Nationalism has had a complex relation with the discipline of political theory during the 20th century. Political theory has often been deeply uneasy with nationalism in relation to its role in the events leading up to and during the Second World War. Many theorists saw nationalism as an overly narrow and potentially irrationalist doctrine. In essence it embodied a closed vision of the world. This article focuses on one key contributor to the immediate post-war debate—Karl Popper—who retained deep misgivings about (...) nationalism until the end of his life, and indeed saw the events of the early 1990s (shortly before his death) as a confirmation of this distrust. Popper was one of a number of immediate post war writers, such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, who shared this unease with nationalism. They all had a powerful effect on social and political thought in the English-speaking world. Popper particularly articulated a deeply influential perspective that fortuitously encapsulated a cold war mentality in the 1950s. In 2005 Popper's critical views are doubly interesting, since the last decade has seen a renaissance of nationalist interests. The collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989, and the changing political landscape of international and domestic politics, has seen once again a massive growth of interest in nationalism, particularly from liberal political theorists and a growing, and, at times, immensely enthusiastic academic literature, trying to provide a distinctively benign benediction to nationalism. (shrink)

The core argument in this chapter is that conventionalist argument, if pursued, is profoundly reductionist. Radical conventionalism can mutate into the thesis of perspectivism. In this scenario, conventionalism links up with the intellectual movements of postmodernism and poststructuralism. The committed postmodern or poststructural critic aims to search out foundationalism in all the remote and hidden corners of political theory. The chapter examines the diverse contributions of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, William Connolly, Richard Rorty, and Jean‐François (...) Lyotard to political theory. (shrink)

Nietzsche versus Schmitt. Agonal versus political thinking This article concerns the reception of Friedrich Nietzsche by Carl Schmitt with regard to the concept of the agon. In the 1933 edition of Der Begriff des Politischen Schmitt states that there is a ‘great metaphysical opposition’ (große metaphysische Gegensatz) between his political thinking and agonal thinking, the latter of which is associated with Nietzscheans like Alfred Baeumler and Ernst Jünger. It is argued that this metaphysical opposition is best explained in light (...) of Schmitt’s intellectual development from decisionist to concrete order thinker. Moreover, it is argued that the reception of Nietzsche’s concept of the agon by Schmitt took place through Baeumler. Nietzsche’s concept of the agon is best described as a measured productive struggle between opponents who are approximately equal to each other. In the reception of Nietzsche’s concept of the agon a shift of focus occurs from a struggle between individuals to a struggle between collectives. At the same time the social character of the agon is lost, which was expressed in the thought that the individual could only develop his talents in a struggle with others. (shrink)

Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992) remains a controversial figure, applauded by those who support the late-twentieth-century turn to neoliberalism and criticized by those who see him as the poster-boy of...

Gerald Sykes -- Aldous Huxley -- Gerald Heard -- Christopher Isherwood -- John van Druten -- Marianna Masin -- J. Crawford Lewis -- Dorothy F. Mercer -- Kurt Friedrichs -- Swami Atulananda -- Jane Molard -- The Countess of Sandwich -- John Yale -- Joan Rayne -- Durgacharan -- Pravrajika Saradaprana.

