Contingentists—who hold that it is contingent what there is—are divided on the claim that having a property or standing in a relation requires being something. This claim can be formulated as a natural schematic principle of higher-order modal logic. On this formulation, I argue that contingentists who are also higher-order contingentists—and so hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are—should reject the claim. Moreover, I argue that given higher-order contingentism, having a property or standing in a (...) relation does not even require possibly being something. (shrink)

Most agree that, in some special scenarios, prudence can speak against feeling a fitting emotion. Some go further, arguing that the tension between fittingness and prudence afflicts some emotions in a fairly general way. This paper goes even further: it argues that, when it comes to anxiety, the tension between fittingness and prudence is nearly inescapable. On any plausible theory, an enormous array of possible outcomes are both bad and epistemically uncertain in the right way to ground fitting anxiety. What’s (...) more, the fittingness of an emotion is a demanding, not a permissive, normative status. So the norms of fitting emotion demand a great deal of anxiety. For almost any realistic agent, it would be deeply imprudent to feel anxiety in a way that meets the demands set by norms of fitting emotion. (shrink)

According to the structured theory of propositions, if two sentences express the same proposition, then they have the same syntactic structure, with corresponding syntactic constituents expressing the same entities. A number of philosophers have recently focused attention on a powerful argument against this theory, based on a result by Bertrand Russell, which shows that the theory of structured propositions is inconsistent in higher order-logic. This paper explores a response to this argument, which involves restricting the scope of the claim that (...) propositions are structured, so that it does not hold for all propositions whatsoever, but only for those which are expressible using closed sentences of a given formal language. We call this restricted principle Closed Structure, and show that it is consistent in classical higher-order logic. As a schematic principle, the strength of Closed Structure is dependent on the chosen language. For its consistency to be philosophically significant, it also needs to be consistent in every extension of the language which the theorist of structured propositions is apt to accept. But, we go on to show, Closed Structure is in fact inconsistent in a very natural extension of the standard language of higher-order logic, which adds resources for plural talk of propositions. We conclude that this particular strategy of restricting the scope of the claim that propositions are structured is not a compelling response to the argument based on Russell’s result, though we note that for some applications, for instance to propositional attitudes, a restricted thesis in the vicinity may hold some promise. (shrink)

In our 2018 paper, “Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame,” we offer an argument justifying the Nonhypocrisy Condition on the standing to blame. Benjamin Rossi (2018) has recently offered several criticisms of this view. We defend our account from Rossi’s criticisms and emphasize our account’s unique advantage: explaining why hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame.

This article explores the connection between two theses: the principle of conditional excluded middle for the counterfactual conditional, and the claim that it is a contingent matter which (coarse grained) propositions there are. Both theses enjoy wide support, and have been defended at length by Robert Stalnaker. We will argue that, given plausible background assumptions, these two principles are incompatible, provided that conditional excluded middle is understood in a certain modalized way. We then show that some (although not all) arguments (...) for conditional excluded middle can in fact be extended to motivate this modalized version of the principle. (shrink)

Propositional quantifiers are added to a propositional modal language with two modal operators. The resulting language is interpreted over so-called products of Kripke frames whose accessibility relations are equivalence relations, letting propositional quantifiers range over the powerset of the set of worlds of the frame. It is first shown that full second-order logic can be recursively embedded in the resulting logic, which entails that the two logics are recursively isomorphic. The embedding is then extended to all sublogics containing the logic (...) of so-called fusions of frames with equivalence relations. This generalizes a result due to Antonelli and Thomason, who construct such an embedding for the logic of such fusions. (shrink)

Criteria are given to characterize mature theories in contradistinction to developing theories. We lean heavily on the physical sciences. An established theory is defined as a mature one with known validity limits. The approximate truth of such theories is thereby given a quantitative character. Superseding theories do not falsify established theories because the latter are protected by their validity limits. This view of scientific realism leads to ontological levels and cumulativity of knowledge. It is applied to a defense of realism (...) against recent attacks by Laudan. (shrink)

Many theorists writing about moral responsibility accept that voluntary control is necessary for responsibility. Call such theorists volitionists. Recently, volitionism has been called into question by theorists I call nonvolitionists. Yet neither volitionists nor nonvolitionists have carefully articulated a clear volitionist thesis, nor have they sufficiently explained the concept of voluntary control that somehow seems connected to volitionism. I argue that attempts to explain the volitionist thesis, voluntary control, and their relation are more problematic than have previously been recognized. Instead, (...) I recommend understanding volitionism in terms of intentional actions and omissions. This understanding has several benefits. It clarifies the debate and its parameters, it avoids the problematic notion of voluntary control while relying on the clearer notion of intentional action, and it highlights that the debate between volitionists and nonvolitionists essentially concerns the nature and scope of obligations. As a result, understanding volitionism in terms of intentional actions and omissions can help breathe new life into the volitionist debate. (shrink)

