A doscientos años de su muerte, aún puede constatarse que no hay una sola teoría filosófica de los últimos dos siglos merecedora de alguna atención que no tenga algo que ver con Kant. ¿Qué puedo yo saber? ¿Qué debo hacer? ¿Qué me es permitido esperar? ¿Qué es el hombre? Son las cuatro grandes preguntas de las que se ocupa la filosofía kantiana. La primera pregunta se refiere a la filosofía teórica. la segunda es eminentemente moral, la tercera se ocupa de (...) la conjunción entre lo teórico y lo práctico, y la cuarta, la más importante de todas, es un cuestionamiento por la condición humana misma. El pensamiento de Kant ofrece grandes aportes a cada una de las ramas del pensamiento filosófico; no en vano decía Friedrich Schiller de él; "¡¿Cómo puede un solo rico alimentar a tantos mendigos?!". Kant: entre sensibilidad y razón es un libro que reúne las conferencias de un grupo de estudiosos de la filosofía kantiana, dictadas en los predios de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, al cumplirse los doscientos años de la desaparición del filósofo alemán. El lector podrá encontrar interpretaciones de la epistemología, la ética, la política y la estética kantianas, así como estudios acerca del legado que Kant dejó a sus contemporáneos y seguidores. El carácter heterogéneo y crítico de este texto le permite ir más allá de ser una introducción al pensamiento kantiano, para convertirse en una herramienta de estudio acerca de uno de los pensadores más importantes de la historia de la filosofía. (shrink)

Los intereses del ingeniero y filósofo chileno Manuel Atria Ramírez recorren una variedad de temas y disciplinas, pero es en la filosofía de las matemáticas y de la física donde se centra una porción importante de su obra publicada. Tras una primera fase de juventud, de manifiesta impronta tomista, su pensamiento de madurez acusa el influjo de las grandes escuelas epistemológicas que prosperan durante la primera mitad del siglo XX. Además de ilustrar la recepción que se le daba por aquellos (...) años en el medio académico latinoamericano a las nuevas tendencias filosóficas europeas, pensamos que el conciso estilo expositivo del autor y su comprensión profunda de la físico-matemática y de su historia, tienen el mérito de plantear con frescura y originalidad la pregunta referida al fundamento último de las matemáticas, y de su vinculación con la realidad. En este artículo presentamos y analizamos las principales directrices de la propuesta epistemológica de Atria, e identificamos algunos puntos abiertos a investigaciones ulteriores. (shrink)

Adding a transparent truth predicate to a language completely governed by classical logic is not possible. The trouble, as is well-known, comes from paradoxes such as the Liar and Curry. Recently, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have put forward an approach based on a non-transitive notion of consequence which is suitable to deal with semantic paradoxes while having a transparent truth predicate together with classical logic. Nevertheless, there are some interesting issues concerning the set of metainferences validated by this (...) logic. In this paper, we show that this logic, once it is adequately understood, is weaker than classical logic. Moreover, the logic is in a way similar to the paraconsistent logic LP. (shrink)

Para explorar las diferencias significativas entre estos dos pensadores, la primera parte de este articulo considerará sus ideas ontológicas. Comenzando con su preocupación común por la multiplicidad, exploraremos el movimiento fundacional de Deleuze hacia diferentes tipos de multiplicidad. La crítica de Badiou a este enfoque estará relacionada con su defensa de los recursos abstractos de la teoría de conjuntos en oposición a las síntesis concretas con las que Deleuze busca comenzar. La segunda parte de este documento explorará las consecuencias de (...) los compromisos ontológicos de Deleuze cuando se trata de la ética del acontecimiento exigido por Badiou. El compromiso de Deleuze con el estoicismo proporcionará el escenario para su explicación de cómo ocurren los acontecimientos y representa una fuente de pensamiento y actividad. En la tercera y última parte se buscará evaluar la explicación de Deleuze sobre el papel de los acontecimientos en situaciones particulares y en las actividades de los sujetos que responden a estos. Esto nos permitirá sacar conclusiones sobre la crítica de Badiou a Deleuze y la capacidad de Deleuze para resistir estas críticas. Argumentaré que Deleuze comparte con Badiou la preocupación de mantener una visión clara del tema como una figura comprometida en la búsqueda de proyectos nuevos e inauditos que responden al llamado de los acontecimientos. (shrink)

