This volume gives an overview of the rising field of Experimental Ethics. It is organized into five main parts: PART I – Introduction: An Experimental Philosophy of Ethics? // PART II – Applied Experimental Ethics: Case studies // PART III – On Methodology // PART IV – Critical Reflections // PART V – Future Perspectives. Among the contributors: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Eric Schwitzgebel, Ezio di Nucci, Jacob Rosenthal, and Fernando Aguiar.

Recent years have seen a continual rise of interest in the empirical study of questions traditionally located in moral philosophy, i.e., studies in Experimental Ethics. In this chapter we briefly outline the recent history of this field. To do so we have to cross disciplinary borders to quite some extent. Tracing the beginnings of Experimental Ethics back to early works in moral psychology, we delineate a sequence of theories which eventually flow into current Experimental (...) class='Hi'>Ethics. We then briefly review four topics which are intensively investigated in Experimental Ethics at the moment: moral relativism, individual and cross-cultural differences in moral judgment, and interactions of moral evaluation with other philosophical concepts. We conclude with a short historically informed comment on the demarcation problem of Experimental Ethics. (shrink)

The first obstacle experimental ethics faces when it comes to its normative account is Hume’s guillotine, also known as the naturalistic fallacy. My objective is to show how experimental ethics can answer to naturalistic fallacy with the help of normative projections.In order to arrive at my objective, I will first explain what experimental philosophy (xphi) is, and how it is perceived as a movement against “armchair philosophy.” In the second section, I explain why experimental (...) moral philosophy or experimental ethics is immune to many of the arguments that are raised against xphi, and why it is not necessary to be against armchair philosophers. After this, I argue that discussing the meta-ethical grounding of experimental ethics will not help us to answer to the naturalistic fallacy. The last section contains my own proposal for seeing people’s intuitions and decisions as normative projections that have an impact on normative ethics. In this way, Hume’s guillotine is no longer an obstacle for a normative account of experimental ethics. (shrink)

Studies suggest that people's moral intuitions are sensitive to morally irrelevant factors, such as personal force, spatial distance, ethnicity or nationality. Findings of this sort have been used to construct debunking arguments. The most prominent champion of this approach is Joshua Greene, who has attempted to undermine deontology by showing that deontological intuitions are triggered by morally irrelevant factors. This article offers a critical analysis of such empirically informed debunking arguments from moral irrelevance, and of Greene’s effort to undermine deontology. (...) One problem with arguments from moral irrelevance concerns the hierarchy between the targeted case-specific intuitions and the more general intuitions about which factors are morally (ir)relevant. If we assume that general intuitions always take precedence over case-specific intuitions, arguments from moral irrelevance become dialectically useless. By contrast, if we assume that both case-specific and general intuitions should be taken seriously, particularly sweeping debunking projects, such as Greene’s, are unlikely to go through. Another problem concerns the experimental aspect of arguments from moral irrelevance. Empirically informed arguments from moral irrelevance have been presented as examples of how empirical moral psychology can advance moral theory. But arguments from moral irrelevance can also be constructed from the armchair. And basing these arguments on empirical findings about laypeople’s intuitions is even counterproductive. (shrink)

According to experimental philosophers, experiments conducted within the psychological sciences and the neurosciences can show that moral intuitions are incapable of thorough justification. Thus, as a substitute for reliable philosophical justifications, psychological or neuropsychological explanations should be taken into consideration to provide guidance about our conduct. - In my essay I shall argue against both claims. First, I will defend the justificatory capacity of moral philosophy and maintain that empirical evidence cannot undermine moral judgements. Secondly, I will point to (...) some methodological difficulties in psychological and neuroscientific explanations of moral judgments. Finally I will show that Greene's (2008) argument from morally irrelevant factors fails to prove that moral implications can be drawn from scientific theories about moral psychology. (shrink)

Much fundamental progress in medicine and, more broadly, in medical sciences has required or benefited from self-experiments. This review provides a definition of self-experiments in which experimenters themselves are subjects for their research, and it considers the logical steps which such experiments require. Lay, medical and scientific communities are often unaware of the contributions and the full range of outcomes from self-experiments. Hence, some implications for ethics committees are explored.

