In this article, the author examines two kinds of eliminativisms in the philosophy of mind – eliminative materialism and functional eliminativism. He shows that mature neuroscience has to explain phenomena which are denoted by the concepts »perception«, »mind« or »consciousness« and that these concepts are not introduced as explanations of something. Consciousness, for example, is a factual phenomenon that should be explained and cannot be eliminated, by eliminative materialism or by functional eliminativism, as an explanandum and as a fact.

Buch 1. Geschichte des Materialismus bis auf Kant.--Buch 2. Geschichte des Materialismus seit Kant.

Im Materialismusstreit der 1850er Jahre prallen die oft provokativ vorgetragenen Positionen des naturwissenschaftlich-weltanschaulichen Materialismus (vor allem Carl Vogts, Jacob Moleschotts und Ludwig Büchners) auf Positionen (insbesondere diejenige Rudolf Wagners), die die Naturwissenschaften mit den traditionellen religiösen Überzeugungen – etwa von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, von der Gültigkeit der biblischen Weltchronologie oder von der Abstammung der Menschheit von einem einzigen Elternpaar – bruchlos verbinden zu können glauben. Mit den wissenschaftlichen Überzeugungen verbinden sich zudem politische Optionen. Jenseits aller lautstarken Polemik werden (...) in diesem Streit die Erklärungskompetenzen der Religion, der Philosophie und der Naturwissenschaften neu gegeneinander abgegrenzt – wobei der Philosophie (in ihren Vertretern I. H. Fichte und F. A. Lange) eine vermittelnde Rolle zufällt. (shrink)

Der Gebrauch des Titels «Historischer Materialismus» ist genauso üblich wie das Unterlassen einer Kategorienklärung dieses Doppelbegriffes. Hier wird die Aufgabe gestellt, das innerkategoriale Verhältnis zwischen der Geschichte und dem neuen Materialismus zu bestimmen. Es geht einerseits um die Geschichtlichkeit als Inhalt des Materialismus und andererseits um die Materialität der Geschichte. Hierbei werden einige Fragen zu klären sein. z.B. die innere Konsistenz des Materialismus gegenüber der Geschichtstheologie; die Klärung der Kategorien Möglichkeit, Zweck, Vernünftigkeit der Natur etc.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Der Materialismus in der Philosophie der griechisch-römischen Antike" verfügbar.

