Nietzsche’s Eternal Return (ER) is interpreted in many ways, including by him. I present it as a hermeneutic device, a way of reading texts, especially those whose influence threatens one’s authorial autonomy and/or are later difficult to take ownership of due to philosophical growth. It returns past texts with new interpretations, similar to the way ER leads one to embrace one’s past without changing anything, which radically changes everything from a resented painful burden into a celebrated enhancement of freedom and (...) power. I show how he could have derived the idea from Schopenhauer, his own embarrassing past, by performing the technique on Schopenhauer. The same attitude toward past texts of recreating them according to one’s present interests and concerns simultaneously releases one’s present texts for future readers to impose their readings onto them, just as Zarathustra tells his followers not to follow him. Heidegger takes the idea up in a far more nuanced account than he is usually given credit for and applies it, among other places, to the history of philosophy. All philosophers say the same as it keeps returning. Derrida then recreates this as iterability, the deconstruction of the no/change dichotomy that Nietzsche began. (shrink)

Paul Helm presents a new, expanded edition of his much praised 1988 book Eternal God, which defends the view that God exists in timeless eternity. Helm argues that divine timelessness is grounded in the idea of God as creator, and that this alone makes possible a proper account of divine omniscience.

In this paper the author examines the key principles of Kant's conception of eternal peace and the possibility of an international legal order grounded in Reason. The central segment of the paper consists of an analysis of the problem of mediation between Kant's normative theory and political practice. U radu se razmatraju kljucni principi Kantove koncepcije Vecnog mira i mogucnosti umnog utemeljenja medjunarodnog pravnog poretka. Glavni deo ovog rada predstavlja analiza problema posredovanja izmedju Kantove normativne teorija i savremene politicke prakse.

This article considers Descartes? doctrine of eternal truths, in connection with the status of the principle of no contradiction. It is shown that the rear created and uncreated eternal truths; the former are eternal truths about creatures and the se truths are the object of divine will, while the latter are the truths about God him self, which are founded in his existence, so he can not change them. Concerning the question whet her the principle of no contradiction is a (...) created or a no created eternal truth, different Descartes? claims on this subject, potentially incongruent, are pointed out. Based on the fact that this principle does not have absolute validity, the conclusion is that in Descartes? metaphysics the status of the principle of no contradiction is not relevant, because God?s infinite power is in different to ward it. U tekstu je razmatrana Dekartova doktrina o vecnim istinama, s obzirom na status principa neprotivrecnosti. Pokazano je da kod Dekarta postoje stvorene i nestvorene vecne istine; prve jesu vecne istine o stvorevinama i jesu objekat Bozje volje, druge jesu vecne istine o Bogu samom, temelje se u njegovoj egzistenciji i on ih ne moze menjati. U vezi sa pitanjem da li je princip neprotivrecnosti stvorena ili nestvorena vecna istina, ukazano je na razlicite, potencijalno nesaglasne Dekartove tvrdnje o ovom problemu. Na osnovu cinjenice da on ne vazi vise apsolutno, izveden je zakljucak da u Dekartovoj metafizici njegov status jeste irelevantan, zato sto je Bozja beskonacna moc prema njemu indiferentna. (shrink)

Metaphysics as an independent discipline has a surprisingly short history. Until the early eighteenth century, many, perhaps even most, writers on “metaphysics” primarily had the eponymous work of Aristotle in mind. In the writings of the early eighteenth-century German rationalists—Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten—we find a conception of metaphysics that is no longer necessarily tied to Aristotle’s great work. But metaphysics as a discipline was not blessed with longevity, as a dozen years or so before Louis XVI it was condemned (...) to the guillotine by Kant’s first critique. The fate of metaphysics after the Kantian revolution is a story that still needs to be told, but it would be fair to say, I think, that for the past two centuries engagement with heavy metaphysical concepts such as eternity has been taken to be either a form of backwardness (religious or otherwise) or a kind of eccentricity. Luckily, things seem to have changed somewhat over the past twenty years. Suddenly, for example, we are seeing debates about monism appear in mainstream journals. (This could hardly be imagined in the 1970s or 1980s.) The emergence of interest in metaphysical monism as well as the persistent engagement with the philosophy of modality may open a window of opportunity through which eternity could again take her rightful seat as a fundamental notion of metaphysics. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Temporal Versus Atemporal Eternality A Defense of Temporal Eternality Incorruptibility Versus Immutability.

