This paper examines the contents of the sixth paragraph of the “Tyrrell Memoir”. This paragraph makes some strong, critical claims about both Locke’s “obsession” with the London physician Thomas Sydenham, and his purported dismissive attitude towards another physician, Richard Lower. In the paragraph, Tyrrell sides with the First Earl of Shaftesbury’s mocking attitude towards the triumvirate Locke, his close friend David Thomas, and Sydenham, and relates some extraordinary and hitherto unknown anecdotes. Tyrrell’s claims are assessed in relation to (...) what we know about the relations between these four men and in relation to the current state of Sydenham historiography. (shrink)

Two medical essays in the hand of John Locke survive amongst the Shaftesbury Papers in the National Archives (National Archives PRO 30/24/47/2, ff. 31r–38v and ff. 49r–56r). Since the 1960s their authorship has been disputed. Some scholars have attributed them to the London physician Thomas Sydenham, others have attributed them to Locke. Detailed analyses of their contents and the context of their composition provide very strong evidence for Lockean authorship. This is reinforced by the application of the most recent (...) techniques of computational stylistics. (shrink)

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

The clinical empiricism of Thomas Sydenham (1624–1689) and his definition of especie morbosae represented a substantial turn in the medicine of his time. This turn supposed the shift towards an ontological conception of diseases, from a qualitative to quantitative interpretation. Sydenham’s clinical proposal had a great influence on empiricism philosophical thinking, particularly in John Locke and his delimitation of knowledge. The dialogue between medicine and philosophy, set out by Sydenham-Locke, reactivates the problem of the clinical and theoretical (...) foundations of medical thought, as well as the limits of scientific knowledge. Similar to problem exposed in the Hippocratic treatise On ancient medicine, seventeenth-century medicine seeks its epistemological foundations and the solution to its difficulties in clinical experience, probability and analogy. The aim of this work is to show the Sydenham’s contribution to one of the great controversies between medicine and philosophy. (shrink)

John Locke’s medical interests resulted in several short texts in which he criticizes two theoretical conceptions of his days, paracelsianism and galenism. Two of the texts – ‘ Morbus’ and ‘ Anatomia’ – show the influence of Thomas Sydenham on Locke’s understanding of medicine which can be summarized as a turn towards clinical medicine and empirical investigations. The article reconstructs this early stage of the development of Locke’s standpoint leading to ‘ An Essay Concerning Human Understanding’.

Following a recent trend in the field of the history of philosophy and medicine, this paper stresses the necessity of recognizing empiricism’s patent indebtedness to the sciences of the body. While the tribute paid to the Hippocratic method of observation in the work of Thomas Sydenham is well known, it seems necessary to take into account a trend more critical of ancient medicine developed by followers of chemical medicine who considered the doctrine of elements and humours to be a (...) typical example of the idols that hinder the improvement of medical knowledge and defend the necessity of experimentation. In light of the fact that modern discoveries resulted in a “new frame of human nature,” they developed a critical reading of ancient empiricism. As a consequence, we can distinguish between two distinct anti-speculative traditions in the genesis of philosophical empiricism. The first recommends an active investigation into nature and refers to the figure of Democritus, the ancient philosopher who devoted himself to the dissection of beasts. Defenders of this first tradition refuse point-blank to be called ‘empiricists’, a label which had a very negative meaning during the seventeenth century, when it was used to dismiss charlatans and quacks. The other tradition, stressing as it does the role of description and observation, is more sceptical of the ability of dissection or anatomy to give us access to causes of diseases. This later tradition comes closer to the definition of ancient empiricism and to the figure of Hippocrates. (shrink)

In this article I contrast 17th and 18th explanations of hysteria including those of Sydenham and Willis with those given by Plato and pre-modern medicine. I show that beginning in the second decade of the 17th century the locus of the disorder was transferred to the nervous system and it was no longer connected with the womb as in Hippocrates and Galen; hysteria became identified with hypochondria, and was a disease contracted by men as well as women. I discuss (...) the purely mechanical explanation of hysteria given by Robert Boyle who attributed its cause to corporeal ideas as well as overly sensitive disposition of the nervous system. I relate this the mechanical theory of the nervous system prominent in Descartes' writings on physiology. The paper closes with a discussion of the contrast between early modern explanations of hysteria and the nature of man with those of Freud in the early 20th century. (shrink)

