Descartes's concept of the mind, as distinct from the body with which it forms a union, set the agenda for much of Western philosophy's subsequent reflection on human nature and thought. This is the first book to give an analysis of Descartes's pivotal concept that deals with all the functions of the mind, cognitive as well as volitional, theoretical as well as practical and moral. Focusing on Descartes's view of the mind as intimately united to and intermingled with the body, (...) and exploring its implications for his philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Lilli Alanen argues that the epistemological and methodological consequences of this view have been largely misconstrued in the modern debate. Informed by both the French tradition of Descartes scholarship and recent Anglo-American research, Alanen's book combines historical-contextual analysis with a philosophical problem-oriented approach. It seeks to relate Descartes's views on mind and intentionality both to contemporary debates and to the problems Descartes confronted in their historical context. By drawing out the historical antecedents and the intellectual evolution of Descartes's thinking about the mind, the book shows how his emphasis on the embodiment of the mind has implications far more complex and interesting than the usual dualist account suggests. (shrink)

On December 29, 1918, the Spartakus League, a Marxist revolutionary movement, rose up in Germany calling for an end to class rule by the bourgeoisie. Massive demonstrations followed and more than 500,000 Berliners took to the streets in January--only to be crushed by police and anticommunist paramilitary troops. Several leaders of the League were killed and the revolt was quashed. Through a detailed reconstruction of the events of that bloody winter, historian and critic Furio Jesi recasts our understanding of (...) a foundational political difference--revolt or revolution? Drawing on a deep reserve of literary sources like Brecht, Eliade, Dostoyevsky, and Mann, Jesi outlines a uniquely incisive phenomenology of revolt that distinguishes between the purposeful historical temporality of revolution and the suspension of time that marks a revolt. And with the addition of an essay on the politics of time and revolution by Rosa Luxemburg, a founding leader of the Spartakus League, this volume becomes a crucial text at the intersection of history and philosophy. (shrink)

Politics is hugely complex. Some try to reduce its complexity by examining it through an ideological worldview, a one-size-fits-all prescriptive formula or a quantitative examination of as many 'facts' as possible. Yet politics cannot be adequately handled as if it were made of cells and particles: ideological views are oversimplifying and sometimes dangerous. Politics is not simply a moral matter, nor political philosophy a subdivision of moral philosophy. This book is devised as a basic conceptual lexicon for all those who (...) want to understand what politics is, how it works and how it changes or fails to change. Key concepts such as power, conflict, legitimacy and order are clearly defined and their interplay in the state, interstate and global level explored. Principles such as liberty, equality, justice and solidarity are discussed in the context of the political choices confronting us. This compact and systematic introduction to the categories needed to grasp the fundamentals of politics will appeal to readers who want to gain a firmer grasp on the workings of politics, as well as to scholars and students of philosophy, political science and history. (shrink)

This paper examines Descartes' controversial theory of the creation of eternal truths and the views of modality attributed to Descartes in recent interpretations of it. It shows why attempts to make Descartes' view intelligible by distinctions of different kinds of modality fail to do justice to his theory, which is radical indeed without being incoherent or involving universal possibilism or irrationalism. Descartes' opposition to traditional rationalist views of modality, it suggests, can be seen instead as foreshadowing contemporary views prefixed, logical (...) structure of reality or of the divine intellect. (shrink)

Discussions of the account of judgment offered in the Fourth Meditation tend to focus on its role in Descartes' epistemology and his response to skepticism. The main focus of the Fourth Meditation is the true and the false, and it completes the discussion conducted in the Second and Third Meditation about truth and falsity and the proper use of the truth rule. This chapter summarizes Descartes' view of the nature of judgment before examining more closely the account of the will (...) unfolding in the Fourth Meditation, and the kind of indifference Descartes appeals to in defending his controversial doctrine of free choice. Descartes' problematic account of the will and its freedom is developed in an epistemological and theodical context, the aim being to warrant the truth rule and, perhaps even more importantly, to draw a line between God's and our own responsibility for our cognitive errors. (shrink)

In this article the claim of normative ethics to be the main philosophical access to the problems raised by climate change is contested and instead it is suggested that these problems be addressed from a different perspective: that of a political philosophy that escapes its own reduction to a theory of justice. Part I shows several incidences of how mainstream climate ethics fails with regard to its intention to shape an effective climate policy. Part II argues that ‘politics for the (...) future’ as required by man-made lethal challenges has to complement the adversarial politics-as-usual. Included here is a redefinition of what the relationship of politics and morality means in the new circumstances – not only with regard to climate change. (shrink)

