The theory of the square of opposition has been studied for over 2,000 years and has seen a resurgence in new theories and research since the second half of the twentieth century. This volume collects papers presented at the Sixth World Congress on the Square of Opposition, held in Crete in 2018, developing an interdisciplinary exploration of the theory. Chapter authors explore subjects such as Aristotle’s ontological square, logical oppositions in Avicenna’s hypothetical logic, and the power of the square of (...) opposition to solve theological problems regarding predestination and theodicy. Other topics covered include: Hegel’s opposition to diagrams De Morgan’s unpublished octagon of opposition turnstile figures of opposition institutional model-theoretic treatment of oppositions Lacan’s four formulas of sexuation the theory of oppositional poly-simplexes The Exoteric Square of Opposition will appeal to pure logicians, historians of logic, semioticians, philosophers, theologians, mathematicians, and psychoanalysts. (shrink)

This chapter examines the fragmentary evidence derived from Timaeus' history of the city-states of Sicily and Southern Italy, with special attention to the account of a certain Apollonius preserved by Iamblichus in his work On the Pythagorean Way of Life. The analysis introduces the term, “exoteric” Pythagoreans, which appears to correspond with the mathematical Pythagoreans, on the grounds that both were considered heretical for having published/demonstrated the doctrines of Pythagoras—an act that corresponded with the advent of a “democratic” type (...) of Pythagoreanism. A comparative analysis of Timaean and Peripatetic histories of Pythagoreanism yields an account of how the “publication” of the doctrines of Pythagoras corresponds with the “democratization” of philosophical knowledge, an activity that serves as a model for the public use of reason in order to resolve disputes. (shrink)

Moshe Halbertal, Ezoterism si exoterism. Restrictiile misterului in traditia iudaica Ed. Limes, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, traducere din limba engleza de Roxana Havrici.

This is a review essay in English of Volume 7 of the Critical Edition of Rudolf Steiner’s Writings, Schriften – Kritische Ausgabe (2015). This volume 7 contains Steiner’s two main texts on the spiritual path of knowledge.

In this paper I provide a comprehensive account of Leibniz's important but neglected distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric. I argue that Leibniz distinguished between esoteric and exoteric modes of presentation, and esoteric and exoteric content. He endorsed the esoteric mode, which was modeled on the geometrical model of demonstration, as the ideal mode of presentation in metaphysics. However, he thought it would be a mistake to introduce his metaphysics to people in the form of an (...) esoteric treatise. This was not due to a problem with the esoteric mode per se. The problem stemmed from the gap between the esoteric content of his metaphysics and the received views of his time, particularly those that were grounded in what he regarded as sensory prejudices. This misguided reliance on the senses made it extremely difficult for people to conceive of the purely intelligible concepts and principles at the core of his metaphysics. Leibniz used pedagogical exoteric writing to compose texts that could function as intellectual stepping-stones that would enable his readers traverse the gulf between received opinions and esoteric truth. I isolate the key rhetorical strategies that Leibniz utilized in his pedagogical exoteric writing, and explain how one can develop principled esoteric/exoteric interpretations of his writings. Awareness of his nuanced views on the esoteric and the exoteric will allow us to more adequately address central questions in Leibniz scholarship about the extent to which his views change over time, about whether he attains considered views on particular topics, and about the extent to which his philosophy is systematic. (shrink)

From the 11th through 13th centuries, the mass of yogic techniques informed by the Yoganiruttara cycle of Buddhist Tantra flowed over the Himalayan range and extended to the Hexi Corridor. The Tibetan, Tangut, and Chinese peoples who had been exposed to such a yogic and tantric culture actively drew on Indian Buddhist legacies as taxonomical and conceptual device to structure and make sense of these cutting-edge contemplative techniques. One such discursive device was the Mahāmudrā rubric considered as the pinnacle of (...) a systematic presentation of both tantric and sūtric paths to ultimacy. In this article, I explore the sūtric path structure embedded within a 12th-century Tangut Mahāmudrā presentation—in the Keypoints of Mahāmudrā as the Ultimate along with its commentary—formulated under the Tibetan auspices. I analyze the relevance of the Keypoints exoteric expositions of Mahāmudrā to the Mahāyāna intellectual history through the lens of non-conceptual meditation scheme. In specific, I argue that the Tangut Mahāmudrā works under survey map out a “positive-mystical” paradigm of Buddhist soteriology shared across those Mahāyāna scholastic traditions inspired by the Buddha-nature doctrine to account for the tantric phenomenology. (shrink)

The article argues for a Straussian interpretation of Tacitus’ Agricola by showing that Tacitus’ explicit praise of the life of Agricola and criticism of the Stoic martyrs are undermined by his implicit comparisons to other lives within the text and by his allusions to other works of Socratic political philosophy, especially Xenophon’s. The popular teaching of the Agricola is that Agricola’s policy of political quietism is the best way of life for an ambitious young Roman living under a tyrannical emperor, (...) while the Stoic’s political extremism is not beneficial for the common good. The philosophic teaching, by contrast, is that a ‘serious and wise man’ will pursue a kind of Xenophontic approach to politics because he recognizes that the philosophic life is the highest life, but that it is necessary for the philosopher to advise the tyrant if the conditions for a philosophic life are going to be possible. (shrink)

