François Boucher | : Dans cet article, j’examine le rôle des villes dans l’aménagement de la diversité ethnoculturelle. Je me penche sur l’idée voulant que la prise en compte des spécificités du contexte urbain et de l’échelle géographique de la ville ait une certaine fonction heuristique. Une telle prise en compte nous mène à réviser notre compréhension des agent.e.s responsables d’honorer une conception de la justice, à revoir l’ordre du jour de la philosophie politique normative en mettant en lumière (...) des questions et problématiques spécifiques à ce contexte et, enfin, à discerner certaines possibilités et stratégies politiques visant à promouvoir la justice et le bien commun. Plus spécifiquement, dans le cadre d’une réflexion sur le multiculturalisme, une attention portée au contexte de la ville porte la promesse d’enrichir notre compréhension des politiques publiques susceptibles de promouvoir ou de compromettre l’intégration et la cohésion sociale dans les sociétés pluralistes. Ainsi, l’idéal de ville interculturelle propose de faire de la promotion des interactions interculturelles dans les espaces urbains un des piliers de la planification urbaine. Après avoir exploré le rôle spécifique des villes dans la mise en place d’une politique d’aménagement de la diversité ethnoculturelle visant à promouvoir l’intégration, je soulignerai quelques limites auxquelles se heurte l’idéal de la ville interculturelle. | : In this article, I examine the role of cities in the accomodation of ethnocultural diversity. I study the idea that there is a certain heuristic function in taking into consideration the specificities of the urban context and the geographic dimensions of the city. Such consideration leads us to revise our understanding of the agents called upon to honour a conception of justice; to take a second look at the agenda of normative political philosophy while shedding light on the questions and issues specific to this context; and, finally, to discern certain political possibilities and strategies aiming to promote justice and the common good. More specifically, paying attention to the context of the city within a reflection on multiculturalism promises to enrich our understanding of the public policies likely to promote or to jeopardize integration and social cohesion in pluralist societies. Thus, the ideal of the intercultural city offers to make the fostering of intercultural interactions in urban spaces one of the pillars of urban planning. (shrink)

Ce livre est la version remaniée d'une thèse dont l'Auteure est désormais maître de conférence à l'EPHE et travaille également à l'Institut Européen en Sciences des Religions récemment fondé sur la recommandation de Régis Debray. Isabelle Saint-Martin évoque un monde en voie de disparition, celui des images pieuses qui ont contribué à la formation religieuse des chrétiens de la génération de nos grands et arrière-grands-parents. Publié pour la première fois vers le milieu des années 1880 et c..