In order to maximize human performance, defence forces continue to explore, develop, and apply human performance enhancement (HPE) methods, ranging from pharmaceuticals to (bio)technological enhancement. This raises ethical, legal, and societal concerns and requires organizing a careful reflection and deliberation process, with relevant stakeholders. We discuss a range of ethical, legal, and societal aspects (ELSA), which people involved in the development and deployment of HPE can use for such reflection and deliberation. A realistic military scenario with proposed HPE application can (...) serve as a starting point for such an iterative and participatory process. Stakeholders can discuss this application, modify its features, and design appropriate processes around it – for instance, procedures for informed consent. We propose that organizing aspects into these three categories – ethical, legal, and societal – can help involve appropriate interlocutors at different moments: legal aspects with people in strategy or management roles, from the start of a project; ethical aspects with people in operations and medical roles, during development; and societal aspects with people in communication and personnel roles, during deployment. Notably, we developed and discussed this framework and the three aspects in close collaboration with personnel from the military. (shrink)

According to experimental philosophers, experiments conducted within the psychological sciences and the neurosciences can show that moral intuitions are incapable of thorough justification. Thus, as a substitute for reliable philosophical justifications, psychological or neuropsychological explanations should be taken into consideration to provide guidance about our conduct. - In my essay I shall argue against both claims. First, I will defend the justificatory capacity of moral philosophy and maintain that empirical evidence cannot undermine moral judgements. Secondly,I will point to some (...) methodological difficulties in psychological and neuroscientific explanations of moral judgements. Finally, I will show that Greene's (2008) argument from morally irrelevant factors fails to prove that moral implications can be drawn from scientific theories about moral psychology. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that experimental ethics – like experimental economics – should also concern itself with field experiments. In particular, I defend two claims: a) that philosophers in normative ethics could considerably narrow down their disputes if they could agree on a wider range of socio-economic facts; and that b) the socio-economic facts that would be needed for this could only be generated by deliberate large-scale social experimentation. This essay normatively grounds my interest in (...) special administration zones. (shrink)

How does affectivity contribute to moral judgment making? -- Normative dissonance vs. the order of argumentation -- Facing otherness as an ethical experiment -- The concepts of respect revisited -- What is universal? Between subjectivity and intersubjectivity -- Experimenting with values in legal contexts : Hegel and Radbruch -- Democracy begins in the mind. Developing democratic personality.

The trolley problem is one of the liveliest research frameworks in experimental ethics. In the last decade, social neuroscience and experimental moral psychology have gone beyond the studies with mere text-based hypothetical moral dilemmas. In this article, I present the rationale behind testing the actual behaviour in more realistic scenarios through Virtual Reality and summarize the body of evidence raised by the experiments with virtual trolley scenarios. Then, I approach the argument of Ramirez and LaBarge (2020), who (...) claim that the virtual simulation of the Footbridge version of the trolley dilemma is an unethical research practice, and I raise some objections to it. Finally, I provide some reflections about the means and ends of trolley-like scenarios and other sacrificial dilemmas in experimental ethics. (shrink)

Throughout its age-old tradition, philosophy has continuously been presented with new challenges. The latest one in this series comes from the experimental disciplines and their methodology: experimental philosophy has, during the last 10 to 15 years, increasingly gained reputation, and it has certainly been a controversial issue. Within this movement, the field of ethics deserves more attention. This article aims to give not a complete overview of, but at least an introduction to, the newly rising field of (...) ‘Experimental Ethics’, the chances it offers, the problems for discussion, and the criticism to be expected. (shrink)

Experimental ethicists investigate traditional ethical questions with non-traditional means, namely with the methods of the empirical sciences. Studies in this area have made heavy use of philosophical thought experiments such as the well-known trolley cases. Yet, the specific function of these thought experiments within experimental ethics has received little consideration. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap. We begin by describing the function of ethical thought experiments, and show that these thought experiments should not only (...) be classified according to their function but also according to their scope. On this basis we highlight several ways in which the use of thought experiments in experimental ethics can be philosophically relevant. We conclude by arguing that experimental philosophy currently only focuses on a small subcategory of ethical thought experiments and suggest a broadening of its research agenda. (shrink)