『이장의』는 번뇌를 다룬 원효의 저작으로 1949년 일본에서 고서본이 발견된 이래 최근 활발하게 연구가 진행되고 있다. 횡초혜일이 원효 『이장의』의 핵심 사상에 대해 유가론과 기신론계의 종합이라 평가한 이후, 이에 대해 학계의 의견이 분분하나 이 논문에서는 유식으로 본다.BR 업(業)과 십이연기(十二緣起)는 초기불교부터 있었던 불교의 핵심 개념이다. 그러나 후대에 와서 연기의 의미와 구조는 새롭게 재편되어야만 하는 필요성에 직면하게 되었다. 초기불교와 설일체유부에서 주장하는 십이연기의 삼세양중인과(三世兩中因果)는 유식에 와서 이세일중인과(二世一重因果)로 변모한 것이 그것이다.BR 원효『이장의』 현료문에서는 유가사지론을 바탕으로 업(業)의 발현과 생(生)의 맺음에 대해 논한다. 즉 십이연기의 주체인 무명(無明)과 애(愛)와 취(取)는 (...) 명언(名言) 종자를 중심으로 발업(發業), 결생(結生)하여 이생인과(二生因果) 한다. 이러한 『이장의』의 설명은 유식의 아뢰야식이 종자설을 기본으로 연기하며 번뇌장이 아집(我執), 소지장이 법집(法執)과 관계하고 있음을 밝힌다.BR 번뇌장은 아공(我空)을 모르는 데서 오는 집착의 번뇌로 아집을 형성하여 해탈을 장애한다. 소지장은 법공(法空)을 모르는 데서 오는 집착의 번뇌로 법집을 형성하여 보리를 장애한다. 유식으로 보자면 번뇌장은 제6의식과 제7말나식의 작용과 관계하고, 소지장은 제7말나식과 제8아뢰야식과 관계한다. 결국 이장은 제7말나식의 역할이 지대하다 볼 수 있다.BR 원효는 한국 대승 불교의 새벽을 연 사상가이자 실천가이다. 그가 쓴 『이장의』는 현상을 드러낸 현료문에 중점을 두었을 뿐만 아니라, 유(有)를 중시한 유식을 기본 바탕으로 하고 었다. 특히 존재의 형성을 드러내는 발업과 결생에 대한 원효의 설명은 자아와 세계가 제8아뢰야식의 식소변이자, 의타기를 의타기로 아는 것이 원성실성이라는 유가행파의 기본 사상을 드러내고 있다. 더구나 원효가 중생심을 강조한 대승의 승려였음을 볼 때 현료문을 중시한 원효의 대표적 핵심사상은 유식에 있다 하겠다. (shrink)

In the present paper, I intend to show the role in Leibniz’s overall philosophy of his definition of a complete notion as a concept that contains every predicate of a certain subject. I will try to argue that this definition consists in an exoteric and more intuitive or accessible device directed to those unfamiliar with the intricacies of his views on logic and also that it plays a pedagogical role in his writings. In addition, I intend to explain away (...) the seeming mismatch between this definition and that of individual substance, as well as Leibniz’s definitions of truth and proposition based on the relation of concept containment. In doing so, I will try to show that the definition above of a complete notion provides an important argument for the existence of such notions based on our ordinary talk about individuals and also how my proposal deals with Donald Rutherford’s problem of this definition’s extensional correctness vis-a-vis accidents. (shrink)

This article explores Ludwik Fleck’s concepts of collective thinking, style of thinking, esoteric and exoteric communication as precursors of the concepts of paradigm and incommensurability central in Thomas Kuhn’s thought.

Exoteric dossier : the literary Agamben -- Projection : there is language -- Logos, thinking thought -- Poiesis, thinking through making -- Modernity, productive anti-poiesis -- Logopoiesis, thinking tautology -- Enjambment, the turn of verse -- Caesura, the space of thought.

"Aristotle versus Plato. For a long time that is the angle from which the tale has been told, in textbooks on the history of philosophy and to university students. Aristotle's philosophy, so the story goes, was au fond in opposition to Plato's. But it was not always thus."--from the Introduction In a wide-ranging book likely to cause controversy, Lloyd P. Gerson sets out the case for the "harmony" of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the standard view in late antiquity. He aims to (...) show that the twentieth-century view that Aristotle started out as a Platonist and ended up as an anti-Platonist is seriously flawed. Gerson examines the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle based on their principle of harmony. In considering ancient studies of Aristotle's Categories, Physics, De Anima, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics, the author shows how the principle of harmony allows us to understand numerous texts that otherwise appear intractable. Gerson also explains how these "esoteric" treatises can be seen not to conflict with the early "exoteric" and admittedly Platonic dialogues of Aristotle. Aristotle and Other Platonists concludes with an assessment of some of the philosophical results of acknowledging harmony. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to expose a basic flaw at the root of perennialism as a method for studying mysticism—its distinction between ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ components of mysticism and religion. Rather than being distinct, the specific ‘exoteric’ doctrines of a given mystic’s tradition penetrate the mystics’ knowledge-claims. Thus, the ‘esoteric’ dimension in a mystical tradition is permeated by that mystical tradition’s ‘exoteric’ doctrines, not by the transcultural and ahistorical perennial spine that perennialists postulate. Contrary to (...) what the perennialists suggest, there is no one underlying esoteric set of beliefs embedded in all traditional religions that all mystics share. Rather, in the different religious traditions of the world, there are genuinely different mysticisms with different beliefs, practices, values, and goals. Thus, the perennialist approach distorts the history of mysticism. It is better seen as a theology of religions than as an alleged discernment of timeless truths presented throughout the history of mysticism. (shrink)