Translated by Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith. Excerpted from Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy , (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2012). THE END TIMES OF PHILOSOPHY The phrase “end times of philosophy” is not a new version of the “end of philosophy” or the “end of history,” themes which have become quite vulgar and nourish all hopes of revenge and powerlessness. Moreover, philosophy itself does not stop proclaiming its own death, admitting itself to be half dead (...) and doing nothing but providing ammunition for its adversaries. With our sights set on clearing up this nuance, we differentiate philosophy as an institutional entity, and the philosophizability of the World and History, of “thought-world,” which universalizes the narrow concept of philosophy and that of “capital.” We also give an eschatological and apocalyptical cause to this end, of “times” or “ages” rather than those of philosophical practice. Last but not least, it is the Future itself in the performativity of its ultimatum that determines this end times, reversing these times from the Identity the Future accorded to it, withdrawing the thought-world from the lie of its death. Why this style of axioms and oracles, these more or less subtle distinctions, old and debased, with an appeal to the ultimata , to end times and last words? We fight to give, parallel to the concept of Hell, its new theoretical position, for its philosophical return and its non-philosophical transformation. No more so than any other word, Hell is not a metaphor here, just the Principle of Sufficient World. Every man, no doubt, has his “hell” readily available, connivance, control, conformism, domestication, schooling, alienation, extermination, exploitation, oppression, anxiety, etc. We have our little list that the Contemporaries established in the previous century in the same way one used to construct lists of virtues and vices or honors and wealth. They invented it for us without knowing it, for us-the-Futures who have as our responsibility to invent its use. In the Christian and Gnostic tradition, the struggle of the End Times takes place “on earth.” The most sophisticated of believers have it taking place in Heaven as well, above all in Heaven. The various kinds of gnosis imagine infinite falls and vertiginous highs, the vertigo of salvation. On Earth as in Heaven, a hell is available. The Marxists have the law of profit and the control of production, the class struggle Capital imposes on man. The Nietzscheans, the dull grumble of the struggle in the foundations of World and History, the domestication of man, the society of control. The phenomenologists, the capture of being, the most superficial amongst them, the age of suspicion. But all of these “hells” are taken from World, History, Society, and Religion. What we call Hell is no longer of the order of these specific and total intra-worldly generalities, it is both more singular and more universal, no longer being at all of the same order, it is the determinant Identity of these small hells strung out through history but unified here in the name of the last Humaneity. It is even found within the French idiom for hell [ enfer ], en-fer literally means “in-irons.” We are as much “in-irons” as we are “alive” [ en-Vie ]. We believe in Hell but as non-philosophers and it is even because we are non-philosophers that we can believe in it outside of any sort of religion. Hell is less mythological than ideological, it combines philosophizability with universal capital. Under what form? A single term could work for them without being a metaphor or something they would participate in by analogy, a more innovative and conjectural term than control, more universal than profit. It would denote the growing and permanent extortion of a surplus-value of communication, of speed and of urgency in change, in productivity and in work, in the pressure of images and slogans. It would be worse than solicitation, more tenacious than capture, more active and persecutory than control, softer and more insidious than a frontal attack, just as perverse as questioning and accusation, less brutal and offensive than extermination, less ritualized than inquisition, it would be soft and dispersed, instantaneous and vicious, it would be a crime without declared violence. Collusion and conformism, it would be afraid to show itself. Related to rumor, from which it borrows its infinite and tortuous ways. It is harassment. As a modernized form of Hell, perhaps harassment has a long future in front of it, of innocent torture, slow assassination, in short the fall, but radical with no way of recovering and which tolerates only salvation. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PAST OF NON-PHILOSOPHY Non-philosophy is thus Man as the utopian identity of the philosophical form of the World, a utopia destined to transform it. We still have to understand these equations, in particular that of the being-uni-versed from Man, and this book adheres to this by re-exposing non-philosophy in a different way via one of its new possibilities. It uses this opportunity to once again take up formulations that lead to objections answering certain external critics, as well as revisiting diverging interpretations specific to non-philosophers. A portion of this book is devoted to going through these theories via a strict or “lengthy” presentation of non-philosophy, and its defense against more expeditious solutions. This work of rectification is the occasion, merely the occasion, for refocusing non-philosophy on Man (the “Man-in-person,” “Humaneity”), and in a more innovative manner, on its utopian vocation established since the book Future Christ . As for this “occasion,” it is quite obvious. A school of posture, not to say a school of thought, supposes a minimum of closure from the most liberating of knowledge, a heritage, its utilization, and its no less certain dispersal. Within its development, a variety of interpretations will no doubt appear, deviations that are as much normalizations, and a struggle against this multiplication of divergent tendencies. These are perhaps not inevitable evils, especially here, merely a normal development according to the twisting paths of history. But the problem is made worse by the fact that this school of non-philosophers is that of utopia. Not the former attempts devoted to commenting on the worst authoritarian and criminal forms of the past and the present, but utopia as the determinant principle for human life, or to put it another way, of the Future as an irreducible presupposition of (for) thinking the World and History. Non-philosophers are engaged in an aleatory navigation between the respect for the most rigorous utopia, whose rules are not that of the reproductive imagination but those from the Future determining imagination itself, as well as the temptations, diversions, and remorse of history. Little by little, we will begin to understand that the Future as we understand it no longer has any temporal consistency or positive content, without being an empty form or a nothingness, but that it is foreclosed to past and present History, just as it is foreclosed to the place of places, the World, and that it is the only method for establishing the practice of thinking in a non-imaginary instance. Because it is the World and History that are imaginary and have a terrible materiality, it is not necessarily utopia. We will overlap two objectives here: the defense of non-philosophy against the (non-) philosophers that we are, only occasionally, and the introduction of philosophy to a rigorous future. Together they set out to definitively render, without any possible return to philosophical conformism or towards the facilities of the past and present, the non-philosophical enterprise understood as utopia or uchronia. Imagination and speculation, left to themselves and thus undistinguished, are quite good for participating in the grand game of History but have little value or worse for the Future which is unimaginable and unintelligible and must be maintained as such. MAN-IN-PERSON AS SUSPENSION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHORA The point where philosophical resistance is concentrated is without a doubt the invention of the Name-of-Man, first name, oracular as much as axiomatic, of the determining cause for the non-philosophical posture. And that which concentrates the differends is the style of non-philosophy as identity that possesses the dual aspect, of discipline and of the oeuvre, of the theorem and of the oracle. But the real difficulty in understanding the simplicity of non-philosophy is profoundly hidden in the depths of philosophy itself. Because philosophy, from Parmenides to Derrida, even Levinas, continues to be a divided gesture, without a veritable immanence, transforming its thematic contents of transcendence in also forgetting to transform the operative transcendence in the element from which the ontology of surface is established which we will call, in memory of Plato, the chorismos. The general effect of the chora literally gives place to philosophy, demanding binding and sutures to which we will once and for all “oppose” the Man-in-person, his power of cloning, and his future being. All philosophy contains a hinter-philosophy in which it deploys its operations and weaves its tradition like an understudy of a topographical nature and in the best of cases being itself topological. Philosophy as well consists of two levels, its pre-ontological operative conditions on the one hand, and its superficial theme on the other, it too has its presupposed, but is not aware of it or erases it within the unity of appearance named Logos. Rightly, the Logos, and its flash or lightning nature, possesses a “dark precursor,” the chora, which is as much a virtual image, and philosophy, dazzled by its own lightning flash, seems to completely forget about it at the same time it sets itself up within it. Non-philosophy risks taking this same path, of confusing what it believes to be the real with its phantom double, contenting itself to working on the thematic level of philosophy, not its surface objects and its idle chatter (we stopped talking about this a long time ago and in any case they are merely simple materials for inducing a work of transformation), but the transcendence-form of its objects. In the end it risks, through precipitation, taking back up the heritage of philosophy, a heritage of a misunderstood presupposed, even more profound than the play of transcendences. This is what the imperative of the radicality of immanence meant, to treat immanence in an immanent manner, not to make a new object out of it. And from here we get non- (philosophy) and its refusal of the Platonic chorismos , symbol of all abstraction, and thus all transcendental appearance. There are no illusions. The message will leave a heritage in tattered pieces and interpretations. But it was difficult not to dispute the differend to its core. There will be complete confusion of the multiple, possible, and necessary effectuations of non-philosophy with its interpretations. The non-philosophical or human freedom of philosophical effectuation and the philosophical freedom of interpretation. Effectuations demand non-philosophy to return to zero from the point of view of its philosophical material and thus also but within these limits the formulation of its axioms , but in no way providing from the outset divergent interpretations of the aforementioned axioms. They are divergent because they do not take into account the material from which these axioms are derived within non-philosophy, and because they do not see themselves as symptoms of another vision of the World. The utterances of non-philosophy are not mathematical theorems and pure axioms, they merely have a mathematical aspect . They are, by their extraction or origin, mathematical and transcendental. And by their determined function in-Real, within non-philosophy, they are identically in-the-last-Humaneity entities which have an aspect of an axiom and an aspect of interpretation (or an oracular aspect as we say) that attempts (sometimes it is ourselves who provide the occasion) to isolate and transform, in complete freedom of interpretation. There will be an opportunity to complain about the complex character of the language of non-philosophy, an idiom saturated with classical references, sophisticated in a contemporary way. Its freedom of decision up against the whole of philosophy demands these effects of “complication” and “privatization,” as the saying goes. But it also demands fighting against the drift [ dérive ] of the pedagogical-all and the mediatic-all that leads philosophy into the shallow depths of opinion, which is the site of its impossible death. The noble idealism of “pop-philosophy” has been consumed into a “philo-reality;” against this we propose philo-fiction. Parricide, which is at the bottom of these interpretations and which we can judge as being quite fertile, although it has informed tradition, only takes place once or within one lone meaning. In regards to Parmenides, it was possible; Plato introduced the Other as non-being and language, bringing into existence the philosophical system of the World, but is it possible to repeat it again with the same fecundity in regards to non-philosophy, this time in introducing (non) religion or (non) art, still mixing them without taking into account this mixture, alternatively as a philosophical or religious resentment? If philosophy begins via a crime, it is no doubt obliged to continue down similar pathways, to the effect that the crimes of philosophy, once the founding crime has been committed, are a reaction of self-defense. It is undoubtedly from this that we get Marx’s declaration that history begins by tragedy and repeats itself or ends in farce. The preservation of rigor and fecundity is, in every respect, a psychologically difficult task within a theory such as non-philosophy. Having posited an essential objective of liberation in regards to philosophy and its services, one has often understood this objective as an authorization of providing particular interpretations of its axioms and ends up obliterating their scope. This ends up confusing, on one hand, two kinds of freedoms in regards to non-philosophy, the freedom of its interpretations and the freedom of its effectuations. On the other hand, any defense of “principles” against precipitated interpretations is immediately taxed with a will to orthodoxy, a prohibitive objection when we are dealing with, as is the case here, a heretical theory of thought. Nevertheless, it is time to stop confusing heresy as the cause of thought with an ideology of heresies, which is certainly not at all our object, but rather a form of normalization. As for the “disciplinary” aspect, which is not the only aspect, it demands something other than philosophical “answers to objections,” a precision in the definition and use of its procedures in the formation of utterances, since non-philosophy is neither a supplementary doctrine interior to philosophy nor a vision of the world but one whose priority is a “vision of Man,” or rather Man as “vision” that implies a theory and a practice of philosophy. In the end, struggle is only one aspect of non-philosophy, not its whole or telos, struggle coming only from its materiality. In particular, if the discipline of non-philosophy is inseparable from struggle, it is not a question of reducing the monomaniacal obsession of its “marching orders.” This would reduce its complexity and kill its indivisibility, deploying it in a “long march” and a form of Maoization whose philosophical presuppositions no longer have any pertinence here, a case of the One and the Two, which are now cloned and no longer tied together. More generally, non-philosophy is a complex thought composed of a multitude of aspects, which is to say, unilateral interpretations, of a philosophical origin but reduced by their determination in-the-last-instance . The “liberalism” of non-philosophy is merely one of the aspects of which it is capable, not an essence. Similarly, it is only capable of having a “Maoist” aspect. Let us generalize. The weakness of non-philosophy is due to a specific cause, the determination-in-the-last-Humaneity of a subject for the World. Everything that has a right to the