Many authors have considered that the notions of paraconsistency and dialetheism are intrinsically connected, in many cases, to the extent of confusing both phenomena. However, paraconsistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in invalidating the rule of explosion, whereas dialetheism is a semantical/ontological position consisting in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we argue against this connection and show that it is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism, and, moreover, that there are examples (...) of non-paraconsistent logics that can be interpreted in a dialetheic way. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-based hierarchy, of which LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document} and ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document}, ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} and the logics of the ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-metainferential logics in general—and STTω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {STT}}_{\omega }$$\end{document} in particular—are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth. (shrink)

Antecedente. Se considera «eutanasia» al acto de acabar con la vida del paciente a petición expresa de él, para terminar el sufrimiento propio de alguna enfermedad sin perspectiva de cura. Objetivo. Evaluar los conocimientos y la percepción sobre la eutanasia en estudiantes y profesionales de medicina, demostrando los conocimientos y clasificando la percepción sobre la eutanasia. Metodología. Estudio clínico-epidemiológico, observacional, cualitativo-cuantitativo, de corte transversal y con muestreo no probabilístico por conveniencia, en los estudiantes y profesionales de medicina de un hospital (...) en Venezuela. Resultados. La muestra estudiada tuvo una distribución según grado de instrucción: 64.85% de estudiantes, 19.33% de residentes y 15.82% de especialistas. Presentaron un grado de conocimiento medio, distribuido en 84.4% de especialistas, 77.3% de residentes y 80.5% de estudiantes (p 0.051). De acuerdo con los grados de conocimiento y el apoyo a la eutanasia, el 76.18% tiene un grado medio de conocimientos (p 0.0002). Conclusión. Se demostró que existe un grado medio de conocimiento, en particular en la población estudiantil. La eutanasia no fue percibida de manera negativa, demostrando una alta significancia en la atención a las implicaciones éticas que rodean este concepto. (shrink)

El ensayo es una réplica al artículo de Claude Romano «Après la chair». Sostengo en él que las dos objeciones fundamentales que el filósofo francés plantea a la comprensión husserliana del cuerpo vivido se basan en una interpretación incorrecta de la distinción entre Körper y Leib. La condición corpórea de los vivientes no alude en absoluto a la objetivación científica de los organismos, sino a la dimensión de cosa de la experiencia, perceptible, visible, tocable, que posee todo ser vivo en (...) el mundo de la vida. La condición corporal de los vivientes, por su parte, no nace del fenómeno de las dobles sensaciones en que el cuerpo se toca a sí mismo, sino que remite a la condición espaciosa de la sensibilidad táctil que, al extenderse por principio, es el fundamento descriptivo de que puedan duplicarse las sensaciones en el contacto entre miembros corporales. La conclusión es que la pretendida superación de la fenomenología husserliana del cuerpo es, en este caso, una apuesta vacía. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. and Pailos recovers classical logic, either in the sense that every classical inferential validity is valid at some point in the hierarchy ), or because a logic of a transfinite level defined in terms of the hierarchy shares its validities (...) with classical logic. Each of these logics is consistent with transparent truth—as is shown in Pailos —, and this suggests that, contrary to standard opinions, transparent truth is after all consistent with classical logic. However, Scambler presents a major challenge to this approach. He argues that this hierarchy cannot be identified with classical logic in any way, because it recovers no classical antivalidities. We embrace Scambler’s challenge and develop a new logic based on these hierarchies. This logic recovers both every classical validity and every classical antivalidity. Moreover, we will follow the same strategy and show that contingencies need also be taken into account, and that none of the logics so far presented is enough to capture classical contingencies. Then, we will develop a multi-standard approach to elaborate a new logic that captures not only every classical validity, but also every classical antivalidity and contingency. As a€truth-predicate can be added to this logic, this result can be interpreted as showing that, despite the claims that are extremely widely accepted, classical logic does not trivialize in the context of transparent truth. (shrink)

The concept of _substructural logic_ was originally introduced in relation to limitations of Gentzen’s structural rules of Contraction, Weakening and Exchange. Recent years have witnessed the development of substructural logics also challenging the Tarskian properties of Reflexivity and Transitivity of logical consequence. In this introduction we explain this recent development and two aspects in which it leads to a reassessment of the bounds of classical logic. On the one hand, standard ways of defining the notion of logical consequence in classical (...) logic naturally induce substructural logics when admitting more than two truth values; on the other hand, these substructural logics give rise to hierarchies of _metainferences_ that can be used to approximate classical logic at different levels. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