John Locke's philosophy was deeply affected by medicine of his times. It was specially influenced by the medical thought and practice of Thomas Sydenham. Locke was a personal friend of Sydenham, expressed an avid interest in his work and shared his views and methods. The influence of Sydenham's medicine can be seen in the following areas of Locke's philosophy: his “plain historical method”; the emphasis on observation and sensory experience instead of seeking the essence of things; the (...) rejection of hypotheses and principles; the refusal of research into final causes and inner mechanisms; the ideal of irrefutable evidence and skepticism on the possibilities of certainty in science. The science which for Locke held the highest paradigmatic value in his theory of knowledge was precisely medicine. To a great extent, Locke's Essay on Human Understanding can be understood as an attempt to justify, substantiate, and promote Sydenham's medical method. This method, generalized, was then proposed as an instrument for the elaboration of all natural sciences. (shrink)

The Meno is one of the foundational dialogues of the Platonic tradition - it initiates a series of investigations into subjects which lie at the heart of philosophy: What is virtue? How is it acquired?This edition of Taylor's revision of Sydenham's translation adds three introductory essays by Tim Addley and an extract from Procclus' commentary on The Republic on Virtue.

What, according to Locke, are ideas? I argue that Locke does not give an account of the nature of ideas. In the Essay, the question is simply set to one side, as recommended by the “Historical, plain Method” that Locke employs. This is exemplified by his characterization of ‘ideas’ in E I.i.8, and the discussion of the inverted spectrum hypothesis in E II.xxxii. In this respect, Locke's attitude towards the nature of ideas in the Essay is reminiscent of Boyle's diffident (...) attitude towards the nature of matter. In posthumously published work, however, Locke suggests that the enquiry into the nature of ideas is one of the things that the enquiry into the extent of human knowledge undertaken in the Essay actually shows to lie beyond the “compass of human understanding”. In this respect, Locke's attitude towards the nature of ideas is reminiscent of Sydenham's attitude towards the nature of diseases. (shrink)

The philosophical thought of John Locke, a physician by profession, was colored by Locke's medical outlook to a much greater degree than had ever been suspected. Patrick Romanell, in John Locke and Medicine, examines Locke's relatively unknown medical writings and asks how Locke's own distinctive conception of human knowledge, traditionally classified under British empiricism, developed. He finds that, of all of Locke's interests, it is medicine that accounts most directly and effectively for his practical ideal of life and for his (...) constant appeal to "profitable knowledge." In his masterpiece An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke attempted, as he stated it, "to describe to others, more particularly than had been done before, what it is their minds do, when they perform that action, which they call knowing." Locke was intent on describing "the natural history of knowledge" and he required an appropriate method of inquiry. Romanell shows that it was Locke's medical thought and his background as a physician that provided the paradigm for his famed "historical, plain method" of inquiry that he applied to his philosophical analysis of human understanding. In addition to the light this sheds on Locke's philosophy, this new information causes us to reconsider several other significant issues: the nature of the debate between the competing schools of Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism; the position of Sydenham the physician in Locke's intellectual development; and the subtle differences of temper within the long tradtition of British Empiricism itself. John Locke and Medicine is the first book to discuss the hitherto neglected relationship between Locke the phycisian and Locke the philosopher. A major contribution to the study of John Locke, it is also a fascinating account of one of the many instances of the meeting of medicine and philosophy in the history of ideas. (shrink)

Well prior to the invention of the term ‘biology’ in the early 1800s by Lamarck and Treviranus, and also prior to the appearance of terms such as ‘organism’ under the pen of Leibniz in the early 1700s, the question of ‘Life’, that is, the status of living organisms within the broader physico-mechanical universe, agitated different corners of the European intellectual scene. From modern Epicureanism to medical Newtonianism, from Stahlian animism to the discourse on the ‘animal economy’ in vitalist medicine, models (...) of living being were constructed in opposition to ‘merely anatomical’, structural, mechanical models. It is therefore curious to turn to the ‘passion play’ of the Scientific Revolution – whether in its early, canonical definitions or its more recent, hybridized, reconstructed and expanded versions: from Koyré to Biagioli, from Merton to Shapin – and find there a conspicuous absence of worry over what status to grant living beings in a newly physicalized universe. Neither Harvey, nor Boyle, nor Locke (to name some likely candidates, the latter having studied with Willis and collaborated with Sydenham) ever ask what makes organisms unique, or conversely, what does not. In this paper I seek to establish how ‘Life’ became a source of contention in early modern thought, and how the Scientific Revolution missed the controversy. (shrink)