Eternity is a unique kind of existence that is supposed to belong to the most real being or beings. It is an existence that is not shaken by the common wear and tear of time. Over the two and half millennia history of Western philosophy we find various conceptions of eternity, yet one sharp distinction between two notions of eternity seems to run throughout this long history: eternity as timeless existence, as opposed to eternity as existence in all times. Both (...) kinds of existence stand in sharp contrast to the coming in and out of existence of ordinary beings, like hippos, humans, and toothbrushes: were these eternally-timeless, for example, a hippo could not eat, a human could not think or laugh, and a toothbrush would be of no use. Were a hippo an eternal-everlasting creature, it would not have to bother itself with nutrition in order to extend its existence. Everlasting human beings might appear similar to us, but their mental life and patterns of behavior would most likely be very different from ours.The distinction between eternity as timelessness and eternity as everlastingness goes back to ancient philosophy, to the works of Plato and Aristotle, and even to the fragments of Parmenides' philosophical poem. In the twentieth century, it seemed to go out of favor, though one could consider as eternalists those proponents of realism in philosophy of mathematics, and those of timeless propositions in philosophy of language. However, recent developments in contemporary physics and its philosophy have provided an impetus to revive notions of eternity due to the view that time and duration might have no place in the most fundamental ontology.The importance of eternity is not limited to strictly philosophical discussions. It is a notion that also has an important role in traditional Biblical interpretation. The Tetragrammaton, the Hebrew name of God considered to be most sacred, is derived from the Hebrew verb for being, and as a result has been traditionally interpreted as denoting eternal existence. Hence, Calvin translates the Tetragrammaton as 'l'Eternel', and Mendelssohn as 'das ewige Wesen' or 'der Ewige'. Eternity also plays a central role in contemporary South American fiction, especially in the works of J.L. Borges. The representation of eternity poses a major challenge to both literature and arts. The current volume aims at providing a history of the philosophy of eternity surrounded by a series of short essays, or reflections, on the role of eternity and its representation in literature, religion, language, liturgy, science, and music. Thus, our aim is to provide a history of philosophy as a discipline that is in constant commerce with various other domains of human inquisition and exploration. (shrink)

The paper argues that two apparently attractive conceptions of an eternal sentence are defective. An alternative conception is presented which the authors think allows greater insight into the nature of semantic concepts.

The Eternal Coin is a fair coin has existed forever, and will exist forever, in a region causally isolated from you. It is tossed every day. How confident should you be that the Coin lands heads today, conditional on (i) the hypothesis that it has landed Heads on every past day, or (ii) the hypothesis that it will land Heads on every future day? I argue for the extremely counterintuitive claim that the correct answer to both questions is 1.

Does it make sense to think of eternal life not as an unending continuation of life subsequent to death but as fully actualized in one’s present mortal and finite life? After outlining conceptual and moral reasons for being troubled by the notion of an endless life, this article draws upon the thought of major Christian theologians and philosophers of religion to expound the idea of eternal life as a possession exclusively of the life one is presently living. Supplementing the claims (...) of religious thinkers with notions of four-dimensionalism and eternalism from theoretical physics and the philosophy of time, and considering important objections to the conception of eternal life in question, I argue for both the conception’s intelligibility and its ethical and spiritual profundity. (shrink)

In eternally inflating cosmology, infinitely many pocket universes are seeded. Attempts to show that universes like our observable universe are probable amongst them have failed, since no unique probability measure is recoverable. This lack of definite probabilities is taken to reveal a complete predictive failure. Inductive inference over the pocket universes, it would seem, is impossible. I argue that this conclusion of impossibility mistakes the nature of the problem. It confuses the case in which no inductive inference is possible, with (...) another in which a weaker inductive logic applies. The alternative, applicable inductive logic is determined by background conditions and is the same, non-probabilistic logic as applies to an infinite lottery. This inductive logic does not preclude all predictions, but does affirm that predictions useful to deciding for or against eternal inflation are precluded. (shrink)