On 22 July, 2011, we were confronted with the horror of the actions of Anders Behring Breivik. The instant reaction, as we have seen with similar incidents in the past—such as the Oklahoma City bombings—was to attempt to explain the incident. Whether the reasons given were true or not were irrelevant: the fact that there was a reason was better than if there were none. We should not dismiss those that continue to cling on to the initial claims of a (...) wider Jihadist plot behind the actions of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols as Islamophobes (or merely lacking common sense): for, it is often easier to rely on reason—no matter how fictional—than not to have anything to cling on at all. In many ways, it is even better if the reason is fictional: for, if grounded in a certain fact, or reality, it can then go away. However, if it is in the realm of the imaginary, it is then always already metaphorical: thus, can be applied to any and every situation. And it is this, if we echo Friedrich Nietzsche, that gives us our “metaphysical comfort”; that we can know what is going on. This is why conspiracy theories are so popular: underlying them is the logic that someone—no matter how implausible—is in control of the situation. One would rather believe that all acts of terror stemmed from Osama bin Laden (and the narrative worked even better when he was in a ‘cave in Afghanistan’) than if they were the actions, and decisions, of singular individuals. For, if there is a head organizing everything, it can be cut off; there is no controlling a mass of singularities. As Jean Baudrillard continues to teach us, the term ‘mass’ is not a concept. It is a leitmotif of political demagogy, a soft, sticky, lumpen-analytical notion. A good sociology would attempt to surpass it with ‘more subtle’ categories: socio-professional ones, categories of class, cultural status, etc. This is wrong: it is by prowling around these soft and acritical notions (like ‘mana’ once was) that one can go further than intelligent critical sociology. Besides, it will be noticed retrospectively that the concepts ‘class’, ‘social relations’, ‘power’, ‘status’, ‘institution’, and ‘social’ itself—all these too-explicit concepts which are the glory of the legitimate sciences—but also only ever been muddled notions themselves, but notions upon which agreement has nevertheless been reached for mysterious ends: those of preserving a certain code of analysis. To want to specify the term ‘mass’ is a mistake—it is to provide meaning for that which has none.1 And it is this lack of meaning—this nothingness of not only the mass, but our inability to know in general—that truly scares us. For, if we are never able to legitimately make a generalizing statement, this suggests that we can never actually posit beyond a singular, situational, moment. Hence, we can never claim to know anyone: at best, we can only catch momentary glimpses. It is for this very reason that the insanity plea Breivik’s lawyer will attempt is the one that horrifies us the most. For, if Breivik is insane, this foregrounds our inability to understand, know. And as Aristotle has taught us, it is more important that something is plausible than if something were probable—in this context, we would rather have Breivik as a calculating mass murderer than someone who was completely out of his mind. This is especially ironic in the light of the fact that none of us would say that we have any similarity with Breivik. If that were so, the declaration that he was mad should be no more than a logical consequence. However, we also want Breivik to be accountable for his actions. And in order for that to be so, we need him to be of sound mind. But if that were true, we can then no longer distinguish ourselves from him. And it is precisely this that scares us. For, we are horrified not when there are abnormalities to our way of life. There are usually two different reactions to this—either oppose and destroy it; or subsume it under the dominant logic. We see this most clearly in reactions to immigration: there are either calls for immigrants to ‘pack up and leave’ or pseudo-liberal notions of ‘we are all alike’. Both of which are merely version of “all men are brothers”—the brutal translation of which is that you are my brother if you live the same way as me; otherwise not only are you not my brother, you are also potentially not part of mankind (you might as well be, to echo Giorgio Agamben, bare life ). This is played out in our age of what is commonly termed post-political bio-politics —an instance of horribly awkward theoretical jargon that Slavoj Žižek channeling Agamben unpacks rather elegantly: “ post-politics is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus[es] on expert management and administration, while bio-politics designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal.”2 Žižek continues: Post-political bio-politics also has two aspects which cannot but appear to belong to two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to ‘bare life,’ to Homo sacer , that so-called sacred being who is the object of expert caretaking knowledge, but is excluded, like prisoners at Guantanamo or Holocaust victims, from all rights; and that of respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme through an attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences the self as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential harassments [….] What these two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. That is why there is no contradiction between the respect for the vulnerable Other and […] the extreme expression of treating individuals as Homini sacer .3 This is why the ones that are harshest towards new immigrants are the recently naturalized citizens of any country. For, if there is no longer any “ideological struggle” and all life is reduced to mere automaton-living, there is the realization that we are all the same—not in a tree-hugging hippie sense—but that the immigrant is the same as us precisely because we are all immigrants. And since all nations, and by extension peoples in a nation (especially those who believe in the notion of nationality, and national identity), have to find some manner, no matter from where or what it is, to distinguish themselves from those around them, the other (in spite, and especially in the light, of its absence) is the most crucial aspect of the discourse of nationality. More precisely, in the interests of what Baudrillard calls “preserving a certain code of analysis” (nationality in this case), what has to be maintained is the absolute otherness of the other. Very rarely is Boris Johnson right: “it is not enough to say he is mad. Anders Breivik is patently mad.”4 However, much like Breivik in his manifesto, he should have stopped whilst he was ahead. By attempting to diagnose Breivik—“the fundamental reasons for their callous behavior lie deep in their own sense of rejection and alienation. It is the ideology that gives them the ostensible cause … that gives them an excuse to dramatize the resentment … and to kill.”