We describe the results and implications of a literature review that identifies the number of normative and empirical articles, respectively, that have appeared in Nursing Ethics in each year from 1994 to 2017. The results of our analysis suggest a powerful trend away from normative scholarship and toward empirical investigation within the field of nursing ethics, both overall and comparatively. We argue that there are several important negative consequences of this trend, and we propose some potential solutions to address them.

In this paper, I argue that major elements of Hume’s metaphysics and epistemology are not only directed at the inductive argument from design which seemed to follow from the success of Newton’s system, but also have far larger aims. They are directed against the authority of Newton’s natural philosophy; the claims of natural philosophy are constrained by philosophic considerations. Once one understands this, Hume’s high ambitions for a refashioned ‘true metaphysics’ or ‘first philosophy’, that is, Hume’s ‘Science of Human Nature’, (...) can be seen and evaluated in their proper light. Hume has three motives for his attack on Newton: his work is informed by and gives cover to superstitious beliefs; his project is not useful to the public; and its success generates a challenge to the independent authority of philosophy. This essay consists of five sections. First, I discuss Hume’s attitude toward Newton. Newton claims that natural philosophy should be the foundation for other sciences, while in the ‘Introduction’ to the Treatise Hume asserts the supremacy of the ‘science of man’. For Hume the human sciences can attain the high epistemic status of ‘proof’, while much of the physical sciences must do with lower forms of ‘probability’. Furthermore, Hume’s ‘rules by which to judge of causes and effects’ do not replicate Newton’s fourth Rule; this opens a gap between the ontologies and methodologies of Newton and Hume. Moreover, Hume’s account of causation is designed to undercut the reductionist bias of natural philosophy. According to Hume the parts of natural sciences that go beyond common life can be evaluated from the point of view of the science of man. I end with remarks on the philosophic origins and significance of Hume’s attack on Newton’s natural philosophy. I depart from two independent traditions of interpreting Hume. One tradition makes many references to Newton’s influence on Hume. On a more detailed level, proponents of this view may call attention to Hume’s ‘rules’, his ‘Experiments’ and ‘Anatomy’, his method of investigation, the application of Newtonian metaphors works (e.g., an ‘attraction’ in the ‘mental world’ on a par with that in the ‘natural world’ – the principles of association are, then, analogous to the laws of motion). Hume’s ‘science of man’ is said to be inspired by Newton’s science of nature. Hume wants his readers to feel that he is modeling his project on the successes of natural philosophy, exemplified by Newton. In the ‘Introduction’ to the Treatise and more explicitly in the opening pages of EHU, Hume suggests that his ‘science of man’ can parallel recent achievements in natural philosophy (especially planetary astronomy). Thus, my claim is not that Newton did not figure importantly in Hume’s philosophy, but, instead, that Hume’s project is in many respects more hostile to Newton’s achievements – as available to well-informed eighteenth-century readers – than many recent interpreters have realized. There is a different tradition that argues Hume simply did not understand Newton. Hume’s philosophy, thus, cannot do justice to Newtonian science. Hume’s lack of mathematical competence is said to be a barrier to his understanding of Newton’s mathematical natural philosophy. One finds this attitude behind the cranking of Bayesian machinery in John Earman’s attack on Hume’s treatment ‘Of Miracles’. However, this tradition begs the question; it takes the authority of ‘science’ for granted in Hume. Against this second tradition I argue that Hume did understand salient features of Newton’s methodology and position, although in ways often unappreciated by the first tradition mentioned above. For example, in his comments on Newton in the History of England, Hume discerns the (broad) outlines of Newton’s commitment to the method of analysis and synthesis (see Newton’s Opticks, Query 31) and how it differs from Boyle’s methodology. So, Hume has a subtle understanding of Newton’s methodology – even if one were to grant that he lacks appreciation of the role of mathematics in Newton’s natural philosophy. Leaving open the question whether Hume understood all the details of Newton’s system, Hume’s departures from Newton are best interpreted not as ‘ironic’, but as philosophically motivated. (shrink)