In True Detective, the description of time as a "flat circle" is one of the most mysterious aspects of the story. The idea of the flat circle ultimately helps Rust to overcome his bleak interpretation of reality, although for a long time it anchors him in his dreary worldview. A philosophical pessimist is likely to view knowledge and meaning as inherently flawed. Rust tells Marty all about his philosophical pessimism in the first episode of season one. A metaphysical claim tries (...) to describe the true nature of reality. Friedrich Nietzsche calls his theory "eternal recurrence", however differ in name aside, there are numerous similarities between his theory and Rust's. The flat circle is really a thought experiment that Rust remains trapped within insofar as he remains a philosophical pessimist, at least up to the point of his near‐death experience, where he "sees the light". (shrink)

In an excellent article that traces the logical structure of Maimonides’ Guide of the perplexed and his arguments on the existence of God, William Lane Craig (1988 122-147), concludes that most of the Guide’s impact rests precisely on its rigorous method of deduction. Perhaps, in Craig’s view, this is one of the things that makes Maimonides a model for further conciliating attempts between theology and philosophy. However, despite his careful analysis, there is one idea that Craig mentions and leaves undeveloped, (...) namely, that a certain notion of eternity of time underlies Maimonides’ argumentative scheme. Trying to go beyond the examples Craig offered in his article, my method toward a final solution to the question is divided in three steps. The first one is a reconstruction of Craig’s statements and its interpretation as supporting material for his conclusion. Then, I present three alternative views about Maimonides’ beliefs on the creation of the world, an issue strongly attached to his idea of time. Finally, I use the material of the two former sections to support an answer to my question. (shrink)

Eleonore Stump and Katherin Rogers have recently defended the doctrine of divine timelessness in separate essays, arguing that the doctrine is consistent with libertarian free will and that timeless divine knowledge is providentially useful. I show that their defenses do not succeed; a doctrine of eternity having these features cannot be saved.

Nietzsche believed in the horror of existence—in a world filled with meaningless suffering. He also believed in eternal recurrence—that our lives will repeat infinitely and that in each life every detail will be exactly the same. Furthermore, it was not enough that eternal recurrence simply be accepted—Nietzsche demanded that it be loved. Thus the philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence is the very same philosopher who also believes in the horror of existence—a paradox that is completely overlooked by commentators (who thus (...) fail to adequately understand Nietzsche). All of this demands careful explanation. (shrink)

Their contributions range from analyzing and defending classical conceptions of eternity (Boethius's and Aquinas's) to vindicating everlastingness accounts, and ...

Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return of the same exhibits the preoccupations and limitations of his middle and late periods. It situates Nietzsche in the grand narrative of the history of the misunderstanding of being that Heidegger was striving to map. Yet it thereby neglects the question of the primordiality and insuperability of mood that was a focus of Being and Time and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. It does not acknowledge the alternative ontological path pursued by (...) Nietzsche’s engagement with a world and time grounded in joy. This article attempts to defend Nietzsche by means of an appeal to the early Heidegger. (shrink)

Between Eternities deals with the future of the tradition of political philosophy. The author argues that this tradition can only progress after the postmodernist fragmentation of political philosophy has been realized as part of the grander scheme of the history of Western thought.

The German philosopher and intellectual historian Karl Löwith is known and discussed mainly in the English language via his major work on secularization – Meaning in History, first written and published in English – and the more recently translated essays that criticize Martin Heidegger. However, Löwith’s body of work is rarely considered for the original contribution that it offers to the discourse on the questions of modernity and modern life. This oversight is due much to the way in which Hans (...) Blumenberg and Jürgen Habermas have each ‘dealt’ with Löwith’s position; Löwith in each case becomes a flagstone in the path to their own theories. This article reappraises Löwith’s thought through an exploration of his major works, and discovers that the concepts and motivations behind the critical force of his intellectual histories suggest a more sensitive reading of the modern condition than his critics allow. His notions of nature, cosmos and eternity, and his steadfast skepticism, reveal Löwith to be a theorist of the limits of human finitude, and set him apart from his contemporaries and his former teacher Heidegger. It is these aspects of his work that will continue to be provocative for both defenders of freedom and defenders of nature. (shrink)