This paper argues that the construction of natural histories, as advocated by Francis Bacon, played a central role in John Locke's conception of method in natural philosophy. It presents new evidence in support of John Yolton's claim that "the emphasis upon compiling natural histories of bodies ... was the chief aspect of the Royal Society's programme that attracted Locke, and from which we need to understand his science of nature". Locke's exposure to the natural philosophy of Robert Boyle, the medical (...) philosophy of Thomas Sydenham, his interest in travel literature and his conception of the division of the sciences are examined. From this survey, a cumulative case is presented which establishes, independently of an in-depth exegesis of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the central role for Locke of the construction of natural histories in natural philosophy. (shrink)

The earlier Life of Locke, by Lord King, had consisted largely of an assemblage of Locke's own letters and manuscripts, of great value to the historian, but of rather less interest to the student of Locke's philosophy. Fox Bourne's biography, by contrast, concentrates on Locke the philosopher, and seeks to place his philosophical works in the context of his life. Fox Bourne thus describes Locke's studies at Oxford, his distaste for scholasticism, the discovery of Descartes' Meditations, and the role of (...) his medical and scientific interests and of his friendships with Boyle, Sydenham and Newton, in shaping his thought. Although the seeds of the Essay may have been sown as early as 1670, Fox Bourne admits, it was during Locke's exile in Holland between 1683 and 1689, and under the influence of such Dutch friends as Le Clerc, that the great work really took shape. At the heart of the work, we are told, is the critique of revelation that occupies pride of place in Book Four - Locke's overriding concern was to articulate a rationally defensible and universally acceptable version of Christianity. (shrink)

Well prior to the invention of the term ‘biology’ in the early 1800s by Lamarck and Treviranus (and lesser-known figures in the decades prior), and also prior to the appearance of terms such as ‘organism’ under the pen of Leibniz and Stahl in the early 1700s, the question of ‘Life’, that is, the status of living organisms within the broader physico-mechanical universe, agitated different corners of the European intellectual scene. From modern Epicureanism to medical Newtonianism, from Stahlian animism to the (...) discourse on the ‘animal economy’ in vitalist medicine, models of living being were constructed in opposition to ‘merely anatomical’, structural, mechanical models. It is therefore striking that the classic narratives of the Scientific Revolution conspicuously avoid any consideration of what status to grant living beings in a newly physicalized universe (I discuss this in Wolfe 2011, 2019 chapt. 1). Neither Harvey, nor Boyle, nor Locke (to name some likely candidates, the latter having studied with Willis and collaborated with Sydenham) ever ask what makes organisms unique, or conversely, what does not. In this chapter I seek to establish how something we might call ‘the knowledge of Life’, to use an expression of Georges Canguilhem’s, emerged as part of early modernity without being part of the mainstream history of life science. This leads to the question, can one can correlate early modern “knowledge of life” with the emergence of a science called ‘biology’? (see Zammito 2018, Wolfe 2019, Bognon-Küss and Wolfe eds. 2019). It was once fashionable to speak of, e.g. ‘precursors of Darwin’, and then Canguilhem and Foucault famously did away with the category of precursor. But how then do we account for the phase that precedes the constitution of a science? With the case of biology, how do we account for the increasing fascination with the ontology of Life during the decades prior to the ‘naming of biology’, as McLaughlin has called it, at the end of the eighteenth century? This increased focus on Life and the ontology of Life sits awkwardly, both with mainstream narratives of the Scientific Revolution and of the history of biology. In seeking to address this increased focus (in which vitalism plays a role but was by no means the only conceptual actor: Wolfe 2020), I critically examine Foucault’s notorious claim (Foucault 1966) that there was no such thing as ‘Life’ in the eighteenth century and thus no such thing as biology. (shrink)