—Johnson falls into the same trap that he accuses others of: “to try to advance any other explanation for their actions … is simply to play their self-important game.” More crucially, and this is the point that Johnson completely misses, attempting to rationalize Breivik’s actions—to rehabilitate reason—is a desperate attempt at maintaining his otherness. In fact, we’ll end up going one step further, insist on Breivik’s sanity, put him on the stand, and hope that he will display such a difference from all of us that we can rest safe that we are unlike him and his kind. That, in itself, is a dangerous game to play. One should not forget that the turning point in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is in the central part of her novel where she lets the monster speak. At that moment, the monster moves from an ‘it’ to a fully subjectivized person; with his own stories, historicities, emotions, and so on. In Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Frankenstein , this is the moment where “the ultimate criminal is thus allowed to present himself as the ultimate victim. The monstrous murderer reveals himself to be a deeply hurt and desperate individual, yearning for company and love.”5 But, in the case of Breivik, this goes beyond just a risk of us feeling for him: for, no right-minded person should ever deny another the opportunity to put forth her or his own case. The problem lies with us trying to deny the madness of Breivik’s act by putting him back under reason. The problem is in our inability to differentiate the act from the person; the singular from the universal.6 In our desperation to preserve the notion that we are rational beings incapable of becoming monsters, we’ve had to deny the meaninglessness—in the strict sense of it lying outside of reason—of Breivik’ act; we’ve had to “provide meaning where there is none.” For, if this act were a moment of madness—a moment that comes from elsewhere—we cannot say that it will not descend upon us one day. If Breivik’s actions were that of a sane person, one who is in control of his being, his self, we can then locate the otherness in his being. More importantly, this would allow us to distinguish ourselves from that said being. Breivik’s sanity is the only thing that allows us to say that ‘this act of terror is borne out of one with an ultra-right ideology’; and ‘since I am not of that ideology, I would never do such a thing’. By doing that, we attempt to protect ourselves by claiming that people who share Breivik’s ideology are foreign to us, other to us. However, if Breivik’s act was a moment of insanity, his otherness is no longer locatable: and the notion of ‘us and them’ shifts from a geographical, physical, religious, or cultural notion, to one in the realm of ideas. And this is what truly scares us. For, if what is foreign is not phenomenological, then it cannot be seen, detected, sensed. Anders Behring Breivik, Timothy McVeigh, and Terry Nichols, terrify us not merely for the fact that they were white in a white society, but more pertinently that their skin color did not matter: we would not be able to spot them even if they were blue, even if they were right next to us, even if we had known them all our lives. Even as we are grappling with holding Breivik accountable by declaring him of sound mind, what truly terrifies us is that deep down we know that Breivik’s act is a moment of madness; beyond all comprehensibility. And this means that we would not be able to spot the idea; even if it were in our heads at this very moment. We have gone to lengths to rehabilitate Breivik, McVeigh, Nichols, and such perpetrators of massive incomprehensible violence, in order to preserve our difference from them. What we have really been trying to deny is the fact that everyone, at any given moment, could have a moment of madness. And this is the true radicality of Mary Shelley: in allowing us to momentarily enter the head of the monster, she shows us not just the fact that he is like any one of us, but that any one of us could, in the right (or wrong) circumstance, be like him. Perhaps here, there is a lesson to be learned from Wes Craven’s A Nightmare on Elm Street . The most dangerous thing that one could do on Elm Street was to mention Freddy’s name—once you had knowledge of him, you were open to the possibility of a visit during your dreams. This suggests that Freddy is a combination of externalities (after all, when you die, he survives) and your self (if you have never heard of him, he cannot come for you). In this sense, Freddy would be the manifestation par excellence of what Avital Ronell calls a “killer text”—it is one’s relationality with the text (and the ideas, notions, in the said text) that opens oneself to it, to the lessons of the text, to being changed, affected, even to the dangers of the text. After all, one should never forget Plato’s warning that ideas can corrupt, can be perilous. To compound matters, as Ronell reminds us, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading.”7 Thus, in attempting to differentiate ourselves from Breivik by concocting some reason(s) why we are not like him, we have done nothing but read him, open a connection to him. *** Bang bang, he shot me down Bang bang, I hit the ground Bang bang, that awful sound Bang bang, my baby shot me down. “Bang Bang (My Baby Shot Me Down)” Sonny Bono, 1966. This is the part that we all know and remember. Whilst never quite remembering that this is a song that is not so much about violence, love, but about remembering. For, after the bridge comes the accusatory stanza: “Now he's gone, I don't know why/ And till this day, sometimes I cry/ He didn't even say goodbye/ He didn't take the time to lie.” Bang Bang is a game that the two lovers used to play; and all she has now is the memory of the game to remember him by. And the only reason she has to recall this game is: he never provided her a reason for his leaving, his death. Not that she will, can, ever get that satisfactory answer. This is precisely the game we are playing with Anders Behring Breivik. Even though he has left a 1500 page manifesto, even though we will allow him to use the court-room as his platform, we will continue screaming at him “tell me why …” For, what we want him to say is that we are not like him: what we really want him to do is, “take the time to lie …” Perhaps here, we should allow the echo of the infans to resound in baby . As Christopher Fynsk reminds us, the infans is one that is pre-language, pre-knowing, pre-understanding: it is the very finitude, and exteriority, of relationality itself.8 And thus, it is a position of openness to the fullness of possibility—and nothing else. This would be, in Ronell’s terms, a “connection to the other” that knows nothing other than the fact that it is a connection. The true horror of 22 July, 2011, is the fact that it is not Anders Behring Breivik who is mad, but the act itself that is. And this is precisely why only “my baby” that could have “shot me down.” For, it is an act that is from beyond, a sheer act of madness that—as Plato warns us—is whispered into our ears (and can so easily be mistaken for inspiration, and even wisdom), an act that can both seize, and cease, us at the same time. And what can this utter openness to an other, the other, be but a moment of love, a true ‘falling in love’. At the moment of whispering, nothing can be known as we are babies as our baby shoots us down …. Hence, all attempts at analyzing this event (including this one) are not only futile, but border on the farcical. The real tragedy is that we forget that all of us have the possibility of becoming Breivik. NOTES Jean Baudrillard. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . Trans. Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton, & Andrew Berardini. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007. p. 37. Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p. 34 Ibid: 35-36. Boris Johnson. “ Anders Breivik: There is nothing to study in the mind of Norway’s mass killer .” The Telegraph . (25 July, 2011): Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p.39. What is killing us is the notion that Breivik’s act is beyond reason, beyond knowing, outside understanding itself. This is why Boris Johnson’s plea was for us to ignore Breivik as a madman. But to do so, Johnson conflates the notion of the act and the person; the singular and the universal. This is exactly the same gesture as insisting on his sanity: the ‘madman’ is merely the absolute other, one that we are not. Avital Ronell. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989: 380. Christopher Fynsk. Infant Figures: The Death of the Infans and Other Scenes of Origin . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.  . (shrink)

