Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with only some trivial (...) assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B). (shrink)

In this paper, I present my solutions to two closely related questions about pleasure. One of these questions is fairly well known. The second question seems to me to be at least as interesting as the first, but it apparently hasn't interested quite so many philosophers.

A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the (...) information producing it. This picture of knowledge captures most of what makes knowledge an important cpistcmological notion. It also avoids many of the problems infecting traditional justificational accounts of knowledge (knowledge as [justified, true belief those (unlike knowledge) having a content that can be either true or false (e.g., belief) – are described in terms of the way internal (presumably neural) structures acquire during learning a certain information-carrying role. The content of these structures (whether true or false) is identified with the kind of information they were developed to carry. (shrink)

Act-utilitarianism and other theories in normative ethics confront the implementability problem: normal human agents, with normal human epistemic abilities, lack the information needed to use those theories directly for the selection of actions. Two Level Theories have been offered in reply. The theoretical level component states alleged necessary and sufficient conditions for moral rightness. That component is supposed to be true, but is not intended for practical use. It gives an account of objective obligation. The practical level component is offered (...) as an implementable system for the choice of actions by agents lacking some relevant information. It gives an account of subjective obligation. Several different ways of developing Two Levelism are explained and criticized. Five conditions that must be satisfied if the practical level principle is to be a good match for a given theoretical level principle are stated. A better form of Two Levelism is presented. (shrink)

Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, (...) the mind is still in the head. (shrink)

Holding unlimited economic freedom to be nearly as dangerous as physical violence, Karl Popper advocated “piecemeanl” economic intervention by the state. Jeremy Shearmur's recent book on Popper contends that as the philosopher aged, his views grew closer to classical liberalism than those expressed in The Open Society—consistently with what Shearmur sees as the logic of Popper's arguments. But Popper's philosophy, while recognizing that any project aimed at bringing about social change must be immensely complex and fraught with difficulty, retains grounds (...) for hope about the purposeful use of government to bring about desirable social results. (shrink)

In comments originally presented at the ISUS conference at Dartmouth College in 2005, Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross raised a number of objections to various things I said in Pleasure and the Good Life. One especially interesting objection concerns one of my central claims about the nature of pleasure. I distinguished between sensory pleasure and attitudinal pleasure. I said that a feeling counts as a sensory pleasure if the one who feels it takes intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in the fact that (...) he is then feeling it. I also said that attitudinal pleasure is a propositional attitude that does not intrinsically involve any particular 'feelings'. On my view, a person can take attitudinal pleasure in things at a time even though he does not feel any pleasurable feelings at that time. In their comments, Mason and Norcross expressed doubts about my account of attitudinal pleasure. In my reply, I try to answer those doubts. (shrink)

A theorem due to Shoesmith and Smiley that axiomatizes two-valued multiple-conclusion logics is extended to partial logics.

Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only (...) satisfactory explanation of this fact is that when one knows that P is true, the reasons or evidence one has in support of P are such as to confer upon P the probability of 1. It is shown by an application of Bayes' Theorem that any value smaller than 1 would permit having reasons to believe what one knows to be false. Hence, it would seem that knowledge requires conclusive reasons to believe (if reasons or evidence is required at all). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on the Abstract Idea of Existence: Comments on Cummins' "Hume on the Idea of Existence"1 Fred Wilson Hume'sviews on theconceptofexistence: thisisone ofthemore obscure parts of Hume's philosophy. Professor Cummins has done a valuable service simply by trying to unravel some ofthe puzzles; it is still more valuable for shedding as much light as it does on the issues. There are nonetheless problems with the interpretation that he (...) develops, and I would like to bring out some ofthese. I will address three questions: (a)What, more precisely, is the (abstract) idea ofexistence? (b)What is the notion of"necessity" as Hume would use it in connection with the notion that something exists "necessarily," or, contrarily, "contingently"? (c)Does it follow from the fact that whatever thing we conceive we conceive as existent that every thing necessarily exists? In order toanswerthese questions somethingwillhave tobe said about Hume's doctrine ofabstractideas. Butonall theseissues, Humeis often not so much inadequate as incomplete; and I shall suggest that a numberofpoints canbeilluminatedbylookingatthe historical context that Hume himselfcould take for granted. The upshot will not be that Hume's views are unproblematic, but only that they are perhaps less problematic than Professor Cummins makes out. I. Abstract Ideas In many respects, Hume's doctrine of ideas is fairly traditional. We think in terms ofideas. In particular, our capacity to think generally, and to use general terms, is a matter ofhaving abstract ideas. In this, Hume follows the views ofhis predecessors such as Locke, Descartes and the Port Royal logicians. Hume also adopts the principle that what is conceivable is possible. Again, he follows the same tradition ofLocke, Volume XVII Number 2 167 FRED WILSON Descartes and the Port Royal logicians. Where Hume differs from his predecessors is in his account of what precisely an abstract is. For Hume's predecessors, one forms an abstract idea by separation. Thus, for Locke, forming ideas by abstraction consists in "separating them from all other Ideas that accompany them in their real existence."2 This sortofseparation is the mechanism bywhich "the Mind makes the particular Ideas, received from particular Objects, to become general" (Essay, 2.11.9). The Port Royal logicians make the same point: abstraction occurs with respect to "choses... composées" when one "les considérant par parties, et comme par les diverses faces qu'elles peuvent recevoir." In abstraction what is thus known is considered separately from the whole; either one considers "les parties séparément" in the case of"parties intégrantes," or one "peut séparer les choses en divers modes," or, finally, "quand une même chose ayant divers attributs, on pense à l'un sans penser à l'autre."3 The former occurs when, for example, we separate in thought the parts ofthe body. Thisis the simplestform ofabstraction. Berkeleyhas noproblems with this notion: "Iwill notdenyI can abstract, ifthatmay properlybe called abstraction, which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects, as is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder."4 Neither does Hume have problems with this notion; it is the basis of his—and Berkeley's—view that ideas are either simple or complex and that some of the complex ideas are a result of our combining simple parts in ways that are not found in reality, as, for example, in our idea ofthe New Jerusalem.5 It is the other two sorts ofabstraction that are more problematic. Consider the first of these two forms of abstraction. We begin with simple ideas ofsensation, for example, white (Essay, 2.3.1). One forms the abstract idea of white by separating the property white from the other qualities with which it is conjoined in the white particulars, for example, snow or milk (Essay, 2.21.73), that are given in sense experience. The resultingideais distinct from other ideas, for example, blue or heat (Essay, 2.12.1). The example given by Nicole and Arnauld is thatofthe geometers who explore the idea ofthree-dimensional space by considering first length alone, then area, and finally volumes or solids (which is the same, for these Cartesians as "corps," body) (Logique, 1.5). This is one form ofseparation. By this means one forms abstract... (shrink)

The touchstone of these seven original essays is the relationship between polis and praxis - the public-political space and the political action that maintains and is conditioned by that space. The argument flows from Martin Heidegger's lament in his Letter on Humanism that modern philosophers have failed to understand that the essence of "action" is "accomplishment." Dallmayr's lucid essays are a step toward achieving that understanding.Dallmayr assesses and puts into perspective the work of many of the seminal thinkers of the (...) 20th century - Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Michael Oakeshott - as he takes up such topics as the plausibility of friendship as a model for political relations, the relationship between political praxis and "experience," Heidegger's ontology of freedom, Foucault's treatment of power, and the merits and disadvantages of Habermasian critical theory. The result is a stimulating and original contribution to current political discourse that explores and advocates the manifold possible levels of active political life below and above the level of the State.Fred Dallmayr has established a reputation as a theorist and critic who is equally well attuned to European and American currents of philosophical and political thought. Like Hannah Arendt, he sees the essay as an ideal form for exercises in theorizing en route while venturing beyond traditional categories and philosophical benchmarks. His aim in this book is not a close-knit propositional framework but a set of tentative and partially continuous explorations that are provocative and inviting, like the movements of a musical suite.Fred R. Dallmayr is Packey Dee Professor of Government, University of Notre Dame. (shrink)

This article treats the conflict between historicism and neo-Kantianism in the late nineteenth century by a careful examination of the writings of Wilhelm Windelband, the leader of the Southwestern neo-Kantians. Historicism was a profound challenge to the fundamental principles of Kant’s philosophy because it seemed to imply that there are no universal and necessary principles of science, ethics or aesthetics. Since all such principles are determined by their social and historical context, they differ with each culture and epoch. Windelband attempted (...) to respond to the challenge of this relativism by either broadening Kantian principles, so that they could accommodate the results of historicism, or by reformulating Kantian principles, so that they were impregnable to historical change. The article examines both aspects of Windelband’s strategy in some detail, noting the many changes and different formulations in his views. A final section considers some of the difficulties of Windelband’s strategy and concludes that, despite its heroic efforts, it was a failure.Keywords: Historicism; Normativity; Weltanschauung; Hegelianism; Relativism; Wilhelm Windelband; Immanuel Kant. (shrink)

C. Fred Alford interviewed working people, prisoners, and college students in order to discover how people experience evil -- in themselves, in others, and in ...