Eternity Lies Beneath: Autonomy and Finitude in Kierkegaard's Early Writings VANESSA RUMBLE AMONG the extant descriptions of Kierkegaard by his contemporaries, one particularly vivid portrait captures the reflections of the young theologian on a carriage ride through his beloved Deer Park: The road was so little travelled that it looked in places almost overgrown with grass. There was absolutely no dust .... On either side there were new leaves on the beech trees .... Uncle Peter [Christian Kierkegaard, SCren's eldest brother] (...) had surely said some- thing about how Danish this sort of weather was -- or even that it was Scandinavian: it was so light and so bright and so fine; there was no wilderness or heath; it was almost childlike in its purity. But the younger brother [SCren] had replied that such weather was perfectly suited to conceal the Eternal. It was a temptation -- he had said that many times -- it tempted the mind to dream and to wander. Who could keep hold of a serious thought while enjoying that smooth, billowing grass? Either one had to let one's mind billow and dream like the grass or one had to surrender to one's thoughts, but in that case all this bright, transient lushness became painful. The whole thing was a quaking bog, he had said. Of course it looked as if that green, open plain was solid ground, but the entire thing was a bog, you know. It quaked and quaked, and Eternity lay beneath. He couldn't imagine how his brother could want.. (shrink)

Modernity seemed to be the autumn of eternity. The secularization of European culture provided little sustenance to the concept of eternity with its heavy theological baggage. Yet, our hero would not leave the stage without an outstanding performance of its power and temptation. Indeed, in the first three centuries of the modern period – the subject of the third chapter by Yitzhak Melamed - the concept of eternity will play a crucial role in the great philosophical systems of the period. (...) The first part of this chapter concentrates on the debate about the temporality of God. While most of the great metaphysicians of the seventeenth century – Suarez, Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz – ascribed to God eternal, non-temporal, existence, a growing number of philosophers conceived God as existing in time. For Newton, God’s eternity was simply the fact that “He was, he is, and is to come.” A similar view of God as being essentially in time was endorsed by Pierre Gassendi, Henry More, Samuel Clarke, Isaac Barrow, John Locke, and most probably Descartes as well. In the second part of the chapter we study the concept of eternal truth, and its relation to the emerging notion of Laws of Nature. The third part of the chapter explicates Spinoza’s original understanding of eternity as a modal concept. For Spinoza, eternity is a unique kind of necessary existence: it is existence that is self-necessitated (unlike the existence of other things whose necessity derives from external causes). Eternity is the existence of God or the one substance. Yet, Spinoza claims that if we conceive finite things adequately - “sub specie aeternitatis” – as nothing but modes flowing from the essence of God, even finite things (like our minds) can take part in God’s eternity. The fourth and final part of the chapter is mostly focused on the reception of Spinoza’s original conception of eternity by Leibniz and other eighteenth century philosophers. (shrink)

This book provides an account of the nature of time, especially time's arrow and the role of entropy, at a semi-popular level. Special attention is given to statistical mechanics, the past hypothesis, and possible cosmological explanations thereof.

This paper examines Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence and the notions of reincarnation in Onyewuenyi and Majeed with a view to showing how convergence and divergence of thought in the Nietzschean, Onyewuenyean and Majeedean philosophy contexts can inform cross-cultural philosophizing. Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence represents his deep thought, which claims that every aspect of life returns innumerable times, in an identical fashion. On the other hand, Onyewuenyi posits that reincarnation is un-African as he conceives it as the theory that (...) when the soul separates from the body, at death, it informs another body for another span of life, while Majeed sees evidence of the African rootedness of the belief in reincarnation, based on his study of the Akan people of Ghana and concedes that the belief, itself, is irrational, since there is no scientific or empirical basis for it. Attempts are made to highlight the dynamics of Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence and to articulate the essential ingredients of Onyewuenyean and Majeedean conceptions of reincarnation. These forms of thought will be examined critically to exhibit their convergence and divergence in the context of cross-cultural philosophizing. Keywords: eternal recurrence, reincarnation, will to power, vital force, cross-cultural philosophy, spirit-world. (shrink)