Vitalism, from its early modern to its Enlightenment forms (from Glisson and Willis to La Caze and Barthez), is notoriously opposed to intervention into the living sphere. Experiment, quantification, measurement are all ‘vivisectionist’, morally suspect and worse, they alter and warp the ‘life’ of the subject. They are good for studying corpses, not living individuals. This much is well known, and it has disqualified vitalist medicine from having a place in standard histories of medicine, until recent, post-Foucauldian maneuvers have sought (...) to change the situation (but for unrelated, contextualist reasons). What is perhaps more suprising is that if we consider the emergence of medical ‘theory’ as a whole, from Harvey through to Locke and Sydenham, is the presence of a sustained anti-experimentalist line of argument, and this from the ‘empiricist’ (not Cartesian or Boerhaavian rationalist) side. It would seem then that ‘empiricks’, medical empiricists and other protagonists of an ‘embodied empiricism’ are not Boylean experimentalists who seek to map out Nature in its transparency, but deliberately archaic, Hippocratic observers of living bodies. (shrink)

Tekst został napisany najprawdopodobniej w roku 1668. Podstawą przekładu są jego dwie edycje: Kennetha Dewhursta, zamieszczona przezeń w monografii Thomas Sydenham. His Life and Original Writings, University and California Press, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1966, s. 85–93 oraz bardziej szczegółowa transkrypcja dokonana przez Jonathana Craiga Walmsleya i zamieszczona w rozprawie doktorskiej John Locke’s Natural Philosophy, opublikowanej elektronicznie: https://core.ac.uk/download/files/99/74250.pdf. Powodem umieszczenia przez Dewhursta tekstu Anatomii w książce poświęconej Sydenhamowi był brak pewności co do jej autorstwa; choć pierwotnie badacz ten przypisał go Locke’owi, (...) po pewnym czasie zmienił zdanie, uznając, że autorem był jednak Sydenham. Powodem był m.in. fakt, że pierwszy akapit napisany został ręką Sydenhama, co skłoniło Dewhursta do przypuszczenia, że rola Locke’a sprowadzała się jedynie do pełnienia obowiązków sekretarza znanego angielskiego lekarza. O autorstwie Sydenhama miała świadczyć także zbieżność poglądów zawartych w tekście z treścią jego Observationes Medicae. Ustalenia te podważyli ostatnio Peter Anstey i John Burrows, którzy analizując źródła i wykorzystując narzędzia statystyczne, rozstrzygnęli – należy sądzić, że ostatecznie – sprawę autorstwa Anatomii na korzyść Locke’a ). (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. The article demonstrates the development and influence of the main diagnostic systems in psychiatry, such as the DSM and the ICD, on the concept of psychiatric diseases. The problem of classification of psychiatric disorders is one of the main topics that is the field of study of the philosophy of psychiatry. The correct diagnosis within a particular diagnostic system directly affects the choice of appropriate drug treatment, psychotherapy and social support (...) for people suffering from mental disorders. Misdiagnosis has not only negative medical but also social consequences, leading to stigmatization and avoidance of people suffering from mental disorders. M e t h o d s. The research uses an integrated approach to the analysis of psychiatric diagnostic systems, including historical, comparative and interdisciplinary methods. The application of the historical method contributed to a detailed study of the evolution of psychiatric diagnostic systems and changes in approaches to the classification of mental disorders. A comparative analysis of the main diagnostic systems was carried out, considering their structure, diagnostic criteria and interaction. The interdisciplinary method involves the integration of knowledge from psychiatry, philosophy, medical history, cultural studies, and psychology, providing a deep understanding of the medical, philosophical, social, and cultural aspects of mental disorders. R e s u l t s. The article analyzes the historical development of ideas and methodology for the classification of mental disorders from ancient Greece to the present. From Hippocrates and Plato to Sydenham, Kabanis, Pinel, and Eskierol, the authors trace the evolution of understanding of mental disorders, emphasizing the shift in emphasis from etiological theories to more descriptive and categorical models. The authors describe the current state of the DSM and ICD classification systems, which play a dominant role in psychiatric science and subsequent social support and welfare for people suffering from mental disorders. Changes that have occurred in these systems and their impact on psychiatric practice and research are discussed. Considerable emphasis is placed on the history of the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which becomes a symbolic indicator of the complexities and challenges associated with the modern classification of mental illness. The authors consider the phenomenological method as a tool for a deeper understanding of PTSD, especially in the context of the constant psychotraumatic factors of war, the consequences of which generate new challenges for Ukrainian psychiatric practice. The authors present a case study using the phenomenological approach to diagnose PTSD, which demonstrates the need for a detailed analysis of patients' internal experience for accurate diagnosis and effective treatment. C o n c l u s i o n s. The conclusions emphasize the importance of integrating philosophical methods into the diagnosis and analysis of mental illness in clinical practice. The authors call for the development of interdisciplinary research involving both philosophers and mental health professionals to develop more detailed and person-centered approaches to the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders. (shrink)