I endeavor to explore Farber’s work leading into the Foundation in order to construct an understanding both of his idiosyncratic interpretation of Husserl, and of what lead to Farber’s break with phenomenology. A great irony of Farber’s career may turn out to be that a scholar so deeply bothered by presuppositions and so committed a methodological pluralist may have discarded phenomenology because of his own philosophical commitments, a fact noted by Farber’s former student, Sang-Ki Kim. In an essay in Farber’s (...) memory, Kim questions whether Farber himself was subject to the limitations and prejudices inherent in his commitments to scientific Marxism and naturalism. Farber’s pervasive interests in naturalism are likely influenced, in part, by consideration for the cancer research of his brother, Sidney. This work will first examine Farber’s attitudes towards metaphysics and naturalism. Second, it will turn to an examination of his interests in logic – which largely prompted his interests in phenomenology. Farber’s methodological pluralism is driven in part by his understanding of logic and in part his other interests. Further disagreements with Husserl will be reappraised in the concluding section of the essay. (shrink)

Trois objections au moins peuvent remettre en question la vocation de l’homme à la liberté. En premier lieu, l’indépendance à l’égard des déterminations extérieures, que suppose la liberté, ne semble-t-elle pas conduire à l’indifférence et à l’incapacité de choisir? En outre à supposer même que l’autodétermination soit possible dans la ressaisie pure de soi, comment, en second lieu, comprendre l’effectivité de ma résolution? Son inscription dans l’extériorité risque en effet d’en condamner la pureté. Enfin, la pensée de la liberté ne (...) repose-t-elle pas sur une expérience nécessairement pré-compréhensive et donc potentiellement illusoire? Or, c’est précisément parce qu’elle surmonte cette triple difficulté que la philosophie bergsonienne peut apparaître, par le renouvellement du sens qu’elle accorde à la liberté, comme une authentique doctrine de la libération. (shrink)

The many kinds of naturalism fall into two main types. Dogmatic naturalists define naturalness using some rule. Progressive naturalists define naturalness in terms of a research program. This research program, illustrated by the sciences, progressively defines things ever more precisely using mathematics. Most traditional religious concepts fail to be natural on any type of naturalism. But progressive naturalists are open to naturalistic revisions of traditional concepts. They do not tie religion to the past, but welcome novel religious and spiritual naturalisms.

According to Eric Olson, the Thinking Animal Argument (TAA) is the best reason to accept animalism, the view that we are identical to animals. A novel criticism has been advanced against TAA, suggesting that it implicitly employs a dubious epistemological principle. I will argue that other epistemological principles can do the trick of saving the TAA, principles that appeal to recent issues regarding disagreement with peers and experts. I conclude with some remarks about the consequence of accepting these modified (...) principles, drawing out some general morals in defending animalism. (shrink)

This paper proposes and employs a framework for determining whether life-saving treatment at birth is in the best interests of extremely preterm infants, given uncertainty about the outcome of such a choice. It argues that given relevant data and plausible assumptions about the well-being of babies with various outcomes, it is typically in the best interests of even the youngest preterm infants—those born at 22 weeks gestational age—to receive life-saving treatment at birth.

This paper explores some connections between competing conceptions of scientific laws on the one hand, and a problem in the foundations of statistical mechanics on the other. I examine two proposals for understanding the time asymmetry of thermodynamic phenomenal: David Albert's recent proposal and a proposal that I outline based on Hans Reichenbach's “branch systems”. I sketch an argument against the former, and mount a defense of the latter by showing how to accommodate statistical mechanics to recent developments in the (...) philosophy of scientific laws. (shrink)

(2013). In the beginning was the doing: the premises of the practical syllogism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 303-321.