Neste ensaio, argumento que qualquer um que adotasse um falsificacionismo do tipo que tenho atribuído a Nietzsche se sentiria atraído pela doutrina do eterno retorno. Para Nietzsche, pensar o 'vir a ser' revelado por meio dos sentidos significa falsificá-lo por meio do 'ser'. Mas o eterno retorno oferece a possibilidade de pensar o 'vir a ser' sem falsificação. Em seguida, argumento que qualquer um que mantenha o falsificacionismo de Nietzsche veria na ação humana um conflito entre o 'ser' e o (...) 'vir a ser', de modo semelhante ao que ocorre no juízo empírico. À luz desse conflito apenas o eterno retorno ofereceria a possibilidade de afirmar a vida de modo verdadeiro. Para concluir, discuto de que maneira tal leitura do eterno retorno resolve uma série de enigmas que têm atormentado os intérpretes. In this essay, I argue that someone who adopted a falsificationism of the sort that I have attributed to Nietzsche would be attracted to the doctrine of eternal recurrence. For Nietzsche, to think the becoming revealed through the senses means falsifying it through being. But the eternal recurrence offers the possibility of thinking becoming without falsification. I then argue that someone who held Nietzsche's falsificationism would see in human agency a conflict between being and becoming similar to that in empirical judgment. In the light of this conflict only the eternal recurrence would offer the possibility of truly affirming life. I end by discussing how this reading of the eternal recurrence solves a number of puzzles that have bedeviled interpreters. (shrink)

It is the laws of nature, among other things, that allow for the periodic processesthat underlie isochronic clocks. Is God in any Measured Time? If not, does our Measured Time measure the eternity of God? I will argue that God is not in any ...

William Hasker and I disagree over whether or not appealing to a particular understanding of divine eternity can reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian human freedom. Hasker argues that if God had foreknowledge of a particular future choice, that choice cannot be free with libertarian freedom. I hold, to the contrary, that, given a certain theory of time—the view that all times exist equally—it is possible to reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian freedom. In a recent article, “Can Eternity be Saved? A (...) Comment on Stump and Rogers”, Hasker makes it clear that one of the fundamental disagreements between us lies in what each of us takes to be required for libertarian free will. In the present paper I outline the version of libertarianism that I find plausible, then explain how a libertarian free choice can be foreknown by God. Then I will explain why Hasker finds this reconciliation unacceptable since it fails to do justice to what he takes to be required for libertarian freedom. Finally, I will argue that Hasker is wrong to insist upon his analysis of free will. (shrink)

This article aims to provide an explication of the Christian doctrine of eternal generation. A model of the doctrine is formulated within the ground-theoretic framework of Jonathan Schaffer and E. Jonathan Lowe, which enables it to be explicated clearly and consistently, and two often raised objections against the doctrine can be successfully answered.

Franz Overbeck associates the eternal return with Nietzsche's passion for the ideal of the extreme (Ideals des ‘Extremen’), a drive for the ultimate that is related to the notion of the Nietzschean overhuman. The aim of this paper is to bring to light and analyze the Nietzschean understanding of the ultimate, starting from Overbeck and bringing to light the conception of Christian eschatology presupposed in Nietzsche’s analysis of ressentiment and the ascetic ideal. Explaining the eschatology from which Nietzsche starts will (...) help to have a better understanding of the doctrine of the eternal return, exploring how the Christian heritage from which Nietzsche drank weighs on it. (shrink)

