This paper discusses how Thomas Aquinas and some Neo-Thomists scholars (Juan José Urráburu, Joseph Hontheim, Édouard Hugon, and Joseph Gredt) analysed the metaphysical possibility of miracles. My main goal is to unpack the metaphysical toolbox that Aquinas uses to solve the basic question about the possibility of miracles and to compare how his late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century followers solved the issue themselves. The key feature to differentiate the two approaches will reside in their use of different notions to (...) account for the possibility of miracles, namely obediential potency for Aquinas and the laws of nature for the Neo-Thomists. To show why neo-Thomist scholars source to this notion, I also briefly discuss how the notion of the laws of nature emerged in the seventeenth century. (shrink)

I am grateful for Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg’s, Avner Baz’s and Max Deutsch’s insightful comments on Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. I have lea.

Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make (...) sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science's emerging view of the mind will find Machery's provocative ideas of interest. (shrink)

In this article, we present evidence that in four different cultural groups that speak quite different languages there are cases of justified true beliefs that are not judged to be cases of knowledge. We hypothesize that this intuitive judgment, which we call “the Gettier intuition,” may be a reflection of an underlying innate and universal core folk epistemology, and we highlight the philosophical significance of its universality.

In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery argues that resolving many traditional and contemporary philosophical issues is beyond our epistemic reach and that philosophy should re-orient itself toward more humble, but ultimately more important intellectual endeavors, such as the analysis of concepts.

Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions—a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

This chapter shows that the experimental philosophy has much to offer to philosophy of science by reviewing the existing experimental‐philosophy work in the philosophy of science and by defending it against an important criticism. A natural way of extending experimental philosophy methods to the philosophy of science is to survey scientists’ judgments. The chapter presents two projects in the philosophy of science that can benefit from such surveys: analyzing the scientific concepts found in particular scientific communities and studying scientific cognition. (...) It explains how surveying lay people's judgments can bear on issues in the philosophy of science. The chapter examines the possible contributions of bibliometric, ethnographic and cliometric methods to the philosophy of science. Ethnographic methods are particularly useful to study the social structure of science, the nature and role of social norms in the production of scientific knowledge, and the discovery heuristics at work in everyday scientific practice. (shrink)

We have recently presented evidence for cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt’s and Ichikawa and colleagues’ criticisms fail to address (...) our concerns. (shrink)

Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one’s intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001) has shown systematic cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases (...) (Weinberg et al. 2001). In light of these findings on cultural differences, two experiments were conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. Both experiments indicate that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and the paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference. (shrink)

Psychologists of concepts’ traditional assumption that there are many properties common to all concepts has been subject to devastating critiques in psychology and in the philosophy of psychology. However, it is currently unclear what approach to concepts is best suited to replace this traditional assumption. In this article, we compare two competing approaches, the Heterogeneity Hypothesis and the hybrid theories of concepts, and we present an empirical argument that tentatively supports the former over the latter.

This chapter examines the folk concept of disease by assessing (1) whether disease judgments are influenced by whether a condition is typical, dysfunctional, and disvalued and (2) whether they are influenced by the causes and symptoms of a condition. Results tentatively suggest that the folk concept of disease is naturalistic (i.e., value judgments don’t seem to matter) and perhaps not essentially causal (symptoms are sufficient for a condition to be a disease) and that gender and disgust sensitivity influence disease judgment.

This article critically examines the contemporary resurgence of empiricism (or “neo-empiricism”) in philosophy, psychology, neuropsychology, and artificial intelligence. This resurgence is an important and positive development. It is the first time that this centuries-old empiricist approach to cognition is precisely formulated in the context of cognitive science and neuroscience. Moreover, neo-empiricists have made several findings that challenge amodal theories of concepts and higher cognition. It is argued, however, that the theoretical foundations of and the empirical evidence for neo-empiricism are not (...) as strong as is usually claimed by its proponents. The empirical evidence for and against neo-empiricism is discussed in detail. (shrink)

Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts.

