sociólogos como Michel Maffesoli e físicos como Fritjof Capra. Compreendemos, com base nos trabalhos de alguns dos seus principais teóricos, que a Ecosofia abrange uma dimensão metafísica que está além das formas consensuais de combate ao desequilíbrio ambiental, os quais se instrumentalizam através de acordos e metas estabelecidas através de instituições políticas, mas que se promove como uma cosmovisão que tem como princípio transformar a consciência humana para que se acomode aos termos de um novo convívio entre si e com a natureza. Daqui emergem duas tarefas a serem plenamente consolidadas: o reconhecimento da interdependência dos seres vivos entre si, em relação ao meio ambiente e à natureza tomada como origem comum de todos. Este último ponto exprime um conflito com a tradição espiritual do Ocidente de matriz judaico-cristã. (shrink)

Many scientists have argued forcefully for the pointlessness of nature, something that challenges any doctrine of Creation. However, apparent design and comprehensibility are also to be found in nature; it is ambivalent. This trait is nowhere more evident than in the natural inclinations that lead to concupiscence and the “seven deadly sins” in human beings. These inclinations are dealt with as pertaining to the “pre-fallen” condition of nature and human beings. As a framework to make sense of the goodness of (...) creation in this context, Paul Tillich's notion of the “vital trends of nature” is called to the fore. Being at the intersection of a philosophy of religion and a philosophy of nature, this notion hints at the goodness of Creation in fragment and anticipation. -/- . (shrink)

This essay is a review of Peter McLaren's most recent work, Capitalists and Conquerors: A Critical Pedagogy Against Empire. The essay situates McLaren's work in the philosophical tradition of Marxist Humanism, with reference specifically to Raya Dunayevskaya and Paulo Freire. Despite invoking the work of Dunayevskaya as a foundation for his own project, McLaren does not offer a robust explication of this important thinker, nor of the Hegelian‐Marxist discourse she embraced. Here, as in much of McLaren's work, the reader is (...) not offered rigorous analysis of his philosophical assumptions. The dearth of such analysis, this essay argues, compromises the critical thrust of McLaren's work. In turn, the essay sketches a framework for unpacking the Marxist Humanist paradigm, and, thereby, rethinking the philosophical foundations of contemporary critical pedagogy. (shrink)