In different papers, Carnielli, W. & Rodrigues, A., Carnielli, W. Coniglio, M. & Rodrigues, A. and Rodrigues & Carnielli, present two logics motivated by the idea of capturing contradictions as conflicting evidence. The first logic is called BLE and the second—that is a conservative extension of BLE—is named LETJ. Roughly, BLE and LETJ are two non-classical logics in which the Laws of Explosion and Excluded Middle are not admissible. LETJ is built on top of BLE. Moreover, LETJ is a Logic (...) of Formal Inconsistency. This means that there is an operator that, roughly speaking, identifies a formula as having classical behavior. Both systems are motivated by the idea that there are different conditions for accepting or rejecting a sentence of our natural language. So, there are some special introduction and elimination rules in the theory that are capturing different conditions of use. Rodrigues & Carnielli’s paper has an interesting and challenging idea. According to them, BLE and LETJ are incompatible with dialetheia. It seems to show that these paraconsistent logics cannot be interpreted using truth-conditions that allow true contradictions. In short, BLE and LETJ talk about conflicting evidence avoiding to talk about gluts. I am going to argue against this point of view. Basically, I will firstly offer a new interpretation of BLE and LETJ that is compatible with dialetheia. The background of my position is to reject the one canonical interpretation thesis: the idea according to which a logical system has one standard interpretation. Then, I will secondly show that there is no logical basis to fix that Rodrigues & Carnielli’s interpretation is the canonical way to establish the content of logical notions of BLE and LETJ. Furthermore, the system LETJ captures inside classical logic. Then, I am also going to use this technical result to offer some further doubts about the one canonical interpretation thesis. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that killing a Conditional Threat usually involves an unnecessary act of self-defense, so killing this aggressor is usually morally impermissible. We defend this thesis by showing that this case is fundamentally similar to a case involving an Unconditional Threat in which the victim can flee to safety although this involves incurring a minor cost. Second, we analyze the thresholds of maximal harm that victims are required to bear before they are (...) permitted to defend themselves by harming their aggressors related to the conditions of necessity and of proportionality. We argue that the maximal harm a victim is required to bear sanctioned by the condition of necessity is, all else being equal, lower than the maximal harm that a victim must bear sanctioned by the condition of proportionality. This result is relevant for determining in which cases victims may use lethal force against Conditional Threats, both in the individual case and also in the case of war. (shrink)