The word 'philosophy' as well as the conjuring expression 'Indian philosophy' has meant different things to different people-endeavours and activities, old and new, grave and frivolous, edifying and banal, esoteric and exoteric. In this book, the author has chosen deliberately a very dominant trend of the classical (Sanskrit) philosophical literature as his subject of study. The age of the material used here demands both philological scholarship and philosophical amplification. Classical pramanasastras usually deal with the theory of knowledge, the nature (...) of inference and language, and the related questions of ontology and semantics. Several important concepts and theories have been singled out for critical analysis and clarification in modern terms so that the results may be intelligible to modern students of both Sanskrit and philosophy. It is hoped that such an attempt will kindle the enthusiasm of young scholars in the field and inspire them to proceed in this comparatively new area of research and explore further and more interesting possibilities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz on Innate Ideas and the Early Reactions to the Publication of the Nouveaux Essais (1765)* GIORGIO TONELLI LIzmNIz' Nouve~ Essais,written in 1703-1705 (citedhereafter as NE), were posthumously published by Raspe x in 1765, at the beginning of a Leibniz revivalwhich was alsomarked by thelargeDutens editionof 1768. As the greatupheaval in Kant's thought took place in 1769, and as thisupheaval had as one of itsmain characteristicsthe rejection of sensibility (...) as the sole source of knowledge,2 it is easy to infer that Kant's reading of the NE may have been one of the elements prompting him to adopt his new solution. It is not the ambition of this paper to answer that difficult question: rather it is an attempt towards clearing the ground for an answer to it, by inquiring into the early reactions of philosophical circles, especially German, to the appearance of the NE. To what extent was the significance of the particular doctrines expounded in the NE noticed? To what extent did contemporary philosophers realize that these were to profoundly modify the picture of Leibniz' psychological tenets? And, therefore, to what extent could Kant have been stimulated by a widespread reaction to pay special attention to the peeu!ia~lies of that work7 In conformity with this purpose, I shall focus my research on the question o/the origin of knowledge. As it is my task to reconstruct a general philosophical atmosphere, I will not confine my research to philosophic reactions prior to 1769, but will also take into consideration some attitudes of the following decade. As frequently happens in the history of ideas, the impact of a certain event may be noticed almost immediately after its occurrence, but the documentation of its effects may be available only after a certain delay. But they are nevertheless indicative of that prior impact. Before starting this enquiry, I shall: (1) point out the difference between the doctrine in question as it is expounded in the NE and as it appeared in the previously published works of Leibniz; (2) examine the interpretations of Leibniz' psychology prior to 1765, especially as represented in the version which was accepted by Wolff and incorporated into his system. * I want to expressmy gratitude to my friend Dr. Heinrieh Schepers,Director of the LeibnizStelle of Miinster University, for severalreferences and suggestions,and for his sympathy with the subjectof this paper. 1 Oeuvres philosophique$ latines et franfaises du feu Mr. de Leibniz tir~es de ses Manuscrits qui #e conservent dans la Biblioth~que royale ~ Hanovre et publi~es par M. Rud. Eric Raspe. Avec une preface de Mr. Kaestner, Professeur en math$matique d GOttingue (Amsterdam et Leipzig, 1765). Cf. (3. Tondli, "Die Umwiilzung yon 1769 bed Kant," Kant-Studien,LIV (1963), 369 ft. [437] 438 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY I. It is an obvious principle in Leibniz' metaphysics that all knowledge stems from the interior of the soul, or monad: from this point of view, it may correctly be stated that for Leibniz all knowledge is innate. It is equally obvious in our day that Leibniz held that there is a basic distinction between the way we know necesstwy and universal truths, emerging from the soul's intellect, and the way we know contingent and particular truths, emerging from the soul's sensibility. Therefore, from a psychological and exoteric point of view (as in the NE) the first kind of truths may be called innate (par excellence), while the second may be called acquired. As it happened, the works of Leibniz published prior to 1765 almost exclusively represented the general metaphysical point of view, and this led to a fatal distortion of his thought by his followers. The interpretations of Leibniz were from the very beginningm and still are in our day---profoundly influenced by the fact that many of Leibniz' works were not published in his lifetime, but appeared (and still shall appear) posthumously during more than two centuries. Consequently the distinction between the origin of necessary and the origin of contingent truths was generally overlooked. This is clearly explained by an examination of Leibniz' worksa which were published before his death (1716) and shortly thereafter. One of the most influential... (shrink)

Leo Strauss presents at least two distinct accounts of the idea that the authors in the political-philosophical canon have often masked their true teachings. A weaker account of esotericism, dependent on the contingent fact of presecution, is attributed to the moderns, while a stronger account, stemming from a necessary conflict between philosophy and society, is attributed to the ancients. Although most interpreters agree that Strauss here sides with the ancients, this view fails to consider the possibility that Strauss's writings on (...) esotericism may themselves be composed esoterically. A reevaluation of Straussian hermeneutics in light of this possibility suggests that the elitism and secrecy often associated with "Straussianism" may stem, not from Strauss's true account of esotericism, but instead from an exoteric doctrine designed to seduce students into a life of philosophy. (shrink)

In this volume Henry Corbin emphasizes the differences between the exoteric and esoteric forms of Islam. He also reveals that whereas in the West philosophy and religion were at odds, they were inseparably linked, at least during this period, in the Islamic world. A valuable section of notes and appendices includes original translation of numerous Sufi treatises.

_The Enduring Importance of Leo Strauss_ takes on the crucial task of separating what is truly important in the work of Leo Strauss from the ephemeral politics associated with his school. Laurence Lampert focuses on exotericism: the use of artful rhetoric to simultaneously communicate a socially responsible message to the public at large and a more radical message of philosophic truth to a smaller, more intellectually inclined audience. Largely forgotten after the Enlightenment, exotericism, he shows, deeply informed Strauss both as (...) a reader and as a philosophic writer—indeed, Lampert argues, Strauss learned from the finest practitioners of exoteric writing how to become one himself. Examining some of Strauss’s most important books and essays through this exoteric lens, Lampert reevaluates not only Strauss but the philosophers—from Plato to Halevi to Nietzsche—with whom Strauss most deeply engaged. Ultimately Lampert shows that Strauss’s famous distinction between ancient and modern thinkers is primarily rhetorical, one of the great examples of Strauss’s exoteric craft. Celebrating Strauss’s achievements while recognizing one main shortcoming—unlike Nietzsche, he failed to appreciate the ramifications of modern natural science for philosophy and its public presentation—Lampert illuminates Strauss as having even greater philosophic importance than we have thought before. (shrink)

