I manoscritti dell'abate Galiani.--Catalogo sistematico dei manoscritti dell'abate Galiani.--Intorno al terzo dei Libri della Biccherna.--Due recensioni.--Groce, B. I manoscritti dell'abate Galiani.--Nicolini, B. Profilo di Fausto Nicolini archivista.

Team semantics is a highly general framework for logics which describe dependencies and independencies among variables. Typically, the dependencies considered in this context are properties of sets of configurations or data records. We show how team semantics can be further generalized to support languages for the discussion of interventionist counterfactuals and causal dependencies, such as those that arise in manipulationist theories of causation. We show that the “causal teams” we introduce in the present paper can be used for modelling some (...) classical counterfactual scenarios which are not captured by the usual causal models. We then analyse the basic properties of our counterfactual languages and discuss extensively the differences with respect to the Lewisian tradition. (shrink)

Natural languages exhibit manysemantic universals, that is, properties of meaning shared across all languages. In this paper, we develop an explanation of one very prominent semantic universal, the monotonicity universal. While the existing work has shown that quantifiers satisfying the monotonicity universal are easier to learn, we provide a more complete explanation by considering the emergence of quantifiers from the perspective of cultural evolution. In particular, we show that quantifiers satisfy the monotonicity universal evolve reliably in an iterated learning paradigm (...) with neural networks as agents. (shrink)

From birth to 15 months infants and caregivers form a fundamentally intersubjective, dyadic unit within which the infant’s ability to recognize gender/sex in the world develops. Between about 18 and 36 months the infant accumulates an increasingly clear and subjective sense of self as female or male. We know little about how the precursors to gender/sex identity form during the intersubjective period, nor how they transform into an independent sense of self by 3 years of age. In this Theory and (...) Hypothesis article I offer a general framework for thinking about this problem. I propose that through repetition and patterning, the dyadic interactions in which infants and caregivers engage imbue the infant with an embodied, i.e., sensori-motor understanding of gender/sex. During this developmental period (which I label Phase 1) gender/sex is primarily an intersubjective project. From 15 to 18 months (which I label Phase 2) there are few reports of newly appearing gender/sex behavioral differences, and I hypothesize that this absence reflects a period of developmental instability during which there is a transition from gender/sex as primarily inter-subjective to gender/sex as primarily subjective. Beginning at 18 months (i.e., the start of Phase 3), a toddler’s subjective sense of self as having a gender/sex emerges, and it solidifies by 3 years of age. I propose a dynamic systems perspective to track how infants first assimilate gender/sex information during the intersubjective period (birth to 15 months); then explore what changes might occur during a hypothesized phase transition (15 to 18 months), and finally, review the emergence and initial stabilization of individual subjectivity-the period from 18 to 36 months. The critical questions explored focus on how to model and translate data from very different experimental disciplines, especially neuroscience, physiology, developmental psychology and cognitive development. I close by proposing the formation of a research consortium on gender/sex development during the first 3 years after birth. (shrink)

We analyze the behaviour of declarations of independence between existential quantifiers in quantifier prefixes of Independence-Friendly (IF) sentences; we give a syntactical criterion to decide whether a sentence beginning with such prefix exists, such that its truth values may be affected by removal of the declaration of independence. We extend the result also to equilibrium semantics values for undetermined IF sentences.

In (Barbero and Sandu 2020 Journal of Philosophical Logic, 50, 471-521), we showed that languages encompassing interventionist counterfactuals and causal notions based on them (as e.g. in Pearl’s and Woodward’s manipulationist approaches to causation) as well as information-theoretic notions (such as learning and dependence) can be interpreted in a semantic framework which combines the traditions of structural equation modeling and of team semantics. We now present a further extension of this framework (causal multiteams) which allows us to talk about probabilistic (...) causal statements. We analyze the expressivity resources of two causal-probabilistic languages, one finitary and one infinitary. We show that many causal-probabilistic notions from the literature on causal inference can already be expressed in the finitary language, and we prove a normal form theorem that throws a new light on Pearl’s “ladder of causation”. In addition, we provide an exact semantic characterization of the infinitary language, which shows that this language captures precisely those causal-probabilistic statements that do not commit us to any specific interpretation of probability; and we prove that no usual, countable language is apt for this task. (shrink)