La noción de verdad ha sido siempre el tesoro de la filosofía, su objeto de estudio y debate durante siglos, sin embargo, en la actualidad hay numerosas perspectivas que ofrecen respuestas innovadoras a la relación entre verdad, conocimiento y realidad, pero ninguna de ellas tiene una claridad abrumadora como la que nos ofrece la filosofía de Alain Badiou. Es que no se queda en poner su postura frente al debate, sino que resuelve lo que a las otras perspectivas les faltaba. (...) El tema abordado en este artículo es relevante al menos por tres razones: en primer lugar, porque al tocar la relación entre verdad, conocimiento y realidad en Badiou se vuelve sobre un lugar clásico dentro de la tradición filosófica, en segundo lugar, porque, al plantear el problema, no solo se queda en el campo de la filosofía sino que ronda el debate actual en múltiples campos los que denomina procedimientos genéricos de verdades, en tercer lugar, porque se intenta explorar las relaciones entre verdad y conocimiento en la filosofía de Badiou, algo no muy frecuente en los estudios badiousianos. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From Methodological Naturalism to Interpretive Exclusivism About Religious PsychopathologyJosé Eduardo Porcher, PhDA particularly deep form of hermeneutical injustice arises when clinicians undermine a patient’s meaningful interpretation of their alleged psychotic symptoms within a religious framework. Cases like Femi’s (Rashed, 2010) illustrate how diagnosing and treating psychotic symptoms with religious content can perpetuate this injustice. Femi’s symptoms, which were very real, were interpreted solely as indicative of a psychotic (...) episode, without considering the possibility of a religious experience. Although hermeneutical injustice is often caused by negative stereotypes, lack of conceptual resources, implicit biases, practices of epistemic privileging, patronizing attitudes, and wrongful pathologization, I propose that interpretive exclusivism about religious psychopathology plays a pivotal role in causing hermeneutical injustice when attributing psychotic symptoms with religious content—that is, the view that an experience is either psychopathological or religious (Scrutton, 2023). Routinely, on attributing psychosis, the potential for the patient to have a genuine religious experience is disregarded and excluded from the therapeutic process and from the very realm of possibility. Why?In their thoughtful commentary, Rosa Ritunnano and Ian James Kidd do me the favor of not only giving careful attention to my argument, but also elucidating my position and providing avenues for further clarification. Although I have not gone much into what is behind interpretive exclusivism, they are right to point to unquestioning adherence to some form of naturalism. Contrary to what they intimate, however, I do not think we are speaking of different kinds of hermeneutical injustice. As I see it, we are speaking about the same kind of injustice, only at different levels of explanation. In my article, I rhetorically ask why [End Page 241] it is assumed that psychotic and religious experiences cannot coexist, and why it is assumed that the same experience cannot be both a genuine religious experience and an instance of psycho-pathology. Ritunnano and Kidd point in the right direction when they say, “Some interpretations of kinds of experience with religious content can be undermined if one is committed to a metaphysical naturalism” (2024, p. 235).Naturalism can be divided into two components: metaphysical and methodological (Papineau, 2020). The metaphysical component concerns the contents of reality, affirming the absence of “supernatural” or other metaphysically elusive entities. In contrast, the methodological component focuses on approaches to investigating reality and attributes a general authority to the scientific method. Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is the more comprehensive view, as it outright denies the existence of the supernatural. Meanwhile, methodological (or scientific) naturalism refers to a pragmatic approach within scientific inquiry, stating that the right methodology to investigate and research something (where this something might not be immediately obvious to be a scientific topic) is that of science, often particular of natural sciences.Although a commitment to metaphysical naturalism may at times be what lies behind interpretive exclusivism, we do not need to go that far, since a commitment to methodological naturalism is enough to breed unwarranted ontological exclusion in practice (Plantinga, 1997; Ratcliffe, 2003). This in turn leads to interpretive exclusivism which is, I argue, the main theoretical flaw behind the kind of hermeneutical injustice I am trying to flesh out. As Ritunnano and Kidd observe, either tacit or explicit adherence to such ontological exclusion causes individuals to struggle to view another person’s spiritual or religious interpretive framework as coherent or even intelligible. Note, however, that the opposite of interpretive exclusivism—that is, interpretive inclusivism—does not need to affirm that the experience is exclusively or even genuinely religious but rather keeps that question open while considering significant epistemic and meaning-making possibilities.Finally, in his commentary, Alasdair Coles (2024) proposes that I overlook the fact that some individuals undergo psychoses featuring deeply distressing and dark religious imagery, the dismissal of which can be therapeutically beneficial. He also contends that therapists often default to considering all religious content as inauthentic, contrasting this with my alleged stance, which he believes assumes the opposite extreme and may be equally or more harmful. In making these assertions, he misrepresents my argument on two counts. I took care to avoid implying that all religious experiences should be uncritically accepted and that all religious content is inherently... (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency are logics tolerant to some amount of contradiction, but in which some versions of explosion still hold. The main result of this paper is a reconstruction of two such logics in the dialogical framework. By doing so, we achieve two things. On the one hand, we provide a formal approach to argumentative situations where some contradictions may occur while keeping the idea that there may still be situations in which some propositions are ‘safe’ in the (...) sense of immunity to the contradictions. On the other hand, we open a new line of study on these logics, in the context of the game-theoretical approach to semantics born in the 1960s, with various interesting perspectives, some of which are discussed at the end of this article. (shrink)