There are a range of ethical issues that confront physicians in times of war, as well as some of the uses of physicians during wars. This book presents a theoretical apparatus which undergirds those debates, namely by casting physicians as being confronted with dual-loyalties during times of war. While this theoretical apparatus has already been developed in other contexts, it has not been specifically brought to bear on the ethical conflicts that attain in wars. Arguably, wars thrust physicians into ethical (...) conflicts insofar as these wars create a tension between a physician's obligation to heal and an obligation to serve some other good (e.g., military chain of command, national security, the greater good, etc.). Alternatively, we can debate whether this conception is appropriate. For example, one could argue that that non-medical duties cannot attach to physicians (e.g., due to nonoverlapping spheres of justice), thus abrogating the dual-loyalty challenge. Or else one could argue that these medically-trained personnel do not act qua physicians at all (but rather partisan advocates) and therefore duties that would otherwise attach to physicians do not attach here. In the first part of this book, these issues are debated. In the second part of the book, the dual-loyalities frame is used to explore various substantive debates that obtain when the military makes use of physicians. Physician involvement in torture is a heated topic, and certainly the most visible element of the debate. Also, however, we could use the dual-loyalties framework to explore issues in other arenas, such as: development of chemical and biological weapons, medical neutrality/battlefield triage, and so on. In each of these cases, the same tensions arguably exist: physicians have duties both to their patients and elsewhere (which, depending on the details of the view, could be any of the above-mentioned ends). (shrink)

We explore whether a Rawlsian approach might provide a guiding philosophy for the development of a healthcare system, in particular with regard to resolving tensions between different groups within it. We argue that an approach developed from some of Rawls’ principles – using his ‘veil of ignorance’ and both the ‘difference’ and ‘just savings’ principles which it generates – provides a compelling basis for policy making around certain areas of conflict. We ask what policies might be made if those making (...) them did not know if one was patient, doctor, nurse or manager – in this generation or the next. We first offer a brief summary of Rawls’ approach and how we intend to extrapolate from it. We examine how this adapted Rawlsian framework could be applied to specific examples of conflict within healthcare; we demonstrate how this framework can be used to develop a healthcare service which is both sustainable (in its training and treatment of staff, and in encouraging research and innovation) and open (to protect the powers and opportunities of those using the health service). We conclude that while Rawls’ approach has previously been rejected as a means to address specific healthcare decisions, an adapted veil of ignorance can be a useful tool for the consideration of how a just health service should be constructed and sustained. Turning the theoretical into the practical (and combining Rawls’ thought experiment with Scanlonian contractarianism), managers, doctors, patients, carers and nurses could come together and debate conflicting issues behind a hypothetical veil. (shrink)

"Vortrag, gehalten auf der Vortragsveranstaltung der Nieders'achsischen Landesregierung am 15. Mai 1975.".

In “Racial Justice Requires Ending the War on Drugs,” Earp and colleagues argue that the personal use or possession of all currently illicit psychoactive substances should be immediately decriminal...

It is claimed that the `problem of the arrow of time in classical dynamics' has been solved. Since all classical particles have a self-field (gravitational and in some cases also electromagnetic), their dynamics must include self-interaction. This fact and the observation that the domain of validity of classical physics is restricted to distances not less than of the order of a Compton wavelength (thus excluding point particles), leads to the conclusion that the fundamental classical equations of motion are not invariant (...) under time reversal: retarded self-interactions lead to different equations than advanced ones. Since causality (the time order of cause and effect) requires retarded rather than advanced self-interaction, it is causality which is ultimately responsible for the arrow of time. Classical motions described by equations with advanced self-interactions differ from retarded ones and do not occur in nature. (shrink)

Since their introduction as ‘no code’ in the 1980s and their later formalisation to ‘do not resuscitate’ orders, such directions to withhold potentially life-extending treatments have been accompanied by multiple ethical issues. The arguments for when and why to instigate such orders are explored, including a consideration of the concept of futility, allocation of healthcare resources, and reaching a balance between quality of life and quality of death. The merits and perils of discussing such decisions with patients and/or their relatives (...) are reviewed and the unintended implications of ‘do not attempt resuscitation’ orders are examined. Finally, the paper explores some alternative methods to approaching the resuscitation decision, and calls for empirical evaluation of such methods that may reduce the ethical dilemmas physicians currently face. (shrink)