La vieillesse constitue une pierre de touche pour toute théorie médicale : elle oblige à rendre raison de la temporalité à l’œuvre dans la vie. Aux yeux de Stahl, les iatromécaniciens méconnaissent la dimension temporelle de l’organisme ; en particulier, ils en ignorent la périodicité. Comprendre la vieillesse suppose donc la critique de la représentation linéaire du temps organique, que développe la mécanique et qui réduit le vivant au seul composé physique et chimique. Il reste alors à trouver la cause (...) de la périodicité organique : sur ce point, Georg Ernst Stahl critique Thomas Sydenham, qui reconnaît certes la périodicité du vivant mais nie la possibilité d’une médecine étiologique. Pour sa part, le médecin de Halle cherche à rendre compte du vieillissement en lien avec les actions organiques fondamentales : le tonus, la circulation, l’excrétion, la sécrétion. (shrink)

Locke wrote Draft A of the Essay while collaborating with physician Thomas Sydenham. Sydenham held that we are ignorant of nature's internal workings, cannot decide which natural philosophical theories are true and should therefore rely only upon experience. Draft A repeated Sydenham's views — we cannot understand nature's modus operandi and must rely on experience for our knowledge of the world. Equally, we must be agnostic about natural philosophical theories, mechanism included. Locke was not a mechanist in (...) Draft A. Consequently, Locke's account of substance, first articulated in this Draft and repeated in the Essay, was completely independent of the mechanical philosophy. (shrink)

This work reflects on hypochondria as well as on the global functioning of the human mind and on the place of the patient/physician relationship in the wider organisation of society. First published in 1711, revised and enlarged in 1730, and now edited and published with a critical apparatus for the first time, this is a major work in the history of medical literature as well as a complex literary creation. Composed of three dialogues between a physician and two of his (...) patients, Mandeville’s Treatise mirrors the digressive structure of a talking cure. Thanks to the soothing and enlightening effects of this casual conversation, the physician Mandeville demonstrates the healing power of words for a class of patients that he presents as men of learning who need above all to be addressed in their own language. Mandeville’s aim was to delineate his own cure for hypochondria and hysteria, which consisted of a talking cure followed by diet and exercise, but also to discuss the practice of medicine in England and continental Europe at a time when physicians were beginning to lose ground to apothecaries. Opposing a purely theoretical approach to medicine, Mandeville takes up the principles presented by Francis Bacon, Thomas Sydenham, and Giorgio Baglivi, and advocates a medical practice based on experience and backed up by time-tested theories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Locke on the Knowledge of Material Things ROBERT FENDEL ANDERSON IT IS nOT John Locke's intention, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, to deal with matter and material substance nor with how these are able to affect the mind. These are considerations for natural philosophy; Locke counts himself rather among the moral philosophers. He does not propose, therefore, to meddle with the physical aspects of the mind, nor with (...) the physical production of sensations through the organs, nor with the production of ideas in the understanding, nor even with whether ideas depend upon matter for their source. He defers to the wisdom of such men as Boyle, Sydenham, Huygens and Newton in these considerations, and finds it "... ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge....,, 1 It is true that Locke's Essay is characterized chiefly not by an interest in matter and the mechanics of perception but rather by an interest in epistemology and in the ordering and assessment of our knowledge. Because of the very nature and emphasis of this epistemology, however, Locke finds that he must, from time to time, at least mention the nature of matter and how it affects us. Finally, it becomes apparent, certain changes or ambiguities in his point of view regarding the mode of our knowledge and its certainty are consequences of his understanding of matter. It is a demonstration of these elements of his doctrine, which seem not to have obtained the full attention of such scholars as Aaron, Fraser, and Gibson, that I shall attempt in this paper. Fundamentally, Locke's theory of matter appears to be that of Democritus and Epicurus. Like the Greek atomists, he conceives of matter as consisting of particles or corpuscles infinite in number. At least some of these are so minute as to be individually insensible, and probably he intends that all are, although, to my knowledge, he never states that this is so. In the aggregate, in any case, particles do constitute perceptible bodies. As for the Greeks, so also for Locke, the particles arc all extended, having size and shape. They are said also to possess motion or rest, although he takes care to say that matter cannot produce motion in itself,e Locke frequently mentions other properties as being "primary" or "really in" material things. Some of these are solidity, texture, cohesion of parts, situation, and number. Apparently some of these may be ranked under others since, as he 1"Epistle to the Reader," Vol. I, p. 14. All footnotes refer to passages in John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, collated and annotated, with prolegomena, biographical, critical, and historical by Alexander Campbell Fraser, in two volumes (New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 1959). Large Roman numerals refer to books of the Essay; small Roman numerals refer to chapters of the books; Arabic numerals refer to sections of the chapters. 2 IV, x, 10. [205] 206 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY remarks, figure presupposes extension, and receiving or communicating motion through impact presupposes solidity. The influences of these particles upon one another are treated by Locke under the topic of "powers," a notion which includes in it some kind of "secret relation of parts." 3 The capacities in any substance to give alterations of primary qualities are active powers; the capacities to receive such alterations are passive powers. This alteration must be accomplished by impact or impulse since this, Locke says, is the only way in which bodies can be conceived to operate. Sensation in the percipient being then is to be understood as a special case of this impact of particles upon others. It is evident to Locke that from external obiects some motion must be conveyed by some parts of our bodies to the brain or seat of sensation to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of these external objects. We are able by sight to perceive at a distance the primary qualities of bodies of observable size. Locke reasons that therefore "... some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to... (shrink)

