Qualitative research should strive for knowledge translation toward the goal of closing the gap between knowledge and practice. However, it is often a challenge in nursing to identify knowledge translation strategies able to illustrate the usefulness of qualitative results in any given context. This article defines storytelling and uses pragmatism to examine storytelling as a strategy to promote the knowledge translation of qualitative results. Pragmatism posits that usefulness is defined by the people affected by the problem and that usefulness is (...) promoted by modalities, like storytelling, that increase sensitivity to an experience. Indeed, stories have the power to give meaning to human behaviors and to trigger emotions, and in doing so bring many advantages. For example, by contextualizing research results and appealing to both the reason and the emotions of audiences, storytelling can help us grasp the usefulness of these research results. Various strategies exist to create stories that will produce an emotional experience capable of influencing readers’ or listeners’ actions. To illustrate the potential of storytelling as a knowledge translation strategy in health care, we will use our story of discovering this strategy during a qualitative study in a nursing home as an example. (shrink)

A pesar de la voluntad de ruptura y el deseo por ocultar sus fuentes, Descartes forja su reflexión sobre las pasiones en base al trabajo previo de una serie de pensadores que durante los siglos XVI y XVII fueron los responsables de iniciar ...

Contre la metaphysique: questions de methode / par Felix Le Dantec,...Date de l'edition originale: 1912Collection: Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaineCe livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920 et fait partie d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande editee par Hachette Livre, dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Bibliotheque nationale de France, offrant l'opportunite d'acceder a des ouvrages anciens et souvent rares issus des fonds patrimoniaux de la BnF.Les oeuvres faisant partie de cette collection ont ete numerisees (...) par la BnF et sont presentes sur Gallica, sa bibliotheque numerique.En entreprenant de redonner vie a ces ouvrages au travers d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande, nous leur donnons la possibilite de rencontrer un public elargi et participons a la transmission de connaissances et de savoirs parfois difficilement accessibles.Nous avons cherche a concilier la reproduction fidele d'un livre ancien a partir de sa version numerisee avec le souci d'un confort de lecture optimal. Nous esperons que les ouvrages de cette nouvelle collection vous apporteront entiere satisfaction.Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.frhttp: //gallica.bnf.fr/ark: /12148/bpt6k5477903d. (shrink)

The following definition of “objective” is proposed: A statement S is objective if and only if in S all parameters that are relevant to its truth value are made explicit. The objectivity of predicates and relations can be defined in a similar manner. This simple conception of objectivity-which could be called “explicitness conception of objectivity”-can be found in Hermann Weyl and plays a central part in the natural sciences. There are grades of objectivity depending on the ‘quality’ and the number (...) of parameters our predicates are relativized to A relativistic Ockham principle has to be recognized: Relativization parameters are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The explicitness conception of objectivity is accessible to mathematical specifications, is the core of the idea of invariance, has a lot of philosophical applications and leads to precise notions of ‘subjectivity’ and a precise formulation of the problem of the limits of objectivity. (shrink)

In certain cases of sudden death, forensic experts may discover during an investigation or autopsy that family members of the deceased are also at risk of harm—from genetic disease, for instance. But do they have a duty to warn them? Looking at similar duties of physicians and researchers to warn third parties of risk suggests they do.

McGarvey (Econometrica, 21(4), 608–610, 1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a relation induced by majority rule. We address the analogous issue for dominance relations of finite cooperative games with non-transferable utility (coalitional NTU games). We find any irreflexive relation over a finite set can be obtained as the dominance relation of some finite coalitional NTU game. We also show that any such dominance relation is induced by a non-cooperative game through β-effectivity. Dominance relations (...) obtainable through α-effectivity, however, have to comply with a more restrictive condition, which we refer to as the edge-mapping property. (shrink)