philosophical city can be said about it in turn and in a retaliatory mode since Man contributes nothing of himself that Man takes from the World. We can consider non-philosophy as being pretentious, absurd, idealistic, empty, materialistic, formalistic, contradictory, modern, post-modern, Zen, Buddhist, Marxist; it endures or tolerates, perhaps “appeals” to, or at least renders possible, sarcasms, ironies, and insults without even talking about the misunderstandings, partly for the same reason as psychoanalysis. All of this goes beyond simple “deviations.” They are its aspects, which is to say, its “unilateral” philosophical interpretations in both senses of the word, being either sufficient coming from the mouth of philosophers, or reduced to their absolute dimension of sufficiency and totality in the mouths of non-philosophers, and both times due to the weakness and strength of Man-in-person as their determination only in-the-last-instance. The non-philosopher is certainly not a Saint Paul fantasizing about a new Church. The non-philosopher is either a (Saint) Sebastian whose flesh is pierced with as many arrows as there are Churches, or a Christ persecuted by a Saint Paul. What is engaged in here is the practice of retaliation. A negative rule of the non-philosophical ethics of outlawed discussion by way of argumentation (the sufficient is you, the orthodox one is always you, you are the fashionable one, and when a master you are someone else) that is founded on the confusion of effectuations of non-philosophy and of its overall interpretations. Retaliation is the law but as with any too-human law, it must acquire a dimension that displaces it, or rather emplaces it and takes away its authority but not all of its effectiveness. If the non-philosopher is only authorized by himself, which is to say by philosophy but limited by the Real-of-the-last-instance, its critique of other non-philosophers can merely be retaliatory under the same conditions, only by the Real limited in-the last-instance. THE TREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SAINTLINESS The thematic horizon or material of these debates is in the relationships between philosophy, religion as gnosis, and non-philosophy. It is inevitable, regarding non-philosophers in general (whether they are non-philosophers by name or simply its neighbors) that we often end up evoking Marx’s Holy Family and imagining, arranged on the neighboring branches of the tree of philosophy and annexed, sometimes abusively, to non-philosophy, authors who would quite evidently and quite rightly refuse this label. So it is that we find, for example, a Saint Michel, a Saint Alain, a Saint Gilles 1 without even mentioning the youngest who aspire as well to the freedom of “saintliness” and who make their muted voices heard here. If there is a Holy Family of non-philosophers, it extends completely beyond these three, provided that the sectarian spirit can save us. This book is organized in the following manner: To begin, in order to recall the essential part of the problematic, we have organized a Summary of Non-Philosophy , a vade-mecum of notions and basic problems, in a classical style. Secondly, there is Clarifications On the Three Axioms of Non-Philosophy , designed to posit their proper use as much as to elucidate their meaning. Thirdly, an analysis of Philosophizability and Practicity , both being extreme constituents of philosophical material or the contents of the third axiom. Fourthly, the heart of this work: Let us Make a Tabula Rasa of the Future or of Utopia as Method . Fifthly, we have a theoretical outline of a non-institutional utopia, The International Organization of Non-Philosophy, L’Organisation Non-Philosophique Internationale, (ONPHI) already created in practice but under the conditions of possibility and functioning from which here we put into question “de jure,” thus not without a perplexity concerning “facts,” in any case, without the capability of “getting to the bottom of things.” Sixthly, an essay characterizing The Right and the Left of Non-Philosophy , a brief topology of several philosophizing and normalizing positions of proponents or tenants of this problematic. Seventhly, Rebel in the Soul: A Theory of Future Struggle , a systematic discussion starting from a confrontation of non-philosophical gnosis and non-religious gnosis to the extent that they pose, posed or perhaps still will pose themselves as rivals to non-philosophy in a mixture of fidelity and infidelity. Despite the fact that it can also be read as putting non-philosophy into perspective: it pits against a standard Platonism two contemporary appropriations of Gnosticism. On the basis of the paradigm of Man who never ceases to come as the Future-in-person, each one of these moments strives to reestablish not the “true” non-philosophy and its orthodoxy, but the minimal conditions to respect in order to allow for its maximum fecundity. And in order to bring about one of the last possibilities of its development, making explicit Humaneity as a utopia-for-the-World. In introducing these considerations in the form of a “testament” and “ultimatum,” we want to indicate two things: First, that this is the last time we will intervene in order to caution non-philosophers against the temptation of returning and looking backwards towards philosophy. Only a disillusioned nostalgia for the former World and its traditions barely remain permissible to us.… Secondly, that non-philosophy is also a sort of ultimatum for considering one’s life and transforming one’s thought from the perspective of a uni-version rather than a conversion. Man as future is this ultimatum in action, not an impatient self-proclaimed genius, and philosophy is his testament. It is obviously the ultimatum that determines this testament as “old” with a view towards a life that is, itself, non-testamentary. In and of itself, the “old” can never bear a veritable eschaton. Thus, this book intersects according to the logic of this paradigm, under the sign of the ultimate or “last” as future, philosophy as testament and cautionary note for maintaining the non-philosophical oeuvre as “future” or “utopian.” We will see that between these two dimensions it cradles a theory of struggle. In the end, this book envisions non-philosophers in multiple ways. It inevitably sees them as subjects of knowledge, most often academics insofar as life in the world demands, but above all as close relatives of three great human types. The analyst and political militant are quite obvious, for non-philosophy is close to psychoanalysis and Marxism insofar as it transforms the subject in transforming philosophy. Here again, one must have a sense not of certain nuances but of aspects (of the interpretations, albeit unilateralized) and not in order to construct a simple proletarization or militarization of thought as theory. To be rigorous, rather than authoritarian or spiteful, is its task. And lastly, non-philosophy is a close relative of the spiritual but definitely not the spiritualist. Those who are spiritual are not at all spiritualists, for the spiritual oscillate between fury and tranquil rage, they are great destroyers of the forces of Philosophy and the State, which are united under the name of Conformism. They haunt the margins of philosophy, gnosis, mysticism, science fiction and even religions. Spiritual types are not only abstract mystics and quietists; they are heretics for the World. The task is to bring their heresy to the capacity of utopia, and their utopia to the capacity of the paradigm. NOTES We will recognize allusions, and sometimes references, to closely related or distant themes, but which are related, in the work of Michel Henry, Alain Badiou and via the representative of “non-religious” gnosis of a Platonic origin, in Gilles Grelet. It goes without saying that these discussions are current and local, neither concerning the ensemble of doctrines nor prejudging the eventual evolution of certain amongst them. This concerns defining certain proximities with non-philosophy (rather than adversaries which in some sense they are) and typological and emblematic differends (rather than conflicts with a certain author). (shrink)

