This book presents the psychological basis, methodology, and application of Marton's phenomenographic approach to the theory of learning.

Diese Studie führt einen Dialog mit dem französischen Philosophen Gilles Deleuze, um anhand seines Denkens die Erscheinungsweisen von Ereignis zeit- und sprachphilosophisch zu beschreiben. Ereignis, dieses Begriffswort, das sich jeder Definition naturgemäß entzieht, wird in der jüngeren Praktischen Theologie und in der Systematischen Theologie seit Karl Barth häufig gebraucht und selten bestimmt. In dieser Studie geht Ferenc Herzig dem Ereignis nach, ohne es mit einer „Was-ist“-Frage einzuzäunen. Die Konsequenzen für liturgische und homiletische Grundfragen werden daraufhin ebenso dargestellt wie der (...) Versuch unternommen, die Frage nach Gott unter poststrukturalistischen Vorzeichen zu stellen. (shrink)

Introductory essay / Peter Jones -- The usefulness of the arts and the humanities : the case of Descartes / Gábor Boros -- Roads of remembrance : the treatment of imagination and memory in Gerard's Essay on genius / Zsolt Komáromy -- Diderot's untimeliness / László Kisbali ; transl. Márton Dornbach -- Melody vs. harmony : Rousseau, or, The aesthetics of vowels / Mária Ludassy ; transl. Zsolt Komáromy -- Judgement and taste : from Shakespeare to Shaftesbury / Ferenc (...) Hörcher -- Lord Shaftesbury's "aesthetic freedom" / Endre Szécsényi -- Why one should imitate the Greeks : on Winckelmann / Sándor Radnóti ; transl. Márton Dornbach -- Beauty or beast, or, Monstrous regiments? : Robertson and Burke on women and the public scene / László Kontler -- The concept of nature and the theodicy problem in the Malebranche-Arnauld-Leibniz debate / Dániel Schmal -- Lessing's anti-candide : between reason and revelation / Krisztina Utasi ; transl. Márton Dornbach. (shrink)

This book provides a critical survey of measurement theories and a clear exposition of the concerning philosophical questions. The author offers a new, constructive interpretation for measurement in both physics and the social sciences, arguing for a constructivist approach.

Bekanntlich ging Fichte von der Philosophie Kants aus und zwar von der praktischen Philosophie Kants und ihrer Deklaration des Prinzips der menschlichen Freiheit. Fichte war nämlich der Ansicht, daß die theoretische Philosophie Kants trotz ihrer guten Tendenzen keine zureichende Basis für die Erklärung der menschlichen Freiheit biete, da Kant die richtige Tendenz nicht konsequent weiterverfolgt habe. Fichte war deshalb anfangs der Meinung - und bis zu einem gewissen Grade zu Recht - daß das, was er tat, einfach die folgerichtige Ausgestaltung (...) der Philosophie Kants sei; übrigens hat auch Hegel in seinen die Wissenschaft der Philosophiegeschichte sozusagen allererst begründenden denkwürdigen Vorträgen[...] die historische Stellung der Philosophie Fichtes so eingeschätzt. Ursprüngliches Ziel Fichtes ist also ein »echter, durchgeführter Kritizismus«, die Realisierung einer Philosophie, die die Prinzipien Kants sowohl vom formellen als auch inhaltlichen Gesichtspunkt her gleichermaßen konsequent verfolgt: »Kant hat nach meiner Überzeugung das System nicht dargestellt, aber er hat es im Besitz« - schreibt Fichte in einem seiner Briefe. (shrink)

At the end of his life György Lukács described his intellectual career as ‘my way to Marx’ [mein Weg zu Marx]. By this he meant that his professional life can be interpreted as an attempt to get to the real Marx. In this paper I use this expression in a narrower and more direct meaning: I attempt to present the road at the end of which the young Lukács arrived at a Marxist standpoint.

This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are that the interpretation of such cases depends on which substantive theory of responsibility one endorses and that Frankfurt-style cases all involve some form of causal overdetermination which can be interpreted either as being compatible with the potentially manipulated agent’s ability to act otherwise or as a responsibility undermining constraint. The paper also argues that the possibility of such scenarios (...) can support the truth of classical compatibilism as much as the truth of semicompatibilism. (shrink)