: Skepticism as doubts about religious knowledge played a significant role in the intellectual reflection of the fourth and fifth Islamic centuries, a period of considerable plurality within Islam on many levels. Such skepticism was directed at revealed knowledge that spelled out the customs and norms particular to the Islamic way of life. Doubts were pushed by theologians who, themselves caught within a web of "parity of evidence" between the various schools of Islam, saw little hope of verifying the superiority (...) of Muslim ways over those of other communities, and Muslim intellectuals who viewed the particular religio-moral practices of Islam as shamefully atavistic and primitive, seeking instead to table "visible" religion for an esoterically conceived one. Against such detractors, a significant scholar of the period, Abū l-Hasan al-'Āmirī, constructed a philosophical defense of exoteric Islam, arguing in Aristotelian terms for the superiority of religio-moral knowledge over philosophical knowledge in light of the greater benefit of the former to the welfare of society and the superiority of Islamic religio-moral knowledge, since, he claims, it squares with logic more than any other communal way of life. The argument, one of many seeking to come to terms with the intellectual vagaries of the day, demonstrates how skepticism pushed scholars to explore more profoundly the nature of religion. In al-'Āmirī's case, his argument, metaphysically based with mystical inclinations, set the stage for later articulations of Islamic religiosity that integrated the human mind into the arena of Islam's revealed way of life. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the reception of Aristotle’s writings from 100 BC to early Neoplatonism. The 1stcentury BC is marked by a renaissance of interest in Aristotle’s acroamatic treatises, in connection to Andronicus’ editorial work (whatever its precise character). This is a well known fact, but it is worth noting that interpreters of Aristotle between the 1st century BC and the 1st century AD were only familiar with a limited set of treatises (in particular, Aristotle’s Categories, Rhetoric, Topics and De (...) caelo). The Academic Eudorus of Alexandria was a partial exception, since he was probably acquainted with parts of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Aristotle’s exoteric dialogues remained a majour source for those interested in Aristotle well into the 2ndcentury AD. Finally, late-hellenistic compendia and handbooks provided second-hand information on Aristotle’s philosophy. It is only between the 2ndand the 3rdcenturies that the Peripatetic commentators developed a systematic reading of the whole corpus of Aristotle’s acroamatic treatises. Their work culminated with Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose exegesis laid the basis for the subsequent incorporation of Aristotle within Neoplatonism accomplished by Plotinus and Porphyry. (shrink)

A cultural change occurred roughly 40,000 years ago. For the first time, there was evidence of belief in unseen agents and an afterlife. Before this time, humans did not show widespread evidence of being able to think about objects, persons, and other agents that they had not been in close contact with. I argue that one can explain this transition by appealing to a population increase resulting in greater exoteric (inter-group) communication. The increase in exoteric communication triggered the (...) actualization of a dormant potential for greater syntactic computational power; specifically it triggered syntactic movement. Syntactic movement, in turn, made possible variable binding, which crucially figures into cognition by description, a naturalistic analogue of Russell’s knowledge by description. Cognition by description made possible the ability to conceive of things one had never experienced, such as mythological beings, places only visited by the dead, and so forth. The Amazonian Pirahã provide some corroboration for this hypothesis, since they exhibit the combination of traits here attributed to Middle Paleolithic individuals, namely exclusively esoteric (intra-group) communication, evident lack of syntactic movement, and a limitation to knowledge (cognition) by acquaintance. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore ways in which metaphors contribute to hermeneutical resistance, that is, to practices that overcome and/or ameliorate hermeneutical injustice. I distinguish two aspects of hermeneutical injustice and two corresponding kinds of resistance: exoteric and esoteric hermeneutical injustice/resistance. The former injustice consists in unjust harm due to an inability to make one's experience understood to others. The latter consists in such a harm due to an inability to fully understand one's own experiences. In exoteric hermeneutical (...) resistance, metaphors can overcome resistances in others to understand oppressed agents' contributions because of its automatic processing and anti-deniability. In esoteric hermeneutical resistance, metaphors may highlight common structures in various aspects of marginalised agent's experiences, they can provide means of denoting social properties obscured by hermeneutical injustice and they can exhibit hermeneutical injustice by resisting interpretation. I illustrate these practices through works by Emily Dickinson, Ralph Ellison, Frantz Fanon, Paul Celan and Nelly Sachs. Those examples show the power of metaphors in hermeneutical resistance. (shrink)

"Henry Corbin's works are the best guide to the visionary tradition.... Corbin, like Scholem and Jonas, is remembered as a scholar of genius. He was uniquely equipped not only to recover Iranian Sufism for the West, but also to defend the principal Western traditions of esoteric spirituality."--From the introduction by Harold Bloom Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240) was one of the great mystics of all time. Through the richness of his personal experience and the constructive power of his intellect, he made a (...) unique contribution to Shi'ite Sufism. In this book, which features a powerful new preface by Harold Bloom, Henry Corbin brings us to the very core of this movement with a penetrating analysis of Ibn 'Arabi's life and doctrines. Corbin begins with a kind of spiritual topography of the twelfth century, emphasizing the differences between exoteric and esoteric forms of Islam. He also relates Islamic mysticism to mystical thought in the West. The remainder of the book is devoted to two complementary essays: on "Sympathy and Theosophy" and "Creative Imagination and Creative Prayer." A section of notes and appendices includes original translations of numerous Su fi treatises. Harold Bloom's preface links Sufi mysticism with Shakespeare's visionary dramas and high tragedies, such as The Tempest and Hamlet . These works, he writes, intermix the empirical world with a transcendent element. Bloom shows us that this Shakespearean cosmos is analogous to Corbin's "Imaginal Realm" of the Sufis, the place of soul or souls. (shrink)