The story of eternity is not as simple as a secularization narrative implies. Instead it follows something like the trajectory of reversal in Kant’s practical proof for the existence of god. In that proof, god emerges not as an object of theoretical investigation, but as a postulate required by our practical engagement with the world; so, similarly, the eternal is not just secularized out of existence, but becomes understood as an entailment of, and somehow imbricated in, the conditions of our (...) practical existence. -/- The sections that follow discuss some of those central figures in modern European philosophy whose views prominently feature some consideration of eternity. I start with Kant in section I. Kant’s critique of speculative theology is well-known, and this hostility would appear to make it unlikely that the eternal, with all its theological baggage, would feature prominently in Kant’s critical philosophy. But in fact Kant’s transcendental idealism endorses no fewer than three different concepts of the eternal, including what turns out to be the most historically influential idea: that practical reason involves a kind of eternal, non-temporal action. Kant shifts this notion of a non-temporal act from its original theological context of god’s actus purus to a practical context, setting the stage for Schelling’s and Kierkegaard’s later development of this theme. Before detailing this trajectory however, section II is devoted to Hegel, the philosopher whose radical historicism is perhaps more than any other thinker responsible for making “the nineteenth century preeminently the historical century.”4 Hegel is not fertile soil for the concept of the eternal, but his historicism does turn out, at a crucial moment in the philosophy of nature, to presuppose a certain conception of eternity as an eternal present. Perhaps more importantly for the further development of eternity in nineteenth century thought however is that both Schelling and Kierkegaard situate their views of the eternal in the context of a collective rejection of Hegel. Section III discusses Schelling, who returns to Kant’s conception of non-temporal choice, seeing human capacities for free eternal self-creation as rivaling god’s. Such powers are required, Schelling argues, to resist the sublimation of the individual human person into the blankness of the Absolute. Section IV briefly consider Schopenhauer’s view that the in-itself of everything is an endlessly striving will. Section V concerns Kierkegaard who is strongly committed to the eternal, and indeed criticizes Hegel for compromising his conception of the eternal by thinking it temporally; but he is obsessed by the paradoxical question of our practical “access” to the eternal within a particular temporal moment: the decisive moment, imbued with significance that can turn life around and create a new person, pushing Schelling’s concerns even further. The remaining, shorter sections, present briefer accounts of more recent figures who make important use of some conception of the eternal: Nietzsche’s eternal return (section VI), Agamben’s (1942-) theory of sovereignty (section VII) and finally Alain Badiou’s unapologetic attempt to resuscitate eternity as the condition of revolutionary political change (Section VIII). I end with a concluding meditation (Section IX). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Nietzsche should be understood as a “thorough-going nihilist”. Rather than broaching two general projects of destroying current values and constructing new ones, I argue that Nietzsche should be understood only as a destroyer of values. I do this by looking at Nietzsche’s views on nihilism and the role played by Nietzsche’s cyclical view of time, or his doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same. I provide a typology of nihilisms, as they are found (...) in Nietzsche—negative, reactive and radical—through a close reading of an unpublished fragment in his later notebooks, remnants of which are scattered throughout his published work. I show how the progression between the different stages of nihilism are a “necessary consequence of the ideals entertained hitherto” , with the eternal recurrence of the same playing a vital role in this progression. The last stage of nihilism—radical nihilism—is ambiguous between a life-denying, or passive, nihilism and a life-affirming, or active, one; but, I argue, both kinds of nihilism preclude a construction of new values. But there is an inherent tension within Nietzsche’s account of nihilism insofar as it relies on the eternal recurrence of the same. This tension is brought out nicely by Löwith and partially resolved by Klossowski. There are at least two meanings of the eternal recurrence of the same. In one sense, the cosmological reading, it is intended to make sense of the idea that time is infinite and matter is finite by claiming that every possible combination of matter will recur infinite times. In the other sense, the anthropological reading, it is a kind of thought experiment, analogous to Kant’s categorical imperative: “live in every moment so that you could will that moment back again over and over” . There is a tension between these readings insofar as one must will to live in such a way that they will do it again, over and over , but also that what they do will make no difference, for what one decides to do has been done innumerable times. I argue that this tension can only be resolved by considering Nietzsche as aiming at “goal-lessness as such” and placing him as an active nihilist. (shrink)

Truth Eternal and the Adversity of Diversity Law sheds new light on the problem of truth, and its power to create, sustain, and account for all things. It also seeks to convey some new insights into how truth inconspicuously pervades every element of creation. Silent and unseen, it grounds time and the flow of events within it.