_Freedom of the Will_ provides a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses several questions about the meaning of free will and its significance for moral responsibility. Although Moore’ theory has a strong initial appeal, most metaphysicians believe that there are conclusive arguments against it. Huoranszki argues that the importance of conditional analysis must be reevaluated in light of some recent developments in the theory of dispositions. The original analysis can be amended so (...) that the revised conditional account is not only a good response to determinist worries about the possibility of free will, but it can also explain the sense in which free will is an important condition of moral responsibility. This study addresses three fundamental issues about free will as a metaphysical condition of responsibility. First, the book explains why agents are responsible for their actions or omissions only if they have the ability to do otherwise and shows that the relevant ability is best captured by the revised conditional analysis. Second, it aims to clarify the relation between agents’ free will and their rational capacities. It argues that free will as a condition of responsibility must be understood in terms of agents’ ability to do otherwise rather than in terms of their capacity to respond to reasons. Finally, the book explains in which sense responsibility requires self-determination and argues that it is compatible with agents’ limited capacity to control their own character, reasons, and motives. (shrink)

Agents have no control over the formation of their own zygote. Others may do. According to a well-known argument, the so-called Zygote Argument for incompatibilism, these facts, together with a prima facie plausible further assumption, are sufficient to prove that human agents cannot be responsible for their actions if they live in a deterministic universe. This paper argues that the lack of agents’ control over the constitution of their own zygote can undermine their responsibility only in exceptional conditions and that (...) the occurrence or non-occurrence of those conditions has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of determinism. What undermines agents’ responsibility in the situations described by the Zygote Argument is the occurrence of some specific initial conditions which may render the manipulation of agents’ behaviour possible, and not the truth of determinism. (shrink)

Here, we propose that the heterogeneity of mutational types in populations underpins alternative pathways of evolutionary adaptation. Point mutations, deletions, insertions, transpositions and duplications cause different biological effects and provide distinct adaptive possibilities. Experimental evidence for this notion comes from the mutational origins of adaptive radiations in large, clonal bacterial populations. Independent sympatric lineages with different phenotypes arise from distinct genetic events including gene duplication, different insertion sequence movements and several independent point mutations. The breadth of the mutational spectrum in (...) the ancestral population should be viewed as a form of bet‐hedging, reducing the risk of evolutionary dead ends and complementing the phenotypic and epigenetic heterogeneities that improve the survival capabilities of a population. Different mutational events arise from distinct cellular processes and are subject to separate environmental impacts, so the availability of any particular type of mutation may constrain or promote adaptive pathways in populations. (shrink)

This book covers the field of and points to the intersections between politics, art and philosophy. Its hero, the late Sir Roger Scruton had a longstanding interest in all fields, acquiring professional knowledge in both the practice and theory of politics, art and philosophy. The claim of the book is, therefore, that contrary to a superficial prejudice, it is possible to address the philosophical issues of art and politics in the same oeuvre, as the example of this Cambridge-educated analytical philosopher (...) proves. Accordingly, the book has a bold thesis on the general, theoretical level, mapping the connections between politics, art and philosophy. However, it also has a pioneering commitment on the level of the particular, offering the first full-length study into the philosophical legacy of Roger Scruton, probably the most important British conservative philosopher of the late 20th and the first decades of the 21st century. It also allows reader to look into the philosopher’s fascination with Central European art and culture. Finally, it also provides a daring analysis of the late Scruton’s metaphysical inspirations, connecting the arts, and especially music, with religion and the bonds of love. (shrink)

This paper provides a short overview of how Oakeshott identifies the functions and limits of government, with reliance primarily on two texts. The first one from “Lectures on the History of Political” thought distinguishes nomocratic and teleocratic ways of governing. Oakeshott describes the two forms in a detached fashion, and indirectly hints at his preference for nomocratic rule. The second text is Oakeshott’s essay “On Being Conservative”, where Oakeshott gives a sceptical and critical description of human nature. The paper argues (...) that this account of human nature should be seen as the basis, on which a nomocratic rule can be defended. It will be argued, that the two texts should be read together, if we want to get a reasoned overview of Oakeshott’s criticism of contemporary forms of government, and of his reasons to choose nomocratic rule instead of the teleocratic one. It will be argued that a complex political philosophy based on these two pillars will be provided by Oakeshott’s late book On Human Conduct. (shrink)