A certain dilemma is inherent in relational accounts of space and time. If any objects endure through change, then temporal elements other than relations are required to describe them. If, on the other hand, no objects endure through change, no permanent reference system is available in terms of which to define the "same place" at different times. An argument which, by exploiting this latter difficulty, attempts to show that "objects with some endurance through time" must be accepted as fundamental is (...) examined and found inconclusive. A sketch is then given of an alternative scheme which does allow the relevant spatial comparisons, but which does not countenance the reidentification of particulars. The discussion is intended to show that the relationist can, as indeed he must, deny the second horn of this delemma. (shrink)

The claim that Empirical Research has Philosophical Implications is the thesis that empirical happiness research in psychology, economics, sociology, neuroscience, or some other similar field has direct implications for the truth of some philosophical theory about happiness. ERPI appears to be an unquestioned presupposition of some philosophers who write about happiness. Several psychologists seem to have endorsed ERPI. Other empirical researchers have made similar claims.After explaining the meaning and importance of ERPI, I discuss a series of specific instances that have (...) been cited in support of ERPI. I discuss work by Martin Seligman, Daniel Kahneman, Richard Layard, Donald Bruckner, Ed Diener, and Pelin Kesebir. In each case, I try to show that the instance cited does nothing to support ERPI. I am inclined to think that there is no instance in which clearly empirical research clearly supports a clearly philosophical conclusion. (shrink)

The concept of action-research has been developed during the last decade, mainly at the Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and at the Commission for Community Interrelations of the American Jewish Congress—centers founded by the late Kurt Lewin whose original and creative mind has made many contributions to social-psychological and sociological research. I owe my acquaintance with this new approach to the Research Center, particularly to Ronald Lippitt and Alvin Zander. Yet most of the following observations (...) are based on my research experience during the last four years. The responsibility for what I am saying is, therefore, completely my own. (shrink)

Books reviewed:Mark BevirThe Logic of the History of Ideas.

Experiencing bodies: Conceptual dualism and the computer metaphor Human bodies are experiencing bodies that feel pain, pleasure and have a point of view. Our experiencing bodies are the natural starting point to develop a fully natural scientific account of our cognitive and experiential processes. However, accepting the experiential nature of our bodies is hampered by a long-standing pre-scientific conceptual dualism between mind and body. Nowadays, this dualism has been morphed into a modernlooking scientific version by the computer metaphor that interprets (...) mind as abstracted, computational processes, while ignoring experience. In this paper, I will, first, sketch how experiencing bodies are a fact of life, second, discuss how the computer metaphor provides a conceptually dualistic and truncated interpretation of who we are, third, present three reasons why this conservative dualistic interpretation is problematical, and, fourth, argue that our experiencing bodies are straightforward natural phenomena that require a home in the general naturalistic perspective of the world. (shrink)

This volume comprises ten essays at the cutting edge of thinking about sculpture in philosophical terms, representing approaches to sculpture from the perspectives of both Anglo-American and European philosophy. Some of the essays are historically situated, while others are more straightforwardly conceptual.