Ethical theory often starts with our intuitions about particular cases and tries to uncover the principles that are implicit in them; work on the ‘trolley problem’ is a paradigmatic example of this approach. But ethicists are no longer the only ones chasing trolleys. In recent years, psychologists and neuroscientists have also turned to study our moral intuitions and what underlies them. The relation between these two inquiries, which investigate similar examples and intuitions, and sometimes produce parallel results, is puzzling. Does (...) it matter to ethics whether its armchair conclusions match the psychologists’ findings? I argue that reflection on this question exposes psychological presuppositions implicit in armchair ethical theorising. When these presuppositions are made explicit, it becomes clear that empirical evidence can (and should) play a positive role in ethical theorising. Unlike recent assaults on the armchair, the argument I develop is not driven by a naturalist agenda, or meant to cast doubt on the reliability of our moral intuitions; on the contrary, it is even compatible with non-naturalism, and takes the reliability of intuition as its premise. The argument is rather that if our moral intuitions are reliable, then psychological evidence should play a surprisingly significant role in the justification of moral principles. (shrink)

It would be unkind but not inaccurate to say that most experimental philosophy is just psychology with worse methods and better theories. In Experimental Ethics: Towards an Empirical Moral Philosophy, Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch, and Matthias Uhl set out to make this comparison less invidious and more flattering. Their book has 16 chapters, organized into five sections and bookended by the editors’ own introduction and prospectus. Contributors hail from four countries (Germany, USA, Spain, and the United Kingdom) (...) and five disciplines (philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, economics, and sociology). While the chapters are of mixed quality and originality, there are several fine contributions to the field. These especially include Stephan Wolf and Alexander Lenger’s sophisticated attempt to operationalize the Rawlsian notion of a veil of ignorance, Nina Strohminger et al.’s survey of the methods available to experimental ethicists for studying implicit morality, Fernando Aguiar et al.’s exploration of the possibility of operationalizing reflective equilibrium in the lab, and Nikil Mukerji’s careful defusing of three debunking arguments about the reliability of philosophical intuitions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14.1 (2004) 47-54 [Access article in PDF] Ethical Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research*(A Recommended Manuscript) Adopted on 16 October 2001Revised on 20 August 2002 Ethics Committee of the Chinese National Human Genome Center at Shanghai, Shanghai 201203 Human embryonic stem cell (ES) research is a great project in the frontier of biomedical science for the twenty-first century. Be- cause the (...) research involves the use of human embryos, it triggers serious debate on ethical issues. Opponents consider the embryo to be an early form of human life that should be respected and not destroyed. However, the majority of scientists support embryonic stem cell research, believing that it offers good prospects for the treatment of diseases that have remained incurable until now and so will benefit humankind. The Ethics Committee of the Department of Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of the Chinese National Human Genome Center at Shanghai seriously discussed the ethical debate initiated by embryonic stem cell research. We concluded that we should support the scientists of our country in actively carrying out human embryonic stem cell research for the noble cause of "medicine being a beneficent art." For the healthy and orderly development of human embryonic stem cell research in our country, we put forward the following recommended Ethical Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research as a reference for leaders, administrative departments, and related scientists. Preface Article 1. Human embryonic stem cells are the primitive cells that play the main role in the growth and development of a human body. These [End Page 47] primitive cells have the potential for infinite proliferation, self-renewal, and multi-directional differentiation. If scientists can discover the mechanism of differentiation of human embryonic stem cells, it will be possible to induce differentiation of human embryonic stem cells to form various types of human cells for clinical cell therapy. If human embryonic stem cell research can be integrated with modern biomedical engineering techniques, it also will be possible to make repair and replacement of human tissues and organs a reality. Article 2. There are two ways to classify human embryonic stem cells. One way is to classify them according to their potential for differentiation. There could be three kinds of stem cells: totipotent stem cells, pluripotent stem cells, and unipotent stem cells.A totipotent stem cell has the potential to develop into a whole individual. It can differentiate into the more than 200 cell types in the whole body, construct any tissue or organ of the body, and finally develop into a whole individual. The fertilized egg and the cleavage cells at the very early stage of embryonic development are totipotent stem cells.A pluripotent stem cell has the potential to differentiate into many cell types derived from the three embryonic layers. However, it has lost the capacity to develop into a complete organism.A unipotent stem cell is derived from the further differentiation of the pluripotent stem cell. It can differentiate only into one cell type such as a hematopoietic stem cell, neural stem cell, and others.The other way is to classify human stem cells according to their source. There could be two kinds of human stem cells: embryonic stem cells and tissue stem cells (also called adult stem cells). The former involves experimentation with embryos, which has serious ethical implications. Ethical issues associated with the latter are mainly expressed in the various opinions regarding the allocation of health resources. Article 3. Human embryonic stem cells are the group of cells called the blastocyst inner cell mass during the early stage of embryonic development. They are the main source of totipotent stem cells, and hence the focal and hot point in stem cell research. Studies on the clinical application of embryonic stem cells probably will involve use of the somatic cell nucleus transfer (SCNT) technique, which destroys the early human embryo. At present, the ethical and moral debate is very serious in human embryonic stem cell research regarding whether the research will develop... (shrink)