Die zweite bedeutende Schaffensperiode Fichtes entfaltet sich in Berlin, der Hauptstadt Preußens, und ist ständig stärker verknüpft mit dem aufgeklärt-absolutistischen preußischen Staat. Selbstverständlich ist dies in vielerlei Hinsicht ein Anzeichen für eine markante Wende im Wirken Fichtes, bei der es sich aber keineswegs um einen unerklärlichen und irrationalen Gesinnungswandel handelt: die Berliner Epoche ist im Vergleich zur Jenaer Periode gleichermaßen gekennzeichnet durch Kontinuität und Diskontinuität. Bezüglich der theoretischen Philosophie bleibt immer die wesentliche Identifikation von Allgemeinem Ich und Gott aufrechterhalten. Doch (...) während in der Jenaer Periode eher Gott sich im Allgemeinen Ich auflöste, löst sich jetzt immer mehr das Allgemeine Ich in Gott auf. Dies steht im Zusammenhang damit, dass zwar auch in Betracht auf seine praktische Philosophie ständig der theoretischen Philosophie gegenüber deren Priorität bestand - doch während in der Jenaer Periode allgemein-abstrakte Prinzipien von Freiheit und Moral im Mittelpunkt standen, wurden diese jetzt konkretisiert und nehmen damit gesellschafts- und geschichtsphilosophische bzw. religionsphilosophische sowie eschatologische Dimensionen an: Gott erscheint in der Geschichte und handelt, dazu noch mit bestimmten Zielen. Das Ziel der Geschichte ist das Reich Gottes auf Erden. All diese Fragen werden immer enger verknüpft mit dem Problem der Zukunft Deutschlands und innerhalb dessen Preußens - so wie auch das Schaffen jeder großen Gestalt der deutschen klassischen Philosophie, unabhängig von der Herkunft, auf diese oder jene Weise mit dem Schicksal Preußens in Verbindung stand. Königsberg und Berlin waren für Kant, Fichte, Hegel und Schelling gleichermaßen wichtige Beziehungspunkte. Schon der spezifischen gesellschaftlichen und historischen Rolle Preußens, der großen ostdeutschen protestantischen Monarchie, wegen müssen wir also bezüglich der Jenaer und Berliner Periode Fichtes nicht nur Diskontinuität sondern auch Kontinuität anerkennen. (shrink)

In this new book, Fr. Damian Ference proposes a more precise lens for decoding Flannery O'Connor's narrative art, one that originates in O'Connor's own words about herself: Hillbilly Thomism. The author examines the various ways in which St. Thomas Aquinas and the philosophical tradition of Thomism shaped not only O'Connor's view of reality but also the stories she told to help us see and know it."--from inside front flap.

Various approaches have been taken recently to a reinterpretation of the European reception of China and the sinophilia-sinophobia dichotomy (Hung 2003, Millar 2010, Jacobsen 2013). In the present article, a nineteenth-century approach to China is examined using Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) as examples. It will be argued that this approach differs from earlier attitudes. First, the central currents will be surveyed in the European reception of China between the Jesuit missionaries and early nineteenth-century philosophies of (...) history, introducing an interpretational framework that differentiates between various approaches to China, namely a _universalistic_ and a _progression-based approach_. Then, first Tocqueville's and then Mill's depictions of China in comparison with the concepts of preceding centuries will be analyzed. It will be argued that Tocqueville and Mill's understanding of China represents a third view that I will call _relation-based_. (shrink)

Argument for fatalism attempts to prove that free choice is a logical or conceptual impossibility. The paper argues that the first two premises of the argument are sound: propositions are either true or false and they have their truth-value eternally. But the claim that from the fatalistic premises with the introduction of some innocent further premise dire consequences follow as regards to the possibility of free choice is false. The introduced premise, which establishes the connection between the first two premises (...) (which are about the nature of propositions) and the concept of free choice is not innocent. It creates the impression that the truth of certain propositions can somehow determine the occurrence of certain events. But no proposition can have such an effect since the counterfactuals If proposition P were true, event E would happen does not say anything about determination. The argument for fatalism is, however, not a boring sophism. It does reveal something about the nature of propositional representation. It shows that each proposition represents necessarily the fact what it represents, i.e. it shows that propositions have their truth conditions non-contingently. But from this nothing follows as regards to the contingent nature of the facts represented. On the bases of the first two premises of the argument for fatalism we cannot infer to the impossibility of free choice. The argument for fatalism should not be interpreted as an attempt to prove on purely logical or conceptual grounds that we do not have the ability to influence future events by our choices. But it could be used to show something about the nature of propositional representation. (shrink)

The most important systematic analysis of social movements to date has been Touraine's The Voice and the Eye. Here, one can almost paraphrase Marx's famous dictum: for the French sociologist, the history of all societies is a history of movements. In identifying movements with social classes, Touraine negotiates a radical turn from system theories to a strong version of action theory and breaks with the Procrustean framework of an Althusserian-Poulantzasian structuralism in which everything is accounted for once the economically based (...) class equivalent has been found. For Touraine, movements emerge and diversify in the process of their challenging “historicity” — a key concept derived from Castoriadis’ central category, the imaginary institution. (shrink)

Marxist philosophers have always given great attention to theoretical questions concerning the historical role and significance of the state and to the processes by which the types and political forms of states have changed. As we know, historical materialism demands both concrete analysis of the political organization of the society of a given socioeconomic system and the discovery of certain general patterns that manifest themselves in the course of world history. Marx's thesis that reality can truly be understood only on (...) the basis of a theoretical study of history retains its full significance to this day for philosophical analysis of the complex and diverse problems of the theory of the state. (shrink)