There is a didactical as well as a philosophical importance to providing a commentary on the Preface to Hegel's handbook on the philosophy of right. Considering the fact that the text brings us the thought of a great and difficult philosopher in a non-rigorous, "exoteric" way, it is well suited to the task of introducing students to the world of think ing. It is, however, too difficult to do this without being supplemented by some explanation. Analysis and hints for (...) further study are necessi tated here by both the interweaving of political and philosophical viewpoints and the philosophical presuppositions with which this Preface is full. The philosophical importance of a commentary on Hegel's text can be found partially in the incessant quotation of the Preface in the literature on Hegel's philosophy to justify very different and contra dictory interpretations. As long as the specialists do not agree about the meaning of the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, anyone trying to explain it cannot avoid the task of making his or her own contribu tion to the philosophical debate concerning the nature and content of Hegel's work. (shrink)

This essay focuses on Günther Anders’s engagement with (political) poetry. I draw on published material and unpublished source texts from the Anders Nachlass to track how Anders arrives at his own writing style and mode of address through his sustained engagement with poetry. Anders’s philosophical prose and exoteric use of language is shaped by multifaceted reflections on (political) poetry and by the tension between ‘political poetry’ and ‘lyrical action’. I first elaborate on Anders's reading of Brecht in the early (...) 1930s, and then turn to the poetry and reflections on poetics that were written during his long exile in the US (1936–50). It is from this basis that I consider Anders’s categorical and programmatic turn away from poetry from the mid-1940s onwards. What emerges from my discussion is that engagements with literature, and with poetry in particular, were not a marginal activity for Anders but reflect a broad, life-long interest in (predominantly) classical and contemporary poetry, resulting in reflections on poetics and his own extensive poetic praxis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 95 direction, it opens a field of pure philosophy, unencumbered by surds such as finite man. Only if the Phenomenology is taken as a monographic work on man can there be difficulty. Let us hasten to add that, on the very premises of his book, Loewenberg's criticism of Hegel is tentative rather than apodictic; its harshness is relieved through the dialogue form. And perhaps, the interlocutors will, (...) as one of them suggests, "resume (their) conversations with fresh minds at a later date" (p. 371). They might find that they have to go beyond the limits of exoteric discussion. Or, conversely, they might find that exoteric treatment can yield no more than an anthropological reading and is, in fact, bound up with it. If Loewenberg 's extant commentary did no more than demonstrate this negative point, however implicitly,it would be of great merit. But there is of course much more: there is the substance of Loewenberg's commentary, largely unaffected by the above counter-representations. Theoretical problems aside, the supreme value of the book lies in its clarity and perceptiveness, in the "sense" it makes of the Phenomenology. Of a kind all its own, it will henceforth serve as the preferred entrance to Hegel. KLAUS HARTMANN Bonn, W. Germany Arthur Hfibscher, editor. XXXVIlI. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch ]~r das Jahr 1957. (Frankfurt/ Main: Waldemar Kramer, 1967.Pp. v + 244.) Schopenhauer: Philosophe de l'Absurde. By Clement Brosset. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.Pp. ix [i] -b 107.Paper, F. 7.--) Manches in dem Jahrbuch ist rein anekdotisch; manches bio- oder bibliographisch. Einiges h~ngt nur sehr lose mit Schopenhauer zusammen; so der liingste Beitrag (K. Engisch, "Todesstrafe--ja oder nein?,") mit nfitzlicher historischer und systematiseher Ubersieht, die zum Ergebnis kommt, dass die Argumente gegen die Todesstrafe iiberwiegen. Von gesetzgeberischen Interessen getragen ist such G. Zoebe, "Sind die Tiere rechtlos?" Der zweitliingste Beitrag (H. Voigt, 'r0ber Schopenhauers Erkenntnistheorie,') enth~ilt eine Art von Variationen sum Thema des Zusammenhanges zwischen Charakter und Schicksah Man freut sich, dass ein Inder (Kanti Chandra Pandey) sich fiber Schopenhauers Kenntnis des Hinduismus und Buddismus eehr anerkennendausspricht. Das Bild der Sehopenhauerschen Philosophie, wie es uns im Jahrbuch begeguet ist das uns vertraute: Pessimismus, ErlSsung durch Kunst, Mitleid, Verneinung des Willens. Aber nach Brosset erfassen diese Kategorien nur die sekund~ren Charaktere der Schopenhauerschen Philosophie. In ihrem wirklich wertvollen Kern sei diese Philosophie erstens Vorl~uferin der yon Brosset so genannten genealogischen Philosophie eines Marx, Nietzsche und Freud; allerdings letzten Endes ein Versager, da sie auf das eigentliche Anliegen der genealogischen Philosophie, n~mlich die Ableitung konkreter und spezifischer Ideen (bei Schopenhauer: der Intelligenz) aus der Umformung unbewusster Tatbestiinde (bei Schopenhauer: des Willens), nicht eingehe, sondern sich mit der Feststellung begniigt, dass die Wurzel der (bewussten) InteUigenz der (unbewusste) Wille ist. Zweitens sei Schopenhauer der erste, der seine Philosophie auf der Urerfahrung der Grundlosigkeit (Brosset zieht den Ausdruck Absurdit~t vor), daher Unausdenkbarkeit oder Unergrfindlichkeit des Seins im ganzen, aufbaut. Auf diese Erfahrung (die Frage, 'Warum nicht Nichts?' ist unbeantwortbar) reagiere der Menseh mit Angst. Die Notwendigkeit und die Zweckm~issigkeit, die die Welt im ganzen charskterisieren, seien selbst kontingent und zwecklos. Manchmal scheint mir Brosset die Originalitiit seiner Interpretationen zu iiberseh~tzen; insbesondere seine Erkl~rung der Blindheit des Willens (S. 26f.) rennt wohl offene Tfiren ein. PHILIP MERLAN ~cripps College, Claremont, California... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rules and CommunityJeffrey Bedrick, MDThe paper, “The Dilemma of Compliance: Roles and Rules in Schizophrenia, Censorship, and Life,” by Riley Paterson raises a number of interesting issues. I am only able to address a few of these issues here, and I do so in the hope of broadening our consideration of some of the basic concerns.Paterson focuses his attention on the potentially repressive side of rules, even while acknowledging (...) the broader role of rules in human life. Thus, towards the end of his paper he writes “While I regard all experience as rule- and role-bound, the aforementioned groups”—those who “experience schizophrenia, persecution, or are otherwise marginalized and vulnerable”—“experience rules and roles with particular violence.” He admirably warns us to be sure that in our work with people we are not traumatizing or re-traumatizing them.But rules play a broader role in human life. Paterson discusses censorship and the role that rules can play in repressing the expression of ideas. But rules also allow the use of language and govern communication in general. Writers living under censorship resorted, Paterson notes, to a system of exoteric and esoteric writing and communication. But those esoteric texts, if they were not to remain purely private and unknowable to those who read the texts, had to follow certain rules and conventions to signal the reader that the exoteric text was not all there was, and that there was another, esoteric, meaning to be found within the text. Writing under conditions of censorship remained a communal, intersubjective, endeavor.With schizophrenia, the seeming central topic of the paper, the situation becomes even more complex. We shall see that Paterson’s analyses point us in two different directions.Paterson writes:In schizophrenia we see an exaggerated instance of the dilemma raised above: There is a gap that exists between the publicly available roles, and the person we feel ourselves to be. We are required to conform with the demands of these roles to preserve what we feel most natural in ourselves. People with schizophrenia often must conceal, at times, their experiences of hallucinations and delusions in order to preserve some ability for social interaction. In my clinical work, however, people with schizophrenia have often reported it has felt freeing to learn when and with whom they can share those thoughts and experiences. Freeing, not because they need to hide part of themselves but because doing so opens up possibilities of social interaction and community.Further, Paterson writes of the difficulties people with schizophrenia may have with ‘weintentionality.’ Referencing Salice and Henriksen (2021) [End Page 381] he concludes that “the self-disorders of schizophrenia preserve a capacity for joint intentionality (rule following) but severely inhibit an experience of group belonging and identity (weintentionality).” Indeed he notes, again following Salice and Henriksen (2021), “that some individuals experiencing more mild forms of schizophrenia spectrum disorders found great comfort and safety in rule following.” The problem for people with schizophrenia thus seems less with applying specific rules, which might in some cases be meant to regulate or repress behavior, than in establishing we-intentionality. Many phenomenologists have explored the concept of intersubjectivity and have noted, as have many psychoanalysts and therapists, that there is no pure, interior subject but that our very selfhood is formed in interaction and relation to others. (See, for one example, the work of Alfred Schutz (1967) for a phenomenological investigation of intersubjectivity and the social.) To borrow Paterson’s gardening metaphor, there are no sole, beautiful flowers. They must be cared for to grow, or be part of a natural ecosystem that allows them to flourish.Cognitive and negative symptoms are widely accepted as posing more of a burden to schizophrenia than the more flamboyant hallucinations and delusions. These seem to me to be due less to a difficulty conforming or complying to social rules that may be felt to be restrictive or repressive and more due to the difficulties with intersubjectivity and we-intentionality. The people I have worked with who were most limited by their schizophrenia in my judgment have been people with severe thought disorders who demonstrated severe loosening of associations and word salad. I say... (shrink)