There is a familiar opposition between a ‘Scientific Revolution’ ethos and practice of experimentation, including experimentation on life, and a ‘vitalist’ reaction to this outlook. The former is often allied with different forms of mechanism – if all of Nature obeys mechanical laws, including living bodies, ‘iatromechanism’ should encounter no obstructions in investigating the particularities of animal-machines – or with more chimiatric theories of life and matter, as in the ‘Oxford Physiologists’. The latter reaction also comes in different, perhaps irreducibly (...) heterogeneous forms, ranging from metaphysical and ethical objections to the destruction of life, as in Margaret Cavendish, to more epistemological objections against the usage of instruments, the ‘anatomical’ outlook and experimentation, e.g. in Locke and Sydenham. But I will mainly focus on a third anti-interventionist argument, which I call ‘vitalist’ since it is often articulated in the writings of the so-called Montpellier Vitalists, including their medical articles for the Encyclopédie. The vitalist argument against experimentation on life is subtly different from the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological arguments, although at times it may borrow from any of them. It expresses a Hippocratic sensibility – understood as an artifact of early modernity, not as some atemporal trait of medical thought – in which Life resists the experimenter, or conversely, for the experimenter to grasp something about Life, it will have to be without torturing or radically intervening in it. I suggest that this view does not have to imply that Nature is something mysterious or sacred; nor does the vitalist have to attack experimentation on life in the name of some ‘vital force’ – which makes it less surprising to find a vivisectionist like Claude Bernard sounding so close to the vitalists. (shrink)

Locke was born in Wrington, Somerset, on 29 August 1632. After the Civil War he was sent to Westminster School, and in 1652 to Christ Church, Oxford. A feature of the university in Locke's early years was growing interest in the natural sciences, fostered by, amongst others, Robert Boyle, John Wilkins, and Robert Hooke. After graduating, Locke was much attracted to the work of these men, and soon he was engaged in medical research with Robert Boyle. He remained in Oxford (...) until 1667, when a chance meeting with Anthony Ashley Cooper, later Lord Shaftesbury, led to his joining Shaftesbury's London household, which from then on became Locke's usual residence, and where he acted as Shaftesbury's personal physician, conducted research with Thomas Sydenham. and became a Fellow of the Royal Society. (shrink)

As John Casti wrote, "Finally, a book that really does explain consciousness." This groundbreaking work by Denmark's leading science writer draws on psychology, evolutionary biology, information theory, and other disciplines to argue its revolutionary point: that consciousness represents only an infinitesimal fraction of our ability to process information. Although we are unaware of it, our brains sift through and discard billions of pieces of data in order to allow us to understand the world around us. In fact, most of what (...) we call thought is actually the unconscious discarding of information. What our consciousness rejects constitutes the most valuable part of ourselves, the "Me" that the "I" draws on for most of our actions--fluent speech, riding a bicycle, anything involving expertise. No wonder that, in this age of information, so many of us feel empty and dissatisfied. As engaging as it is insightful, this important book encourages us to rely more on what our instincts and our senses tell us so that we can better appreciate the richness of human life. (shrink)