The concept of precision medicine aims to tailor treatment based on data unique to the patient. An example is the use of genetic data from malignant tumours to select the most appropriate oncological treatment. The competing interests of utilitarianism and egoism create dilemmas for decisions regarding investment in precision medicine. The need to balance the perceived rights and needs of individuals against those of society as a whole is an on-going challenge in the distribution of limited health service resources. There (...) is need for proper planning, organisation and investment into precision medicine to cope with the consequences of both direct-to-consumer and healthcare-directed genetic testing for genetic counselling, therapeutics and diagnostic networks. Consideration needs to be given to providing adequate time and training to allow for meaningful shared decision-making with patients and there is a strong case in support of a hub-and-spoke model to provide rapid, solid tumour genetic mutational analysis to prevent patients missing out on beneficial treatments. (shrink)

At the beginning of the series, a dozen young women are introduced as potential mates for the eligible young bachelor. The audience accompanies the couples on their limo-escorted dates, meets the bachelor's family and friends, listens to their evaluation of the bride, and watches expectantly as the smiling Prince Charming singles out a few finalists for his attention. As the weeks pass by, one by one, tearful young women are dismissed from the show as the presentation of the final rose (...) that signifies singular devotion draws near. In the end, only two young women remain, and only one can receive…. (shrink)

One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant’s moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for (...) the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man’s recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively. Keywords: culture, final end, Highest Good, hope, imagination, Kant, moral ideal reflective judgment, ultimate end. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its (...) pitfalls. (shrink)

(2013). The Final Volley in the Strauss Wars? The European Legacy: Vol. 18, Reflections on the Future University, pp. 78-82. doi: 10.1080/10848770.2012.722526.

Com base na crítica que Hume faz ao argumento do desígnio, especialmente nas partes 10 e 11 dos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural, meu objetivo neste artigo é, a partir de uma análise da relação entre a existência do mal no mundo e a suposta existência de uma divindade possuidora dos atributos tradicionais do teísmo, defender a tese segundo a qual o tratamento que Hume dá ao problema do mal corresponde, digamos assim, à cartada final – o último e decisivo (...) recurso que Philo personagem que articula essa crítica) aciona para mostrar que o argumento do desígnio não fornece bases suficientemente sólidas e consistentes para dar suporte à crença na existência de um Deus maximamente poderoso, justo e benevolente; e que, portanto, a existência do mal no mundo tem uma força argumentativa tal que a improbabilidade da existência de Deus é maior do que com base nos argumentos apresentados nas partes 2 a 8 dos Diálogos. Isso significa que eu tomo aqui o problema do mal como o maior problema para o teísta experimental – cuja argumentação pretende provar a existência de Deus a partir da observação dos fenômenos do mundo. (shrink)

Este trabajo, quiere considerar retórica y narrativamente el relato de Pablo acerca del conflicto de Antioquía, para proponer como tesis, que el final abierto de Pablo en su descripción del conflicto de Antioquía es una estrategia retórica consciente y deseada, que genera tensión en su auditorio gálata, en orden a presentar la afirmación teológica central de la carta: “somos salvados en Cristo por la fe y no por las obras de la ley”, una tesis que quiere sostener su mensaje principal (...) a la comunidad gálata «no os circuncidéis», si lo hacéis, “Cristo no os servirá de nada”. (shrink)

Mythical stories are, according to Luce Irigaray, one source where the matrix of repression, desire and correction of the female body is made visible. The Book of Revelation is one of the parts of the Bible told in a typical mythical language framework. It is also one of the most infamous biblical books because of its misogynist approach and repeated use of female stereotypes such as the whore and the pure bride. The purpose of this article is not to deny (...) the validity of this feminist critique, but to open up the meaning of the story of Revelation from an Irigarayan perspective as also to include possibilities of a counter-story where phallocentrism is challenged and finally altered into a new era where women, as well as other previously objectified categories, are aware of themselves as subjects in their own right. (shrink)

Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the (...) physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying the way in which powers work. (shrink)

