Alienation is among the most influential terms in Marxist theory, but also one of the most ambiguous and controversial. Unlike previous literature, which has tended to focus on Marx’ early philosophical writings, this offers a novel reinterpretation of the theory of alienation found in Marx’s later works. Rather than conceiving alienation as a subjective experience or an inherent feature of social organization, I contend that alienation in the Marxist sense can be understood as an objective process arising from the appropriation (...) of the results of production and their transformation into capital. This interpretation resolves the main theoretical problems conventionally associated with alienation theory, for example the tendency towards essentialism and moral paternalism. In particular, a Marxist theory of alienation explains the paradox of social power and isolation that characterizes contemporary capitalist societies, in which feelings of powerlessness and loneliness are intensified despite objective increases in humanity’s social power and interdependence. (shrink)

We develop canonical rules capable of axiomatizing all systems of multiple-conclusion rules over K4 or IPC, by extension of the method of canonical formulas by Zakharyaschev [37]. We use the framework to give an alternative proof of the known analysis of admissible rules in basic transitive logics, which additionally yields the following dichotomy: any canonical rule is either admissible in the logic, or it is equivalent to an assumption-free rule. Other applications of canonical rules include a generalization of the Blok–Esakia (...) theorem and the theory of modal companions to systems of multiple-conclusion rules or (finitary structural global) consequence relations, and a characterization of splittings in the lattices of consequence relations over monomodal or superintuitionistic logics with the finite model property. (shrink)

We show that \, the basic theory of bounded arithmetic corresponding to the complexity class \, proves the \ axiom expressing the totality of iterated multiplication satisfying its recursive definition, by formalizing a suitable version of the \ iterated multiplication algorithm by Hesse, Allender, and Barrington. As a consequence, \ can also prove the integer division axiom, and the \-translation of induction and minimization for sharply bounded formulas. Similar consequences hold for the related theories \ and \. As a side (...) result, we also prove that there is a well-behaved \ definition of modular powering in \\). (shrink)

Excerpt from Die Lehre vom Urteil Windelband hat in seinen "präludien und in dem Aufsatz der Festschrift für Zeller "beiträge zur Lehre vom nega tiven Urteil gerade vermittelst der Urteilslehre den ent scheidenden Schritt zu tun vermocht, der Logik wieder ihre sachliche Heimat im Ganzen der Philos0phie zu bestimmen. Rickerts "gegenstand der Erkenntnis ist sodann das Grund buch für alle logischen Untersuchungen der Werttheorie geworden und geblieben. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. (...) Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

According to John Rawls’s famous Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justifiable to all citizens. The currently dominant interpretation of what is justifiable to persons in this sense is an internalist one. On this view, what is justifiable to persons depends on their beliefs and commitments. In this paper I challenge this reading of Rawls’s principle, and instead suggest that it is most plausibly interpreted in externalist terms. On this alternative view, (...) what is justifiable to persons is not in any way dependent on, or relativized to, their beliefs and commitments. Instead, what is justifiable to all in the relevant sense is what all could accept as free and equal. I defend this reinterpretation of the view by showing how it is supported by Rawls’s account of the freedom and equality of persons. In addition, a considerable advantage of this suggestion is that it allows for an inclusive account of to whom the exercise of political power must be made justifiable. (shrink)

There have been few attempts thus far to read Rorty through a humanistic lens. This paper is an attempt at making explicit some of the key features of his conception. My main objective is to show that humanism is integral to his philosophy and to explain what it consists in. I focus on Rorty’s secular humanism, which I believe lies at the center of his thought. In sections 2 and 3, I provide an account of key humanist sources, both pragmatist (...) and non-pragmatist. Section 4 examines recent interpretations of Rorty as a humanist. In section 5, I focus on the distinction between the human and nonhuman as the central feature of his humanism. Section 6 outlines Rorty’s project to humanize humanity. In the concluding section, I summarize the key features of his humanism. (shrink)