In several disciplines within science—evolutionary biology, molecular biology, astrobiology, synthetic biology, artificial life—and outside science—primarily ethics—efforts to define life have recently multiplied. However, no consensus has emerged. In this article, I argue that this is no accident. I propose a dilemma showing that the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless. The notion of life at stake in this project is either the folk concept of life or a scientific concept. In the former case, empirical evidence shows that (...) life cannot be defined. In the latter case, I argue that, although defining life may be possible, it is pointless. I conclude that scientists, philosophers, and ethicists should discard the project of defining life. (shrink)

This article develops a new, general account of replication. I argue that a replication is an experiment that resamples the experimental components of an ori...

Recent experimental fi ndings by Knobe and others ( Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 ) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the signifi cance of these fi ndings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the signifi cance of these experimental fi ndings for the nature of the concept of intentional action (...) cannot be determined. Unfortunately, the lack of progress in the philosophy of concepts casts doubt on whether such a consensual theory will be found. Second, I propose a new, defl ationary interpretation of these experimental fi ndings, ‘ the trade-off hypothesis ’ , and I present several new experimental fi ndings that support this interpretation. (shrink)

This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition ( prameya ) in various parts of his works, considering in particular the claims that (i) there are two kinds of prameyas (particulars and universals), (ii) the particular alone is prameya , and (iii) what is non-existent also qualifies as prameya . It inquires into the relationship between validity ( prāmāṇya ), reliability ( avisaṃvāda ) and causal efficacy ( arthakriyā ) and suggests that (...) the discussion on non-existent prameyas in Pramāṇaviniścaya 3 provides an alternative to an overall “practicalist” reading of Dharmakīrti, practicalist in the sense that pramāṇas are primarily oriented toward human aims and hence bear on objects capable of fulfilling them through their causal capacities. Considering the views of Dharmakīrti’s interpreters, it shows how Dharmottara (8th c.), rejecting such an alternative, strives to reconcile claim (iii) with a practicalist interpretation, while Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (12th c.) generalizes the application of a criterion of validity superseding an arthakriyā -oriented framework by bringing to the fore the notion of “non-opposition” ( abādhana ) introduced by Dharmakīrti with regard to non-existent prameyas and suprasensorial objects. (shrink)

La question de l’appropriation sociale de la technique dans la vie quotidienne semble d’autant plus entière qu’elle émerge à un moment de notre histoire où dominerait une posture critique faisant de la machine le vecteur de standardisation du temps, des objets et des relations humaines. Il faut pourtant savoir se rendre attentif à des situations autres, dans l’ordre du banal, notamment dans toutes ces technologies de communications, pour lesquelles il faut bien admettre cette capacité de connectivité et de mise en (...) relations, avec ses potentiels sociaux parfois inattendus. (shrink)

Ce volume, dirigé par une spécialiste de l’histoire croisée de la sexualité et de l’Empire britannique, fait partie d’un vaste ensemble éditorial, commencé à la fin des années 1990 et sans doute amené à s’étoffer encore : la magistrale collection intitulée Oxford History of the British Empire. Le cœur de l’entreprise éditoriale est constitué de cinq volumes principaux, dont quatre organisés chronologiquement et le dernier portant sur l’historiographie. Mais l’esprit de cette collection étant...