Clinical ethics services are increasingly receiving case referrals regarding requests for access to experimental therapies. Sometimes, patients or families seek access to an experimental therapy that has not been subsidised by any government scheme, and for which no local clinical trial is underway. All else being equal, a patient may benefit from receiving an experimental therapy without making any other patient worse off. However, within public healthcare systems, treating only one patient with an experimental therapy, (...) when others might also benefit from it, evokes a troubling sense of inequity. In this paper, I examine the relevance of Pareto principles and the ‘levelling down’ objection to ethical deliberation about patient or family-initiated requests for experimental therapies. While facilitating access to an experimental therapy may benefit a patient without making any other patients worse off, this does not dispel ethically relevant considerations concerning equity. When deliberating about cases i... (shrink)

In this chapter, we present supporting arguments for the claim that Order Ethics is a school of thought within ethics which is especially open to empirical evidence. With its focus on order frameworks, i.e., incentive structures, Order Ethical advice automatically raises questions on implementability, efficacy, and efficiency of such recommended institutions, all of which are empirical questions to a good extent. We illustrate our arguments by presenting a small selection of experiments from economics that we consider highly informative (...) for Order Ethics. These experiments vary in their details but share one common theme: individual decision-making and its aggregate results are tested against the background of incentive structures. In particular, these studies provide first insights on how unregulated markets influence moral behavior over time, how trial-and-error experiences convince subjects to migrate to more efficient institutions, and how default rules can influence fundamental choices of people. We argue that Order Ethics, for which implementability of any moral claim is an essential requirement, can largely benefit from the use of such experimental methods. Finally, we suggest the provision of self-commitment devices as one example of smart policy design that avoids paternalistic intrusions into individual liberty. (shrink)

According to a classical work on experimental design internal validity “refers to the approximate validity with which we infer that a relationship between two variables is causal or that the absence of a relationship implies the absence of cause”. External validity “refers to the approximate validity with which we can infer that the presumed causal relationship can be generalized to and across alternate measures of the cause and effect and across different types of persons, settings, and times”. Since then, (...) these have been the accepted definitions, with slight variations, of both concepts. However, there have been deep differences in interpreting the scope and limits of validity concepts in economics. From theory-driven experimental designs that defend the priority of the internal over the external validity to those researches that are demanding the importance of external validity in economics, we can find the most diverse points of view. What can experimental ethics learn, then, from recent debates on external and internal validity in experimental economics? If we want to elicit moral intuitions into the lab, are we testing moral theories that way? Could intuitions be generalized “across different types of persons, settings, and times”? Is that really possible? (shrink)

Offers a vision of wholeness for approaching human ethical responses to what science is telling us about the crises facing our environment and climate.

The social scientific study of ethical-unethical behavior in work organizations is in an early stage of development. This paper discusses some of the problems of conducting social scientific research in this area and explores the potential contribution of experimental research approaches. Both laboratory and field experimentation allow the investigator to test theory-based hypotheses and to study causal relations. Examples are provided of investigations that have applied these methods to the study of business ethics.

