The schoolwork engagement inventory: Energy, Dedication, and Absorption is a measure of students' engagement in schoolwork and has been demonstrated valid in Western student populations. In this study, we adapted this inventory to and tested its psychometric appropriates in Chinese upper secondary school students. Participants were 1,527 general high school students and 850 vocational high school students. The mean age of the total sample was 16.21 years. The results of confirmatory factor analyses showed that a modified one-factor model fitted the (...) data best. The results of the multigroup CFA showed that the factor structure was metrically invariant across school tracks and scalarly invariant across gender and school types. Moreover, schoolwork engagement was negatively related to emotional exhaustion and positively related to self-efficacy, perseverance of effort, teacher–student relationships, and life satisfaction. Overall, the CEDA can be regarded as a valid measure for the assessment of student engagement in the Chinese upper secondary school context. (shrink)

Suppose that we acquire various items of information from various sources and that our degree of confidence in the content of the information set is sufficiently high to believe the information. Now a new item of information is being presented by a new information source. Are we justified to add this new item of information to what we already believe? Consider the following parable: “I go to a lecture about wildlife in Greenland which was supposed to be delivered by an (...) expert in the field. When I arrive I notice that the expert has excused himself and that the biology department has sent a newcomer to fill in for him. I have no beliefs about wildlife in Greenland, but I do have some beliefs about Greenland’s climate and about the kinds of climate conditions that various types of wildlife favor. Suppose that our newcomer proclaims that large colonies of elk roam in a particular valley on the southern tip of Greenland. Then I would certainly be willing to accept this item of information. But suppose that he proclaims that large colonies of armadillos roam in the same valley. Then I would not be willing to accept this item of information. Why do I accept the former but not the latter item of information? Let us suppose that neither item of information is logically inconsistent with what I already believe. Clearly, the former item of information is not inconsistent. But also the latter item is not: after all, there may be small pockets of Greenland with special climatological conditions and some Texan sailors may have set loose a pair of armadillos as a practical joke. But whereas the former item of information is quite plausible given my previous beliefs, the latter item of information is not. And this is what makes for the difference. Now suppose that our newcomer proclaims that large colonies of wild boars roam this valley in Greenland. I am not that sure anymore. Given everything I believe, I find wild boars in Greenland more plausible than armadillos in Greenland, but certainly less plausible than elk in Greenland. Had our expert presented the lecture and provided precisely the 2 same information, then I would have been willing to adopt the belief that there are wild boars in Greenland, but, with our newcomer delivering the lecture, I am not willing to do so. It is not that I would believe anything out of the expert’s mouth: also he could not have convinced me that there are armadillos in Greenland. But when it comes to wild boars, the difference between the expert’s and the newcomer’s credentials simply makes for the difference.” What we learn from this story is that the question of belief expansion has something to do with the reliability of the information source as well as with the plausibility of the new information, given what I already believe. The more reliable the information source is, the less plausible the new information needs to be given what I already believe, for me to be justified to add the belief to our belief set. The more plausible the new information is given what I already believe, the less reliable the information source needs to be given what I already believe, for me to be justified to add the belief to my belief set. The challenge is: can a precise account of this relationship be provided? (shrink)

The Buddhist Jātaka tells the tale of a hare lounging under a palm tree who becomes convinced the Earth is coming to an end when a ripe bael fruit falls on its head. Soon all the hares are running; other animals join them, forming a stampede of deer, boar, elk, buffalo, wild oxen, rhinoceros, tigers and elephants, loudly proclaiming the earth is ending.1 In the American retelling, the hare is ‘chicken little,’ and the exaggerated fear is that the sky (...) is falling. The story offers a cautionary tale for considering the trend towards calamity thinking in artificial intelligence (AI). A growing chorus of tech leaders has warned that AI poses existential risk (X-Risk) that could result in the extinction of the human species, the collapse of civilisation, or a colossal decline in human potential and culture. In 2014, Hawking told the Washington Post that AI, ‘could spell the end of the human race’.2 Musk has repeatedly warned about AI’s perils, calling AI, ‘more dangerous than nukes’, recommending colonising Mars to ensure ‘a bolt-hole if AI goes rogue and turns on humanity’,3 and donating 10 million dollars to the Future of Life Institute to jumpstart research on AI’s X-Risk. Gates has stated, ‘I am in the camp…concerned about super intelligence…I agree with … Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned’.4 Altman, CEO of OpenAI, has fretted that technologies OpenAI was building could endanger humanity—‘even destroying the world as we know it’.5 This paper offers a critical appraisal of the rise of calamity thinking in the scholarly AI ethics literature. It cautions against viewing X-Risk in isolation and highlights ethical considerations sidelined when X-Risk takes centre stage. Section I introduces a working definition of X-Risk, considers its likelihood and …. (shrink)

