Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it (...) is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception. (shrink)

According to Phillips, (1) genuine perception is attributable to the individual (i.e. it’s a personal state/event, as opposed to sub-personal states/events in the individual’s brain); (2) since unconscious perceptual representations are ill-suited to guide action, there’s no good reason to attribute them to the individual; (3) not being attributable to the individual, they don’t instantiate genuine perception, thereby failing to support the hypothesis that genuine perception can occur unconsciously. I argue that this reasoning is flawed and can’t be easily fixed. (...) Phillips contends that unconscious perceptual representations don’t guide action because they fail to meet certain conditions that are sufficient for action guidance. But those conditions may not be necessary for action guidance. Consequently, unconscious perceptual representations may guide action even if they don’t meet Phillips’ conditions. Furthermore, due to his commitment to the distinction between personal and sub-personal states/events, Phillips isn’t in a position to argue that his conditions are necessary for action guidance. For the distinction applies to action as well as to perception, and when genuine action is identified by personal-level criteria, Phillips’ conditions turn out unnecessary for action guidance. (shrink)

Austere relationalism combines two claims. First, the phenomenal character of perception is at least partially constituted by the perceived items. Second, perception doesn’t consist in representing the perceived items as being a certain way. Recently, Daniel Kalpokas, Avner Baz, and Søren Overgaard have cast doubt on the ability of austere relationalism to account for the peculiar phenomenology of aspect-seeing. I show that this explanatory challenge can be met. Some of the claims made by the critics can be resisted, whereas other (...) can be accommodated into austere relationalism. Most notably, I argue that austere relationalists should acknowledge that aspect-seeing is enabled by unconscious perceptual judgment. This not only allows them to meet the challenge, but also provides the means to reconcile the apparently belief-independent phenomenology of aspect-seeing with the arguably indispensable role that concepts and recognition play in it. (shrink)

This paper controverts the ability of intentionalism about perception to account for unique epistemic significance of phenomenal consciousness. More specifically, the intentionalist cannot explain the latter without denying two well-founded claims: the transparency of experience, and the possibility of unconscious perception. If they are true, intentionality of perception entails that phenomenal consciousness has no special epistemic role to play. Although some intentionalists are ready to bite this bullet, by doing so they effectively undermine one of the standard motivations of their (...) view, i.e. the claim that perceptual experiences justify beliefs. Consequently, whatever reason might there be to think that phenomenal consciousness has unique epistemic import, it is also a reason to reject intentionalism. I recommend replacing the latter with an unorthodox formulation of relationalism about perception. (shrink)

According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously. The proponents of UP often support it with empirical evidence for a more specific hypothesis, according to which colours can be seen unconsciously (UPC). However, UPC is a general claim that admits of many interpretations. The main aim of this paper is to determine which of them is the most plausible. To this end, I investigate how adopting various conceptions of (...) colour and perceptual phenomenal character affects UPC’s resilience to objections. This brings me to the conclusion that the most plausible reading of UPC is the one according to which the phenomenal character of colour perception (i) is constituted by colours qua primitive mind-independent qualities of the environment and (ii) is not essentially tied to consciousness. My conclusion not only identifies the most plausible interpretation of UPC, but also highlights and supports an unorthodox version of the relational theory of perception, which is a perfectly viable yet so far overlooked stance in the debate about unconscious perception. (shrink)

Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been argued (...) that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds. (shrink)

It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological (...) disjunctivism and epistemic externalism explains the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception. (shrink)

The paper is a contribution to the object ontology. The general approach assumed in the investigation is that of Roman Ingarden's The Controversy Over the Existence of the World where an object is the subject-of-properties. The analysis of the form and the mode of existence of properties leads to the rejection of both negative and general properties. Each property is an individual qualitative moment of a particular object. Its form reveals existential heteronomy: the quality of the property is not immanent (...) but refers to the object. The subject of properties has not its own qualitative content: its form is just the internal causality establishing the unity of an object. An object is not causally isolated from other objects, but external causation differs from internal either by being ramified in case of the composition and destruction of an object or reciprocal in case of interaction between coexisting objects. (shrink)

This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly (...) expressed without the employment of disjunction. (shrink)