La base no 215 de Delphes, qui est située en face du trésor des Siphniens, peut être datée du IIe s. av. n. è. Monument familial, elle portait à l’origine trois statues féminines. Au Ier s. av. n. è., on a ajouté les statues de deux hommes, apparemment de la même famille de Naupacte. La base a aussi servi à l’affichage de décrets honorant surtout des Étoliens. La niche qui l’encadre est dans un état très tardif, mais son histoire remonte (...) haut car elle contient un bassin situé dans l’axe du grand réseau hydraulique du sanctuaire et qui doit avoir appartenu à une fontaine. Le mur de fond a été reconstruit plus d’une fois. Dans un état ancien, il a pu porter certains des décrets cités plus haut. La niche pourrait être appelée «étolienne ». (shrink)

The focus of this paper is the intertextual relationship between the work of François Truffaut and that of Honoré de Balzac. It explores Balzac's influence on the shaping of Truffaut's voice and argues that Balzac's Human Comedy served Truffaut as a model for some of his cinematic innovations. This applies to Truffaut's total oeuvre, but particularly to his series of autobiographical films, “The Adventures of Antoine Doinel”: The 400 Blows (Les Quatre Cents Coups, 1959), Antoine and Colette, Love at (...) Twenty (Antoine et Colette, L'Amour à Vingt Ans, 1962), Stolen Kisses (Baisers Volés, 1968), Bed and Board (Domicile Conjugal, 1970), Love on the Run (L'Amour en Fuite, 1979). In examining Truffaut's “rewriting” of Balzac, I adopt—and adapt—the intertextual approach of Harold Bloom's theory of the “anxiety of influence.” My paper applies Bloom's concept of misreading to an examination of the relationship between Truffaut's autobiographical films, and Balzac's Human Comedy, both thematically and structurally. (shrink)