This article reports an experimental study aimed at evaluating the change of cognitive processes in ethical decision making before and after business ethics training. An experimental design (Solomon Four-Group Design) was used to test the effectiveness of the training within a German university undergraduate business-oriented student sample. The cognitive processes in decision making (implicit and explicit moral attitudes, selective attention, moral awareness, moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior) were measured by using different direct instruments (e.g. questionnaire (...) items for moral judgments and explicit moral attitude scales) as well as indirect measures such as eye-tracking and the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The study yielded mixed results. On the one hand, significant changes in explicit attitudes, moral awareness, moral judgments, moral intention, and moral behavior in the pre-post-measurements of the training group have been revealed. On the other hand, there were no significant differences between the pre-post-measurements of the first training and control group as well as between the posttest-only-measures of the second training and control group. In addition, the implicit measures did not show any significant training effect. Implications with an emphasis on methodological aspects for future research on business ethics training are discussed. (shrink)

The moral status of human brain organoids (HBOs) has been debated in view of the future possibility that they may acquire phenomenal consciousness. This study empirically investigates the moral sensitivity in people’s intuitive judgments about actions toward conscious HBOs. The results showed that the presence/absence of pain experience in HBOs affected the judgment about the moral permissibility of actions such as creating and destroying the HBOs; however, the presence/absence of visual experience in HBOs also affected the judgment. These findings suggest (...) that people’s intuitive judgments about the moral status of HBOs are sensitive to the valence-independent value of phenomenal consciousness. We discuss how these observations can have normative implications; particularly, we argue that they put pressure on the theoretical view that the moral status of conscious HBOs is grounded solely in the valence-dependent value of consciousness. We also discuss how our findings can be informative even when such a theoretical view is finally justified or when the future possibility of conscious HBOs is implausible. (shrink)

How are we to appraise new technological developments that may bring revolutionary social changes? Currently this is often done by trying to predict or anticipate social consequences and to use these as a basis for moral and regulatory appraisal. Such an approach can, however, not deal with the uncertainties and unknowns that are inherent in social changes induced by technological development. An alternative approach is proposed that conceives of the introduction of new technologies into society as a social experiment. An (...) ethical framework for the acceptability of such experiments is developed based on the bioethical principles for experiments with human subjects: non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and justice. This provides a handle for the moral and regulatory assessment of new technologies and their impact on society. (shrink)

Experimental design is one aspect of a scientific method. A well-designed, properly conducted experiment aims to control variables in order to isolate and manipulate causal effects and thereby maximize internal validity, support causal inferences, and guarantee reliable results. Traditionally employed in the natural sciences, experimental design has become an important part of research in the social and behavioral sciences. Experimental methods are also endorsed as the most reliable guides to policy effectiveness. Through a discussion of some of (...) the central concepts associated with experimental design, including controlled variation and randomization, this chapter will provide a summary of key ethical issues that tend to arise in experimental contexts. In addition, by exploring assumptions about the nature of causation and by analyzing features of causal relationships, systems, and inferences in social contexts, this chapter will summarize the ways in which experimental design can undermine the integrity of not only social and behavioral research but policies implemented on the basis of such research. (shrink)

The existential, experiential, ethical, pathic and pre-pathic dimensions of education are essential for the creative composition of subjectivities in institutional spaces, yet educational research and policy tend increasingly to privilege technical discourses and prescriptive approaches both when evaluating ‘what is effective in education’ and when determining educational policy. This essay explores those aspects of the educational experience and educational institutions that are often felt and sensed pre-cognitively by students, parents and teachers, but are seldom given further elaboration or articulation in (...) educational research. We will reflect on what is meant by the experience of education and experience in education, including the struggles to make sense of or understand something, the surprises that strike pre-reflectively, and the ways in which such moments are noticed, pursued, and explored rather than reflexively ‘evaluated’. We then explore the idea of experimentation in institutions, in particular in relation to the range of concepts that Jean Oury introduces in order to move our attention and awareness to questions of experience, existence, atmosphere, and the pathic—the way in which we undergo, sense and participate in the world prior to cognition and the desire for mastery and control of our encounters. Finally, we address the question of the ethics of institutions. (shrink)