Im Auftrag des Friedrich-Meinecke-Instituts der Freien Universitäauml;t Berlin herausgegeben von Hans Herzfeld und Walther Hofer (Band 1-9). Füuuml;r Band 10 herausgegeben von Gisela Bock, Jürgen Kocka und Gerhard A. Ritter.

The procedures of canonical quantization of the gravitational field apparently lead to entities for which any interpretation in terms of spatio-temporal localization or spatio-temporal extension seems difficult. This fact is the main ground for the suggestion that can often be found in the physics literature on canonical quantum gravity according to which spacetime may not be fundamental in some sense. This paper aims to investigate this radical suggestion from an ontologically serious point of view in the cases of two standard (...) forms of canonical quantum gravity, quantum geometrodynamics and loop quantum gravity. We start by discussing the physical features of the quantum wave functional of quantum geometrodynamics and of the spin networks of loop quantum gravity that motivate the view according to which spacetime is not fundamental. We then point out that, by contrast, for any known ontologically serious understanding of quantum entanglement, the commitment to spacetime seems indispensable. Against this background, we then critically discuss the idea that spacetime may emerge from more fundamental entities. As a consequence, we finally suggest that the emergence of classical spacetime in canonical quantum gravity faces a dilemma: either spacetime ontologically emerges from more fundamental non-spatio-temporal entities or it already belongs to the fundamental quantum gravitational level and the emergence of the classical picture is merely a matter of levels of description. On the first horn of the dilemma, it is unclear how to make sense of concrete physical entities that are not in spacetime and of the notion of ontological emergence that is involved. The second horn runs into the difficulties raised by the physics of canonical quantum gravity. (shrink)

Never one to back away from controversy, Friedrich Nietzsche assails the Christian church in Twilight of the Idols. In this classic work, he sets out to substitute the morality of the Catholic and Protestant churches with that of Dionysian morality. Twilight of the Idols furthermore lays the foundation for key arguments that Nietzsche more fully develops in later writings.