La collection « Lettres numériques » d’Honoré Champion est un des rares lieux éditoriaux aujourd’hui qui s’applique à promouvoir des ouvrages de philologie numérique. L’essai de Margareta Kastberg Sjöblom ne déroge pas à la ligne éditoriale fixée par les directeurs de collection, François Rastier et Jean-Marie Viprey, et propose une étude linguistique assistée par ordinateur de l’œuvre littéraire de Jean-Marie Le Clézio. La force de l’ouvrage tient d’abord dans le corpus étudié et la méthode...

En une petite centaine de pages, l'auteur éclaire l'œuvre de Simone Weil avec des facettes emblématiques de sa biographie : une cartographie des lieux et des influences, la question du déracinement, son rapport à la judaïté.

We prove that the statement “there is aksuch that for everyfthere is ak-bounded diagonally nonrecursive function relative tof” does not imply weak König’s lemma over${\rm{RC}}{{\rm{A}}_0} + {\rm{B\Sigma }}_2^0$. This answers a question posed by Simpson. A recursion-theoretic consequence is that the classic fact that everyk-bounded diagonally nonrecursive function computes a 2-bounded diagonally nonrecursive function may fail in the absence of${\rm{I\Sigma }}_2^0$.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Pour comprendre l'oeuvre de Teilhard de Chardin, qui aura tant innové, il convient de ne pas s'arrêter à quelques textes. Une lecture ininterrompue de tous les écrits de Teilhard, du début à la fin, s'avère indispensble, souligne B. Honoré, psychiatre et philosophe.

Developing countries face numerous barriers to conducting effective and efficient ethics reviews of international collaborative research. In addition to potentially overlooking important scientific and ethical considerations, inadequate or insufficiently trained ethics committees may insist on unwarranted changes to protocols that can impair a study's scientific or ethical validity. Moreover, poorly functioning review systems can impose substantial delays on the commencement of research, which needlessly undermine the development of new interventions for urgent medical needs. In response to these concerns, the Drugs (...) for Neglected Diseases Initiative, an independent nonprofit organization founded by a coalition of public sector and international organizations, developed a mechanism to facilitate more effective and efficient host country ethics review for a study of the use of fexinidazole for the treatment of late stage African Trypanosomiasis. The project involved the implementation of a novel ‘pre-review’ process of ethical oversight, conducted by an ad hoc committee of ethics committee representatives from African and European countries, in collaboration with internationally recognized scientific experts. This article examines the process and outcomes of this collaborative process. (shrink)

In the target article, Schilbach et al. defend a perspective that focuses on the neural basis of social cognition during live, ongoing interactions between individuals. We argue that a second-person neuroscience would benefit from formal approaches borrowed from economics and behavioral ecology and that it should be extended to social interactions in nonhuman animals.

Health researchers may have a strategic role to play in confronting the predicament of refugee detainees because they can lend their analytic skills and authority to document the personal cost and impact of this practice. The justification for such ‘subversive’ research comes from the discrepancy between the sources of legitimacy and legality for government action. The practice of detention may be legal but illegitimate, judged against the standards of international human rights. Hence, research to explore the consequences of this policy (...) is both morally and politically legitimate. Morally, it reflects a commitment to uncover and oppose unjustified violence against others; politically, it represents an attempt to identify and challenge abuses of power by the state. However, doing research without official approval or with the use of deception raises concerns for the safety of detainees as vulnerable research subjects as well as the credibility of researchers and the research enterprise. Researchers also may face sanctions that will limit their future effectiveness. An international network of researchers working on issues of human rights and the health of asylum seekers can provide an institutional basis to support work that challenges local practices. (shrink)