It is well known that AI-based language technology—large language models, machine translation systems, multilingual dictionaries, and corpora—is currently limited to three percent of the world’s most widely spoken, financially and politically backed languages. In response, recent efforts have sought to address the “digital language divide” by extending the reach of large language models to “underserved languages.” We show how some of these efforts tend to produce flawed solutions that adhere to a hard-wired representational preference for certain languages, which we call (...) language modeling bias. Language modeling bias is a specific and under-studied form of linguistic bias were language technology by design favors certain languages, dialects, or sociolects with respect to others. We show that language modeling bias can result in systems that, while being precise regarding languages and cultures of dominant powers, are limited in the expression of socio-culturally relevant notions of other communities. We further argue that at the root of this problem lies a systematic tendency of technology developer communities to apply a simplistic understanding of diversity which does not do justice to the more profound differences that languages, and ultimately the communities that speak them, embody. Drawing on the concept of epistemic injustice, we point to the broader ethico-political implications and show how it can lead not only to a disregard for valuable aspects of diversity but also to an under-representation of the needs of marginalized language communities. Finally, we present an alternative socio-technical approach that is designed to tackle some of the analyzed problems. (shrink)

We analyze the causal-observational languages that were introduced in Barbero and Sandu (2018), which allow discussing interventionist counterfactuals and functional dependencies in a unified framework. In particular, we systematically investigate the expressive power of these languages in causal team semantics, and we provide complete natural deduction calculi for each language. Furthermore, we introduce a generalized semantics which allows representing uncertainty about the causal laws, and we analyze the expressive power and proof theory of the causal-observational languages over this enriched semantics.

In this article, I query whether participation in the labour market can hinder neo-republican freedom as non-domination. I briefly present the view of Philip Pettit on the topic, based on the distinction between offering a reward and threatening a punishment. I compare it to the analysis of labour republicans, recently reconstructed by Alex Gourevitch, according to whom, the exclusion of a group of individuals from the control of productive assets represents a form of structural domination. Then, I explain why I (...) take a position that is different from both. I hold that capitalist structural domination leads only to exploitation, not interpersonal domination. In doing this, I consider two objections that might be raised against my argument. The first one is based on incomplete contracts and on a possible ideal benchmark for job offers. The second one challenges the supposed arbitrariness of unequal property relations within the capitalist social system. (shrink)

A uniform carbon tax with equal per capita dividends is usually advocated as a cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions without increasing, and in many cases even reducing, economic inequality, in particular because of the positive balance between the carbon taxes paid by the worse off and the carbon dividends they receive back. In this article, I argue that a uniform carbon tax reform is unjust regardless of how the revenue is used, because it does not discourage the (...) rich from indulging in wasteful emissions. This is at odds with a normative account of the distribution of the GHG budget that I define as emissions limitarianism, which is a climate derivative of economic limitarianism. Emissions limitarianism holds that, under low GHG budget conditions, emissions permits should not be used to achieve functionings that over-consume the GHG budget without producing significant welfare gains relative to the achievement of alternative functionings. Accordingly, I argue that a uniform carbon tax should be complemented by a limitarian carbon tax, which restricts the capabilities of the rich to achieve wasteful emission-generating functionings. The article adopts a methodological multi-level perspective on capabilities as a measure of welfare, distinguishing between basic, secondary and tertiary capabilities. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é a análise das críticas de Hannah Arendt à concepção dos direitos humanos, introduzida pelo pensamento dos filósofos contratualistas e efetivada, politicamente, pelas revoluções americanas e francesas no final do século XVIII. Contudo, este objetivo não seria plenamente alcançado sem a avaliação da proposta de Arendt para a superação de suas próprias críticas: a reconstrução dos direitos humanos através do reconhecimento que cada indivíduo tem direito a ter direitos, independente das fronteiras do Estado-nação. Arendt vai buscar (...) na moral universalista e cosmopolita kantiana o conceito de humanidade e dá a ele as dimensões ontológicas e políticas necessárias para se construir um espaço público internacional, onde o direito a ter direito seja decorrente do mero pertencimento à humanidade, não se dissolvendo nos limites de cada Estado-nação. The purpose of this article is the analysis of the criticisms of Hannah Arendt's conception of human rights, introduced by the thought of the contractual philosophers and made effective, politically, by American and French revolutions in the late eighteenth century. However, this aim would not be fully achieved without the review of Arendt's proposal to overcome her own criticisms: the reconstruction of human rights by recognizing that every individual has the right to have rights, regardless of borders of the Nation-State. Arendt tries to discover in the universal and cosmopolitan moral of Kant the concept of humanity and gives him the ontological and political dimensions needed to build an international public space where the right to have rights is due to the mere belonging to the humanity, not dissolving itself in the limits of each Nation-State. (shrink)