The history of philosophy must identify in each system the determining motifs, the genuine crystallizations present throughout the entire system, and separate them from proofs, justifications, and dialogues, from their presentations by philosophers, to the degree that the latter were conscious of them. It must separate the silently advancing mole of genuine philosophical knowledge from the wordy, exoteric, phenomenological, multiformed consciousness of the subject, that consciousness which is the receptacle and motivating force of these reasonings.

Recent studies of Michael Oakeshott have stressed the mutually constitutive importance of Hobbes to Oakeshott, arguing in part that Oakeshott's Hobbes largely reflected his own concerns and broader philosophical project. This article does not dispute this, but proposes a complementary account: Oakeshott's interpretation of Hobbes was also formed in large measure by both his sympathy for Leo Strauss's account and by his perception of it as the principal rival to his own. To demonstrate the existence of such a formative engagement, (...) a close reading of Oakeshott's essay The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes is undertaken. Not only is Oakeshott found to have absorbed much of Strauss's interpretation (surprisingly including Strauss's distinction between esoteric and exoteric doctrines), the key impetus of the essay is shown to be a refutation of Strauss's characterization of Hobbes as a 'moralist of the common good'. (shrink)

What is the correct way to interpret terms when they are used to signify divine attributes? In The Guide of the Perplexed Maimonides addresses this perennial problem. I shall discuss his solution, and on the basis of that discussion I shall attempt to shed light on the question of the relationship between Maimonides' solution and that of St Thomas Aquinas, Maimonides' most illustrious critic. I wish to argue that on this most important of issues the difference between these two universal (...) figures is a good deal less than might readily be supposed. But first it should be said that Maimonides did not make things easy for those of later generations who have sought his help. Part of our difficulty with the Guide is rooted in the pastoral concern which Maimonides had for the strength of faith of those in his care. He recognized that certain of his doctrines lent themselves to misinterpretations which could lead to loss of faith. And we should scarcely expect the greatest leader of twelfth-century Jewry to ignore such a risk. His solution was to write the Guide on two levels, for two classes of people, the philosophically sophisticated and the multitude. Evidently a book which is both esoteric and exoteric leaves room for dispute about the author's intentions. And disputes have duly taken place. But there is a consensus on one critically important matter, namely, the purpose of the Guide . It was written in order to provide a philosophical interpretation of the Bible for conscientiously observant Jews who have at the same time been successful in their philosophical studies. Those studies might set the faith of such Jews at risk, and Maimonides’ intention is to protect their faith. In accepting this as his intention I am taking him at his word. (shrink)