La littérature économique s’intéresse aux enjeux du développement soutenable, mais elle aborde rarement le pilier social, car elle se concentre sur l’imbrication entre les piliers économique et environnemental. Quand il est pris en compte, le pilier social l’est comme interface qui facilite la jointure entre les deux autres. Les analyses économiques soulignent unanimement l’importance d’effectuer cette jonction, qu’il s’agisse d’évoquer les conditions de vie des populations ou l’acceptation sociale des transformations vers une transition écologique. Pourtant, les études consacrées au développement (...) soutenable ne considèrent guère le social autrement que comme une simple interface. Le social doit trouver sa juste place dans les politiques économiques de développement soutenable. Pour cela, il importe de reconceptualiser ce pilier en le faisant entrer en résonance avec les thèmes à l’origine du développement soutenable. De nouvelles justifications se présentent alors pour des politiques publiques pensées jusque là en dehors du développement soutenable. Classification JEL : Q01, Q56, Z13. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between the puericulture of Adolphe Pinard and Léon Bourgeois’ solidarism. In an attempt to create a progressive and humanistic form of eugenics, Pinard links the science he was developing with the imperatives of social justice advocated by Bourgeois. This results in, on the one hand, the subordination of puericulture to principles of equality and fundamental rights for all individuals and, on the other, the idea of the need for a biological enhancement of the population as (...) a condition for the extension of liberty and solidarity. The first part of the article establishes a connection between the two authors through the neo-Lamarckian paradigm which they spoused, and details the how and the why of solidarism. A second part examines the nature of the assimilation of the “religion of humanity” into solidarity, which entails both the defence of love at a collective level and the sanctity of those deemed “abnormal”. A final part describes the solidarist-inspired levers envisaged by Pinard for preventing the degeneration of humanity. They are based on a redefinition of the criteria used to determine the value of the social function of the individual and have an impact on the family, on the one hand, and eugenic women on the other. (shrink)

Les notions relatives au vivant jouent un rôle central dans l'économie interne du système de la nature selon Leibniz. Cet aspect est étudié ici, ainsi que son influence sur les théories qui ont ponctué le développement des sciences de la vie.

D'où nous vient l'efficacité? Comment la penser sans construire un modèle à poser comme but, donc sans passer par le rapport théorie-pratique, et hors de tout affrontement héroïque? A la difficulté européenne à penser l'efficacité - même sur le versant " réaliste " de notre philosophie (d'Aristote à Machiavel ou Clausewitz) - s'oppose l'approche chinoise de la stratégie : quand l'efficacité est attendue du " potentiel de la situation " et non d'un plan projeté d'avance, qu'elle est envisagée en termes (...) de conditionnement et non de moyens à fin, de transformation et non d'action, de manipulation et non de persuasion, etc. : " l'occasion " à saisir n'est plus alors que le résultat de la tendance amorcée, et le plus grand général ne remporte que des victoires " faciles ", sans même qu'on songe à l'en " louer ". De ce clivage, on percevra mieux en quoi consiste la possibilité d'effet ; et notamment, qu'il faut sortir d'une conception spectaculaire de l'effet pour comprendre qu'un effet est d'autant plus grand qu'il n'est pas visé, mais découle indirectement du processus engagé, et qu'il est discret. J'appellerai fonds d'effet ce dont nous vient cette efficacité sans dépense, et qui ne rencontre pas de résistance. Il nous conduira à concevoir une stratégie qui serait de l'efficience plus que de l'efficacité. (shrink)

L’invention au xii e siècle de la fin’amor va occuper, pour la première fois en Occident, le cœur du chant poétique, avec lequel il va entièrement s’identifier. Cette forme aristocratique, raffinée et intrinsèquement peccamineuse du sentiment amoureux exerce encore sur nos mœurs une profonde influence alors même que nous avons tendance à confondre mariage, amour et sexualité. Ne faut-il pas pourtant toujours, à l’amour, une « racine d’impossible » pour utiliser un terme commun à J. Lacan et à G. Bataille?

Dans quelle mesure, et de quelle manière, la confrontation d’un texte à un corpus en modifie-t-elle l’analyse? Symétriquement, de quelle approche du texte la constitution d’un corpus est-elle tributaire? L’exemple du projet éditorial de L’Astrée, aux deux volets complémentaires (édition critique / site internet), permet d’ébaucher quelques réponses à ces questions qui engagent tout autant une méthodologie qu’un arrière-plan épistémologique. Cette contribution se réclame d’une philologie actualisée, soucieuse de tenir compte des nouveaux espaces de dialogue entre linguistique et littérature.

L’échec du sommet de Vilnius à la fin de 2013 et les récents événements ukrainiens ont mis en évidence les conséquences liées au refus de la prise en compte de l’histoire des partenaires dans la négociation que développe l’Union européenne avec ses voisins orientaux. Ils montrent que les expériences collectives alimentées à des sources historiques différentes sont autant de ressources que les acteurs mobilisent pour faire valoir d’autres dimensions temporelles. Sans une communauté de références partagées, à la base des intérêts (...) collectifs, les asymétries entre les joueurs ne peuvent que croître. L’examen du processus d’élargissement et celui de la Politique européenne de voisinage mettent en valeur les limites de la stratégie de la Commission quand elle prétend s’appuyer sur la socialisation des élites pour contrer les conflits. Les résultats se mesurent en termes de déclarations sans suite quand les idées constitutives de l’UE et le transfert des compétences ne sont d’aucun poids. L’analyse des deux séquences permet de conclure que les temporalités sont un enjeu de la négociation et que l’ « européanisation » n’est pas le modèle de toute négociation possible. (shrink)