Suppose that we acquire various items of information from various sources and that our degree of confidence in the content of the information set is sufficiently high to believe the information. Now a new item of information is being presented by a new information source. Are we justified to add this new item of information to what we already believe? Consider the following parable: “I go to a lecture about wildlife in Greenland which was supposed to be delivered by an (...) expert in the field. When I arrive I notice that the expert has excused himself and that the biology department has sent a newcomer to fill in for him. I have no beliefs about wildlife in Greenland, but I do have some beliefs about Greenland’s climate and about the kinds of climate conditions that various types of wildlife favor. Suppose that our newcomer proclaims that large colonies of elk roam in a particular valley on the southern tip of Greenland. Then I would certainly be willing to accept this item of information. But suppose that he proclaims that large colonies of armadillos roam in the same valley. Then I would not be willing to accept this item of information. Why do I accept the former but not the latter item of information? Let us suppose that neither item of information is logically inconsistent with what I already believe. Clearly, the former item of information is not inconsistent. But also the latter item is not: after all, there may be small pockets of Greenland with special climatological conditions and some Texan sailors may have set loose a pair of armadillos as a practical joke. But whereas the former item of information is quite plausible given my previous beliefs, the latter item of information is not. And this is what makes for the difference. Now suppose that our newcomer proclaims that large colonies of wild boars roam this valley in Greenland. I am not that sure anymore. Given everything I believe, I find wild boars in Greenland more plausible than armadillos in Greenland, but certainly less plausible than elk in Greenland. Had our expert presented the lecture and provided precisely the 2 same information, then I would have been willing to adopt the belief that there are wild boars in Greenland, but, with our newcomer delivering the lecture, I am not willing to do so. It is not that I would believe anything out of the expert’s mouth: also he could not have convinced me that there are armadillos in Greenland. But when it comes to wild boars, the difference between the expert’s and the newcomer’s credentials simply makes for the difference.” What we learn from this story is that the question of belief expansion has something to do with the reliability of the information source as well as with the plausibility of the new information, given what I already believe. The more reliable the information source is, the less plausible the new information needs to be given what I already believe, for me to be justified to add the belief to our belief set. The more plausible the new information is given what I already believe, the less reliable the information source needs to be given what I already believe, for me to be justified to add the belief to my belief set. The challenge is: can a precise account of this relationship be provided? (shrink)

It is held that absolute poverty causes approximately one third of all human deaths, some 18 million annually, and blights billions of lives with hunger and disease. This book develops universalizable norms aimed at tackling absolute poverty and the complex and multilayered problems associated with it.

It is argued that neither contextualism nor relativism can provide a satisfying semantics of knowledge ascriptions. According to contextualism, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions of the form “S knows that p” vary with the epistemic standards operative in the contexts of utterance. These epistemic standards are determined, in particular, by the speaker’s stakes with regard to p or the consideration of error-possibilities. It is shown that the absolute concept of utterance truth together with a knowledge rule of assertion lead (...) to certain unassertable truths in contextualism and to counterintuitive results with regard to certain cross-context knowledge ascriptions. Although utterance truth is relativized to contexts of assessment in relativist accounts of knowledge, relativism still makes inadequate semantic predictions. In particular, relativism runs into problems in cases where the context of assessment is lower than the context of utterance. It is finally argued that invariantist accounts, according to which the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions do neither vary with the context of utterance nor the context of assessment, but are determined by objective features given in the situation in which the knowledge claim is made, are better suited for modelling the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. Besides the fact that stakes or the consideration of error-possibilities can have an influence on the belief in a proposition, they have no further bearing on the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