Não há dúvida de que uma intenção moral presidiu ou, no mínimo, acompanhou grande parte da arte do passado. Esquecemos suficientemente de falar da arte, em geral, como um domínio em que as considerações éticas não têm lugar e em relação a qual seria inconveniente falar em moral, isso porque belo e bom são valores não apenas distintos, mas independentes, e dentre esses importa conservar-lhes essa independência. Uma visão sensata do estado histórico da questão supõe, no entanto, que tomemos consciência (...) da historicidade dessa posição separatista, ou seja, que, por um lado, esqueçamos por um instante a autonomia e a autotelia da arte ensinada no século XIX e, por outro lado, que nos lembremos da maneira com que os artistas e os pensadores da arte, anterior à invenção moderna das belas-artes, concebiam a prática artística. Nessa longa história pré-moderna da arte, gostaria de examinar mais precisamente aqui as intenções éticas da teoria humanista da pintura e de submeter a um exame crítico a eficácia dessas intenções.Palavras-chave: Efeitos Éticos da Pintura. Teoria Humanista da Pintura. Efeitos Estéticos e Cognitivos da Arte. Résumé:Qu’une intention morale ait présidé ou au moins accompagné une grande partie de l’artdupassé, c’estcequi ne fait aucundoute. Nous l’avons suffisamment oublié pourparler de l’art, engénéral, comme d’un domaine où les considérations éthiques n’ontpasleurplace et à propos duquel il serait déplacé de parler de morale, aumotif que beau et biensont desvaleurs non seulement distinctes mais indépendantes et dontqu’il importe de leur conservercette indépendance. Une visionsaine de l’état historique de la question suppose pourtant que nous prenions conscience de l’historicité de cette position séparatiste, autrementdit, que d’une part nous ou blions pour un temps l’autonomie et l’autolélie de l’artenseignée par le XIX èmesiècle et d’autrepart, que nous nous rappelions la manière dont artistes et penseurs de l’art d’avant l’invention modernedes beaux-art sont conçula pratique artistique. Dans cette longue histoire prémoderne de l’art, on considérera plus précisément ici les intentions éthiques de la théorie humaniste de lapeinture et l’onsoumettra à unexamen critique lesmoyens de cesintentions.Mots-Clés: ÉffetsÉthiques de laPeinture. ThéorieHumaniste de laPeinture. ÉffetsEsthétiques et Cognitifs de l’art. (shrink)

La philosophie de l'art sans histoire de l'art est vide, l'histoire de l'art sans philosophie de l'art est aveugle. Car l'art est fait non seulement d'oeuvres, mais aussi de mots pour les dire, de concepts pour les distinguer et de théories pour les penser. Pourquoi le XIXe siècle a-t-il défendu «l'art pour l'art»? Pourquoi la musique, la littérature ou la peinture furent-elles si soucieuses de formalisme? Que signifia la création en 1863 d'un «Salon des refusés»? Comment évolua le régime économique (...) des arts plastiques? Telles sont quelques-unes des questions dont traite cet ouvrage et auxquelles on ne peut répondre sans convoquer à la fois les oeuvres, les acteurs et les courants, mais aussi les concepts même d'«art» et d'«artiste». Il analyse donc la production et la réception artistiques de la Modernité au sein de l'atmosphère théorique du XIXe siècle, et étudie notamment l'importance considérable qu'eurent sur le devenir de l'art le Romantisme allemand, la philosophie de Hegel et celle de Schopenhauer. (shrink)

Dans la langue courante comme dans les textes specialises, l'adjectif - esthetique - est aujourd'hui volontiers utilise comme un parfait synonyme d' - artistique -, comme si la valeur de l'art tenait tout entiere dans la valeur esthetique. Tel est le paradigme esthetique de l'art qui s'est mis en place entre la Renaissance et le XVIIIeme siecle et a, depuis lors, vectorise l'histoire des arts en Occident. Or cette assimilation est doublement reductrice: d'une part parce que l'experience esthetique deborde largement (...) la sphere de l'art, d'autre part parce que la dimension esthetique n'est qu'une des dimensions de l'art. Il s'agit ici de comprendre la genealogie de cette assimilation illicite, d'analyser ses consequences a la fois dans la creation artistique et dans la production theorique qui l'accompagne, et de montrer en quoi elle est a la fois fallacieuse et prejudiciable aux arts.". (shrink)

Daniel Charles est devenu professeur au département de philosophie de l’université de Nice en 1989, apportant avec lui une atmosphère de jovialité, de fantaisie et de hardiesse théorique exceptionnelle et incomparable. Il arrivait du département de musique de l’université de Paris VIII, où le nombre croissant de travaux à diriger et un grand nombre de tâches administratives...

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Semantics, Cross ‐ Cultural Style Metalinguistic and Linguistic Intuitions Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference The Vacuity of Ontological Disagreements Conclusion References.