Son histoire l'a prouvé, le roman tient à deux mondes divergents, qu'il met en lutte autant qu'il les rapproche : celui de la réalité et celui des fictions imaginées par ses personnages. Mais lorsque les rêves des personnages tendent à se confondre avec la réalité, le roman n'atteint-il pas les limites de son action? De cette frontière témoignent tout particulièrement les œuvres romanesques du XIXe siècle. De Balzac à Zola, de Flaubert à Proust, le personnage réaliste rêve des fictions toujours (...) plus ténues qui lui font perdre ses contours et vont jusqu'à le rapprocher des figures de plus en plus abstraites exposées par la peinture de la même époque. Parvenu à ce point critique, le roman doit trouver les moyens de se poursuivre : passage fascinant, analysé ici par Isabelle Daunais à la lumière de ce qu'elle appelle une histoire interne du roman. A travers le roman réaliste, c'est ainsi l'œuvre générale du roman qu'elle éclaire sous un angle nouveau. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Listening to the World:Prophetic Anger and Sapiential CompassionFelix WilfredPope Benedict XVI has insisted all along how the absence of reference to God has caused dehumanization in our world. Unfortunately, what does not seem to occur to him and those who think along these lines is how the absence of concern and engagement with the issue of suffering—poverty, oppression, racism, and sexism—causes dehumanization. Suffering epitomizes the condition of our contemporary (...) world. This is the meeting point of any meaningful common discourse of religious traditions, independent of the God question. For those believing in God, the very God question is itself bound up with the question of suffering. As Gustavo Gutierrez has rightly pointed out, the real question today is how to speak about God in a world of suffering, and indeed suffering of the innocent.1a world not angry enoughWhat defines us as individuals and groups is the way we respond to suffering. This is a crucial question. For, as Hannah Arendt has drawn to our attention, there is something like a banality of evil.2 Its everyday genesis and manifestations are not anything sensational, as they are mostly committed by ordinary men and women who go about their daily lives and are by no means moral monsters.The first sentiment in responding to suffering should be a sense of horror, trembling, and indignation at the injustice inflicted on the victims, and that is very important. We note that the environment we live in is so politicized that human beings are less and less shocked by the horror of evil. Suffering has become a matter of statistics, codification, media commercialization, and photography.3What strikes us is the fact that anger characterized men and women of great leadership, because they were upset with the existing situation and they imagined a different order of things. Moses was such a man in the biblical tradition. In modern times, such was the case for example with B. R. Ambedkar, the foremost leader of the Dalits (“Untouchables”) of India, and Martin Luther King Jr. of the civil rights movement in the United States, both of whom were great, angry leaders. We could [End Page 63] characterize this as “holy anger.” It aims not at destroying the enemies or punishing them but at redeeming a society from the consequences of suffering.prophetic anger: some salient featuresWhen we speak of prophetic anger, the question that could be raised is: Whose anger? It is first and foremost the anger of the victims. For it is they who know the pain evil inflicts in the form of grinding poverty, violence, and humiliation. Along with the victims, we have those in solidarity with them who express rage at the situations of gross injustice. Anger is of different kinds. Anger can and does often accompany the spirit of vindication and revenge.4 This anger is aimed at others as enemies, and as threats to oneself. But prophetic anger has a direct reference to justice. The anger of the victims has something visceral about it. The whole being of the victim reacts to the injustice and oppression suffered—be it women; discriminated-against ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities; or any victim of human rights violations. There is then ample room to speak about “black rage,” “Dalit rage,” and “gender rage,” which express the anguish of the victims pushed to the wall through long-standing oppression and yet having the strength to imagine something different. Prophetic anger is a healing anger. It opens the wounds of society and has ultimately the goal of healing them.Prophetic anger is the result of being gripped by an encounter and experience of something wonderful and exceedingly beautiful beyond the present distortion of reality. This is something different from a mere human passion. Like symbols that help us convey what words and speech are incapable of, so anger is a medium to bridge the gulf that divides the lofty realities and the misery of the prevailing situation. The encounter and experience that is in the prophets also finds expression in prophetic anger as it is directed at the cause behind the suffering of the innocent.Prophetic anger is directed... (shrink)