The study attempts to conduct a fundamental theological discussion with Feminist Theology, a new variety ofLiberation Theology. The basis for this discussion is R. R. Ruether's book Sexism and God- Talk, which can be viewed as the first attempt at a feminist dogmatic theology. The study concludes that the theological foundation of this Christian Feminism is a monistic-pantheistic understanding of God which results in an ethic with distinct totalitarian tendencies.

With a focus on how national identity impacts the decision-making of the European Court of Justice, Elke Cloots provides an innovative adjudication scheme that purports to assist the ECJ in its search for a proper balance between respect for national identity and European integration.

I begin with an explication of "thought experiment". I then clarify the role that intuitions play in thought experiments by addressing two important issues: (1) the informativeness of thought experiments and (2) the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments in philosophy and the natural sciences. I defend a naturalistic account of intuitions that provides a plausible explanation of the informativeness of thought experiments, which, in turn, allows thought experiments to be reconstructed as arguments. I also specify criteria for distinguishing (...) bad "intuition pumps" from legitimate thought experiments. These criteria help us to avoid being seduced by the dangerous suggestive power of misleading intuitions. (shrink)

Emotions shape judgments and decisions, including actions in response to climate change. Despite growing interest in the cognitive, social, and political determinants of climate (in)action, the role of emotions has received limited attention. This review discusses the role of hope in climate action. While many emotional states are oriented to the past or present, hope offers a positive vision of the future. In exploratory analyses of a nationally representative survey of US residents, we identify the most important predictors of hope, (...) climate action, and policy support from a large set of potential variables. We find suggestive evidence that hope, a construct comprised of cognitive, emotional, and contextual factors, is an important motivator of future-oriented action. (shrink)

Alles Bewusstsein ist auch Selbstbewusstsein -- so lautet die Grundthese, der Elke Steckkonig in diesem Buch nachgeht. Doch was ist das fur ein Bewusstsein, wenn das Subjekt sich seiner selbst gewahr wird? Weder Identifikation noch (Selbst-) Reflexion sind geeignete Konzepte, um die gesuchte Form von Selbstbewusstsein als Seiner-selbst-inne-Sein zu analysieren. Die Autorin gelangt zu einer Positivbestimmung des Selbstbewusstseins im subjektiv wertenden Selbsterleben, indem sie sich auf fruhromantische Uberlegungen zum "Selbstgefuhl" sowie auf aktuellere sprachanalytische Uberlegungen beruft und den phanomenalen Aspekt (...) des Bewusstseins vor allem mit Bezug auf Husserl untersucht. Erweitert wird die Analyse um die Aspekte der Selbstwahrnehmung sowie der Selbstvertrautheit. (shrink)

Gemeinschaft ist ein Begriff, der in den Debatten der Moderne immer wieder infrage gestellt wurde. Im Moment ist eine Renaissance dieser Begriffsdebatte zu beobachten, sie steht in Verbindung zu den Diskussionen um ökologische Nachhaltigkeit und um die Grenzen des Wachstums. In dem Buch werden philosophisches Denken, politische Theorien, Theorien des Ästhetischen und die Künste zusammengeführt, um danach zu fragen, wie „Mit-Sein“ überhaupt denkbar und darstellbar ist, ob Gemeinschaft gegeben ist, wie sie sich ereignet und sich zeigt.