In 1582, Carlo Sigonio published a text entitled De Republica Hebraeorum. It used the format of the De repubblica Athenensium manual. The question of the political structure in ancient Israel had already been addressed before, but Siconio was the first to adopt a systematic approach. However, he did not know Hebrew and so used the translation of the Septuagint, giving rise to not a few problems.

We analyze the expressive resources of \ logic that do not stem from Henkin quantification. When one restricts attention to regular \ sentences, this amounts to the study of the fragment of \ logic which is individuated by the game-theoretical property of action recall. We prove that the fragment of prenex AR sentences can express all existential second-order properties. We then show that the same can be achieved in the non-prenex fragment of AR, by using “signalling by disjunction” instead of (...) Henkin or signalling patterns. We also study irregular IF logic and analyze its correspondence to regular IF logic. By using new methods, we prove that the game-theoretical property of knowledge memory is a first-order syntactical constraint also for irregular sentences, and we identify another new first-order fragment. Finally we discover that irregular prefixes behave quite differently in finite and infinite models. In particular, we show that, over infinite structures, every irregular prefix is equivalent to a regular one; and we present an irregular prefix which is second order on finite models but collapses to a first-order prefix on infinite models. (shrink)

In the literature on logics of imperfect information it is often stated, incorrectly, that the Game-Theoretical Semantics of Independence-Friendly quantifiers captures the idea that the players of semantical games are forced to make some moves without knowledge of the moves of other players. We survey here the alternative semantics for IF logic that have been suggested in order to enforce this “epistemic reading” of sentences. We introduce some new proposals, and a more general logical language which distinguishes between “independence from (...) actions” and “independence from strategies”. New semantics for IF logic can be obtained by choosing embeddings of the set of IF sentences into this larger language. We compare all the semantics proposed and their purported game-theoretical justifications, and disprove a few claims that have been made in the literature. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 7, July 2022.

In this article, I discuss whether the theory of justice as fairness famously proposed by John Rawls can justify the implementation of global principles of socioeconomic justice, contrary to what Rawls himself maintains. In particular, I dwell on the concept of the basic structure of society, which Rawls defines as “the primary subject of justice” and considers as a prerogative of domestic societies. In the first part, I briefly present Rawls’s theory of socio-economic justice and his account of justice between (...) peoples. I then proceed with the analysis of the cosmopolitan counterarguments that have been levelled against Rawls’s dualism between domestic and international justice, which mainly revolve around the outlining of a global basic structure as a consequence of globalisation. Between these two opposing poles, I also discuss the intermediate stance taken by those authors who maintain that the empirical dispute between a domestic and a global basic structure is misleading, because the pressing question is whether the unfair practices and norms that characterise the global economy demand the existence of a global basic structure, regardless of the fact that it already exists or not. Lastly, I collect some points, both theoretical and empirical, that have emerged from the analysis and I argue that the theoretical requirement of a global basic structure can have practical implications even if its existence is contradicted in empirical terms. (shrink)