We investigate the substitution Frege () proof system and its relationship to extended Frege () in the context of modal and superintuitionistic propositional logics. We show that is p-equivalent to tree-like , and we develop a “normal form” for -proofs. We establish connections between for a logic L, and for certain bimodal expansions of L.We then turn attention to specific families of modal and si logics. We prove p-equivalence of and for all extensions of , all tabular logics, all logics (...) of finite depth and width, and typical examples of logics of finite width and infinite depth. In most cases, we actually show an equivalence with the usual system for classical logic with respect to a naturally defined translation.On the other hand, we establish exponential speed-up of over for all modal and si logics of infinite branching, extending recent lower bounds by P. Hrubeš. We develop a model-theoretical characterization of maximal logics of infinite branching to prove this result. (shrink)

By a well-known result of Cook and Reckhow [S.A. Cook, R.A. Reckhow, The relative efficiency of propositional proof systems, Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 36–50; R.A. Reckhow, On the lengths of proofs in the propositional calculus, Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, 1976], all Frege systems for the classical propositional calculus are polynomially equivalent. Mints and Kojevnikov [G. Mints, A. Kojevnikov, Intuitionistic Frege systems are polynomially equivalent, Zapiski Nauchnyh Seminarov POMI 316 129–146] have recently shown p-equivalence of (...) Frege systems for the intuitionistic propositional calculus in the standard language, building on a description of admissible rules of IPC by Iemhoff [R. Iemhoff, On the admissible rules of intuitionistic propositional logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 281–294]. We prove a similar result for an infinite family of normal modal logics, including K4, GL, S4, and. (shrink)

The elementary arithmetic operations +,·,≤\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${+,\cdot,\le}$$\end{document} on integers are well-known to be computable in the weak complexity class TC0, and it is a basic question what properties of these operations can be proved using only TC0-computable objects, i.e., in a theory of bounded arithmetic corresponding to TC0. We will show that the theory VTC0 extended with an axiom postulating the totality of iterated multiplication proves induction for quantifier-free formulas in the language ⟨+,·,≤⟩\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} (...) \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\langle{+,\cdot,\le}\rangle}$$\end{document}, and more generally, minimization for Σ0b\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Sigma_{0}^{b}}$$\end{document} formulas in the language of Buss’s S2. (shrink)

We show how to formalize approximate counting via hash functions in subsystems of bounded arithmetic, using variants of the weak pigeonhole principle. We discuss several applications, including a proof of the tournament principle, and an improvement on the known relationship of the collapse of the bounded arithmetic hierarchy to the collapse of the polynomial-time hierarchy.

Timothy Michael Fowler has argued that, as a consequence of their commitment to neutrality in regard to comprehensive doctrines, political liberals face a dilemma. In essence, the dilemma for political liberals is that either they have to give up their commitment to neutrality (which is an indispensible part of their view), or they have to allow harm to children. Fowler’s case for this dilemma depends on ascribing to political liberals a view which grants parents a great degree of freedom in (...) deciding on the education of their children. I show that ascribing this view to political liberals rests upon a misinterpretation of political liberalism. Since political liberals have access to reasons based upon the interests of children, they need not yield to parent’s wishes about the education of their children. A correct understanding of political liberalism thus shows that political liberals do not face the dilemma envisaged by Fowler. (shrink)

We formalize the construction of Paterson’s variant of the Ajtai–Komlós–Szemerédi sorting network of logarithmic depth in the bounded arithmetical theory , under the assumption of the existence of suitable expander graphs. We derive a conditional p-simulation of the propositional sequent calculus in the monotone sequent calculus.

It has been argued that Hume's denial of infinite divisibility entails the falsity of most of the familiar theorems of Euclidean geometry, including the Pythagorean theorem and the bisection theorem. I argue that Hume's thesis that there are indivisibles is not incompatible with the Pythagorean theorem and other central theorems of Euclidean geometry, but only with those theorems that deal with matters of minuteness. The key to understanding Hume's view of geometry is the distinction he draws between a precise and (...) an imprecise standard of equality in extension. Hume's project is different from the attempt made by Berkeley in some of his later writings to save Euclidean geometry. Unlike Berkeley, who interprets the theorems of Euclidean geometry as false albeit useful approximations of geometrical facts, Hume is able to save most of the central theorems as true. (shrink)

We study variants of Buss’s theories of bounded arithmetic axiomatized by induction schemes disallowing the use of parameters, and closely related induction inference rules. We put particular emphasis on \ induction schemes, which were so far neglected in the literature. We present inclusions and conservation results between the systems and \ of a new form), results on numbers of instances of the axioms or rules, connections to reflection principles for quantified propositional calculi, and separations between the systems.