En parlant de Wagner, depuis _Richard Wagner à Bayreuth_ jusqu'aux écrits de 1888, Nietzsche parle en réalité de la civilisation occidentale, c'est-à-dire de la morale, de la décadence, des Allemands et de la musique allemande. Il élargit donc et agrandit son propos d'une manière _polysémique_, ou même il le double ou le pluralise d'une manière _contrapuntique_, en procédant à plusieurs séries de glissements, d'usurpations d'identité, de substitutions, de condensations. Ces polysémies font éclater l'identité de Wagner selon la logique de la (...) « Flüssigkeit » des significations, fonction de l'ordre physiologique et psychologique. Ce n'est pas seulement de Nietzsche contre Wagner qu'il s'agit, mais de Dionysos contre le Crucifié, de la « Heiterkeit » contre la décadence, ainsi qu'en témoignent par exemple les multiples équivoques polysémiques du titre « Le Cas Wagner ». (shrink)

Two papers on global morality and ethics—by David Loye and Solomon H. Katz—are hereby placed into an evolutionary context. Simply stated though no less true, ethical evolution will likely be the next great evolutionary leap forward into the future—if humankind is to have a future.

In this paper c i lewis's theory of practical reason is discussed. the purpose is to explicate the role which value experience plays in the thinking of a rational agent who is attempting to determine imperatives of action. lewis, who vehemently opposed noncognitivism in ethics, believed that the objectivity of ethics could be shown to be the result of the logical demands of consistency upon the deliberative consciousness of an active self-determining agent. rightness, for lewis, was not primarily a moral (...) concept but rather a logical concept to be exercised in the critique of any deliberate activity; ethics thus rests on very general features of agent rationality. (shrink)

Santa is an unextended thinking substance. Since Santa is unextended, he has no parts; since he has no parts, he is simple. Santa is a monad. According to the traditional accounts, Santa has agency. Yet Santa's agency need not be mechanical. Santa is not a machine. Santa's agency is not located in the physical motions of matter; on the contrary, Santa's agency is located in the logical structure of the world. It is revealed by a conceptual or logical analysis of (...) the causal order itself. (shrink)

This article deals with the concept of infinity in classical American philosophy. It focuses on the philosophical and technical developments of infinity in the 19th Century American thinkers Royce and Peirce.

This article describes the development and validation of a scale specifically designed to measure one's propensity for Objectivism. The scale developed in this article assesses metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and politics. A three-stage process of scale development results in a multidimensional scale that largely supports Rand's original conception of the construct in the United States and Lithuania. Several challenges are identified, including problems with select items referencing specific political preferences and addressing notions of a higher being. Prospects for future research are (...) identified, including tests for associations between Objectivism and individual factors such as leadership style, organizational commitment, and job performance. (shrink)

For over one hundred and fifty years G.W.F. Hegel’s ghost has haunted theoretical understanding and practice. His opponents first, and later his defenders, have equally defined their programs against and with his. In this way Hegel’s political thought has both situated and displaced modern political theorizing. This book takes the reception of Hegel’s political thought as a lens through which contemporary methodological and ideological prerogatives are exposed. It traces the nineteenth century origins of the positivist revolt against Hegel’s legacy forward (...) to political science’s turn away from philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. The book critically reviews the subsequent revisionist trend that has eliminated his metaphysics from contemporary considerations of his political thought. It then moves to re-evaluate their relation and defend their inseparability in his major work on politics: the_ Philosophy of Right_. Against this background, the book concludes with an argument for the inherent metaphysical dimension of political theorizing itself. Goodfield takes Hegel’s reception, representation, as well as rejection in Anglo-American scholarship as a mirror in which its metaphysical presuppositions of the political are exceptionally well reflected. It is through such reflection, he argues, that we may begin to come to terms with them. This book will be of great interest to students, scholars, and readers of political theory and philosophy, Hegel, metaphysics and the philosophy of the social sciences. (shrink)