Our cognitive capabilities force us into a description of the world by levels. But theories on different levels result in descriptions that differ qualitatively. Therefore, the resulting incommensurability requires ontological bridges between such theories. These are obtained uniquely when the equations of the reduced theory are compared with a suitable limit of the equations of the reducing theory. Four case studies from theoretical physics and astronomy support this claim, two for theories of composites and two for non-composites (field theories). These (...) results a coherent view of a single real world despite its ontological pluralism. The cumulativity of scientific knowledge is thus ensured and realism is supported. (shrink)

Business in Ethical Focus is a compilation of classical and contemporary essays on business ethics. Approximately 50 essays are organized into five units: Corporate Social Responsibility; Rights and Obligations of Employees and Employers; Justice and Fair Practice; Distributive Justice; and Advertising, Marketing, and the Consumer. Readers will become acquainted with seminal ideas from important thinkers such as Milton Friedman on corporate social responsibility and Amartya Sen on whether business ethics makes economic sense. They will also find classic readings on distributive (...) justice by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Karl Marx, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick. Other topics include drug testing, sexual harassment, environmental responsibility, bribery, and ethical issues in advertising and marketing. The editors provide thoughtful commentary, case studies, and study questions for each unit, enabling readers to clearly understand the growing discipline of business ethics. (shrink)

Die Sprachlichkeit des Glaubens ist von Anfang an zentrales Thema protestantischer Theologie. Der Glaube, als Vertrauen auf das biblisch bezeugte und lebendig gepredigte Evangelium, lebt in der Sprache, weil er aus dem Horen kommt: Er vollzieht sich im Modus des Verstehens. Seit jeher sind daher theologische Hermeneutik und Homiletik Orte, an denen die Sprachlichkeit des Glaubens reflektiert wird. Diese Reflexion setzen die Beitrage des vorliegenden Bandes in je unterschiedlicher Facherperspektive fort.

Universal language and the languages of the world (1924) -- Composition as a teaching method (1926) -- Life sciences and the teaching of ethics (1926) -- Bio-ethics (1927) -- Death and the animals (1928) -- Social and sexual ethics in the daily press (1928) -- Ways to sexual ethics (1928) -- Egoism and altruism (1929) -- Character dictate or freedom of thought? (1930) -- Our doubts about God (1933) -- Child and technology (1933) -- Life after death (1933) -- Three (...) studies on the 5th Commandment (1934) -- Faith in the Hereafter and ethics in Christianity (1934) -- The ethical-social importance of Sunday (1934) -- Doubts about Jesus? (1934) -- Ethical reflectoins on inter-Christian quarrels (1935) -- Faith and works : oppostion and alliance (1935) -- Three stages of life (1938) -- The Sunday--a secular holiday (1947) -- Early Christian Communio (1948). (shrink)

UNDERSTANDING HOW EMOTIONS ARE COMPOSED AS MENTAL STATES can help us understand the access many people have to their own emotions. It also can help us understand how people might increase this access and make more effective use of it in their efforts to become more free and responsible in their emotional lives. This essay focuses on some forms of cognition that enter into the composition of at least some emotional states. It shows how thoughts, beliefs, assumptions, intuitions, and questions (...) that are arguably religious can condition the ways in which people construe objects and events in their lives and thus the ways in which they form emotional responses to those objects and events. The essay takes its bearings from the work of James Gustafson and Martha Nussbaum. (shrink)

Pro-environmental behaviors symbolic of the three R’s—reduce, reuse, recycle—are focused on individual consumption and use patterns. These traditional environmentalist behaviors—what I shall call “shallow environmentalism”—are vulnerable to the problem of inconsequentialism, in that a single individual engaging in them does little to combat or mitigate climate change. Indeed, some argue that continued occupation with shallow environmental behaviors such as recycling and reducing travel gets in the way of fighting climate change by inappropriately focusing blame on individuals, wasting energy on ineffective (...) means, and creating a low benchmark by which people can measure whether they have done their environmental duty. Using environmental virtue ethics, I will argue for the importance of engaging in shallow environmentalism. I will use findings in behavioral psychology to show how these behaviors play an important role in fostering motivation and how behavioral alignment with popular understandings of environmentalism is related to perceptions of legitimacy of climate activists’ positions. (shrink)

Rahner's Mariology and theology of the saints exemplify his respect for the universality of the Catholic ethos. The article’s three parts substantiate this claim. First, it analyzes Rahner's placement of Mary outside his theology's center, while he resists marginalizing her. This analysis involves contrasting Rahner with Hans Urs von Balthasar. Second, it reads Rahner's theology of Mary's Assumption as an exercise in fundamental-eschatological theology. He takes a similar approach in his theology of the saints. Third, it considers Rahner's thoughts on (...) devotion to Mary and the saints, relating these practices to his fundamental-eschatological theology. Rahner’s contextualization of Mary and the saints within the wideness of all history, to which eschatology attests, reflects his holding open of the universal Catholic ethos. This sets him apart from other Catholics, who fix Mary and the saints firmly at Catholicism’s center, thus potentially restricting the Catholic ethos. Today’s Catholics must learn from Rahner’s holism. (shrink)