Pritchard calls his epistemological disjunctivism ‘the holy grail of epistemology’. What this metaphor means is that the acceptance of this thesis puts the internalism-externalism debate to an end, thanks to satisfaction of intuitions standing behind both competing views. Simultaneously, Pritchard strongly emphasizes that the endorsement of epistemological disjunctivism does not commit one to metaphysical disjunctivism. In this paper I analyze the formulations and motivations of epistemological disjunctivism presented by Pritchard and McDowell. Then I consider the most common argument for the (...) claim that epistemological disjunctivism can be held without the support of metaphysical disjunctivism. I conclude that the plausibility of epistemological disjunctivism depends on the plausibility of metaphysical disjunctivism. If the latter is false, the former postulates a set of conditions for epistemic justification that are impossible to be fulfilled. (shrink)

The claim currently known as “disjunctivism” is usually interpreted in terms of exclusive disjunction. However, it can be also explicated through the lens of alternative denial. The aim of this paper is to show that the latter interpretation is more accurate. Firstly, it reflects the core of disjunctivism more precisely. Secondly, it reduces metaphysical weight of the claim, thereby making it more plausible.

ObjectivesA growing number of studies indicate that coping with the experience of a crisis event, which causes a breach in the individual’s fundamental beliefs regarding the world and his/her place in it, can result in posttraumatic growth. Positive emotions can have an undoing effect on negative emotional arousal and broaden an individual’s scope of action, and they can foster posttraumatic growth. This study aimed to examine relations between prioritizing positivity, styles of rumination, coping strategies, and posttraumatic growth.MethodsOne hundred and sixty-four (...) Polish adults took part in the study, filling out questionnaires to measure prioritizing positivity, hope, and self-efficacy. Twelve to fifteen months later, 104 of them accepted the invitation to the second part of the study. The participants reported the intensity of rumination associated with the most critical event in their lives, which took place between the first and second stages of the study and the coping strategies they used. Posttraumatic growth and life satisfaction were also measured.ResultsResults from hierarchical regressions found that higher levels of prioritizing positivity, deliberate ruminations, and religious coping and lower level of intrusive ruminations were associated with posttraumatic growth. The results also indicate that self-esteem was a significant predictor of life satisfaction.ConclusionsThe results of the prospective study confirm that individual differences in prioritizing positivity can relate to a process of posttraumatic growth. Prioritizing positivity was associated with the use of an active coping strategy and deliberate but not intrusive ruminations. Previous studies on the role of prioritizing positivity have focused on the impact on the level of wellbeing of seeking positive emotions in everyday life. Our results show the importance of prioritizing positivity in coping with stress and trauma. These results can be used to design effective psychological intervention techniques to support people experiencing trauma and psychological crises. The results also indicate that life satisfaction has different predictors from posttraumatic growth. (shrink)

Ingarden conceives ontology as a philosophia prima, which deals with being as purely possible. It is an intuitive and a priori analysis of the content of the relevant ideas. It consists of three parts: existential, formal and material ontology. Existential ontology deals with the possible modes of existence. Problems of factual existence pertain to metaphysics, which is a separate branch of theoretical philosophy, based on ontology.

Tekst, nawiązujący do artykułu Stanisława Judyckiego „Bóg i uniwersalia”, zawiera analizę zasadniczych stanowisk w sporze o uniwersalia i przedstawia własną interpretację niektórych kluczowych kwestii tej problematyki — zwłaszcza koncepcji tak zwanego realizmu umiarkowanego, przypisywanego Arystotelesowi. Wspomniana jest też ewentualność wykorzystania tego rodzaju rozważań w innym zagadnieniu klasycznej metafizyki — w kwestii istnienia Absolutu.

Celem artykułu jest odsłonięcie nowych sensów symbolicznych _Cmentarzyska_ Władysława Stanisława Reymonta poprzez poddanie tekstu oglądowi z perspektywy widmontologii, koncepcji filozoficznej i metodologii badawczej autorstwa Jacques’a Derridy. Szczególnie istotny jest dla niej motyw światła i cienia oraz emersji, stopniowego wyłaniania się obiektów z mroku. W tekście światło kojarzone jest z wiedzą, informacją, dźwiękiem rozmowy, zaś ciemność oznacza milczenie, napięcie i oczekiwanie. Zwycięstwo światła nad cieniem ma silne konotacje symboliczne, zarówno w kontekście religijnym – triumf dobra nad złem, jak i filozoficznym – (...) oświecenie wypierające obskurantyzm. W teorii Derridy rola światła jest nierozerwalnie związana z kategorią obecności, objawienia istnienia. Filozof dekonstruuje to klasyczne znaczenie, wprowadzając pojęcia widm, śladów oraz odraczania apokalipsy, rozumianej jako odsłonięcie prawdy. Analiza widmontologiczna prowadzi do konstatacji, że osobiste doświadczenia autora stały się źródłem widma rewolucji, zaś tekst jest manifestacją jego nawiedzenia. Czerwień _Cmentarzyska_ to wcielenie apokalipsy, zapowiedź kataklizmu nadciagającego nad fabryczne miasto, z pewnością inspirowane Łodzią przełomu XIX i XX stulecia. (shrink)

