Kockelmans’ book is an anthology of readings which he has collected together and in most cases translated. Eight of the eleven selections have already been published—although not all have appeared in English. Part I contains two essays with no evident connection—one by Kockelmans and a 1961 article from a Dutch periodical by Jan Aler on the view of language in Being and Time. Part II is the heart of the book and contains the translated texts of the six lectures given (...) at the Colloquium at Penn State in 1969 on "Heidegger’s Conception of Language," of which Kockelmans was the director. It also includes the panel discussion among the participants: Walter Biemel, Otto Poeggeler, Henri Birault, Heinrich Ott, Werner Marx and Kockelmans. These papers are extremely high level Heideggerian scholarship and very penetrating studies. They will repay careful study. Part III contains papers of a linguistic nature by Johannes Lohmann and Erasmus Schoefer. The essay by Schoefer is interesting; it is excerpted from his valuable book Die Sprache Heideggers which studies Heidegger’s own use of the German language. This is a worthwhile collection of studies which is enhanced by a bibliography and index.—J. D. C. (shrink)

Erasmus, a true child of the Renaissance, wrote with a brilliance seldom equalled in the history of letters. His withering catalogue of human follies and vanities is still just as timely as it was over four centuries ago. A master stylist, famed for his elegant prose, he was also a great humanist, who believed in the ultimate triumph of reason over stupidity and prejudice. His most favous work, "The Praise of folly", is a dazzling disply of his supreme gift (...) for irony, parody and satire. His "Colloquies" are a witty and far-ranging demonstration not only of Erasmus' own ideas on crucial questions, but of the basic thinking of his time. His "Letters" offer a fascinating personal view of such famous Renaissance figures as Sir Thomas More, Thomas Wolsey, Pope Leo X, and Martin Luther. (shrink)

Keuze uit het werk van de Nederlandse humanist (1469-1536).

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Our self-understanding as human agents includes a commitment to three crucial claims about human agency: that agents must be active, that actions are part of the natural order of the universe, and that intentional actions can be explained by the agent's reasons for acting. While all of these claims are indispensable elements of our view of ourselves as human agents, they are in continuous conflict and tension with one another, especially once one adopts the currently predominant view of what the (...) natural order must be like. One of the central tasks of philosophy of action consists in showing how, despite appearances, these conflicts can be resolved and our self-understanding as agents be vindicated. The mainstream of contemporary philosophy of action holds that this task can only be fulfilled by an event-causal reductive view of human agency, paradigmatically embodied in the so-called 'standard model' developed by Donald Davidson. Erasmus Mayr, in contrast, develops a new agent-causal solution to these conflicts and shows why this solution is superior both to event-causalist accounts and to Von Wright's intentionalism about agency. He offers a comprehensive theory of substance-causation on the basis of a realist conception of powers, which allows one to see how the widespread rejection of agent-causation rests on an unfounded 'Humean' view of nature and of causal processes. At the same time, Mayr addresses the question of the nature of reasons for acting and complements its substance-causal account of activity with a non-causal account of acting for reasons in terms of following a standard of success. (shrink)

We argue that artificial networks are explainable and offer a novel theory of interpretability. Two sets of conceptual questions are prominent in theoretical engagements with artificial neural networks, especially in the context of medical artificial intelligence: Are networks explainable, and if so, what does it mean to explain the output of a network? And what does it mean for a network to be interpretable? We argue that accounts of “explanation” tailored specifically to neural networks have ineffectively reinvented the wheel. In (...) response to, we show how four familiar accounts of explanation apply to neural networks as they would to any scientific phenomenon. We diagnose the confusion about explaining neural networks within the machine learning literature as an equivocation on “explainability,” “understandability” and “interpretability.” To remedy this, we distinguish between these notions, and answer by offering a theory and typology of interpretation in machine learning. Interpretation is something one does to an explanation with the aim of producing another, more understandable, explanation. As with explanation, there are various concepts and methods involved in interpretation: Total or Partial, Global or Local, and Approximative or Isomorphic. Our account of “interpretability” is consistent with uses in the machine learning literature, in keeping with the philosophy of explanation and understanding, and pays special attention to medical artificial intelligence systems. (shrink)

This book offers a discussion of the kalām cosmological argument, and presents a defence of a version of that argument after critically evaluating three of the most important versions of the argument. It argues that, since the versions of the kalām cosmological argument defended by Philoponus (c. 490–c. 570), al-Ghazālī (1058– 1111), and the contemporary philosopher, William Lane Craig, all deny the possibility of the existence of an actual infinite, these arguments are incompatible with Platonism and the view that God (...) foreknows an endless future. This conclusion, however, is not a problem for the proponents of the kalām cosmological argument, for the book shows how the argument can be defended without denying the possibility of the actual infinite. -/- In order to offer a comprehensive analysis of Philoponus and al-Ghazālī’s cosmological arguments, the book draws on recent English translations of some of their works. Next, the book advances a detailed argument against the popular argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite. Finally, the book offers a unique defence of the kalām cosmological argument by defending philosophical arguments for a beginning of time that do not deny the actual infinite, evaluating which hypothesis best explains the discoveries of modern cosmology, and offering an argument in support of the premise that, if the universe came into existence, then God brought it into existence. (shrink)

This volume includes the texts of Erasmus's 1524 diatribe against Luther,De Libero Arbitrio, and Luther's violent counterattack,De Servo Arbitrio.