This paper examines the modalities and mechanism of text-use pertaining to Indian and Tibetan material in a selection of Tibetan Buddhist epistemological treatises written between the eleventh and the thirteenth century. It pays special attention to a remarkable feature of this corpus: the phenomenon of “repeat,” that is, the unacknowledged integration of earlier material by an author within his own composition. This feature reveals an intellectual continuity in the tradition, and is found even for authors who claim a rupture from (...) their predecessors. Regarding acknowledged text re-use in the form of quotations, I consider which factors condition the identification of the source or the lack thereof, and what role quotations play for the respective authors. In particular, I discuss whether any inference can be drawn, from the presence or absence of quotations, about an author’s knowledge of the corresponding source. (shrink)

In The Architecture of the Mind, Carruthers proposes a new and detailed explanation for how human cognition could be both flexible and massively modular. The combinatorial nature of our linguistic faculty and our capacity to engage in inner speech are the cornerstones of this new explanation. Despite the ingenuity of this proposal, I argue that Carruthers has failed to explain how a massively modular mind could display the flexibility that is characteristic of human thought.

The use of power to infer null hypotheses from negative results has recently come under severe attack. In this article, I show that the power of a test can justify accepting the null hypothesis. This argument also gives us a new powerful reason for not treating p-values and power as measures of the strength of evidence.

Contemporary research on racial categorization is mostly encompassed by two research traditions—social constructionism and the cognitive-cum-evolutionary approach. Although both literatures have some plausible empirical evidence and some theoretical insights to contribute to a full understanding of racial categorization, there has been little contact between their proponents. In order to foster such contacts, we critically review both traditions, focusing particularly on the recent evolutionary/cognitive explanations of racial categorization. On the basis of this critical survey, we put forward a list of eleven (...) requirements that a satisfactory theory of racial categorization should satisfy. We conclude that despite some decisive progress, we are still far from having a complete theory of why humans classify people on the basis of skin color, body appearance or hair style. (shrink)

The present research examines whether identity essentialism, an important component of psychological essentialism, is a fundamental feature of human cognition. Across three studies (Ntotal = 1723), we report evidence that essentialist intuitions about the identity of kinds are culturally dependent, demographically variable, and easily malleable. The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different countries spread across four continents. Participants were presented with two scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions. Their answers suggest that essentialist intuitions vary dramatically across cultures. Furthermore, (...) these intuitions were found to vary with gender, education, and across eliciting stimuli. The second study further examined whether essentialist intuitions are stable across different kinds of eliciting stimuli. Participants were presented with two different scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions—the “discovery” and “transformation” scenarios. Their answers suggest that the nature of the eliciting stimuli influences whether or not people report essentialist intuitions. Finally, the third study demonstrates that essentialist intuitions are susceptible to framing effects. Keeping the eliciting stimulus (i.e., the scenario) constant, we show that the formulation of the question eliciting a judgment influences whether or not people have essentialist intuitions. Implications of these findings for identity essentialism and psychological essentialism, in general, are discussed. (shrink)

In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings.

The title and blurb suggest that this book makes a case for eliminating concepts. The suggestion is misleading, however. What Machery really does is multiply them.Here is his characterization of what concepts are. He says that a concept is ‘a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgements about x’. He holds that people represent (...) categories through exemplars, prototypes and theories, that these types of representations really exist, and that they all count as concepts according to the above characterization.Machery offers an interesting new take on the concept research undertaken by cognitive psychologists over the past three or four decades. Psychology textbooks tend to classify the main theories of concepts as follows. They draw a contrast between the ‘classical definition’ theory and late 20th century ‘probabilistic’ theories. They distinguish, within the probabilistic camp, between ‘prototype-based’ theories and ‘exemplar-based’ theories, and they admit a further family of ‘theory–theories’, according to which a concept of x is a mini-theory about x. Within each camp, different specific …. (shrink)