BackgroundPaternalism/overprotection limits communication between healthcare professionals and patients and does not promote shared therapeutic decision-making. In the global north, communication patterns have been regulated to promote autonomy, whereas in the global south, they reflect the physician’s personal choices. The goal of this study was to contribute to knowledge on the communication patterns used in clinical practice in Mexico and to identify the determinants that favour a doctor–patient relationship characterized by low paternalism/autonomy.MethodsA self-report study on communication patterns in a sample of (...) 761 mental healthcare professionals in Central and Western Mexico was conducted. Multiple ordinal logistic regression models were used to analyse paternalism and associated factors.ResultsA high prevalence (68.7% [95% CI 60.0–70.5]) of paternalism was observed among mental health professionals in Mexico. The main determinants of low paternalism/autonomy were medical specialty (OR 1.67 [95% CI 1.16–2.40]) and gender, with female physicians being more likely to explicitly share diagnoses and therapeutic strategies with patients and their families (OR 1.57 [95% CI 1.11–2.22]). A pattern of highly explicit communication was strongly associated with low paternalism/autonomy (OR 12.13 [95% CI 7.71–19.05]). Finally, a modifying effect of age strata on the association between communication pattern or specialty and low paternalism/autonomy was observed.ConclusionsAmong mental health professionals in Mexico, high paternalism prevailed. Gender, specialty, and a pattern of open communication were closely associated with low paternalism/autonomy. Strengthening health professionals’ competencies and promoting explicit communication could contribute to the transition towards more autonomist communication in clinical practice in Mexico. The ethical implications will need to be resolved in the near future. (shrink)

No cartesianismo contemporâneo, devido à retomada da teoria da livre criação das verdades eternas, alguns intérpretes trazem ao debate internacional um interessante viés interpretativo do pensamento de Descartes. Segundo eles, ao apresentar a indiferença da vontade como atributo de Deus, Descartes instaura uma concepção totalmente perigosa, da qual derivam a incompatibilidade entre a indiferença divina e o sistema cartesiano, deflagrando, enfim, um irracionalismo radical.

Em sua obra Semiótica dos Jogos Infantis, Pierre Normando Gomes-da-Silva situa o movimento humano e, por conseguinte, a Educação Física, no campo da linguagem, especificamente das semióticas (francesa, americana e russa). Apresenta um arcabouço teórico e desenhos de análise semiótica que permitem visualizar e acompanhar a produção de sentido ou a semiose que transcorre em diferentes jogos infantis. O sujeito da aprendizagem foi tomado como configuração sígnica das experiências vividas, denominando-as corporeidades. O movimento como signo motor é descrito como ocorrências (...) comunicativas, situações de movimento, que produzem uma ambiência afetiva, temporalidade em que se realizam as aprendizagens, produzindo efeitos de interpretação nos participantes, alterando as configurações existenciais. (shrink)

En la primera parte del artículo se propone un análisis de la insuficiencia constitucional del ser humano en el contexto de la filosofía griega. Se presenta una crítica al concepto de autarquía y se analiza el carácter contracultural de los movimientos filosóficos del cinismo, estoicismo y epicureísmo. La negación relativa y absoluta de la alteridad son igualmente analizadas. En la segunda parte, se analiza la insuficiencia constitucional desde el concepto de pobreza en el contexto de la orden franciscana y su (...) renuncia a la propiedad. También se hace referencia a los argumentos de los teólogos de la escuela de Salamanca y finalmente se plantea en qué medida el discurso franciscano está presente hoy como discurso político revolucionario. El objetivo general de las dos partes es presentar dos momentos anómalos de nuestra historia filosófica y su posible carácter contracultural válido para una crítica al capitalismo actual. (shrink)

Esta investigación analiza la interpretación hegeliana de América. Por un lado, mostraremos su carácter más problemático, al reducir toda actividad del hombre americano como parte de la categoría «culturas naturales», aun cuando se registraron noticias de las civilizaciones azteca e inca. Por otro lado, también se revalorará a las civilizaciones aludidas, especialmente la andina, teniendo en cuenta la concepción hegeliana de la historia. Dicha reconsideración encuentra suficiente sustento para afirmar, contrario a lo propuesto por Hegel, que los incas fueron un (...) imperio, o, en otras palabras, una civilización semejante a las que existieron en Asia, África y Europa. Asimismo, se muestra que en el territorio andino se desplegó un espíritu propio, impulsando el desarrollo de los diferentes pueblos; a su vez, alcanzado su máxima expresión en el imperio de los incas o Tawantinsuyu. (shrink)