This article examines the history of Erich Auerbach’s relationship with the DVjs, in which science and politics intersect. In the early phase of his career, Auerbach attributed great importance to the DVjs and developed a special relationship with Rothacker in particular. This is evident from his letters to the journal’s editors, which are the focus of this study. When Rothacker began to take sides with National Socialism, Auerbach turned his back on the DVjs. After the Second World War, he was (...) one of the emigrated academics whose cooperation the journal sought. The effects of the political upheavals of 1933/45 on the DVjs can be exemplified by the relationship Auerbach had with it. (shrink)

ArgumentThe question, how organisms obtain their specific complex and functional forms, was widely discussed during the eighteenth century. The theory of preformation, which was the dominant theory of generation, was challenged by different alternative epigenetic theories. By the end of the century it was the vitalist approach most famously advocated by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach that prevailed. Yet the alternative theory of generation brought forward by Caspar Friedrich Wolff was an important contribution to the treatment of this question. He turned his (...) attention from the properties of matter and the forces acting on it towards the level of the processes of generation in order to explain the constitution of organismic forms. By regarding organic structures and forms to be the result of the lawfulness of ongoing processes, he opened up the possibility of a functional but non-teleological explanation of generation, and thereby provided an important complement to materialist and vitalist approaches. (shrink)

Several authors have argued that traumatic experiences are processed and remembered in a qualitatively different way from neutral events. To investigate this issue, we interviewed 121 Croatian war veterans diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder about amnesia, intrusions , and the sensory qualities of their most horrific war memories. Additionally, they completed a self-report scale measuring dissociative experiences. In contrast to what one would expect on the basis of theories emphasizing the special status of traumatic memories, amnesia, and high frequency intrusions (...) were not particularly typical for our sample of traumatized individuals. Moreover, traumatic memories were not qualitatively different from neutral memories with respect to their stability and sensory qualities. The severity of PTSD symptoms was not significantly correlated with dissociative experiences. Our findings do not support the existence of special memory mechanisms that are unique to experiencing traumatic events. (shrink)

Current analytical philosophies of romantic love tend to identify the essence of such love with one specific element, such as concern for the beloved person, valuing the beloved person or the union between the lovers. This paper will deal with different forms of the union theory of love which takes love to be the physical, psychic or ontological union of two persons. Prima facie, this theory might appear to be implausible because it has several contra-intuitive implications, and yet, I submit, (...) it is more coherent and attractive than it seems to be. I shall distinguish three specific models and thereby offer a differentiated account of the union theory which has not previously been provided in the literature. I will claim that two of these models should be rejected. I shall then defend the third model against certain possible objections ; but nevertheless, I shall conclude by showing how this model, too, faces further significant objections which ultimately expose the limits of the union theory of love. In conclusion, I will sketch the outlines of a non-reductive cluster theory of love. (shrink)

With the advent of strategic science, multidisciplinary and cross-institutional research is more and more becoming the rule. The problems encountered by such multidisciplinary research and development cooperations are highly varied. They derive from multiple differences in the backgrounds of the participants and are often perceived as cultural gaps that need to be bridged for cooperation. The main argument of the article is that multidisciplinary collaborations have mechanisms at their disposal to cooperate despite multiple problems counteracting such a cooperation. Since symbolic (...) communication is the primary medium of articulation across sites, this article focuses on how symbolic communication enables cooperation across sites without a deep comprehension of each other's work. Multidisciplinary cooperations start out with few shared symbolic resources, but as the cooperation continues, they may develop communicative boundarytranscending objects such as active and passive dictionaries and hybrid repertoires. (shrink)

According to truthmaker maximalism, each truth has a truthmaker. Peter Milne has attempted to refute truthmaker maximalism on mere logical grounds via the construction of a self-referential truthmaker sentence M “saying” of itself that it doesn’t have a truthmaker. Milne argues that M turns out to be a true sentence without a truthmaker and thus provides a counterexample to truthmaker maximalism. In this paper, I show that Milne’s refutation of truthmaker maximalism does not succeed. In particular, I argue that the (...) notion of truthmaker meets two structural principles which, if added to a formal language of a theory, are already sufficient to produce a provable contradiction—a contradiction that gives rise to a socalled “Truthmaker paradox”. I also address the question of how to possibly resolve the Truthmaker paradox. I thereby show that the Truthmaker paradox, just as the strengthened Liar paradox, yields a “revenge problem” for paracomplete theories and might lead to triviality for Priest’s dialetheist account LP if the notion of truthmaker is defined as a certain semantic predicate within LP. But regardless of how one tries to cope with the Truthmaker paradox, this paradox is surely interesting in its own right. However, its significance is completely orthogonal to the question of whether truthmaker maximalism is a philosophically sound view. (shrink)