Part of the recent neglect of eternity comes from a poor definition of it as static abstraction, as mere form, or even robust form that is not so mere. This, of course, could not be what the ancients such as Origin or Plotinus must have meant when they claimed that God is eternal, and thus more real than things that change. Therefore, my first task here is to develop a contemporary theory of eternity that is worth being an orientation point (...) for time in education. I argue that the importance of eternity for education lies in the fact that true human identity—and the identity of such human affairs as might exhibit the obligations of responsibility—are eternal as well as temporal. Temporally we live day by day, with the date of the present determining the past that is actual and fixed and the future that is open in various structured ways. The temporal structure of life as such is insufficient to account for moral identity with any sense of responsibility for acting through time. In the following, I will illustrate this point and then draw a lesson about eternity from it. (shrink)

This paper develops a detailed reading of Deleuze's philosophical study of Bacon's triptychs in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. It examines his claims regarding their apparent non-narrative status, and explores the capacity of the triptychs to embody and express a spiritual sensation of the eternity of time.

This article uses Michael Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization to question whether or not Charles Patterson is justified in his comparison of the Holocaust with animal cruelty in Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. It considers whether the comparison adheres to a competitive model of ethics or a multidirectional model.

The article is primarily a study of Nietzsche’s unpublished fragments from the period spring-autumn 1881, in which Nietzsche first developed his thought of the “eternal recurrence of the same.” In the article, I attempt to accomplish two goals: the first goal is to explain Nietzsche’s theses on the eternal recurrence, which at that time were still remarkably clear and coherent. And the second goal is to try to find in these same theses an explanation for their future silence. In other (...) words, the article examines the relationship between Nietzsche’s theses that he developed in 1881 and his book _Thus spoke Zarathustra_, which, in Nietzsche’s own words, relies on these theses as their “grounding thought,” but nevertheless never fully reveals them. Both lines of inquiry lead to the conclusion that the core of Nietzsche’s introduction of the idea of eternal recurrence is his concept of _Einverleibung_ or embodiment. Indeed, the analysis shows that Nietzsche’s main concern with the thought of eternal recurrence was not to set forth its clear articulation within consciousness, but rather to construct it in such a way that it could become an unconscious instinct capable of gradually displacing the “embodied mistakes” that dominate our thinking from within itself. (shrink)

Anthony Ellis; XII*—Eternal Life, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 159–173, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/.

IN HIS BRILLIANT AND WIDE-RANGING WORK Time, Creation and the Continuum, Richard Sorabji summarizes the history of the concept of eternity from Parmenides to the Neoplatonists of the early Middle Ages, and concludes that an intellectual denouement is reached when eternity is understood in the sense of timeless existence.

The present piece focuses on the influence of Plotinus' understanding of time and eternity as articulated in Plotinus' third and fifth Enneads upon Mīr Dāmād's (d. 1631–2) conception of eternity, perpetuity, and time found in his Book of Blazing Brands (Kitab al‐Qabasāt). Although Mīr Dāmād's conception of eternity, perpetuity, and time resembles that of Plotinus' cosmology and ontology, he departs from Plotinus' hypostases in establishing strict parameters for each domain. Unlike Plotinus, Mīr Dāmād argues that the realm of eternity is (...) reserved for God alone, while the realm of Perpetuity contains the Platonic Forms. For Mīr Dāmād, the realm of time is an effect of the realm of Perpetuity and a tool for human beings to understand how to measure events in the temporal world. Unlike many other Shī'ite philosophers, Mīr Dāmād's articulation of these three cosmological realms incorporates thought found in the works of both prominent Sunni and Shī'ite scholars such as Ibn Sīnā, Abū Ḥāmid al‐Ghāzālī, Suhrawardī, and Naṣīr al‐Dīn Ṭūsī. Although his most successful student, Mullā Ṣadrā Shirazī, had ultimately disagreed with his teacher's cosmological doctrine, he remained influenced by the multitude of sources that his teacher had used. (shrink)

The question has been raised whether Nietzsche intends eternal recurrence to be like a categorical imperative. The obvious objection to understanding eternal recurrence as like a categorical imperative is that for a categorical imperative to make any sense, for moral obligation to make any sense, it must be possible for individuals to change themselves. And Nietzsche denies that individuals can change themselves. Magnus thinks the determinism “implicit in the doctine of the eternal recurrence of the same renders any imperative impotent…. (...) How can one will what must happen in any case?” At the other end of the spectrum, those who do hold that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative, for their part, tend to ignore or deny the determinism involved in eternal recurrence. This article explores the extent to which it can be claimed that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative without downplaying Nietzsche's dterminism. (shrink)

The Eternal Legacy: An Introduction to the Canonical Literature of Buddhism. Sangharakshita. Tharpa Publications, London 1985. xvi + 317pp. £7.50.