Il saggio affronta alcune questioni che il concetto di Antropocene pone non solo alla teoria politica ma anche alle scienze umane e sociali. Lungo un percorso critico fra teorie e autori diversi (da Chakrabarty a Latour, da Moore e Malm fino all'ecofemminismo), il saggio discute il concetto di Antropocene con un approccio di “ecologia politica”. L'obiettivo è di tenere insieme la dimensione comune - umana e non umana - dell’appartenenza agli eco-sistemi terrestri, con la capacità di leggere criticamente e genealogicamente (...) le asimmetrie di potere, le disuguaglianze e i conflitti che hanno reso possibile e che tuttora strutturano l’Antropocene, nell’ottica politica di una giustizia climatica interumana e multi-specie. (shrink)

Il saggio esamina il modo in cui nell’Antichità classica è stato pensato il conflitto politico a partire dalla riflessione su “fazioni” e “partiti”. L’analisi prende le mosse da Omero ed Esiodo, per i quali la Giustizia è lo strumento con cui dal caos originario si passa al cosmo ordinato. Si concentra quindi sulla nascita della polis come fattore di mediazione del conflitto fra le “parti” sociali, affrontando il pensiero di Tucidide, Platone e Aristotele, che condividono la stessa critica nei confronti (...) di “parti” interpretate come “fazioni” distruttive dell’ordine politico. Polibio, invece, valorizza le “parti” come elementi costitutivi del “tutto” politico, mentre per Sallustio le “fazioni” sono la causa della decadenza della Repubblica romana. Anche Cicerone rifiuta le “fazioni” in quanto distruttive della “concordia” dello Stato, mentre con l’Impero viene superato l’orizzonte particolaristico delle poleis; sarà Tacito, infine, a riflettere sulla contraddizione di un potere particolare che si legittima come universale. (shrink)

The essay identifies and analyses the main similarities between Weber’s and Foucault’s work. They concern the three main areas of their reflection: knowledge, power and the subject. These thematic axes are always firmly intertwined in their work. With regard to knowledge, both authors practice a form of historical knowledge in which both the “subject” of knowledge and the “object” known are radically called into question. Regarding power, they abandon the model of the state and sovereignty in order to analyse the (...) relations of power and domination that run through the entire social body and that “govern” the conduct of individuals. As for the subject, both elaborate ethical forms of subjectivity and “care of the self” that take on an ascetic significance. For Weber, however, it is a question of making objectivity itself a “vocation” for the subject, while Foucault proposes a resistance and a struggle for a new subjectivity. (shrink)

There has been an explosion of interest in the idea of European Union citizenship in recent years, as a defining example of postnational cosmopolitan citizenship potentially replacing or layered on top of national citizenship. We argue this form of EU citizenship undermines industrial citizenship, which is a crucial support for social solidarity on which other types of citizenship are based. Because industrial citizenship arises from collectivities based on class identities and national institutions, it depends on the national territorial order and (...) the social closure inherent in it. EU citizenship in its ‘postnational’ form is realized through practices of mobility, placing it in tension with bounded class-based collectivities. Though practices of working-class cosmopolitanism may give rise to a working-class consciousness, the fragmented nature of this vision impedes the development of transnational class-based collectivities. Industrial and cosmopolitan citizenship must be re-imagined together if European integration is to be democratized. (shrink)

Today the halls of Technology, Entertainment, and Design and Davos reverberate with optimism that hacking, brainstorming, and crowdsourcing can transform citizenship, development, and education alike. This article examines these claims ethnographically and historically with an eye toward the kinds of social orders such practices produce. This article focuses on a hackathon, one emblematic site of social practice where techniques from information technology production become ways of remaking culture. Hackathons sometimes produce technologies, and they always, however, produce subjects. This article argues (...) that the hackathon rehearses an entrepreneurial citizenship celebrated in transnational cultures that orient toward Silicon Valley for models of social change. Such optimistic, high-velocity practice aligns, in India, with middle-class politics that favor quick and forceful action with socially similar collaborators over the contestations of mass democracy or the slow construction of coalition across difference. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introductory Remarks The Cartesian Background Impressions and Ideas Passions as Reflective Impressions Direct and Indirect Passions Association and the Individuation of Passions Perception and Perceiving Passions and Moral Sentiments Notes References Further reading.