This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. (...) In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Disrupting Homelessness: Alternative Christian Approaches by Laura StiversFred GlennonDisrupting Homelessness: Alternative Christian Approaches Laura Stivers Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011. 187 pp. $18.00In this book Laura Stivers describes the limitations of traditional Christian approaches to homelessness that emphasize charity (rescue missions) or home ownership (Habitat for Humanity). While these approaches do, in fact, deal with some of the effects of homelessness, they not only fail to address the structural (...) causes of homelessness and poverty but they also reinforce certain ideological assumptions—such as individualism, a pattern of “blaming the victim,” and idyllic conceptions of home ownership—that keep us from addressing the [End Page 214] causes of homelessness in the first place. If we are really going to end homelessness, Stivers contends, we have to address the structural issues that keep people homeless, such as the inadequate availability of low-incoming rental housing, unemployment, low wages, and increasing inequality between rich and poor. If Christians and churches want to end homelessness, they must collaborate more fully and develop social movements that will address the full range of factors affecting homelessness, including causes and effects. In other words, they must embody in principle and in practice not only hospitality and compassion but also social justice. The place to begin, Stivers argues, is by listening to the homeless and the poor, allowing their experiential realities to set the agenda, and working in solidarity with them to disrupt the ideologies and to challenge the policies that perpetuate the problem.This requires an education in “disruption” that enables Christians to move beyond the behavioral manifestations of homelessness so that they can see the web of oppressive structures that have generated the bonds experienced by so many poor and homeless. Stivers provides a wealth of data that illustrate and document the full extent and complexity of homelessness in our society. Drawing upon Tracy West’s ethical methodology of “disruption,” Stivers then brings to light what she considers the dominant ideological assumptions that sustain homelessness. These include the assumptions that homeowners are responsible, autonomous citizens while the homeless are deviant, dependent, and criminal; and further that excessive wealth and inequality is justified. Stivers illustrates how these assumptions fail to consider certain factors—such as power, privilege, and racial and class disparities—that underlie and perpetuate the problems of homelessness and promote private over public policies to address them. To address these factors, Stivers argues for a different approach—modeled on such groups as the Industrial Areas Foundation and the PICO (People Improving Communities through Organizing) National Network—that embodies community organizing principles that engage the victims of homelessness in meaningful dialogue about the problems, actively listens to their stories and to their solutions, and works in solidarity with them to address the causes and the policies that perpetuate their homelessness.The audience for this book is Christians and churches seeking to address the issue of homelessness in our nation. Ethicists and Christians of like mind will have few problems with Stivers’s diagnosis of and remedy for homelessness, even if her remedy comes across as a bit utopian at places. Nonetheless, her rhetoric of empowerment, solidarity, social justice, and sustainability might drive away those of a more conservative theological bent. Since many involved in ministry to the homeless today presuppose precisely the assumptions she challenges, I am not sure she has done enough to convince them to change their approach, even though she attempts to ground her approach [End Page 215] biblically in the life and ministry of Jesus. Stivers is correct in asserting that substantive change will only come about as a result of a concerted social movement that involves churches of all theological stripes. The challenge is to find ways for us to set aside our differences for the sake of greater good: disrupting and ending homelessness.Fred GlennonLe Moyne CollegeCopyright © 2013 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Architecture is a philosophical puzzle. Although we spend most of our time in buildings, we rarely reflect on what they mean or how we experience them. With some notable exceptions, they have generally struggled to be taken seriously as works of art compared to painting or music and have been rather overlooked by philosophers. In On Architecture , Fred Rush argues this is a consequence of neglecting the role of the body in architecture. Our encounter with a building is (...) first and foremost a bodily one; buildings are lived-in, communal spaces and their construction reveals a lot about our relation to the environment as a whole. Drawing on examples from architects classic and contemporary such as Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wright, and exploring the significance of buildings in relation to film and music and philosophers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Fred Rush argues that philosophical reflection on building can tell us something important about the human condition. (shrink)

Michael Root argues, in Philosophy of Social Science, that social scientific investigations do not and cannot meet the liberal requirement of "neutrality" most familiar to social scientists in the form of Max Weber's requirement of value-freedom. He argues, moreover, that this is for "institutional," not idiosyncratic, reasons: methodological demands (e.g., of validity) impel social scientists to pass along into their "objective" investigations the values of the people, groups, and cultures they are studying. In this paper, I consider the implications of (...) Root's claims for the use of social scientific results in the formation of policy in a democratic society. In particular, I argue that Root's results amplify familiar "post-modernist" conclusions: there is no "neutral" and "objective" basis for policy-making. (shrink)

Although past commentators saw Aristotle as recognizing the rights of individuals, recent interpreters have objected that no single Greek word corresponds to the modern word ‘rights’. In reply, it is shown with evidence from Aristotle and other writers that the ancient Greek discourse of law and politics included distinct locutions corresponding to the different senses of ‘rights’ distinguished by the jurist W. N. Hohfeld: to dikaion corresponds to Hohfeld's claim right, exousia to a liberty or privilege, kurios to authority or (...) power, and adeia and ateleia to immunity. A right for Aristotle is essentially a just claim that a person has against other members of the same community, and a natural right is a just claim based in nature. Recent arguments that rights have theoretical implications inimical to Aristotle's principles are also found to be unpersuasive, because they rely on tendentious assumptions that would rule out many modern theories of rights as well. The chapter also indicates how a respect for the rights of others might be justified on the basis of Aristotelian practical wisdom. (shrink)

Aristotle states that ‘there is only one constitution which is everywhere according to nature the best.’ This constitution is unqualifiedly just and ‘according to nature’ because it promotes the common advantage. The interpretation of ‘common advantage’ is problematic: does it consist in the advantage of the citizens considered as distinct individuals or the advantage of the polis considered as a whole? Only on the former, individualistic interpretation would the best constitution be deeply committed to individual rights, and it is argued (...) that a moderate version of individualism is the correct interpretation of Aristotle's best constitution. The chapter goes on to consider difficulties in Aristotle's account of the best constitution, including his views on education and the question of which is better: virtuous kingship or the rule of law. (shrink)