The aim of this paper is to discuss some aspects of the nature gravitational energy within the general theory of relativity. Some aspects of the difficulties to ascribe the usual features of localization and conservation to gravitational energy are reviewed and considered in the light of the dual of role of the dynamical gravitational field, which encodes both inertio-gravitational effects and the chronogeometrical structures of spacetime. These considerations will lead us to discuss the fact that the very notion of energy (...) - gravitational or not - is actually well-defined in the theory only with respect to some background structure. (shrink)

Direct brain intervention based mental capacity restoration techniques-for instance, psycho-active drugs-are sometimes used in criminal cases to promote the aims of justice. For instance, they might be used to restore a person's competence to stand trial in order to assess the degree of their responsibility for what they did, or to restore their competence for punishment so that we can hold them responsible for it. Some also suggest that such interventions might be used for therapy or reform in criminal legal (...) contexts-i.e. to make non-responsible and irresponsible people more responsible. However, I argue that such interventions may at least sometimes fail to promote these responsibility-related legal aims. This is because responsibility hinges on other factors than just what mental capacities a person has-in particular, it also hinges on such things as authenticity, personal identity, and mental capacity ownership-and some ways of restoring mental capacity may adversely affect these other factors. Put one way, my claim is that what might suffice for the restoration of competence need not necessarily suffice for the restoration of responsibility, or, put another way, that although responsibility indeed tracks mental capacity it may not always track restored mental capacities. (shrink)

In the thirties, Martin Heidegger was heavily involved with the work of Ernst Jünger (1895-1998). He says that he is indebted to Jünger for the ‘enduring stimulus’ provided by his descriptions. The question is: what exactly could this enduring stimulus be? Several interpreters have examined this question, but the recent publication of lectures and annotations of the thirties allow us to follow Heidegger’s confrontation with Jünger more precisely. -/- According to Heidegger, the main theme of his philosophical thinking in the (...) thirties was the overcoming of the metaphysics of the will to power. But whereas he seems to be quite revolutionary in heralding ‘another beginning’ of philosophy in the beginning of the thirties, he later on realized that his own revolutionary vocabulary was itself influenced by the will to power. In his later work, one of the main issues is the releasement from the wilful way of philosophical thinking. My hypothesis is that Jünger has this importance for Heidegger in the thirties, because the confrontation with Jünger’s way of thinking showed him that the other beginning of philosophy presupposes the irrevocable releasement of willing and a gelassen or non-willing way of philosophical thinking. -/- In this article, we test this hypothesis in relation to the recently published lectures, annotations and unpublished notes from the thirties. After a brief explanation of Jünger’s diagnosis of modernity (§1), we consider Heidegger’s reception of the work of Jünger in the thirties (§2). He not only sees that Jünger belongs to Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the will to power, but also shows the modern-metaphysical character of Jünger’s way of thinking. In section three, we focus on Heidegger’s confrontation with Jünger in relation to the consummation of modernity. According to Heidegger, Jünger is not only the end of modern metaphysics, but also the perishing (Verendung) of this end, the oblivion of this end in the will to power of representation. In section four, we focus on the real controversy between Jünger and Heidegger: the releasement of willing and the necessity of a radical other beginning of philosophical thinking. -/- . (shrink)