L'idéalisme comprend le devoir moral comme une catégorie éternelle et le formule en lois qui s'adressent aux sentiments de chaque individu. Le matérialisme, au contraire, cherche à expliquer la conscience morale par les conditions sociales et à l’exposer historiquement. L'article ci-dessus donne les grandes lignes d'une telle analyse. Il distingue entre la morale, phénomène de notre temps, l'éthique de l'antiquité et la conception autoritaire du moyen âge. La morale se base essentiellement sur la société bourgeoise, dans laquelle l'intérêt particulier et (...) l’intérêt général sont distincts. L'individu qui, dans l'activité quotidienne, ne recherche que son propre avantage, éprouve à l’appel de sa conscience, le souci de la société. L'auteur démontre ce fait au moyen d'une analyse de l’impératif catégorique de Kant.La morale bourgeoise contient déjà les germes de sa victoire sur elle- même. Elle tend vers une société dans laquelle le devoir et l'intérêt ne seront plus séparés. On retrouve cette tendance non seulement chez Kant, mais encore chez d'autres grands philosophes bourgeois. Les idées de justice, d'égalité et de liberté prennent peu à peu, au fur et à mesure que la société bourgeoise se développe, une autre signification que celle qu'elles paraissent avoir eue au début ; elles exigent aujourd'hui la modification des conditions pour l'introduction desquelles elles ont pourtant été proclamées à l'origine. Cette dialectique est une des raisons de la perplexité actuelle en matière d’idées sur le monde et la vie. Dans l'exposition de cette dialectique, l'auteur montre comment les idées bourgeoises ne vivent plus aujourd'hui dans la pensée idéaliste, mais bien plus dans la pensée matérialiste. Les deux formes principales d’expression de la morale ont actuellement, d’après M. Horkheimer, la pitié et la politique. Elles ne peuvent pas être rationnellement liées l'une à l'autre, mais le sens moral se manifeste dans toutes deux.L'impulsion morale est vivante non seulement dans la vie pratique, mais aussi dans la science. Le matérialisme nie la possibilité d'une science entièrement objective : les intérêts des hommes influencent la recherche scientifique. Il est vrai que ces intérêts, si sublimes qu'ils puissent être, ne sont pas l'émanation d’un sujet libre, comme l'enseigne l'idéalisme, mais la conséquence nécessaire du processus historique. Aussi le matérialisme n’exige- t-il nullement, pour autant que le respect de la vérité reste l'élément de base, le manque de chaque jugement moral dans la science. La croyance du positivisme actuel à la possibilité de faire des constatations affranchies de toute théorie, comme d'ailleurs son aversion envers toute théorie en général, sont dues à ce qu’il ne possède pas lui-même de grandes idées directrices. La théorie naît partout où les connaissances sont sciemment rapportées à un but, c'est-à-dire strictement en relation avec des valeurs de la pratique.Philosophical idealism conceives moral obligation as an eternal category, and formulates it in commandments that appeal to individual sentiment. Philosophical materialism on the other hand, endeavours to explain moral consciousness in terms of social conditions, and to present it in its historical perspective. This essay attempts to furnish the main features for such an analysis. It distinguishes ethics, as a phenomenon of modern times, from that of ancient times, and from the authoritative attitude in the middle ages. Its foundation rests on bourgeois society in which individual and collective interests become sharply separated from each other. The individual, who in his daily work looks to his private interests, experiences through his conscience, concern for the public welfare. H. proves this through his analysis of Kant’s categorical imperative.Bourgeois morality already contains within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. It indicates a society in which duty and interest are no longer separate. This tendency in ethics becomes manifest, not only in Kant, but also in other great philosophers of bourgeois society. With the development of the latter the ideas of Justice, Equality, and Freedom acquire a content other than that they seem to have possessed in their genesis, and to-day require that change in conditions, to effect which, they were originally introduced. This dialectical process is one of the causes of the present-day philosophical uncertainty. H. shows in his exposition of this dialectical process, how bourgeois ideas are no longer active in idealist thought, but are so in materialist thought.The two main forms in which contemporary ethics expresses itself, are according to H. pity and politics, which cannot indeed, in a rational way, be connected one to the other. Both arise out of a moral sentiment. This moral impulse is active not only in practical life, but also in knowledge. Philosophical materialism denies the possibility of completely objective knowledge : men’s interests find expression also in their cognition. Indeed, however sublime these interests are, they do not spring from „free“ beings, as idealism maintains, but are the necessary results of historical processes.Accordingly, materialism in no way claims for knowledge, freedom from all subjective valuations, but only that a consideration for truth, remain the dominant characteristic. The belief of modern positivism in the possibility of attitudes free from all valuations, as well as its disinclination for all theory, is due to the fact that it possesses no great leading ideas. In all cases is theory vindicated, only when knowledge has a definite aim, that is, when it is related to practical values. (shrink)

Discusses and contrasts various accounts of physicalism, naturalism and materialism.

[Materialism and Hylomorphism] The author disputes the view, expressed recently by Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, that materialism, dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind, should be substituted by Thomist hylomorphism. The critique focuses on two aspects of Machula and Peroutka’s argument. Firstly, on their assumption that the contemporary preference for materialism is the result of chance (ignorance of the fact that in addition to materialism and dualism the position of hylomorphism is also available). This assumption fails to take into account (...) the fact that dualism was already the subject of criticism in the 17th century, but materialism only became properly established in the mid-twentieth century. Secondly, the author argues that Thomist hylomorphism can be updated in a more fruitful way than that proposed by Machula and Peroutka. This updating requires us, however, to sacrifice certain metaphysically unsustainable ideas – in particular the idea that the soul is a non-material substance independent of the body. (shrink)