In response to widespread concern about illegal drug use and the associated risk of the spread of HIV/AIDS, a study was undertaken to examine whether it was, in principle, feasible to conduct a trial providing heroin to dependent users in a controlled manner. Such a trial involves real ethical issues which are examined in this paper. The general issues examined are: should a trial be an experiment or an exercise in public policy?; acts and omissions; countermobilization; termination of a trial, (...) and payment for drugs and for a trial. The specific issues examined are: selection of trial participants; privacy; issues for staff working on a trial; coupling the trial with other treatment, and issues for researchers. A number of alternative approaches to the various ethical issues are presented and discussed. (shrink)

This book focuses on experimentation that is carried out on human beings, including medical research, drug research and research undertaken in the social sciences. It discusses the ethics of such experimentation and asks the question: who defends the interests of these human subjects and ensures that they are not harmed? The author finds that ethical research depends on the adequacy of review by committee. Indeed most countries now rely on research ethics committees for the protection of the interests (...) of the human participants in research. Dr McNeill analyses how successful these committees are in balancing the interests of science with the interests of human subjects. (shrink)

Although undergraduate engineering ethics courses often include the development of moral sensitivity as a learning objective and the use of active learning techniques, teaching centers on the transmission of cognitive knowledge. This article describes a complementary assignment asking students to perform an ethics “experiment” on themselves that has a potential to enhance affective learning and moral imagination. The article argues that the focus on cognitive learning may not promote, and may even impair, our efforts to foster moral sensitivity. (...) In contrast, the active learning assignments and exercises, like the ethics “experiment” discussed, offer great potential to expand the scope of instruction in engineering ethics to include ethical behavior as well as knowledge. Engineering ethics education needs to extend beyond the narrow range of human action associated with the technical work of the engineer and explore ways to draw on broader lifeworld experiences to enrich professional practice and identity. (shrink)

I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a (...) normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: A `experimental treatment' is defined as the use of a not yet approved medical treatment or product in a single patient outside the scope of regular clinical trials. Especially in oncology the patient is usually in a desperate situation and does not respond to other treatments. Even if he or she is fully informed about the risks he or she may occasionally make an irrational decision.Discussion of the problem: The moral problems in experimental treatments (...) have to do with the medical and scientific quality of the treatment and the patient-physician relationship. It is argued that there are also moral duties for pharmaceutical manufacturers and health insurrance companies.Conclusion: A regulation of experimental treatment trials is necessary both for physicians and for pharmaceutical manufacturers. (shrink)

Numerous accounting and economics research studies employ an experimental research method requiring student participants to make representations about an individual characteristic (e.g., ability, cost) that provides a basis for payment of cash rewards. In response, many participants intentionally misrepresent the nature of that characteristic to receive a greater reward. Typically, such studies are deemed to be either exempt from review by institutional review boards (IRBs) or subject only to an expedited review. Moreover, investigators seldom debrief participants, purportedly to avoid (...) contamination of the participant pool. The authors question the ethics of inducing strategic misrepresentation and rewarding fraudulent behavior without appropriate debriefing. A theoretical framework of cognitive ethical development indicates that such research methods can be harmful to student participants. Furthermore, principles of operant conditioning suggest that the rewards reinforce fraudulent behavior. It is recommended that research studies inducing strategic misrepresentation should not be exempt from IRB review and should be required to include desensitization procedures for debriefing participants. (shrink)

This study investigated several basic research questions suggesting a positive relationship between education and cognitive moral development. More specifically, these research questions examined the relationship between government mandated ethics education and cognitive moral development by testing the efficacy of a compulsory ethics intervention. Kohlberg's (1969, 1984) Cognitive Moral Development Theory was applied to test the efficacy of compulsory ethics education on the moral development of real estate salespeople used comparative statistical measures of ethical reasoning ability.The results of (...) this research, while somewhat counterintuitive, suggest that the value of compulsory ethics education as an intervention to improve the moral reasoning of real estate salespeople is highly questionable. However, the results of the study do provide new insights into the relationship between ethics education and cognitive moral development. (shrink)