This collection of essays is a response to a challenge that is undoubtedly paradoxical: to introduce in Italy an author who is already known and appreciated by scholars who have encountered his work, and, often, followed his teachings. While the transmission of knowledge has traditionally been through both exoteric and esoteric teachings (the former intended for the general public, and the latter for a small group of researchers), this divide is reproduced constantly through the distinction between ‘institutionalised’ knowledge found (...) even in ‘philosophy manuals’, and the knowledge that animates the research and discussions of researchers. If we keep in mind this distinction, we will undoubtedly better understand the influence and role of the work of Jean Greisch (born in 1942), within the Italian hermeneutical tradition from the second half of the last century. If on the one hand, the work of this philosopher is still not much known to the general public (owing to the lack of Italian translations), on the other hand it is difficult, if not impossible, to meet a scholar in the field of hermeneutical tradition who has not been engaged with at least some of Greisch’s works, and who has not suggested or not recommended their reading to junior researchers interested in acquiring hermeneutical reason. This gradual dissemination of Greisch’s work has led to the building of a growing community of scholars gathered around his work, a community that goes beyond all pretentious ‘Rubicon’ divide between German and French hermeneutics. (shrink)

The Library of Aristotle follows the adventures of Aristotle's book collection down to the edition of the corpus aristotelicum by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century CE. Aristotle started to collect books in order to form his personal library even before he became a member of the Academy and a pupil of Plato (367 BCE). The kernel of his collection consisted in the texts of his father Nicomachus and medical treatises which the latter, who was physician to Amyntas III (...) of Macedonia, probably had in his possession. Aristotle's own writings, the exoteric together with the didactic, cover 106 cylinders. In order to comment on the whole of the cultural tradition, he also collected all written texts accessible to him at the time: treatises on physics, philosophy, poetry, rhetoric, theory of government and politics, cosmogony, the diatribes of the sophists and all the works of Plato and the members of the Academy. His knowledge of the written tradition is evident from the numerous citations he uses in his texts and his critical comments on the works of other authors. There are three discernible periods in Aristotle's writing, which correspond to the three stages in his life in which he made major additions to his library: the period of the Academy (c. 367-347), the period of his self-imposed exile to Assus, Lesbos and Macedonia (c. 347 - 335) and the time when he taught at the Lyceum of Athens (c. 335-322). His library, comprised of all these books, came to form part of the Lyceum library, and remained intact until Theophrastus's death." -- Publisher's website. (shrink)

THE TENTH BOOK OF THE LAWS, which contains Plato's last word on cosmology and theology, has often been considered as presenting Plato's views in a more exoteric way in contrast with the more esoteric style of the Timaeus. And there are good reasons to think that this view is correct. Whereas the Timaeus stresses that "to find the maker and father of this All is difficult, and, having found it, it is impossible to communicate it to the crowd", Plato (...) is in Laws 10 intending to establish a "proemium" or rational foundation for his laws against impiety, which are supposed to be known by all. In this proemium Plato tries to argue for three propositions: that the gods exist ; that they take care of human affairs ; that they cannot be bribed by sacrifices or prayers. The underlying assumption is that learning these facts about the gods will also help to prevent impiety which, like any kind of vice, is often due to ignorance. (shrink)

The late tenth century siddha and scholar Ratnākaraśānti, also known as the Mahāsiddha Śāntipa, was renowned as the author of both philosophical śāstras and commentaries on tantra. Typically, these are considered separate spheres of activity. However, Ratnākaraśānti’s approach, building on the tradition of scholarship associated with the Mahāvairocanābhisaṃbodhitantra and the Guhyasamājatantra, as well as on Yogācāra analysis and Buddhist pramāṇa theory, is highly syncretic. This paper is a study of Ratnākaraśānti’s commentaries that highlights his synthesis of the exoteric and (...) esoteric streams of Buddhist discourse, with particular emphasis on the nondual nature of reflexive awareness (svasaṃvitti, rang rig), or 'luminosity' (prakāśa, gsal ba), which serves as the conceptual bridge between sūtra and tantra. (shrink)

The fact that Ludwik Fleck drew his inspiration from medicine has been largely overlooked, with the exception of a few scholars. Although Fleck considered his ideas applicable to all sciences, he always insisted on the specificity of medicine. To illustrate the usefulness of Fleck’s concepts for the history of medicine, three main ideas developed by Fleck are applied to the historical study of diabetes mellitus : first, that different and often divergent pictures of disease coexist within a given culture; second, (...) that scientific ideas circulate between ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’ circles; and third, that scientific concepts are often incommensurable. The author also suggests that Fleck’s epistemology, like other scholars’, is loaded with ethical and political consequences. However, the link between an ‘open’ epistemology and political or ethical questions is more explicit in Georges Canguilhem’s pioneering work on the normal and the pathological . Indeed, Canguilhem and Fleck’s conceptions of disease have much in common, so that we can use Canguilhem’s work to bring out the hidden ethical and political issues in Fleck’s work. (shrink)

Just war theory needs to become a real-time critique of government war propaganda in order to facilitate peace advocacy ante bellum. This involves countering asserted justificatory reasons with demonstrable facts that reveal other motives, thereby yielding reflective understanding which can be collectivized via electronic media. As a case in point, I compare here the publicly declared reasons for the U.S./U.K. invasion of Iraq in 2003 with reasons discussed internally months and even years before in government and think-tank documents. These sources (...) show that control of oil rather than regime change or a WMD threat was theunderlying motive. Neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration justified such deception by citing an exoteric/esoteric distinction traceable to Plato via Leo Strauss. As with the Iraq invasion, so in general such propaganda and its rationalizations can be undermined by investigative journalism understood as ranging from fact gathering to rhetorical analysis and critique. (shrink)