A travers la lecture du Visible et de l ‘Invisible, Guy-Félix Duportail se propose de montrer que la notion de chair connaît une structure topologique que l’on peut expliciter sous la forme de trois principes élémentaires : indivision, division, et réversibilité. Ceux-ci constituent l’infrastructure oubliée de la conscience et forment un inconscient phénoménologique (l’invisible- du visible). De plus, ces trois principes de la chair possèdent une signification· ontologique_ Dire que ľêtre est charnel, c’est ipso facto reconnaître la médiation nécessaire d’ (...) un troisième terme qui modifie le lien entre l’Être et le Néant. Ce troisième terme est ľ ouverture qui apparaît dans les phénomènes comme béance et qui s’apparente à l’objet du désir. L’ontologie de Merleau- Ponty dépasse ainsi la philosophie de la conscience de Husserl et de Sartre, de même que l’ontologie désincarnée de Heidegger. (shrink)

L'article propose de commenter le rapprochement entre l'architecture et ce que les anglophones nomment Wearability. Pour ce que ce thème à double entrée renvoie à la question de l'habiter dans et avec la technologie connectée, à l'instar d'un vêtement (tendant à la combinaison spatiale), il fut choisi de l'approcher par le biais de l'expérience vécue et de l'organiser à partir de deux expositions récentes, à Paris et à New York, afférentes à la problématique des campements. Quand la première permet de (...) discuter combien les moindres équipements portables ont le potentiel à accompagner une remise en question de l'architecture comme infrastructure du monde, la seconde offre de découvrir que l'émergence d'une nouvelle idée de l'architecture en elle-même portable amène réciproquement à déranger ce qui fait dès lors office d'infrastructure technologique (et commerciale) de nos habitats. Il en est de la possibilité de préserver, à l'échelle de la personne, de toujours pouvoir choisir de porter (tirant profit de la polysémie de ce verbe) les récentes poussées technologiques, ou non. (shrink)

If Fichte influenced in Kant like a reagent so that this took conscience of thelast consequences of his unfinished system, Would it be necessary to say thesame of Schelling? In principle, everything leads us to a negative answers.During the nineties Schelling was considered as a mere pupil and until..

En este artículo se trata la formalización del poder político de las nuevas dinastías (msñik al-fawd'~fjl que gobemaron en al-Andalus tras la desaparición del califato omeya. Para ello se ha tenido en cuenta el análisis de las inscripciones que aparecen en las monedas emitidas por estas dinastías, específicamente la de los 'Amiríes instalados en Denia, que acuñaron primeramente en Etola y treinta años después en la misma Denia yen Mallorca. Tanto las variables inscripciones reconociendo la autoridad de un imóm, como (...) los nombres inscritos de miembros de las familías gobemantes o del séquito palatino revelan de manera conspicua esta nueva legalidad, finalmente cuestionada. (shrink)

Jake Kosek. Understories: The Political Life of Forests in Northern New Mexico Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9341-3 Authors Caroline Felix Oliveira, Iowa State University, 403 East Hall, Ames, IA 50011, USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.

Both the sound and the sea are characterized by a constant fluidity and transformation, which has been considered as a creative foundation for expanded sonic practices that identify, capture and experiment with natural elements. The text aims to explore how the idea of sonification as a process of translating qualities and data into sound constitutes the departure point towards contemporary sound practices that encourage deeper listening and immersive experiences. Taking the sea-responsive sound installations of French artist Félix Blume, Rumors from (...) the Sea and Suspiros as a foundation, the article presents a reflective conversation between Félix Blume and Bill Psarras on aspects of such artworks that highlight ideas of sea and limens, listening experience, sound ecology and sonic instruments through performative, inventive and participatory lenses. (shrink)

Sebastian Grève interviews Felix Mühlhölzer on his work on the philosophy of mathematics.

This collection of original essays on political and legal theory concentrates on themes dealt with in the work of Felix Oppenheim, including fundamental political and legal concepts and their implications for the scope of morality in politics and international relations. Among the issues addressed are the relationship between empirical and normative definitions of "freedom", "power", and "interests", whether governments are free to act against the national interest, and whether they can ever be morally obliged to do so.