Eine neue Ausgabe von Nietzsches Klassiker "Also sprach Zarathustra" mit einer neuen Einleitung von 2023 und Referenzmaterialien einschließlich eines philosophischen Wörterbuchs, historischem Kontext zu anderen Autoren, die Nietzsche häufig erwähnt, und biografischen Informationen zu Nietzsche. "Also sprach Zarathustra" ist ein Buch von Friedrich Nietzsche, das zwischen 1883 und 1885 in vier Teilen veröffentlicht wurde. Es gilt als eines seiner wichtigsten und berühmtesten Werke. Das Buch ist ein philosophischer Roman, der der Figur des Zarathustra folgt, der aus seinem einsamen Leben (...) in den Bergen herabsteigt, um seine Lehren mit der Welt zu teilen. Das Buch befasst sich mit Themen wie der Natur des Daseins, dem Konzept des "Übermenschen" und der Ablehnung der traditionellen Moral und Religion. Nietzsches Texte in Also sprach Zarathustra" zeichnen sich durch ihre poetische, metaphorische Sprache und ihre herausfordernden, oft provokativen Ideen aus. Er präsentiert die Idee des "Übermenschen" oder "Übermenschen", der über der traditionellen Moral steht und in der Lage ist, seine eigenen Werte zu schaffen. Das Buch gilt als ein Meisterwerk der deutschen Literatur und wird aufgrund seines Einflusses auf das existenzialistische und postmoderne Denken auch heute noch häufig gelesen und studiert. Es ist auch bekannt für seinen Einfluss auf die Themen der Science Fiction und der Popkultur. (shrink)

In the unequaled and majestic contemporary technological phase of our cultural development, where democratic liberties and the means of well being are accessible to everyone; man is unsatisfied, insecure, rebellious, confused and lost. More than ever before he seems to lack the sureness of his way in life. The abundance of theories, doctrines and various philosophical, social or religious systems and moral teachings fails to provide the individual today with any clarity whatsoever. Lacking this, he turns to peripheral events, to (...) sensational occurrences; he turns his attention to more and to glaring new models of technological products. more new things, mostly Acquiring a great multitude of these and various other things, he seems to stress his own importance, thus making an inquiry in its fundamental validity superfluous. In this way he escapes the search of his very own mission; he betrays the superior powers which demand from him his existential contribution in finding his ideals and outlining the way of his life. (shrink)

The transformation of the writing of history in the nineteenth century is to a large degree the work of the great German masters from Niebuhr and Boeckh to ...

Le modèle d’Ising décrit les interactions locales entre des flèches fixées aux nœuds d’un réseau et orientées vers le haut ou vers le bas. Ce modèle mathématique, très abstrait, mais aussi très simple, est l’un des plus étudiés en physique moderne. Cet article s’intéresse à la nature de ce modèle et à ses fonctions épistémiques. Nous montrons qu’il a d’abord rempli une fonction représentationnelle en tant que « modèle approché » du magnétisme. Ensuite, comme « modèle-jouet » il a permis (...) la compréhension qualitative des transitions de phase. C’est enfin comme « modèle minimal » pour l’étude des phénomènes critiques qu’il remplit désormais une fonction explicative. (shrink)

The so-called daxue zhi dao 大學之道, though a Confucian way of self-cultivation, can inspire contemporary universities through a process of creative interpretation. Having examined the ethos of modern university in its four historical stages, I come up with its last stage of reaching out in the era of globalization and dialogue among civilizations, in which we have to rethink the idea of university from the fuller development of human reason. This can be achieved only through increasingly reaching out toward many (...) others by means of mutual waitui 外推 and self-reflection, which presuppose and announce an ethics of generosity in priority over and implementable by reciprocity. Universities today should learn from classical Confucianism, and we should keep in mind their initial generous spirit as exemplified by Confucius himself. Strangification and self-reflection, being moved by original generosity and implemented by reciprocity, will eventually bring us the hope of reason. (shrink)

The most popular of Friedrich Nietzsche's works, Thus Spoke Zarathustra ranks among the most remarkable feats of German literature. A symphony of language, it abounds in every kind of wordplay and an intricate network of leitmotifs. This dual-language edition features one third of Nietzsche's work, keeping the most famous concepts intact and encompassing a variety of moods and modes as well as the author's full linguistic scope. Editor Stanley Appelbaum presents accurate English translations on the pages facing the original (...) German, an informative introduction to the author's life and oeuvre, plus notes throughout the text and brief summaries of the omitted chapters. (shrink)