1. Introduction The influence of Richard Rorty has not faded since his demise more than a decade ago. Some of his works have been published posthumously (Rorty 2010; Rorty 2016), others have been republished in valuable collections (Voparil & Bernstein 2010; Rorty 2014) and some of his unpublished work has already appeared too (Małecki & Voparil 2020). Important international symposia have been held around the world (see e.g. Penelas & Voparil 2014) and the Richard Rorty Society (RSS) was fou...

Mixed strategies have been used to show that Pascal’s Wager fails to offer sufficient pragmatic reasons for believing in God. Their proponents have argued that, in addition to outright belief in God, rational agents can follow alternatives strategies whose expected utility is infinite as well. One objection that has been raised against this way of blocking Pascal’s Wager is that applying a mixed strategy in Pascal’s case is tantamount to applying an iterated mixed strategy which, properly understood, collapses into the (...) pure strategy of becoming a theist. I argue that since the assumptions used to develop the iterated mixed strategies response are even more questionable than those the initial objection relies on, this type of response to the mixed strategy objection fails. (shrink)

IN THE PREFACE to his Philosophy of Right Hegel writes: "Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig"--"What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational." In paragraph 6 of the third edition of his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences he repeats this statement verbatim, calling it "simple." Few interpreters, however, have ever found it so. Even friendly critics are baffled; hostile ones dismiss it as either scandalous or senseless. Two centuries after Hegel's birth (...) there is thus still room for a modest exposition of the meaning of this famous Hegelian statement, much more so for one of its "simplicity." Both tasks, however--and in particular the second, seemingly hopeless one--should be undertaken in full awareness of two conditions which the Encyclopedia passage considers evident but which can be taken as such no longer. One is possession of "religion." The other is the kind of philosophical "culture" which includes "knowledge" of "God.". (shrink)

David Lewis argued that Newcomb’s Problem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are “one and the same problem” or, to be more precise, that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is nothing else than “two Newcomb problems side by side” (Lewis Philosophy and Public Affairs 8:235–240, 1979 : 235). It has been objected that his argument fails to take into account certain epistemic asymmetries which undermine the one-problem thesis. Sobel ( 1985 ) acknowledges that many tokens satisfy the structural requirements of both problems, while questioning (...) the generality of the thesis. Bermúdez (Analysis 73:423–429, 2013 ), on the other hand, argues that there is a deeper structural conflict between the two problems in the sense that the epistemic requirements that give Newcomb’s Problem its force are precisely those that prevent it from being a Prisoner’s Dilemma. I argue that the epistemic asymmetry objections raised by Sobel and Bermúdez fail to undermine the one-problem thesis. A different type of objection raised by Bermúdez, one which relies on the contrast between parametric and strategic choices, fares no better. Although NP is a problem that has been primarily studied for its implications to decision theory, it contains enough game theoretic elements to justify the claim that a juxtaposition of two such problems can be thought of as a strategic game. (shrink)

We prove that (additive) ordered group reducts of nonstandard models of the bounded arithmetical theory are recursively saturated in a rich language with predicates expressing the integers, rationals, and logarithmically bounded numbers. Combined with our previous results on the construction of the real exponential function on completions of models of, we show that every countable model of is an exponential integer part of a real‐closed exponential field.

The paper discusses the relation of philosophical pragmatism to empiricism as the backdrop to understanding human being. The crux of the problem is the relation between language and experience. The author argues that pragmatist empiricism is based on the concept that human practices are transactions, which includes both non-linguistic as well as linguistic practices. Within pragmatist anthropological philosophy, experience is a complex of transactions between humans and reality. Humans are both natural/physical and cultural/linguistic beings, whose living experience involves transactions with (...) both the natural and the sociocultural environment. The dualism between language and experience is false and should be abandoned. (shrink)