본 논문은, 대승불교의 『대승기신론』과 레비나스의 『전체와 무한』이 마음의 오염과 정화의 과정에 대해 얼마나 생산적인 대화를 나눌 수 있는지를 보이려는 목적 아래, 그 마지막 단계인 전자의 구경각究竟覺과 후자의 에로스를 비교 분석한다. 양자의 대화는 쌍방에 호혜적이다. 『전체와 무한』 쪽에서는 종잡기 힘들 만큼 얽히고설킨 에로스 드라마가, 『기신론』의 논리적 도식 덕분에, 그에 상응하는 명료한 분절을 얻었다. 『기신론』 쪽에서는 추상성에 갇혀 있던 구경각의 운동이, 『전체와 무한』의 세세한 연출 덕분에, 일련의 구체적 사건들의 드라마로 생동하게 되었다. 특히 『기신론』에서 수수께끼처럼 남아 있던 시각의 역설이 『전체와 무한』의 드라마를 통해 (...) 명쾌히 해명될 수 있었다. (shrink)

How does valuing something for its own sake differ from valuing an entity for the sake of other things? Although numerous answers come to mind, many of them rule out substantive views about what is valuable for its own sake. I therefore seek to provide a more neutral way to distinguish the two valuing attitudes. Drawing from existing accounts of valuing, I argue that the two can be distinguished in terms of a conative-volitional feature. Focusing first on “non-final valuing”—i.e. valuing_ (...) x_ for the sake of something else—I argue that it involves adopting certain reasons on account of a desire for _x_ to contribute to other things. I then show how this contrasts final valuing. The result, I argue, is a plausible account of how the two modes of valuing differ that leaves open substantive views about what all can be valued for its own sake. This is helpful because it develops a popular methodology used to explore the value of a wide range of things, including natural entities, family heirlooms, and artworks, as well as, more broadly, entities that might have “extrinsic final value.”. (shrink)

본 연구는 최종근거짓기 문제와 헤겔의 현실 개념이 도대체 어떻게 이해되고 있는지 고찰하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이를 위해서 필자는 현대 철학에서 눈부신 성과와 발전을 거듭하고 있는 경험적인 개별 학문들도 근거짓기가 필요하다고 생각한다. 왜냐하면 경험적인 개별 학문도 객관적 · 이론적 타당성, 근거짓기의 문제가 필수불가결하기 때문이며, 특히 근거짓기의 문제와 내재적으로 관련된 학문의 경우 그 학문성을 추구하는 것은 불가피한 일이기 때문이다.BR 따라서 필자는 이 글에서 먼저 최종근거짓기 증명과 최종근거지어진 인식의 존재론적 타당성에 대한 테제를 검토하고(II), 이어서 최종근거짓기 증명의 존재론적 타당성을 논증한 후에(III), 헤겔 철학에서 논리적인 (...) 것의 현실 개념이 어떻게 이해되고 있는지를 고찰하면서(IV) 글을 마무리할 것이다. (shrink)

The Japanese philosopher, Tanabe Hajime is taken up as an example of a thinker who, like the conference question, straddles intellectual histories East and West. Of all the Kyoto School philosophers, it was he who took history most seriously. He not only criticized Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxist notions of teleology and the modern scientific myth of "progress" on their own ground, but went on to counter these views of history with a logic of emptiness grounded in Buddhist philosophy. The essay (...) concludes with an attempt to uncover the tacit assumption that allows Tanabe to make his arguments. (shrink)

Convergent scientific realism entails that science will sooner or later arrive at the final theory of the fundamental constituents of matter. At that stage, all fundamental truths about nature will be discovered so that the search for basic principle seems bound to come to a halt. I explore options for a non-convergent scientific realism that allows for sustained progress in basic research. I defend the views that the coherence of non-convergent realism requires an emergence claim and that this claim can (...) be supported. I develop the example of the relation between equivalence classes among biological functions and their physiological realizations. Given strongly emergent laws in the sense elaborated in the paper, progress in basic research may survive the discovery of the laws governing the tinymost parts of matter. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that sports at their best qualify as final ends, that is, as ends whose value is such that they ground not only the practices whose ends they are, but everything else we do as human agents. The argument I provide to support my thesis is derived from Harry Frankfurt's provocative work on the importance of the things we care about, more specifically, on his claim that it is by virtue of caring about things and practices, (...) really caring about them ? even loving them ? we are able to regard and treat them as final ends. Sports, I claim, are paradigmatic examples of practices cared about and loved in these deep ways, and as such deserve to be considered, rather than dismissed because of their supposed triviality, as one of those ends around which a life most worth living can be legitimately forged. (shrink)

His final set of lectures at the College de France, described here by Thomas Flynn, focused on the concept of truth-telling as a moral virtue in the ancient ...