The paper offers a new interpretation of the Life of Ovid in the Scriptorum illustrium Latinae linguae libri XVIII of Sicco Polenton. While so far scholarship has mostly criticized the lack of historical and philological accuracy in this Life and Sicco’s dependency on medieval speculations, the paper tries to take a closer look at the implications of Sicco’s own methodological stance towards poetry, historiography and rhetoric. A discussion follows whether Sicco’s own biography has shaped his outlook on the ancient poet, (...) and to what extent Sicco’s treatment of Ovid’s relegation can be integrated into an early humanist tradition of anti-tyrannical discourse. It is argued that both Sicco’s literary ideals and the elaboration of the Life of Ovid, especially the description of the exile, reflect Sicco’s own life story and social background, but also his fundamental purpose of promoting his humanistic teaching. (shrink)

This issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy contains three papers on a topic of increasing importance within the field of "neurolaw"-namely, the implications for criminal law of direct brain intervention based mind altering techniques. To locate these papers' topic within a broader context, I begin with an overview of some prominent topics in the field of neurolaw, where possible providing some references to relevant literature. The specific questions asked by the three authors, as well as their answers and central claims, (...) are then sketched out, and I end with a brief comment to explain why this particular topic can be expected to gain more prominence in coming years. (shrink)

This volume presents an English translation of Nietzsche's Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen or, Unfashionable Observations. The common impulse that links up these four essays is Nietzsche's attitude towards all mainstream and popular movements that constituted contemporary European, and especially German culture. The work offers the foundations for Nietzsche's whole philosophy, prefiguring both his characteristic philosophical style and many of the major ideas he develops in his later writings.

The theory and philosophy of artificial intelligence has come to a crucial point where the agenda for the forthcoming years is in the air. This special volume of Minds and Machines presents leading invited papers from a conference on the “Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence” that was held in October 2011 in Thessaloniki. Artificial Intelligence is perhaps unique among engineering subjects in that it has raised very basic questions about the nature of computing, perception, reasoning, learning, language, action, interaction, (...) consciousness, humankind, life etc. etc. – and at the same time it has contributed substantially to answering these questions. There is thus a substantial tradition of work, both on AI by philosophers and of theory within AI itself. - The volume contains papers by Bostrom, Dreyfus, Gomila, O'Regan and Shagrir. (shrink)

Welche Verbindungen bestehen zwischen den Begriffen der Zeit und der personalen Identität? Die Studie untersucht drei zentrale Begriffe aus der Debatte um personale Identität: Erinnerung, Überleben und Verantwortung. Dabei erweist sich der - für Personen spezifische - zeitlich perspektivische Selbstbezug als Kern der begrifflichen Beziehungen zwischen Zeit und personaler Identität.

Aphorismen: Allgemeines über Historismus und Aufklärungshistorie. Möser. Herder. Goethe. Ranke.--Skizzen: Ein Wort über geschichtliche Entwicklung. Von der Krisis des Historismus. Deutung eines Rankewortes. Gedanken über Welt- und Universalgeschichte.

Opera prima de Friedrich Nietzsche, El origen de la tragedia es una obra intrépida y chispeante, llena de arrojo intelectual y entusiasmo juvenil, que desconcertó y fue malinterpretada por sus contemporáneos. El propio Nietzsche la calificó quince años después como un libro imposible por la ambigüedad de su estilo. En ella, el joven catedrático universitario de Filología Griega enfocaba un problema en apariencia de corte académico y filológico como el de los orígenes de la tragedia griega. Pero lo hacía (...) con tal audacia en su planteamiento, que su tesis traspasaba los límites de la filología clásica para ofrecer una visión metafísica y existencial del arte como producto de la tensión, la alternancia y la fusión de dos principios opuestos: lo apolíneo y lo dionisíaco, luz y oscuridad, razón e instinto, serenidad y embriaguez, orden y caos. El resultado fue una obra fascinante, notablemente híbrida y con una temeraria capacidad imaginativa, construida con datos filológicos y arqueológicos pero vivificada de un extremo a otro por un empeño filosófico. En todo caso -escribió su autor- aquí habla una voz extraña, el apóstol de un dios desconocido, pertrechado provisionalmente con el birrete de doctor; habla aquí el espíritu repleto de exigencias nuevas y aún inominadas, una memoria hinchada de interrogantes, de observaciones, de obscuridades; aquí habla algo como un alma mística, un alma de ménade que, atormentada y caprichosa, y casi irresoluta sobre si debe escaparse o entregarse, balbucea en cierto modo un extraño lenguaje. (shrink)