(2011). Casuistry: Case-based Reasoning for the Ethical Journalist. Journal of Mass Media Ethics: Vol. 26, Media Accountability Part Two, pp. 88-92. doi: 10.1080/08900523.2011.532386.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die Briefe des Synesius von Kyrene" verfügbar.

The book gives an introduction to the new research field of Historical Pragmatics of Controversies and provides seven case studies (from 1609 to 1796) on controversies in the fields of astronomy/astrology, medicine, chemistry, philosophy, and theology. The protagonists of these controversies include both famous authors like Kepler, Hobbes and Leibniz and internationally less known authors like the German theologian A.H. Francke and the chemist F.A.C. Gren. The case studies examine the organizing principles of historical controversies, language use, moves and strategies, (...) topic management and text organisation, and the adherence to communication principles in these controversies. At the same time they analyse the use of different text types and media in the course of controversies, including pamphlets, journal articles, reviews, scientific handbooks and letters. In addition, the case studies demonstrate early modern writers' resources from disputation practice, dialectic, and rhetoric and show developments of the practice of polemical writing during this period. (shrink)

Things could have been different, but could it also have been different what things there are? It is natural to think so, since I could have failed to be born, and it is natural to think that I would then not have been anything. But what about entities like propositions, properties and relations? Had I not been anything, would there have been the property of being me? In this thesis, I formally develop and assess views according to which it is (...) both contingent what individuals there are and contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are. I end up rejecting these views, and conclude that even if it is contingent what individuals there are, it is necessary what propositions, properties and relations there are. -/- Call the view that it is contingent what individuals there are first-order contingentism, and the view that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are higher-order contingentism. I bring together the three major contributions to the literature on higher-order contingentism, which have been developed largely independently of each other, by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. I show that a version of Stalnaker's approach to higher-order contingentism was already explored in much more technical detail by Fine, and that it stands up well to the major challenges against higher-order contingentism posed by Williamson. -/- I further show that once a mistake in Stalnaker's development is corrected, each of his models of contingently existing propositions corresponds to the propositional fragment of one of Fine's more general models of contingently existing propositions, properties and relations, and vice versa. I also show that Stalnaker's theory of contingently existing propositions is in tension with his own theory of counterfactuals, but not with one of the main competing theories, proposed by David Lewis. -/- Finally, I connect higher-order contingentism to expressive power arguments against first-order contingentism. I argue that there are intelligible distinctions we draw with talk about "possible things", such as the claim that there are uncountably many possible stars. Since first-order contingentists hold that there are no possible stars apart from the actual stars, they face the challenge of paraphrasing such talk. I show that even in an infinitary higher-order modal logic, the claim that there are uncountably many possible stars can only be paraphrased if higher-order contingentism is false. I therefore conclude that even if first-order contingentism is true, higher-order contingentism is false. (shrink)

The Health System Food and Nutrition Units are designed to produce and offer balanced meals, establishing dietary patterns, maintaining and restoring the health of the individual. The control of dirty in leftover ingestion can lower costs and organic waste. The objective of the study is to quantify and analyze the leftover intake i meals served to patients, and ingestion of dirty leftovers in collective meals of a Food and Nutrition Unit, located in the Southwest of Paraná. The data were collected (...) in two weeks, being developed in two stages. The first was the determination of the leftover ingestion and dirty remains of the healthy collective, and the second quantification of the rest intake by the patients community. Two scales were used to obtain the total weight of the food distributed in the cafeteria. Vats were weighed, before and after lunch. The garbage bags were weighed in order to quantify the leftover ingestion. The results of total leftovers showed an average of 44.71 kg / day, with a percentage of 44.19% being unacceptable. The leftover intake presented 8.72%, being classified as bad with this waste331 people could be fed. In order to measure the leftover intake by the diseased community, the weights of three lunch boxes were collected; the number of boxes wss added, resulting in kilos of food distributed for the day. Weighing the bags of garbage, was 19.02 kg / day, representing 28.36% of leftover ingestion, being above the acceptable of up to 20%. Based on this data, 148 people could be fed, making it necessary to take in consideration organoleptic criteria, satisfaction surveys, their preferences and nutritional needs, both for the healthy and the diseased group. (shrink)