We analyse the two definitions of generalized quantifiers for logics of dependence and independence that have been proposed by F. Engström, comparing them with a more general, higher order definition of team quantifier. We show that Engström’s definitions can be identified, by means of appropriate lifts, with special classes of team quantifiers. We point out that the new team quantifiers express a quantitative and a qualitative component, while Engström’s quantifiers only range over the latter. We further argue that Engström’s definitions (...) are just embeddings of the first-order generalized quantifiers into team semantics, and fail to capture an adequate notion of team-theoretical generalized quantifier, save for the special cases in which the quantifiers are applied to flat formulas. We also raise several doubts concerning the meaningfulness of the monotone/nonmonotone distinction in this context. In the appendix we develop some proof theory for Engström’s quantifiers. (shrink)

The favorable reception that was received for the book Per salvare la democrazia in Italia (Rubbettino, 2019) did not prevent some demanding readers from raising objections to some passages included in part five of the book, containing proposals to improve the functioning of our democratic system. It was therefore decided to take advantage of the period of forced domicile imposed by the pandemic to write this new book, whose primary objective is to clarify the passages in question while explaining the (...) proposed innovative solutions in a simpler manner, starting with the description of his own career path and ending with a suggestion for changing the way of doing politics in Italy. The second objective is to make readers aware of the enormous impact exerted by European legislation on the Italian legal system--Translated from back cover. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has confronted humanity with a complex and unexpected challenge. One part of this challenge concerned individual ethics, i.e., the behaviour of individuals with respect to the rules and restrictions that have been imposed by health authorities in the collective interest. Another part concerned, instead, the social organisation of immunisation campaigns. In this article I wonder whether the lessons we have learned in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic can be applied to climate change mitigation. My first argument (...) is that at least some of the ethical successes obtained at the individual level can be repeated with respect to climate change, but only if we stop focusing solely on the risks of climate change and offer a convincing picture of the benefits and opportunities of a more sustainable world. The second argument is that the Covid-19 pandemic offered us a new perspective on the relationship between global systemic threats and social justice: no one can adapt in isolation, neither medically nor economically. An out-of-control climate will lead to the same situation, so the asymmetry of vulnerability between developed and developing countries is only a short-term illusion. (shrink)

the domain of Art critique and becoming a philosophical argument. How can we think of Perspective as symbolic Form? Is Perspective really a symbolic form? Why is Perspective so important? Because at the beginning of the Modern Age, Perspective as spiritual figure grounds many symbolic or even many scientific constructions. We could we say that perspective open the foundation of modern science as such. The “Geometrization” of Vision, beginning with perspective, will be for us the interpretative key in order to (...) understand the Modern Age as a whole. This understanding will allow us to understand the anthropologic dimension arising from the Modern Age, called „Perspectivism“. Assuming that perspective was neither only an invention of painting nor of geometry nor of philosophy, taken as singular fields of human inquiry, we will try to sketch the genesis of “perspective” from an interdisciplinary point of view. By doing so, we will also try to fix its deep significance for the anthropology of the Modern Age. Living and feeling in a perspectival world is the real invention of the Modern Age, one that overcame the closed Cosmos of the Middle Ages in order to reveal to mankind its own potential. Our interdisciplinary approach will proceed from many points of view and converge on the idea of a new kind of human experience. Such an interdisciplinary approach will open new questions about our present time. Are we justified in thinking of our experience today as perspectival? What does it mean today to think from perspectives in the manifold dimensions of our living and to face to the complexity of our times? (shrink)

The end of the twentieth century marks the slow disintegration of both the Marxist and capitalist socioeconomic theories, inasmuch as both have proven inadequate to meet basic issues of human existence. Their inadequacy rests on the tendency to use the criteria of extrinsic rewards, quantification, production, and consumption to evaluate human personhood and human activity. What is needed is a third alternative to these two systems, one that is based on intrinsic rewards and cultivates internal values rather than production, consumption, (...) and quantification. Religious communities have traditionally been such an alternative and seem to represent an ordered nucleus of information that can counter the inadequacies of Marxism and capitalism. To carry out this function, religions must (1) minimize the trivial differences that set belief systems against one another; (2) support bimodal cultural evolution that allows the old and the new to coexist; and (3) discover the unifying factors that cut across human groups. (shrink)