Frontmatter -- Vorwort -- 1. Grundsätze der Edition -- 2. Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches von Anfang 1884 bis Herbst 1885 Chronik -- 3. Chronologie der Manuskripte -- 4. Ergänzungen im Text der Abteilung VII -- 5. Kritischer Apparat -- Vorbemerkung -- 25 = W I 1 -- 26 = W I 2 -- 27 = ¿ II 5a -- 28 = Gedichte und Gedichtfragmente -- 29 = ¿ VI 9 -- 30 [ 1 ] = ¿ II 5, 83 (...) -- 31 = ¿ II 8 -- 32 = ¿ II 9 -- 33 = ¿ II 10 -- 34 = ¿ VII 1 -- 35 = W I 3a -- 36 = W I 4 -- 37 = W I 6a -- 38 [1-1 4 ] = Mp XVI 1a -- 39 [1-21] = ¿ VII 2a -- 40 = W I 7a -- 41 = W I 5 -- 42 = Mp XVII 2a -- 43 = ¿ I 2c -- 44 = Mp XVII 2b -- 45 = W I 6b -- 6. Beschreibung und Inhaltsverzeichnis der Manuskripte -- 7. Nachträge und Berichtigungen -- Namenregister -- Inhalt -- Faksimiles. (shrink)

A lattice L is coordinatizable, if it is isomorphic to the lattice L of principal right ideals of some von Neumann regular ring R. This forces L to be complemented modular. All known sufficient conditions for coordinatizability, due first to von Neumann, then to Jónsson, are first-order. Nevertheless, we prove that coordinatizability of lattices is not first-order, by finding a non-coordinatizable lattice K with a coordinatizable countable elementary extension L. This solves a 1960 problem of Jónsson. We also prove that (...) there is no [Formula: see text] statement equivalent to coordinatizability. Furthermore, the class of coordinatizable lattices is not closed under countable directed unions; this solves another problem of Jónsson from 1962. (shrink)

1m Juni 1971 hatte das Weizmann-Institut, die berlihmte intematio­ nale Forschungsstatte des Landes Israel, zu einem Symposium unter dem Titel "The Impact of Science on Society" nach Brlissel einge­ laden. Wahrend zweier Tage versuchten Wissenschaftler die Situ­ ation unserer heutigen, durch die Wissenschaft veriinderten Welt zu analysieren. Man fragte sich, welchen Nutzen uns die Wissenschaft gebracht habe und wohin sie uns fUhre. Stellt die Wissenschaft die hochste Ausformung des menschlichen Geistes, die groBte Kultur­ leistung dar? Wie weit geht die Verantwortung (...) des Forschers fUr die Resultate seiner Forschung? Welches ist die Rolle der Wissen­ schaft in einer klinftigen Gesellschaft? In ihren Referaten gaben die Forscher hochst individuelle und origi­ nelle Antworten zu diesem Thema. Der vollstandige W ortlaut des Symposiums wurde 1973 von A. R. MICHAELIS und H. HARVEY unter dem Titel "Scientists in Search of their Conscience" beim Springer-Verlag Berlin - Heidelberg - New York veroffentlicht. Die hiervorliegende deutsche Ausgabe habe ichaus dieser Originalausgabe stark liberarbeitet und durch einftihrende Zwischenkapitel erganzt. Dr. A. R. MICHAELIS, London, Dr. JOSEF COHN und Frau RENATE V. BAMBERG, Europaisches Komitee des Weizmann-Instituts, ZUrich, danke ich fUr die Zusammenarbeit und Hilfe bei der Abfassung der deutschen Ausgabe. Dr. DIETER GAUSS, Gottingen, und Dr. HARALD K. WIEBKING, Springer-Verlag Heidelberg, bin ich fUr die redak­ tionelle Bearbeitung des Manuskripts verbunden. Gottingen, im Sommer 1974 F. CRAMER Inhaltsverzeichnis Einftihrung: Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft in unserer Zeit FRIEDRICH CRAMER........... (shrink)

Excerpt from Fragmenta Philosophorum Græcorum Valckemrius Diatrib. In Eur. Fragm. P. 282; Wyltenbaehius Epist. Ad Heusd. Opuse. II p. 38, alii. Mms. Cue. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, (...) such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)