In a recent reply to our article, “What is Interpretability?,” Prasetya argues against our position that artificial neural networks are explainable. It is claimed that our indefeasibility thesis—that adding complexity to an explanation of a phenomenon does not make the phenomenon any less explainable—is false. More precisely, Prasetya argues that unificationist explanations are defeasible to increasing complexity, and thus, we may not be able to provide such explanations of highly complex AI models. The reply highlights an important lacuna in our (...) original paper, the omission of the unificationist account of explanation, and affords us the opportunity to respond. Here, we argue that artificial neural networks are explainable in a way that should satisfy unificationists and that interpretability methods present ways in which ML theories can achieve unification. (shrink)

It has often been noted that many of our intuitive assessments of particular actions suggest that there is an asymmetry between blameworthy and praiseworthy actions with regard to the question of whether moral responsibility requires that the agent could have acted otherwise. It is a quite different question, though, whether such an asymmetry between good and bad cases can be supported by more systematic considerations. In this paper, I will develop a new argument for a restricted version of the asymmetry, (...) by showing that in cases of praiseworthy actions responsibility cannot generally presuppose that the agent could have acted otherwise. This argument will be based on a distinction between two different kinds of roles that moral norms can play in determining whether an action is right and in guiding our deliberation. That agents can sometimes be responsible for their praiseworthy actions even though they cannot act otherwise is best seen as a reflection of the fact that moral norms can prohibit treating certain courses of action as genuine options at all. (shrink)

In a recent article, Andrew Ter Ern Loke raises several objections to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef’s exposition and response to the so-called ‘Infinite God Objection’ to the kalām cosmological argument. According to this objection, the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite brings into question the view that God’s knowledge is infinite. Erasmus and Verhoef’s solution to this objection, which Loke criticises, depends on an unusual account of omniscience. In this article, I respond to Loke (...) and show that his objections are unsuccessful. (shrink)

In “Causality and Determination”, Anscombe stressed that, in her view, physical determinism and free action were incompatible. As the relevant passage suggests, her espousal of incompatibilism was not merely due to specific features of human ‘ethical’ freedom, but due to general features of agency, intentionality, and voluntariness. For Anscombe went on to tentatively suggest that lack of physical determination was required for the intentional conduct of animals we would not classify as ‚free‘, too. In this paper, I examine three different (...) lines of argument to establish Anscombe’s latter suggestion, which are based on general considerations about the causal efficacy of psychological-agential phenomena, the nature of agency, and the specific features of intentional agency. I start with Anscombe’s own claim from “The Causation of Action” that microphysical determinism would make psychological and personal phenomena epiphenomenal, before I turn to the view of ‘Agency Incompatibilism’, that genuine agency requires the absence of antecedent necessitation, and, lastly, to concerns about some crucial features of intentional agency which we find in both human and animal agents. (shrink)

This article was motivated by the need to academically frame and share the response of the North-West University to the perceived increase of academic dishonesty during Covid-19. Within the ambit of the online teaching and learning approach that became dominant during the Covid-19 pandemic, the NWU established a Community of Practice for Academic Integrity to enhance Academic Integrity in a holistic manner. By critically discussing the NWU’s response through their CoPAI, the lessons learned, and strategies developed in the process, the (...) NWU can hopefully assist other Higher Education institutes to progressively enhance AI in the future. This is important, because many contextual shifts in teaching and learning approaches, pedagogy, assessment, and the application of technology, that were enforced in an online mode of delivery during the pandemic, will prevail in future.In writing this article, we focused on contextualising the NWU CoPAI within current literature on community of practice and Academic integrity and emphasising the unique strategy and holistic nature of this CoPAI. The establishment of the CoPAI is discussed within the appreciative inquiry as methodological framework. This methodology is commonly used by CoPs, but it is particularly relevant to the CoPAI since CoPAI sought answers to all the AI questions that presented itself due to disruptions in the higher education landscape. The appreciative inquiry method allowed for the opportunity to find some answers in a holistic manner. Some of these answers or insights gained through the activities of CoPAI is further discussed in the latter part of the article. In conclusion, some of the outcomes and shortcomings of CoPAI at the NWU are highlighted.The main finding of this article concluded that the establishment of a CoPAI can enhance AI at HE institutions in a holistic manner. The applicability, relevance, and success of this CoPAI was realised through its holistic approach which included the valorisation of institutional aspects, the engagement and empowerment of lecturers, and the engagement and empowerment of students. This novel and unique approach to promote AI in HE could fill the existing knowledge gap in the South African context, where the establishment of a CoPAI, the application of appreciative inquiry as methodology, and the inclusion of a holistic approach are still absent. It might however also be an example for other HE institutions to follow globally. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 2, Page 196-209, March 2022.

Volume 80, Issue 3, July 2019, Page 303-304.

L'éloge de la folie.--L'essai sur le libre arbitre.--Le cicéronien.--La réfutation de Clichtove.