This article aims to explicate the concept of emotional sharing against the background of interactive and situated approaches to affectivity, and to contextualize emotional sharing within the broader context of emotion research. It brings together research on situated affectivity with the debate on collective emotion. Emotional sharing is defined via four requirements and distinguished from other phenomena in the broad field of collective emotion, especially from mechanisms of emotional convergence and other forms of affective we-experience. The paper makes use of (...) the recently proposed concepts of affective scaffolding and affective arrangement to explore how emotional sharing is always enacted in sociorelational dynamics and embedded in socio-material contexts which enable, shape, and modulate the unfolding of emotional sharing and regulate who is likely to participate. (shrink)

Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered and Experimental Interventions (MEURI) is an ethical framework developed by the WHO for using unproven interventions in public health emergencies outside the context of medical research. It is mainly intended for use when medical research would be impracticable, but there is still a need to systematically gather data about unproven interventions. As such, it is designed as something of a middle ground between clinical and research ethical frameworks. However, I argue that MEURI does not truly (...) lie at the intersection of clinical care and research. Due to its intent, structure and oversight requirements, it takes on most of the crucial features of research, to the point that it is best understood as a form of research. As a result, cases where MEURI could practicably be applied should instead make use of existing research frameworks. For those circumstances where research is truly impracticable, a more straightforward oversight system than MEURI is needed. While existing practices of compassionate use have some applicability, proposals to make use of clinical ethics committees to oversee unproven interventions may help achieve the right balance in acting in a patient’s best interests when the relevant evidence base is weak. (shrink)

G. C. J. Midgley; XIV—Linguistic Rules, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 271–290, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

Jelson Roberto de Oliveira, autor de “Compreender Hans Jonas”, é graduado em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Paraná, com especialização em Sociologia Política e mestrado em História da Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea pela mesma universidade. Atualmente é professor da pós-graduação em Filosofia na PUC-PR, e coordenador do GT Hans Jonas, da Anpof, que reúne vários pesquisadores de nível nacional na área. Ética para a civilização tecnológica e A solidão como virtude moral em Nietzsche são alguns dos diversos títulos que compõem (...) o acervo de obras do autor. (shrink)

© 2016 RCNi Ltd. All rights reserved. Background Conceptual frameworks are important to ensure a clear underpinning research philosophy. Further, the use of conceptual frameworks can support structured research processes. Aim To present a partnership model for a reflective narrative for researcher and participant. Discussion This paper positions the underpinning philosophical framework of the model in social constructionism and narrative enquiry. The model has five stages - study design, invitation to share a research space and partnership, a metaphorical research space, (...) building a community story, and reading the community story to others. Core principles of the partnership model are continual reflection by the researcher, potential reflections by participants, reciprocal sharing, and partnership in research. Conclusion A 'trajectory of self' for both participants and researchers can be enhanced within reflective partnerships. Implications for practice This model can be applied to studies that use narrative enquiry and are seeking a humanistic approach with participant engagement. (shrink)

_The Ethics of Homelessness_ is a compilation of essays analysing the philosophical, legal and social implications of the seemingly intractable condition that people endure without a home, where their fundamental human rights, autonomy and privacy are compromised. Authors use literature and arguments to demonstrate the failings of public policy.

Impartiality is primarily a feature of normative or evaluative deliberation – deliberation about what ought to be done or about something's goodness or badness. An initial description is this: such deliberation is impartial when it is not unduly influenced by the deliberator's own interests, preferences, or loyalties. Derivatively, impartiality can be attributed to actions that are guided by deliberation with this feature, or persons who characteristically deliberate or act in this way.

It is usual to read nomina, with which three interpretations are possible. The stronger arrogates to himself the titles of moderation and justice. So in the excellent Rumanian translation of 1871 by Gavrilu J. Munteanu: ‘Cându are sâ decida pumnulu, celu mai tare si atribue titlu de moderatu şi de onestu.’.

The article aims to develop the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas as a valuable new perspective in understanding the triune drama of the Resurrection. Firstly, the juxtaposition of Levinas’ thought and Christian theology will be argued for, followed by a development of von Balthasar’s Trinitarian theology of the Resurrection. Especially, Levinas’ non-phenomenological notion of “otherness” will be used to offer an understanding of the Risen Christ’s “Otherness” as communicating the non-phenomenality of Holy Saturday to the disciples. As a result, we discover (...) significant theological openings towards a vision of a Biblical God free from the constraints of ontological thinking and phenomenal experience. (shrink)

Since these notes were written, news has come of the finding at Troizen of an inscription purporting to bear a decree proposed by Themistokles in 480, which is relevant to Part II above, pp. 33–35. If this new evience is valid, it would appear to confirm the view expressed there to some extent.

Charles S. Peirce has a great deal to contribute both to understanding and to solving many of the philosophical problems which puzzle contemporary thinkers. In fact it is probably true that in some ways philosophers of our time are in a better position to understand Peirce's thought than those of his own day. In this paper I would like to consider two puzzling notions: 1) the substantiality of things, and 2) the foundations of human knowledge.

In REG 73 and 75 I discussed various points connected with the Peace of Philocrates, a number of which have been assailed by M. M. Markle in CQ N.S. 24 in an article entitled ‘The Strategy of Philip in 346 B.C.’. Time passes, and, although de Ste. Croix in his Origins of the Peloponnesian War , p.105, felt able to declare that ‘a book shortly to be published by M. M. Markle makes a valuable and original contribution to our understanding (...) of the Peace of Philocrates’, and Markle himself confirms that a book is indeed forthcoming, some comment on his preliminary comments may be permitted. (shrink)

There is frequently an appearance of conflict between medicine and economics. This arises first because the nature of health and health care requires the doctor to make decisions on behalf of the patient and thus serves to explain why medical ethics exist. But secondly it is due to the relative lack of acceptance of the ethics of the common good within medical ethics. As a result while economics in the field of health has as an objective the maximisation of the (...) health of the community, subject to resource constraints, medical ethics pushes individual doctors to try to maximise the health of their patients. There is no reason to believe that the latter will sum to the former. To make the maximisation of health of the community the goal of the medical profession requires institutional changes, particularly with regard to budgeting, which will cajole and if necessary coerce doctors to adopt the good of the community as their objective. (shrink)