Hume is famous for his criticism of substantial minds, free will, and self-consciousness—central elements in traditional philosophical accounts of persons. His empiricism dissolves self-inspecting minds into heaps of distinct perceptions and turns cognitive faculties into successions of causally related, discrete impressions and ideas. Whatever regularities the complex ideas and their bundles or heaps display are explained by laws of association of ideas, which are supposed to play the same role in the mental world as Newton’s laws of gravitation play in (...) physical nature. This paper explores some strands of the new science of man proposed in Hume’s Treatise, in particular his account of personal identity.. (shrink)

This paper breaks with the sociological notion of ‘risk society’ and argues in favour of a philosophical view that sees the two planetary threats of late modernity, nuclear weapons and global warming, as ultimate challenges to morality and politics rather than risks that we can take and manage. The paper also raises the question of why we should feel responsible for the effects of these two global challenges on future generations and in this sense elaborates on the transgenerational chain of (...) parenthood rather than on considerations of justice. (shrink)

Cet article relève une impasse qui apparaît quand les travaux récents sur la suspension du jugement sont intégrés aux solutions évidentialistes au problème de la «mauvaise sorte de raison» : il semble qu’il n’existe aucune raison pour suspendre le jugement. Deux réponses possibles à cette impasse sont considérées ici : l’une redéfinit la suspension du jugement comme une action mentale, l’autre la redéfinit comme une attitude de second ordre. L’article fait valoir que ces réponses n’évitent l’impasse qu’en compromettant de manière (...) inacceptable la notion de suspension du jugement. (shrink)

There are two main strands in the afterlife of Descartes’s famous redefinition of mind in terms of thinking likely to color one’s reading of his notion of mind or self. The one stressed most by his posterity and developed from early on in the empiricist tradition sees consciousness as its main characteristic. The other focuses on reason and rationality. This paper discusses the textual support for the first reading promoted by Ryle and his followers and aligns itself with the second (...) arguing that it is the exercise of its rational, cognitive capacities that are essential to the Cartesian mind and not consciousness, which is merely a presupposition for its rational activity. It examines the interrelation and respective roles of awareness on the one hand, and reason on the other in Descartes’s account of mind or self. But it also suggests that the role given by Descartes to the will in judgment and his separation of will and intellect into two distinct powers may be seen as contributing to a transformation of the very notion of reason and of self as a cognitive and moral agent. (shrink)

Feminist work in the history of philosophy has come of age as an innovative field in the history of philosophy. This volume marks that accomplishment with original essays by leading feminist scholars who ask basic questions: What is distinctive of feminist work in the history of philosophy? Is there a method that is distinctive of feminist historical work? How can women philosophers be meaningfully included in the history of the discipline? Who counts as a philosopher? This collection is a unique (...) collaboration among philosophers from North America and the Nordic Countries, including papers written from both analytic and continental philosophical perspectives and discussing both ancient and modern philosophers. Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy will be of interest to historians of philosophy, feminist theorists, women's studies faculty and students, and humanists interested in canon formation and transformation. (shrink)

On the 100th anniversary of the death of Max Weber, we dedicate the monographic section of this issue to his political thought through a series of international contributions which investigate its multiple economic, religious, cultural and social perspectives.

Originally published in 1914, this book contains an illustrated story of life in a provincial French town in the early twentieth century. The French of the story is accessible for a young audience, and provides an entertaining as well as educational story for readers. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in French life or the history of French education in Britain.

If we may rely for our evidence on simple observation, it would appear that the tendency of random or unguided activity in external nature is opposed to the development of complex organization and favorable to structural simplicity—in the sense of uniformity in the distribution of elements. This anti-organizing trend of purely physical processes is illustrated in ordinary large-scale mixing and stirring operations, as well as in the automatic increase of entropy with time in systems subject to the laws of thermodynamics. (...) It is common experience that complex systems which are the seat of physical activity tend to become simpler when left to themselves, i.e., they lose organization. Recently Eddington has given the whole matter an admirably clear expression: “Entropy may most conveniently be described as the measure of disorganization of a system.... We can see chance creeping in where formerly it was excluded.” Unless counteracted by directive action the casual or random element in nature tends to increase. If things are left to chance, not only does organization of any high degree of complexity fail to develop, but what organization there is tends to lapse or disappear. Hence in those cases, such as living organisms, where the existence and activity of the system depend on a special and complex organization, it appears necessary to assume the continued operation of a stable directive influence or factor which pervades the whole system and excludes or compensates casual factors as far as possible. The presence of this factor is what makes possible the development and maintenance of the organization required for vital activity. (shrink)