Finality suggests an unchangeable conclusion. It also raises the idea of a goal towards which a reality is directed. This is the sense in which one finds the final cause in Aristotle and other philosophers. Nearly everyone feels helpless before finality. This is because it evokes the spectrum of finitude as it appears to occur in the dead. No one in the prime of life and at the peak of health, wealth, pleasure and hopeful optimism actively desires death. (...) Yet like a shadow, the awareness of a possible sudden end stalks at everyone. It is not the most comfortable feeling. This raises a situation where both the idea and the reality of death must be confronted in order to make sense of life. Has it meaning? Is it destined or free floating? How and when will life end or does it even have an absolute termination at all? Is death life’s last unassailable barrier or just a simple demarcation from other forms of conscious existence in some way? Though often never put into words, failure to engage these questions raises conundrum. Attempts to answer them form and inform cultures, nourish customs, create traditions, inspire inventions, and generally stimulate the human spirit. They keep religions alive, engage thinkers, inspire fidelity to cultural roots and symbols and fire up the spirit of research. It is the position of this paper that confronting human finality is at the service of valorizing human life further. It is like an unseen engine that keeps the vehicle alive. Thus, life approaches death while death serves life. It (death) forbids anyone at the level of the intellect, experience and knowledge from making any absolute positive claims regarding the termination of life. Confronting death psychologically, physically and spiritually requires specific perspectives since each man must face it inevitably in his person and each culture and religion must make sense of it in its own way. That is what this study examines. (shrink)

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. (...) The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes. (shrink)

Summary A group of scientists at the Max Planck Institut at Starnberg have recently been studying the interrelation between science and society in the context of science policy. They have advanced the thesis that there is a connection between: (1) the level of cognitive development of any given science and (2) the ability of that science to be directed towards externally set goals.

This item consists of two excerpts from Berlin's ‘My Intellectual Path’, an autobiographical piece, which was the last essay he wrote. It was written to help introduce Chinese students of philosophy to contemporary western philosophy. The portions reprinted here give a reminiscence of ‘Historical Inevitability’ and ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’.

From the perspective of an African ethic, analytically interpreted as a philosophical principle of right action, what are the proper final ends of a publicly funded university and how should they be ranked? To answer this question, I first provide a brief but inclusive review of the literature on Africanising higher education from the past 50 years, and contend that the prominent final ends suggested in it can be reduced to five major categories. Then, I spell out an intuitively attractive (...) African moral theory and apply it to these five final ends, arguing that three of them are appropriate but that two of them are not. After that, I maintain that the African moral theory prescribes two additional final ends for a public university that are not salient in the literature. Next, I argue that employing the African moral theory as I do enables one to rebut several criticisms of Africanising higher education that have recently been made from a liberal perspective. I conclude by posing questions suitable for future research. (shrink)

(Ak 10:74).[1] During the so-called ‘silent decade’ of the 1770s, when Kant was working on the Critique of Pure Reason, he promised repeatedly not only that he would soon finish that work but also that he would soon publish a “metaphysics of morals” (Ak 10:97, 132, 144).[2] Yet it was not until four years after the first Critique that Kant finally wrote a work on ethics, and even then he merely laid the ground for a metaphysics of morals by identifying (...) and establishing the supreme principle on which a system of duties would be based (G 4:392). Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant once again dealt entirely with foundational questions in moral philosophy. Kantian ethics is primarily known, especially among English-speaking philosophers, through these two ethical works of the 1780s, neither of which contains anything like a ‘metaphysics of morals’. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the processes undergone by the yoga practitioner in the later stages of purification according to the classical Yoga of Pata jali. Through a process termed the sattvification of consciousness, the mental processes of the yogin are remolded, reshaped and restructured leading to a transformation of the mind and its functioning. The mind thus can be seen not only as a vehicle of spiritual ignorance, but of liberating knowledge culminating in authentic identity. Yoga philosophy, far from (...) negating or suppressing human nature, has profound implications for psychological improvement and an embodied understanding of freedom and human integrity. (shrink)