The paper aims at a critical investigation of the famous initial chapter of the so called "transcendental deduction of categories" from Hegel's "Science of Logic". At first, some graphic interpretation of the dialectic of becoming is proposed to show how different aspects of it fit the general "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" scheme ruling the transcendental deduction. Then the question is put forward whether the notions involved in Hegel's doctrine of becoming can really serve any explanation or clarification of it. The not very surprising (...) answer is that instead of explaining anything they badly need explanation themselves. A suspicion arises that Hegel's actual intention could have been rather to completely confuse a reader at the very beginning of the exposition of his system, with the hope that after such a shocking treatment he will loose his criticism altogether. Such tactics can be very effective sometimes, as the famous Blitzkrieg invented by German General Staff showed once. (shrink)

The paper refers to the author's informal considerations from his article „The ontology of founding” (published in „Filozofia Nauki”, 1995, no 1-2). The starting point of the paper is a definition of „monadic whole”, i.e. such a whole, which contains no elements mutually linked up by moments of unity. Then definitions of „part stricto sensu”, „whole (in general)”, „identity of two wholes” etc., are formulated. Using the conceptual apparatus, introduced by these definitions, the author gives some theorems withoutlines of their (...) proofs. In conclusion, the explicative power of the presented formalization with reference to remaining categorial notions of ontology (i.e. notions of property, relation, universals), and in comparison to some other modern theories of parts and wholes, is discussed. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to provide information on the evolution of three correlated notions listed above. Only constructive standpoints, assuming possibility of the relevant sciences are taken into account, no criticism of metaphysics as such, etc. is mentioned. Included are some opinions on the methodology of these disciplines. As Polish reader still cannot find information concerning many basic issues in this field of study, some elements of doxography are also included to fill the most nagging gaps. This provisional (...) survey is intended to serve as a complementary source of information in the field of ontology for students of philosophy. (shrink)

The paper develops the argument presented in my earlier article, Intentional Reference and Its Object in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism. It contains further considerations on the proper understanding of Husserl’s notion of noema. My aim is not only to present an interpretation of Husserl’s text, but primarily to understand what constitutes an intentional reference of an act of consciousness. I agree with some of Husserl’s claims in Ideas, Book I, that noema, sense and intentional object are basically the same. This standpoint (...) implies, however, a drastic reinterpretation of the notion of an object. I refer to Ingarden’s conception of a purely intentional object to show the difficulties connected with regarding noema as an object separate from consciousness but still existentially dependent on it. Analyzing Husserlian notion of a noematic core I emphasize the relevance of universals for Husserl’s theory of consciousness. (shrink)

The following issues are considered in the paper: The proper understanding of the ‘attempt to doubt’ recommended by Husserl in Ideas, Book I, as a point of departure on a way to the transcendental reduction. How intentional reference of an act of consciousness is possible and what it consists in, according to Husserl. A logical dependence between the characteristics of intentional reference and the standpoint of transcendental idealism in Husserl’s Ideas, Book I. How to understand Husserl’s claim that the intentional (...) object is equivalent to sense. I arrive at the conclusion that a fully consistent interpretation of Husserl’s declarations regarding the aforementioned issues does not seem to be possible; for one needs to modify Husserl’s standpoint in certain respects. These considerations will be carried on in an article titled ‘The Noema as Sense. The Problem of the Object of Consciousness in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism’, forthcoming in Diametros. (shrink)

The problems investigated in the paper concern mainly the question: What do components of the predicative sentence „A is b” refer to? The following particular issues are considered: the Aristotelian distinction between particularity and ontic self-sufficiency; the interpretation of different kinds of predication based on that distinction; a debate on different standpoints in the controversy concerning the nature of the predicate referent, in particular a contemporary version of nominalism called The Resemblance Theory of Universals (with the related problem of the (...) ontic status of the relation of temporal existence in general and different kinds of this relation; and finally different dimensions of the complexity of a thing. A former version of the paper was published in English in The Proceedings of The Second German-Polish Workshop on Logic and Logical Philosophy (Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, Toruń 1998). (shrink)