Following on from _A Life of One’s Own_ and _An Experiment in Leisure_, _Eternity’s Sunrise_ explores Marion Milner’s way of keeping a diary. Recording small private moments, she builds up a store of ‘bead memories.’ A carved duck, a sprig of asphodel, moments captured in her travels in Greece, Kashmir and Israel, circus clowns, a painting _-_ each makes up a 'bead' that has a warmth or glow which comes in response to asking the simple question: What is the most (...) important thing that happened yesterday? From these beads – sacred, horrific, profane, funny – grows a sense of an ‘answering activity’, the result of turning one’s attention inwards to experience real joy. What Marion Milner conveys so vividly and inspirationally is her lifelong intention to live as completely as possible in the moment. With a new introduction by Hugh Haughton, _Eternity’s Sunrise_ will be essential reading for all those interested in reflecting on the nature of their own happiness – whether readers from a literary, an artistic, a historical, an educational or a psychoanalytic/psychotherapeutic background. (shrink)

본고는 스피노자의 『윤리학』에 나타난 영원성 개념과 그것의 철학적 함축에 대해서 논하고자 한다.『윤리학』 1부의 영원성에 대한 정의에 따르면, 영원성은 필연적 실존을 뜻한다. 신만이 아니라 유한한 개체도 이러한 의미에서 실존한다고 일컬어질 수 있다. 실존은 두 가지 의미를 갖는데, 그것은 지속의 측면에서 이해될 수도 있고, 비시간적 측면에서도 이해될 수 있다. 후자의 실존은 신의 본질에 논리적으로 함축된다. 이러한 의미에서 개체도 영원하다고 말해질 수 있다. 『윤리학』5부는 이러한 존재론적 영원성 개념에서 출발하지만 그러한 영원성에 대한 인식까지 다루고 있다. 이러한 구도는 스피노자의 윤리적 기획과 연관이 있다. 자신의 영원성에 (...) 인식은 우리의 개별 본질을 능동적으로 실현하는 것이기 때문이다. 스피노자의 철학에서 구원은 개체성의 초월이 아니라, 개체성에 기초한다. 현자는 지속 속에서 영원한 자기를 인식함으로써 스스로가 신의 한 부분임을 적합하게 의식하고, 그러한 자기에 대한 만족을 획득한다. (shrink)

Approaching the idea from three viewpoints, The author contends that eternal recurrence is a central and unifying theme in nietzsche's thought. She first considers its scientific basis, Arguing for a reinterpretation of the doctrine because nietzsche did not subscribe to the classical atomism of his time. She then considers the idea in its metaphysical perspective: it represents a repudiation of platonism and an affirmation of life. Finally, Urging the unity of the metaphysical and the ethical in nietzsche's philosophy, The author (...) interprets eternal recurrence as an idea created by life itself to serve life by strengthening the will to power. (staff). (shrink)

T. H. Green’s eternal consciousness can be explained in a meaningful way. In his paper “The Much —Maligned and Misunderstood Eternal Consciousness” Coin Tyler argues that “the eternal consciousness is a potential of every individual mind”. Later in this paper I will myself argue that the eternal consciousness has a role to play. It comes to emphasise the importance of what exists beyond the routine daily experience, more specifically, the importance of true knowledge and moral perfection. However, does the fact (...) that we can make sense from the eternal consciousness give us enough grounds to defend it? Tyler vigorously criticises the critics of the eternal consciousness but his two lines of defending it end up with two rather modest claims. (shrink)

There is debate in the philosophy of religion about whether the being of God is timelessly eternal or is instead temporal but unbounded. In this paper, I seek to defend the first view by motivating and deriving it from the Christian doctrines of the trinity and salvation. My goal is to present the notion of eternity in a way that makes clear that it belongs to God by nature and to man by grace, with the condition of time being part (...) of the medium of grace. To this end, I also employ the doctrine of theosis, as found in Maximus the Confessor and Dumitru Staniloae, and the Augustinean theory of time. (shrink)