In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributer contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretske's Relevant Alternatives Theory and Nozick's Tracking Account of Knowledge, we reconstruct the history of various forms of contextualism and the ways contextualists try to (...) handle some notorious epistemological quandaries, especially skepticism and the lottery paradox. Then we outline the most important problems that contextualist theories face, and give overviews of their criticisms and defenses as developed in this issue. (shrink)

As a result of his studies in metalogicEssler became convincedthat an absolute fixed totality of alltruths and a final metalanguage doesnot exist. Taking this result into account,it is shown that the usualabsolute concept of omniscience isuntenable. From this it can be concludedthat definitions of knowledge whichappeal to such a concept of omnisciencelead to serious problems.

Contextualism has become one of the leading paradigms in contemporary epistemology. According to this view, there is no context-independent standard of knowledge, and as a result, all knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive. Contextualists contend that their account of this analysis allows us to resolve some major epistemological problems such as skeptical paradoxes and the lottery paradox, and that it helps us explain various other linguistic data about knowledge ascriptions. The apparent ease with which contextualism seems to solve numerous epistemological quandaries has (...) inspired the burgeoning interest in it. This comprehensive anthology collects twenty original essays and critical commentaries on different aspects of contextualism, written by leading philosophers on the topic. The editors’ introduction sketches the historical development of the contextualist movement and provides a survey and analysis of its arguments and major positions. (shrink)

C.Z. Elgins Argumente zur Unbrauchbarkeit des Wissensbegriffes für epistemologische Untersuchungen und die damit begründete Ersetzung des Wissensdurch den Verstehensbegriff werden anhand einer Analyse der Funktion von Begriffsexplikationen zur Bildung wahrer gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen zurückgewiesen. Die Verwendung grober Begriffskategorien, die mit einer Reduktion der Irrtumsmöglichkeit und somit einer leichten Bildung vieler gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen einhergeht, erweist sich nur vordergründig als epistemischer Vorteil für die Laien, da die so gewonnenen Uberzeugungen kognitiv weniger gehaltvoll sind, Experten aber neben den feineren gewöhnlich auch über die groben (...) Begriffskategorien verfügen, und selbst bei eingestandener Irrtumsmöglichkeit und dem Verzicht auf definitive Überzeugungen der Art „Dieses x ist F" erheblich mehr und Gehaltvolleres wissen als Laien, da auch,,x ist definitiv kein F" oder,,x ist höchstwahrscheinlich F" Wissen ausdrücken. (shrink)

Musical ensemble performances provide an ideal environment to gain knowledge about complex human interactions. Network structures of synchronization can reflect specific roles of individual performers on the one hand and a higher level of organization of all performers as a superordinate system on the other. This study builds on research on joint singing, using hyperscanning of respiration and heart rate variability from eight professional singers. Singers performed polyphonic music, distributing their breathing within the same voice and singing without and with (...) physical contact: that is touching each other's shoulder or waist. The idea of singing with touch was motivated by historical depictions of ensemble performances that showed singers touching each other. It raises the question of the potential benefit of touch for group performances. From a psycho-physiological point of view, physical contact should increase the synchronization of singing coordination. The results confirm previous findings on synchronization of respiration and HRV during choir singing and extend those findings to a non-homophonic musical repertoire while also revealing an increase in synchronization in respiration during physical contact. These effects were significant across different frequency ranges. The effect of physical contact was stronger when all singers were singing in comparison to the partial ensemble. Importantly, the synchronization could not be fully explained by the singing action or by the standing position or touch. This finding suggests a higher level of organization of all singers, forming a superordinate system. (shrink)