That Leibniz finds the philosophy of Spinoza horrifyingly wrong is obvious to anyone who reads Leibniz’s work; that Leibniz finds Spinozism so seductive that his own system is in danger of collapsing into it is less obvious but, I believe, equally true. The difference here is not so much between an exoteric and an esoteric philosophy suggested by Russell2 but between a thorough-going rationalism on the part of Spinoza and Leibniz’s “mitigated rationalism” – mitigated by the exigencies of his (...) orthodox Christianity. In other words, it is Leibniz’s traditional view of the nature of God and his creatures that leads him to abhor Spinoza’s vision, while his own commitment to a number of principles and ideas pushes him to rationalism. And if Kant is right that the mind naturally desires a system, then Leibniz ought to see the Spinozistic consequences of many of his philosophical principles. Of course, there is nothing new in saying that the God of Spinoza and the God of Leibniz are fundamentally different, but I believe that if we focus on Leibniz’s critique of Spinoza’s account of the nature of God and a constellation of related concepts, we can come to a deeper understanding of the thought of both philosophers. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill's commitment to liberty and individual development is one of the most exoteric themes of his moral and political philosophy. But the linkages between this commitment to liberty and development and Mill's conception of utility and principles of the good are not as commonly recognized. As part of a more general transformation of his utilitarianism, Mill repudiated Bentham's principles of the good and instead adopted a more sophisticated form of hedonism. While Bentham admits only the total quantity (...) of pleasure as contributing to value, Mill expands the circle to admit quality or kind of pleasure as well into the value reckoning. I have elsewhere interpreted and defended Mill's qualitative hedonism, and in this paper I can offer only a brief overview of that account and must largely assume its plausibility. Bentham and Mill agree that only pleasurable experiences and the absence of painful experiences have value and so both are called hedonists. But they have very different views about what properties of pleasures makes them valuable, or in other words what are the good-making properties of pleasure. Bentham thinks that only intensity and duration, or quantity, are good-making properties of pleasures, and thus he includes only these properties in measuring value. As a consequence, in the context of value measurement he is not interested in the kinds of things in which people take pleasure. But Mill is a qualitative hedonist, and thinks that the quality or kind of pleasure is also a good-making characteristic and thus should be included in value measurement. The things that are sources of pleasure matter to Mill. (shrink)

Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie is metaphysical, to be sure; but it is also political. To help show this I will make sense, and show the plausibility and relevance, of what appears to be one of the most metaphysical (and bizarre) claims to be found in Hegel's political philosophy: his justification of hereditary monarchy. While among Hegel scholars Hegel's theory of constitutional monarchy has been a focus of heated debate over whether Hegel is a liberal or a conservative; and has recently become a (...) focus in the debate over whether Hegel accommodated himself to the Prussian government out of fear of censorship by publishing an exoteric view endorsing hereditary monarchy that belies his �genuine�, more democratic view, to the nonspecialist Hegel's argument will seem to be of little relevance -- hereditary monarchy is not a live option for us in the 1990s. My intention in giving it serious consideration is not to have us entertain hereditary monarchy as an undeservedly neglected possibility, but rather to put the brakes on a tendency to dismiss Hegel as too much the idealist to dirty his hands with politics. (shrink)

Retrieved from unpublished manuscript remains, Arthur Schopenhauer’s Eristic Dialectics (1830–1831) has been largely ignored both by philosophers and rhetoricians. The work is highly enigmatic in that its intended meaning vacillates between playful irony and Machiavellian seriousness. Adopting an esoteric perspective, this article argues that the tract can be read as simultaneously operating on two levels: an exoteric, cynical one, according to which Schopenhauer accepts that people are going to argue irrespective of the truth and as a result provides tools (...) for defeating one’s opponents, and a deeper, esoteric level, which functions not cynically but, in Peter Sloterdijk’s language, kynically, as a satirical unmasking of the cynical impulses animating the study and practice of argumentation, especially as evinced in the rhetorical-humanist tradition. Such an interpretation reveals that, while a minor work, Eristic Dialectics offers a sophisticated philosophical critique of “the art of persuasion.”. (shrink)

Seweryn Blandzi Plato and the Protestant Principle of Autarchy of the Scripture (sola scriptura)The author gives reasons why the new holistic Tübingen-interpretation of Plato (H. Krämer, K. Gaiser, Th. A. Szlezák), which combines the Dialogues with his unwritten teaching is still difficult to accept (especially in Germany). The discovery (on the basis of indirect testimonies of Aristotle and his commentators) that there was a separate oral (“exoteric”) metaphysics of principles, which was parallel to dialogues but more valuable (timiotera) in (...) content, and which Plato did not popularize in his writings, has been an antithesis to the traditional romantic paradigm (particularly strong in Germany) of F. Schlegel-Schleiermacher, founded on the conviction of the primacy of autarchy of the written (“exoteric”) text in general. This conviction leads us to the Protestant postulate of Biblical exegesis treated as self-sufficient (sola scriptura), interpreted exclusively on its own basis (sui ipsius interpres), and Schleiermacher transposes this requirement onto Plato’s writings. On the other hand, F. Schlegel, who emphasizes the fragmentary and asystematic character of Plato’s thought in dialogues, sees Plato as a thinker who constantly moves toward infinity, unable ever to reach it. With respect to the dialogues, the reader finds himself in a similar situation as the limited individuality of finite being to infinity. For the romantics (inspired by the idealistic philosophy of subjectivity and identity), man’s greatness as a finite being manifests itself in creating works which reflect infinity. The infinity of the Absolute manifests itself in the absolute freedom and the power of creation, which man – so to speak – meets halfway, with his infinite reflection, creativity, invention, interpretation as an expression of spirit’s freedom. Hence the lasting attraction of this traditional approach, which is unlike the new paradigm that imposes great requirements and constraints on the reader (studying doxographic literature, finding in it testimonies of Plato’s disciples regarding the intra-academic teaching). When Plato’s literary dialogue is treated as a kind of an “open text,” it thus justifies all the possible “hermeneutic” attempts at free and creative interpretations. Keywords: Plato, Hans Krämer, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schlegel, romantic paradigm, sola scriptura, infinity of reflection, new paradigm, unwritten teaching, metaphysics of principles. (shrink)