This thought-provoking book analyses the process of labour commodification, through which the individual’s ability to earn a basic living becomes dependent on the conditions of the market relationship. Building on the premise that the separation of a group of individuals from the means of production is an intrinsic element of capitalism, Fausto Corvino theorises that this implies a form of domination in a neo-republican sense. -/- Proposing an original theory of global justice denoted as a minimum de-commodification of labour (...) power, this book explains the ways in which this cosmopolitan principle resists the criticisms that are commonly advanced against classic theories of global justice and charts a theory falling between the neo-republican and labour republican approaches. It stimulates the debate on, and moral critique of, capitalism and the obstacles it poses to individual freedoms, with a focus on exploitation and domination. -/- Global Justice, Markets and Domination will be a key resource for students and scholars researching capitalism and analytical Marxism, political economics and human rights. It will also be of benefit to those interested in theories of global and distributive justice and the economic implications of the neo-republican theory of freedom as non-domination. (shrink)

Tool-use behavior is currently one of the most intriguing and widely debated topics in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts of our ability to use tools have been proposed. In the first part of the paper we review the most prominent interpretations and suggest that none of these accounts, considered in itself, is sufficient to explain tool use. In the second part of the paper we disentangle three different types of reasoning on tools, characterized by a different distribution of motor and cognitive (...) ingredients. At the conceptual level, these types of reasoning reflect the distinction between three types of abductive inference as they are described in semiotic studies. At the functional level, we suggest that these types of reasoning on tools may correspond to different mental processes, possibly implemented in different regions of the left inferior parietal lobe. This proposal can account for the different interpretations commonly associated with the role of the left parietal cortex in tool use. (shrink)

In this article, I maintain that the social process of labour commodification, through which the individual capability to uphold a decent welfare is bound to participation in the labour market, poses a problem of justice from the republican prospective on freedom as non-domination. I first discuss the reasons we might hold that capitalism brings a form of systemic domination by virtue of one of its intrinsic features: unequal access to the means of production. Then, I argue for a minimum de-commodification (...) of labour power as a criterion of justice, adding that it should be conceived as a cosmopolitan proviso because states unfairly suffer from their limited economic capacity to neutralize capitalist systemic domination. Lastly, I compare the normative account of global justice that I am proposing in this article with sufficientarianism, with the capability approach, and with Thomas Pogge’s ‘Global Resources Dividend’. (shrink)

A common view in affective neuroscience considers emotions as a multifaceted phenomenon constituted by independent affective and motor components. Such dualistic connotation, obtained by rephrasing the classic Darwin and James’s theories of emotion, leads to the assumption that emotional expression is controlled by motor centers in the anterior cingulate, frontal operculum, and supplementary motor area, whereas emotional experience depends on interoceptive centers in the insula. Recent stimulation studies provide a different perspective. I will outline two sets of findings. First, affective (...) experiences can be elicited also following the stimulation of motor centers. Second, emotional expressions can be elicited by stimulating interoceptive regions. Echoing the original pragmatist theories of emotion, I will make a case for the notion that emotional experience emerges from the integration of sensory and motor signals, encoded in the same functional network. (shrink)

Climate justice demands polluters to take responsibility for both present and future harm caused by past GHG emissions and for future harm caused by future GHG emissions. One problem with this is double climate taxation: people living in historical polluting countries must both shoulder the burden of an effective and inclusive climate transition and repay the climate debt incurred by their predecessors. Although double climate taxation might be defensible on normative grounds, it risks making climate justice politically infeasible. I therefore (...) maintain that global climate justice should focus on future, rather than past, climate harms. The forward-looking polluter pays principle (FL-PPP) can ensure both a cost-effective climate transition and a fair distribution of the climate burden, provided it is applied as follows: i) each country must introduce a carbon price calibrated to the global social cost of carbon; ii) each country must transfer part of carbon revenues collected at the country level to an international fund; iii) global carbon revenues must be redistributed on the basis of the country-level social cost of carbon. The FL-PPP burden can be made more progressive, moreover, if the formula for allocating global carbon revenues is adjusted through two coefficients, one consumption-based and one priority-sensitive. (shrink)