John C. Altmann decides whether Dracula can really be blamed for his crimes, since it's his nature as a vampire to behave a certain way. Robert Arp argues that Dracula's addiction to live human blood dooms him to perpetual frustration and misery. John V. Karavitis sees Dracula as a Randian individual pitted against the Marxist collective. Greg Littmann maintains that if we disapprove of Dracula's behavior, we ought to be vegetarians. James Edwin Mahon uses the example of Dracula to resolve (...) nagging problems about the desirability of immortality. Adam Barkman and Michael Versteeg ponder what it would really feel like to be Dracula, and thereby shed some light on the nature of consciousness. Robert Vuckovich looks at the sexual morality of Dracula and other characters in the Dracula saga. Ariane de Waal explains that "Dragula" is scary because every time this being appears, it causes "gender trouble." And Cari Callis demonstrates that the Count is really the Jungian Shadow archetype--with added Shapeshifter elements--in the journey of Mina Harker, heroine/victim of Stoker's novel, from silly girl to empowered woman. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the very project (...) of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that lying differs from mere misleading in a way that can be morally relevant: liars commit themselves to something they believe to be false, while misleaders avoid such commitment, and this difference can make a moral difference. Even holding all else fixed, a lie can therefore be morally worse than a corresponding misleading utterance. But, we argue, there are also cases in which the difference in commitment makes lying morally better than misleading, (...) as well as cases in which the difference is not morally relevant. This view conflicts with the two main positions philosophers have defended in the ethics of lying and misleading, which entail either that lying is in virtue of its nature worse than misleading or that there is no morally relevant difference between lying and misleading. (shrink)

Educational authority is an issue in contemporary democracies. Surprisingly, little attention has been given to the problem of authority in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Emile and his work has not been addressed in the contemporary debate on the issue of authority in democratic education. Olivier Michaud's goals are, first, to address both of these oversights by offering an original reading of the problem of authority in Emile and then to rehabilitate the notion of “educational authority” for democratic educators today. Contrary to (...) progressive readings of Emile, he argues, Rousseau's position on this issue is not reducible to “education against authority.” What appears at first glance to be an education against authority is, in a deeper sense, an education toward and even within authority. Michaud contends that we have to embrace these complexities and contradictions that inform Rousseau's work in order to gain insights into the place and role of authority in democratic education. Michaud sheds light on Rousseau's stance on authority through a close study of specific topics addressed in Emile, including negative education, opinion, one's relation to God, friendship and loving relationships, and, finally, the relation Rousseau established with his reader. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:360 HUME'S NATURALI Z EP PHILOSOPHY In "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine claimed that the failure of reductive-foundationalist attempts in epistemology, after the model of Carnap' s Aufbau, must lead to a redefinition of epistemology's task. Instead of setting out to reconstruct the whole fabric of our knowledge from absolute data through deductive operations, we should investigate how human subjects derive their knowledge of nature from sensory inputs. Thus epistemology is (...) to be conceived as a branch of natural science, cognate with psychology, not as the study of the foundations of science any more. In the present paper, I will first outline Quine's position and his related interpretation of Hume's philosophical enterprise. Then, I will try to assess the relevance and fairness of Quine's account and consider in what measure it allows us to understand the novelty of Hume's conception of philosophy, since Hume also advocated a nonfoundationalist conception of philosophy which bears some striking analogy to naturalized epistemology. Finally, I will suggest which consequences are to be drawn from this unusual view of Hume, especially as regards the self-reference of philosophy. Quine's position in the matter of epistemology is well known. For him, under its traditional form and program, epistemology used to deal with the foundations of science, be it mathematics or the science of nature. This foundationalist approach had two connected aspects, one which Quine calls conceptual; the other he calls doctrinal. As Quine 361 puts it "the conceptual studies are concerned with clarifying concepts by defining them, some in terms of others" (Quine, p. 69). In the same manner, the doctrinal studies attempt to establish laws "by proving them, some on the basis of others" (Quine, p. 69). Derivative concepts will be defined in terms of the clearer ones and complex laws will be proved from primitive and obvious ones. Thus the traditional or classical conception of epistemology involves simultaneously a theory of concepts or meanings and a theory of truth. These two branches (Quine speaks of a duality of structure or bifurcation) converge so as to provide an analysis of the way our knowledge of nature -- and our knowledge in general — stems from and is built upon our sensory experience which validates it. In so characterizing epistemology, Quine simply restates in his own terms the f oundationalist and reductivist program of positivist epistemology, which itself tied in with the logicist program in mathematics. Then Quine suggests that Hume dealt with both sides of this program, the conceptual and the doctrinal. To begin with, Hume developed what might be called a theory of concepts or meanings in terms of our sensory data. Such is the point of his theory of ideas which consists in tracing them back to the original impressions they are derived from. In spite of its limitations, which hinge on the lack of an approach in terms of statements, Hume's phenomenalism does the job of a theory of meaning and concepts. Hume also attempted to give an answer to the question of the truth of our knowledge. In this case again, his phenomenalist stand allows him to account for the truth of our singular statements concerning our perceptions, even though this result is achieved at the cost of identifying objects and sensory data. 362 However, when Hume comes to general statements and singular statements concerning future events, his attempt fails. This is not surprising. According to Quine, if it were possible to improve on Hume's theory of meaning and concepts, especially through the use of contextual definition techniques, by contrast, all the attempts to logically derive the truth of our knowledge from true premises have failed. In matter of induction, we are not one step further than Hume was. "The most modest of generalizations about observable traits will cover more cases than its utterer can have had occasions actually to observe. The hopelessness of grounding natural science upon immediate experience in a firmly logical way was acknowledged" (Quine, p. 74). Or "the Humean predicament is the human predicament." For Quine, foundationalist attempts of the sort Hume engaged in involve two cardinal principles of empiricism which remain unchallenged. One of these principles is to the effect... (shrink)

