A significant proportion of conservationists' work is directed towards efforts to save disappearing species. This relies upon the belief that species extinction is undesirable. When justifications are offered for this belief, they very often rest upon the assumption that extinction brought about by humans is different in kind from other forms of extinction. This paper examines this assumption and reveals that there is indeed good reason to suppose current anthropogenic extinctions to be different in kind from extinctions brought about at (...) other times or by other factors. Having considered – and rejected – quantity and rate of extinction as useful distinguishing factors, four alternative arguments are offered, each identifying a way in which anthropogenic extinction is significantly different from other forms of extinction, even mass extinction: (1) Humans are a different kind of natural cause from other causes of extinction; (2) Extinctions brought about by humans are uniquely persistent; (3) Anthropogenic extinctions are effectively random whereas past mass extinctions are rule-bound; (4) The impact of the current anthropogenic extinction event differs from the impact of other extinction events of the past, such that future recovery may not follow past patterns. Together, these four arguments suggest that the present-day extinction event brought about by humans may be unprecedented and that we cannot clearly extrapolate from past to present recovery from extinctions. Although insufficient as justification for the claim that present-day extinctions are undesirable, the arguments provide some ammunition for conservationists' conviction that species extinction – in which humans play an accelerating role – ought to be prevented. (shrink)

Like all research, embryo research can take a variety of forms, some posing substantially more risks to persons than others. Savulescu et al argue persuasively that regulatory regimes specially designed for sensitive embryo research should differentiate between person-affecting and non-person-affecting embryo research, with substantial scrutiny only warranted for the former.1 Yet if we find Savulescu et al ’s argument persuasive, what practical implications would it have? In this commentary, we focus in particular on how such an argument might apply in (...) Singapore, one of the jurisdictions with special regulations for embryo research. We will summarise the way in which approval for oocyte and embryonic research operates in Singapore, and suggest that Savulesc et al ’s distinction requires specification to be useful in such contexts. We propose adopting a risk-stratified framework similar to that employed with Institutional Review Boards. This requires a wider view of risks than the focus by Savulescu et al on future persons. We then illustrate how such a framework would apply in five scenarios discussed in Savulescu et al. Research with embryos and oocytes is regulated in Singapore under the Human Biomedical Research Act.2 Enacted in 2015, this law sets out requirements for consent, IRB review and research oversight. By definition, all research involving gametes and embryos fall within the remit of the Act. Moreover, such research is defined as ‘restricted’; besides the Act, research involving oocytes and embryos is also subject to control under the Human Biomedical Research …. (shrink)

Dans l’Antiquité, affronter la vaste étendue de la mer symbolisait l’inconnu des dangers de la vie mortelle. C’était une tâche ardue pour les hommes, et tout simplement inconcevable pour les femmes. C’est peut-être pour cette raison que les études sur la condition féminine dans les sociétés antiques, notamment en Grèce, qui, depuis les années 1970, éclairent la position sociopolitique, familiale, juridique et religieuse des femmes au sein de la communauté urbaine, négligent leur rapport avec...

The nature of Marx's ethics has been a matter of considerable dispute since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Some have maintained that Marx had no ethics; others have claimed that his ethics is Kantian; and yet others have maintained that his ethics is utilitarian. The first two views were prominent at the turn of the century. It is the utilitarian view that seems to hold favor among a great many today. Thus Adam Schaff has claimed that ‘Marxist theory (...) … leads to the general position that may be called “social hedonism” —the view that the aim of human life is to secure the maximum happiness for the broadest masses of the people … ’ Similarly, Derek Allen has claimed that ‘it is possible … to show that the arguments which support [Marx's and Engels’] moral judgments are utilitarian in all but name.’. (shrink)

An obituary notice outlining the main aspects of Charles Hartshorne's life, career, and thought.

This volume presents new texts of Cicero's dialogues on political philosophy, De Re Publica and De Legibus, together with corrected versions of the editor's previously published editions of Cato Maior de Senectute and Laelius de Amicitia. The texts are based on a full reconsideration of the manuscript evidence and are presented in a clear and readable form.