In recent years, the question of national styles in science has received increasing attention. The different forms of Darwinism that emerged in the nineteenth century provide an impressive example of the role of non-scientific factors in the development of scientific ideas. Although the reception of Darwinian theory has been acknowledged to differ according to distinct national traditions even in Darwin's time, there have been few systematic efforts to understand the underlying causal factors. Usually these explanations have conceived of the relationship (...) of science to its social and political context as a distortion of science by ideology. In contrast to this picture, I attempt to demonstrate here how a scientific research program was situated in a concrete historical context. The German tradition of Darwinism in the nineteenth century will be described as a coalition of political liberalism, materialism, and morphology. Whereas the liberals used Darwinism to give their anti-religious and progressive program a naturalistic foundation, the morphologists appreciated that Darwinian theory allowed them to dispense with the idealistic origins of their research program, and the materialists were provided with a naturalistic explanation of the origin of organic form. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 3 Heft: 2 Seiten: 246-255.

In diesem Aufsatz wird die bislang kaum beachtete frühe Moralphilosophie von Max Horkheimer aus den 1930er Jahren in ein produktives Spannungsverhältnis zu den Grundannahmen des ethischen Naturalismus gesetzt. Horkheimer versteht die Moral als ein normatives Instrument, mit dem die menschliche Gattung ihr gesellschaftliches Leben zu organisieren versucht. Die natürliche Normativität der menschlichen Lebensform ist für Horkheimer selbst historisch bestimmt, als die menschliche Lebensform sich notwendig nur historisch realisieren kann. In der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ist diese Normativität nach Horkheimer widersprüchlich verfasst: Einerseits (...) sollen die Menschen moralischen Normen und nicht allein ihren eigenen Interessen folgen, andererseits erfordert die bürgerliche Gesellschaft gerade das rücksichtslose Verfolgen eigener Interessen, da sonst die Selbsterhaltung der Menschen gefährdet würde. Die Auswirkungen dieser Widersprüchlichkeit werden hier anhand von drei Aspekten untersucht: die Opazität und Naturhaftigkeit der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, das Leiden der menschlichen Natur, Geschichte als Anpassungsprozess der menschlichen Natur. Abschließend wird Horkheimers Ansatz hinsichtlich seiner theoretischen Reichweite in den moralphilosophischen Diskussionen der gegenwärtigen Kritischen Theorie verortet. (shrink)

[Realism, Materialism, and Art] Recent years have seen the ascendance of a new trend in continental philosophy called “the speculative turn”, “speculative realism”, “continental materialism”, or “object-oriented ontology” (OOO). I focus on the work of one of the proponents of this new trend, Graham Harman, in particular his recent attempt to extend his “object-oriented” approach to art and aesthetics. In part 1, I start with a brief characterization of the new trend in terms of the shared opposition of all its (...) proponents to what Quentin Meillassoux calls “correlationism”, which is, roughly, anti-realism. However, there is a split among the new realists as to whether they accept materialism. As I explain in an exposition of OOO in part 2, Harman does not accept it, but he has an inadequate view of materialism. This affects his defense of the Greenbergian formalism as an alternative to materialism, which I outline in part 3. I believe Harman’s favorite formalism is quite unfit for understanding the art of the period that interests him, that is, post-1960s art. I close with a few notes on an alternative, namely a certain branch of materialism which, however, has as its source psychoanalysis rather than the metaphysical doctrine which usually goes by this name. (shrink)

In view of the increasing social and economic inequality in recent decades, both globally and locally, more and more attempts are being made in political philosophy to understand social structures not only in terms of their symbolic and idealistic constitution, but also in the light of their underlying political-economic foundations. However, the concepts of materialism used in these works, especially in feminist thought over the last ten years, have caused much confusion due to their different meanings, especially when they are (...) considered transnationally. This article discusses the numerous publications on materialism in feminist and queer thought and situates them in their respective contexts of origin. Their analysis is then placed in a broader context of philosophical debates on materialism in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics at play but also in order to better grasp the contributions of feminist and queer thought to the philosophical study of materialism. (shrink)