The Aristotelian double characterization of a primary substanceexploits the difference between the part-whole relation and the non-linguisticrelation of predication. A problem arises whether and how the second relationcould be reduced to something else. Such a reduction is explicitly declared orat least implicitly assumed in all version of conceptualism and nominalism.The moderate realism is often interpreted as a reductionism of this kindbut such interpretations do not seem corect. Only the so called resemblancetheory can be regarded as a successful attempt at the (...) reduction in question.However, it seems that the predication per se cannot be disposed of even inthis way. If so, then the nature of the relation of predication still waits fora precise analysia and description. This would provide an insight into theessence of a universal being. (shrink)

Klasyczny rachunek zdań w ujęciu semantycznym, uważany niekiedy za idealizację opisowej części języka naturalnego czy też za teorię spójników zdaniowych, traktuje negację jako czystą funkcję prawdziwościową. Przyzwyczajeni do takiego ujęcia, uważamy je za adekwatne, ściśle oddające sens, jaki ma ten funktor w zdaniach opisowych. Tymczasem okazuje się, że w refleksji filozoficznej przypisywano negacji i inne, bardzo różnorodne role. Na przykładzie tego, co o negacji i zdaniach przeczących mówią: Parmenides, sofiści, Platon, Arystoteles, a z filozofów nowożytnych i współczesnych Kant, Hegel, Bergson, (...) fenomenologowie Reinach i Ingarden, Ludwig Wittgenstein, przedstawiciele brytyjskiej filozofii analitycznej J.L. Austin i A.J. Ayer czy wreszcie Martin Heidegger, można zauważyć zależność funkcji semantycznych przypisywanych negacji od takich czy innych rozstrzygnięć ontologicznych dokonywanych przez tych myślicieli. Pamiętając o tym, warto jednak wyróżnić interpretację negacji jako funkcji prawdziwościowej - nie dlatego, żeby była ona jedynie poprawna, lecz ze względu na to, że interpretacja taka jako najmniej zaangażowana ontologicznie daje się uzgodnić z większością innych tu wymienionych. W tym i tylko tym znaczeniu może ona być uważana za uprzywilejowaną w stosunku do innych. (shrink)

My aim is to show that the elaborated and very attractive theory of the purely intentional object developed by Roman Ingarden within the framework of his ontology is nevertheless untenable. The main reason of this is the false assumption, generally accepted in phenomenology, that some existing object always corresponds to an act of consciousness. This general issue has been investigated in my paper "On Intending and Being Intended" (to appear in Studia Philosophiae Christianae). In the present paper however I am (...) dealing with the more detailed question of the relation between Ingarden's theory of the purely intentional object and his ontology. I maintain that the existential and formal description of the purely intentional object contradicts the general characteristics of the object as such, developed in Ingarden's Hauptwerk: "Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt". With this respect three main objections can be mentioned: inconsistency in the existential characterization of the purely intentional being, incomprehensibility of the formal "two-sidedness" of the purely intentional object and finally - lack of the authentic unity of the intentional content. (shrink)

Remarks on Barbara Tuchańska’s “Cultural Ontology” , Diametros – An Online Journal of Philosophy, no. 41 , B. Tuchańska, “ Cultural Ontology: the Cultural Constitution of Being ” , Diametros – An Online Journal of Philosophy, no. 42 ).

Ajdukiewicz podejmował kilkakrotnie próbę analizy i krytyki metafizycznego idealizmu zarówno w jego wersji obiektywnej, jak subiektywnej. Angażował do tego celu pewne pojęcia i wyniki współczesnej metalogiki, co stanowiło przykład zastosowania właściwej mu metody analizy filozoficznej, zwanej metody parafraz. Analiza Ajdukiewiczowskiej argumentacji ukazuje jej dalece niekonkluzywny charakter, jak również zdaje się wykazywać, że metoda parafraz nie znajduje tu swego efektywnego zastosowania. Konkluzją przedstawionych rozważań jest hipoteza, iż fundamentalne przekonania metafizyczne nie poddają się krytyce o charakterze semiotycznym.

Today, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility is more popular in Poland. Under the framework, many companies are taking actions to its stakeholders and the environment. These include building human capital, social capital and innovation. These elements are the immaterial factors of competitiveness of the region. This means that the actors in the CSR contribute to increasing the competitiveness of the region and its competitive advantage. The article discusses the factors of competitiveness and also provides examples of companies that build (...) them. (shrink)