Gabriel Marcel is not typically read as a political theorist and social commentator. He never wrote a treatise devoted specifically to a systematic treatmentof politics. His writings, nevertheless, abound in political theorizing and social analysis. This study articulates Marcel’s socio-political thought, explicating itscoherence with his overall concrete philosophy and with his personal engagement in political events of his time. It develops through three themes. The first details Marcel’s particular approach to sociopolitical thought as a “watchman.” The second shows why Marcel (...) offers a “hopeful communitarianism” which overcomes the problems of collectivism and individualism. The third delineates Marcel’s views on the concrete, socio-political, and ethical issues of peace and population control. A brief closing section explains the importance of politics in Marcelian scholarship and the “prophetic” quality of his thought. (shrink)

John Haught has awarded the debates between religion (Christianity in particular) and science a central place in his ongoing corpus of work. Seeking to encourage and enhance the conversation, Haught both critiques current positions and offers his own perspective as a potential ground for continuing the discussion in a fruitful manner. This essay considers Haught's primary criticisms of the voices on both sides of the debate which his work connotes as polarizing or conflating the debate. It also extrudes from Haught's (...) work themes that provide alternative visions. The essay concludes with two questions for further consideration. (shrink)

Alfred Schutz formulated his phenomenology with the aim of circumventing what he perceived to be the idealistic character of Husserl’s theory of meaning constitution. Schutz contended that constitution for Husserl was idealistically creationistic in the sense that the meanings and very being of phenomena were merely the created products of the constitutive acts of consciousness itself. This article argues, however, that Schutz’s theory of constitution is not without an idealistic character in that the meanings which consciousness constitutes and predicates to (...) phenomena are simply created by consciousness itself. This argument is articulated through 1) a delineation of the basic principles of Schutz’s phenomenology, 2) an explication of his theory of constitution, and finally, 3) an exposition of its idealistic character with, by way of contrast, a brief account of how and why Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology expunged all features of idealistic constitution. (shrink)

A cultural infrastructure of shared morality is necessary for the success of market economics. Traditional views maintain that religion is the nurturing source of the morality, which grows in the culture. The Progressive revolution aims to overturn Traditional morality and impose its social justice morality on culture. This article dissects and critiques the multifaceted Progressive revolution in the United States, while contrasting it with the Traditional view. It argues that the ultimate aim of the Progressive revolution is to redefine the (...) human person through identity politics as a collective entity, which essentially liquidates the individual, conforms the person to social justice morality, and establishes socialistic economics. (shrink)

Contemporary economics is dominated by logical positivism, a methodology that emphasizes empirical validation of theories but excludes normative evaluation. Preclassical economics was premised on normative analysis. With the growing socialist movement in the USA, especially among the millennials, who are fixated on moral issues of justice and equality, positive economics is alienated from addressing the normative challenges of socialism. There are, however, basic normative principles from Preclassical thought which can be used to contest socialist moral claims, particularly in economics education.