Grau and Pury (Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5, 155–168, 2014) reported that people’s views about love are related to their views about reference. This surprising effect was however not replicated in Cova et al.’s (in press) replication study. In this article, we show that the replication failure is probably due to the replication’s low power and that a metaanalytic reanalysis of the result in Cova et al. suggests that the effect reported in Grau and Pury is real. We then (...) report a large, highly powered replication that successfully replicates Grau and Pury 2014. This successful replication is a case study in the challenges involved in replicating scientific work, and our article contributes to the discussion of these challenges. (shrink)

La critique cartésienne de la logique est souvent reconduite à celle du syllogisme et d’une dialectique dont l’Organon aristotélicien fournit l’exposé canonique. On veut montrer ici, en resituant le propos cartésien dans son cheminement initial , que cette critique vise aussi, sinon en premier lieu, une conception alternative d’inspiration lulliste qui tend à s’imposer dans la Schulmetaphysik allemande contemporaine, et par le biais de laquelle celle-ci, déjà, prétend pouvoir se constituer en système encyclopédique du savoir. Le point culminant de cette (...) critique ne se trouve nullement dans le rappel de l’humaine finitude, et la dénonciation d’une vaine prétention à l’omniscience, car l’universalité de la méthode cartésienne lui permet tout aussi bien de viser la connaissance de toutes choses, même les plus « cachées » et les plus « éloignées ». Il se trouve en revanche dans une théorie des « natures simples » , qu’on peut juger lacunaire et inachevée au vu de l’incapacité apparente de Descartes à en établir la nomenclature exacte. Mais le statut propre de la logique cartésienne est indissociablement lié à celui de ces « natures simples » et au refus motivé d’en établir une liste exhaustive.Descartes’ criticism of logic is often reduced to criticism of syllogism and to the dialectic which can be perfectly represented and illustrated in Aristotle’s Organon. Going back to the very roots of Descartes’ thought , this article tries to demonstrate that above all else, his criticism also includes an alternative representation of logic widely diffused in contemporary German Schulmetaphysik which asserts itself as an encyclopaedic knowledge system. The climax of this criticism does not consist in the idea of human finitude nor in the pretension of universal knowledge. In fact universality of Descartes’ method can be applied to everything, even the « deepest » and « most distant » ones. This climax lies in the theory of « simple natures » which can be judged as incomplete as regards Descartes’ apparent inability to establish an exact list and description. Nevertheless, the exact status of Descartes’ logic is precisely linked to the status of these simples natures and to Descartes’ conscious refusal to establish a list. (shrink)

Machery et al. (2004) reported some preliminary evidence that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures, and they argued that if real, such variation would have significant philosophical implications (see also Mallon et al. 2009). In a recent article, Genoveva Martı´ (2009) argues that the type of intuitions examined by Machery and colleagues (‘metalin- 10 guistic intuitions’) is evidentially irrelevant for identifying the correct theory of reference, and she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about reference within (...) and across cultures has not been established. (shrink)

<P>Experimental philosophy is one of the most active and exciting areas in philosophy today. In <EM>Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy</EM>, Elizabeth O’Neill and Edouard Machery have brought together twelve leading philosophers to debate four topics central to recent research in experimental philosophy. The result is an important and enticing contribution to contemporary philosophy which thoroughly reframes traditional philosophical questions in light of experimental philosophers’ use of empirical research methods, and brings to light the lively debates within experimental philosophers’ intellectual community. (...) Two papers are dedicated to the following four topics:</P> <P></P> <UL> <LI>Language (Edouard Machery & Genoveva Martí)</LI> <LI>Consciousness (Brian Fala, Adam Arico, and Shaun Nicols & Justin Sytsma)</LI> <LI>Free Will and Responsibility (Joshua Knobe & Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson)</LI> <LI>Epistemology and the Reliability of Intuitions (Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel & Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg).</LI></UL> <P></P> <P>Preliminary descriptions of each chapter, annotated bibliographies for each controversy, and a supplemental guide to further controversies in experimental philosophy (with bibliographies) help provide clearer and richer views of these live controversies for all readers.</P> <P></P> <P> </P>. (shrink)