L'adversaire le plus dangereux de la psychanalyse est le révisionnisme. Au contraire, « l'axiome fondamental de la non- analyse est que le Réel de l'Inconscient et de l' Être est forclos à tout discours et que c'est justement cet être forclos qui détermine un discours et une pratique non analytiques ». La non- analyse n'est pas le retour à des préjugés philosophiques mais une « théorie unifiée de la philosophie et d'un savoir » qui peut prendre une couleur psychanalytique. Les (...) concepts fondamentaux sont: le Réel, l'imaginaire philosophico-analytique, l'apparaître phénoménal de l'Inconscient, la binante symbolique. The most dangerous adversary of psychoanalysis is revisionism. On the contrary, the fundamental axiom of non-analysis is that the Real of the Unconscious and of Being is forclosed to any discourse, and it is indeed this forclosed Being which détermines a nonanalytic discourse and practice. The non-analysis is in no way a return to philosophical prejudice but « a unified theory of philosophy and of a knowledge » which may sound psychoanalytical. The fundamental concepts are : the Real, the philosophico-analytical imaginary, the phenomenal appearing of the Unconscious, the symbolical binarity. (shrink)

Poser la question de la lecture des Écritures, et spécifiquement de la lecture théologique des Écritures, implique – mais cela est-il si clair ? – qu’une lecture non théologique des Écritures soit vraiment possible, qu’elle n’ait jamais eu lieu. Or, la question de la lecture, c’est-à-dire du « comment lire? », est une question politique, à cause de son arraisonnement à la logique calculante du programme, mais aussi parce qu’elle suppose résolues les questions « pourquoi lire? » et « qui (...) peut lire? ». Et s’agissant plus spécifiquement de la lecture de la Bible, et de ce que l’on appelle une lecture théologique des Écritures, les questions se redoublent. Identifier une certaine lecture cléricale – c’est-à-dire une lecture officielle, et à la limite autoritaire - à la lecture authentiquement théologique possible, ou exclure, en la disqualifiant, toute lecture théologique en lui reprochant par exemple son déficit d’ecclésialité ou de scientificité, c’est s’interdire de penser une certaine lecture théologique des Écritures.To raise the question of reading the Scriptures, and specifically of a theological reading of the Scriptures, implies –is it so obvious? – that a non-theological reading of the Scriptures may be truly possible and has never occurred. But the question of reading, i.e. “how to read?”, is a political question, because it examines the calculating logic of the program, and also because it presupposes that the questions “why read?” and “who can read?” have been resolved. More specifically with regard to reading the Bible, and what is known as a theological reading of the Scriptures, the questions become twofold. To identify a certain clerical reading – i.e. an official, and ultimately authoritarian reading – with the theologically authentic reading possible, or to exclude, by disqualifying it, any theological reading by criticizing its ecclesial or scientific deficiencies, is to deny the possibility of thinking about a certain theological reading of the Scriptures. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j’étudie la façon dont Pierre de La Ramée aborde la question de l’analyse mathématique, d’abord dans ses écrits de logicien, puis dans ses traités mathématiques. Dans les Scholae mathematicae, en reprenant un argumentaire qui lui avait servi dans les controverses des années 1550 concernant la « méthode unique», il est conduit à la conclusion que l’analyse n’a aucune valeur démonstrative. Ses recherches sur les significations diverses du mot analysis et sur la nature de l’analyse dans les mathématiques (...) grecques m’apparaissent pourtant comme une condition préalable pour que soit reconnue au xviie siècle la fécondité de la méthode analytique en géométrie. (shrink)

En politique, comme en poésie, les Chinois privilégient l'expression allusive, la formulation détournée. Et au face à face, ils préfèrent la subtilité d'un abord de biais. Ils "chinoisent", dit-on d'ailleurs, parce qu'on ne comprend pas comment ils procèdent. A travers l'analyse de quelques-uns des grands textes de la pensée chinoise les Entretiens de Confucius, le Mencius, etc. François Jullien montre qu'il s'agit, en fait, d'une stratégie du sens particulière, qui a son efficacité propre. Par là même, il nous conduit (...) à revenir sur quelques-uns de nos partis pris théoriques : celui notamment qui prétend cerner au plus près l'objet du discours, en tant que vérité, comme celui qui interprète le détour de la parole à partir d'un dédoublement entre la chose et l'Idée. Détours et retours : ce travail devient alors un cheminement patient, un voyage au lointain pays de la "subtilité" qui, finalement, se révèle une invitation à remonter dans notre propre pensée. (shrink)