O presente trabalho procura discutir a função-autor a partir de Michel Foucault em suas possíveis contribuições ao campo da Ciência da Informação. Tratando-se de trabalho de caráter qualitativo, a partir de material bibliográfico, realizou-se a leitura da literatura pertinente à temática em textos de Michel Foucault e Paul Otlet, a fim de identificar o tratamento dispensado à figura do autor em ambos, procedendo à realização de um exercício comparativo. Identificou-se em Paul Otlet a presença da atribuição à figura do autor (...) o papel explorado por Michel Foucault em seus textos, correspondendo a um sentido ordenador e a uma espécie de chave de leitura para um conjunto a que se compreende por “obra”. Concluiu-se a necessidade de aprofundar o tratamento dos textos foucaultianos no campo da Ciência da Informação, procurando compreender as condições de possibilidade dos nossos objetos. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize Comesaña's point of view on Putnam's model-theoretic argument. I claim that there is an interesting point made by the argument that Comesaña has not taken into account: if we want our semantic assertions to be at ali justified, the externalist claim according to which justification requires the God 's Eye View has to be given up.

A collection of essays introducing and assessing the work of political theorist Wendy Brown. Includes an original essay by Brown and a reply to her critics.

El objetivo de este artículo es investigar diversos resultados limitativos acerca del concepto de validez. En particular, argumento que ninguna teoría lógica de orden superior con semántica estándar puede tener recursos expresivos suficientes como para capturar su propio concepto de validez. Además, muestro que la lógica de la verdad transparente que Hartry Field desarrolló recientemente conduce a resultados limitativos similares.

En este artículo, me propongo exponer algunas dificultades relacionadas con la posibilidad de que la Teoría de Modelos pueda constituirse en una Teoría General de la Interpretación. Específicamente la idea que sostengo es que lo que nos muestra la Paradoja de Orayen es que las interpretaciones no pueden ser ni conjuntos ni objetos. Por eso, una elucidación del concepto intuitivo de interpretación, que apele a este tipo de entidades, está condenada al fracaso. De manera secundaria, muestro que no hay algún (...) supuesto conjuntista que sea imprescindible para que surja la mencionada paradoja: sólo se necesita que las interpretaciones sean objetos. Voy a argumentar que si las interpretaciones son objetos, tal como lo supone la posibilidad de cuantificar sobre las mismas para poder dar una caracterización satisfactoria de consecuencia lógica, la au-toaplicación (como un caso de aplicación de los recursos semánticos de la teoría de modelos para encontrar una interpretación con máxima generalidad) es imposible. Finalmente, discuto cada una de las dos soluciones que el propio Orayen imaginó frente a su paradoja, y muestro que cada una posee diferentes dificultades.In this paper, I intend to present some problems to construe the Model Theory as a Theory of Interpretation. Specifically, I am going to defend that, according to the Paradox of Orayen, interpretations can not be neither set nor object. Thus, an explication of the intuitive concept of interpretation that appeals to these types of entities will be condemned to failure. Secondary, I will show that there is not any like-set assumption indispensable to get rise to that paradox: only all is needed is the assumption that interpretations are objects. I am going to argue that if interpretations are objects, as it is assumed by the possibility of quantifying over interpretations in order to offer an satisfactory characterization of logical consequence, self-application (as a case of application of semantics resources of the Model Theory for finding a interpretation with absolute generality) is not possible. Eventually, I will discuss both of the solutions provided by Orayen to his paradox and I will support that both have different difficulties. (shrink)

Robert Brandom has maintained that Wittgenstein is wrong in denying the notion of interpretation any theoretical role in the task of accounting for our linguistic practices. In this paper, I intend to throw some doubts on this thesis. First of all, I argue that Brandom´s objection is unfair: in my opinion, giving up the concept of interpretation does not amount to condemning oneself to silence on rule – governed practices. Secondly, I try to show that Brandom´s appeal to the concept (...) of implicit interpretation is not without problems in as far as it involves the thesis that all the participants in a certain practice may be wrong about the interpretation of its rules. This makes room for a dichotomy between what we do and what we say we do, which should be thoroughly avoided. (shrink)

Klimovsky (1984) and (1982) presents a dilemma against any semantics of natural language while offering an objection against the syntactist view of it. As a reply, Moretti (2011) offers a “minimally” syntactist solution to Klimovsky’s objections. In this paper I have two goals. First, I want to rescue Klimovsky’s general dilemma and his objections against syntactism. Second, I argue that Moretti’s way out of the dilemma does not fully succeed. The paper concludes by arguing that the dilemma is still standing (...) and should concern our best available semantic theories. (shrink)