En este trabajo muestro la existencia de un "giro experimentalista" en ética que pertenece a una tendencia de la filosofía en general hacia la experimentación. Explicito la conexión entre este giro y un tipo de naturalismo que denominaré "débil". En el trabajo reflexiono sobre la manera en que este giro experimental, en tanto forma de un tipo de naturalismo, tiene un doble impacto en la ética como disciplina filosófica. En realidad, examino la manera en que el naturalismo subyacente al (...) experimentalismo afecta la naturaleza del análisis conceptual y el carácter normativo de la ética. In this paper I show the existence of an "experimental turn" in ethics belonging to a trend of general philosophy towards experimentation. I specify the connection between this turn and a type of naturalism that I will name "weak". In this work I reflect on how this experimental turn, shaped as a type of some sort of naturalism, has a double impact on ethics as a philosophical discipline. Actually, I examine how the type of naturalism that underlies experimentalism, affects the nature of the conceptual analysis and the normative character of ethics. (shrink)

When a new intervention or drug is developed, this has to pass through various phases of clinical testing before it achieves market approval, which can take many years. This raises an issue for drugs which could benefit terminally ill patients. These patients might set their hopes on the experimental drug but are unable to wait since they are likely to pass away before the drug is available. As a means of nevertheless getting access to experimental drug, many seriously (...) ill and terminally ill patients are therefore very willing to participate in randomised controlled trials. However, only very few terminally ill patients are able to actually participate, and those that do participate are at risk of participating solely as a way of getting experimental drugs. Currently, there are, however, ways of getting access to drugs that have not gained market approval. One such mean is via expanded access or compassionate use programs where terminally ill patients receive experimental new drugs that are not yet market approved. In this paper, I examine some of the common justifications for such programs. The most frequently voiced justifications for compassionate use or expanded access programs could be put in one of three categories. First, there are justifications of justice, where compassionate use programs could be seen as a just or fair way to distribute experimental new drugs to patients who are denied access to RCT’s through no fault of their own. Second, such programs could be justified by reference to the ethical principle of beneficence where it could be claimed that terminally ill patients stand to benefit greatly at very little risk. Third, there are considerations of autonomy where, it is claimed, patients should be able to exercise their autonomy and have access to such drugs if that is there free choice and they are fully aware of the risks associated with that choice. In this paper, I argue currently all justifications are potentially problematic. If they truly form the basis for justification, compassionate use programs should be designed to maximize justice, beneficence and autonomy. (shrink)

Ethical conduct is the hallmark of excellence in engineering and scientific research, design, and practice. While undergraduate and graduate programs in these areas routinely emphasize ethical conduct, few receive formal ethics training as part of their curricula. The first purpose of this research study was to assess the relative effectiveness of ethics education in enhancing individuals’ general knowledge of the responsible conduct of research practices and their level of moral reasoning. Secondly, we examined the effects of ethics (...) education on the positive psychological outcomes of perspective-taking, moral efficacy, moral courage, and moral meaningfulness. To examine our research hypotheses, we utilized a pretest–posttest quasi-experimental design consisting of three ethics education groups (control, embedded modules, and stand-alone courses). Findings revealed that both embedded and stand alone courses were effective in enhancing participants’ perspective-taking, moral efficacy, and moral courage. Moral meaningfulness was marginally enhanced for the embedded module condition. Moral judgment and knowledge of responsible conduct of research practices were not influenced by either ethics education condition. Contrary to expectations, stand alone courses were not superior to embedded modules in influencing the positive psychological outcomes investigated. Implications of these findings for future research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 3, Page 875-887, July 2022.

Population ethics is widely considered to be exceptionally important and exceptionally difficult. One key source of difficulty is the conflict between certain moral intuitions and analytical results identifying requirements for rational (in the sense of complete and transitive) social choice over possible populations. One prominent such intuition is the Asymmetry, which jointly proposes that the fact that a possible child’s quality of life would be bad is a normative reason not to create the child, but the fact that a (...) child’s quality of life would be good is not a reason to create the child. This paper reports a set of questionnaire experiments about the Asymmetry in the spirit of economists’ empirical social choice. Few survey respondents show support for the Asymmetry; instead respondents report that expectations of a good quality of life are relevant. Each experiment shows evidence (among at least some participants) of dual-process moral reasoning, in which cognitive reflection is statistically associated with reporting expected good quality of life to be normatively relevant. The paper discusses possible implications of these results for the economics of population-sensitive social welfare and for the conflict between moral mathematics and population intuition. (shrink)