Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

This paper offers a new version of a historically influential, yet today unpopular, neglected, and on the whole insufficiently developed argument for socialism: socialism makes it possible for people to really act together. This idea of socialist action, combining the claims that there is a particularly valuable form of joint action and that socialism is about making such action possible, played an important role in the history of the labor movement, going back to the early Marx and running through various (...) strands of socialist thought. I shall argue that socialist action should be seen as central to the socialist project, its critique of capitalism, and the institutional alternatives envisaged by it. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis book assumes that basic ways of thinking about history are hard‐wired in the brain. Since different styles of discourse with which we talk about the past are hardwired, Blum infers that a protohistorical consciousness is necessary for the existence of language. Historical logics reflect some preconceived part–whole relation. Blum discerns four kinds of part‐whole structure, which he terms continuity, quantum, continuum, and dialectic. Blum believes that these part–whole relations rest on universal, prereflective intuitions. He concludes that humans have different (...) prelinguistic intuitions of time.Blum claims that people's variable innate temporality is expressed in their historical style. It follows that historical style antedates history as a genre. Hence we are not talking about historical style, but about how individuals apply their sense of the relation between parts and wholes to the problem of time. Our study of historical context becomes secondary to the assumptions we make about the interface between part–whole relations and time. The temporality of history is derivative of a phenomenon that is not historical.Certain conclusions are suggestive. First, modality precedes tense in evolution. Second, we ourselves are continuing to evolve. Blum believes that we are moving “towards a selection of abstract thinkers ruled by pure reason.” Instead of viewing cultures as organisms, it is more profitable to think of the evolution of structures of thinking, and to show that some are more prominent at present than they have been in the past.For Blum, historical thinking is a dependent variable. It depends on tense and modality, which are given before language and culture. Historical thinking reflects a primary experience, but it is not such a primary experience itself. (shrink)

There is little doubt that a second-order axiomatization of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus the axiom of choice (ZFC) is desirable. One advantage of such an axiomatization is that it permits us to express the principles underlying the first-order schemata of separation and replacement. Another is its almost-categoricity: M is a model of second-order ZFC if and only if it is isomorphic to a model of the form Vκ, ∈ ∩ (Vκ × Vκ) , for κ a strongly inaccessible ordinal.

Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that (...) Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entire Ethics as an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of the Ethics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life. Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy. (shrink)

El Estado de Hegel es el Estado de Derecho. Sin embargo en su Filosofía del Derecho se encuentran fundamentos decisivos para una teoría del Estado Social. Siguiendo el hilo de las Líneas fundamentales de la Filosofía del Derecho, se empieza por ver el derecho al bienestar, tal como se formula en la Moralidad (1). En la familia aparece el derecho de los hijos "de ser alimentados y educados" (2). El Derecho al bienestar se concreta en la sociedad civil (3), se (...) hace posible en el sistema de las necesidades (3.1.) y efectivo en la policía y la corporación (3.2 y 3.3), que ejercen funciones de suplencia de la familia. El mayor problema es la pobreza, tanto la que surge por contingencias subjetivas y sociales como por el funcionamiento mismo de la sociedad civil: la plebe. A este problema la sociedad es incapaz de darle una solución. (shrink)

I would like to discuss the claim that the resources of plural reference and plural quantification are sufficient for the purpose of paraphrasing all ordinary statements apparently concerned with composite material objects into plural statements concerned exclusively with simples.

Groups are ubiquitous in our lives. But while some of them are highly structured and appear to support a shared intentionality and even a shared agency, others are much less cohesive and do not seem to demand much of their individual members. Queues, for example, seem to be, at a given time, nothing over and above some individuals as they exemplify a certain spatial arrangement. Indeed, the main aim of this paper is to develop the more general thought that at (...) a given time, a group is nothing over and above some individual members as they exemplify a certain complex condition. The general conception of groups that emerges is able to accommodate a variety of constraints on a reasonable answer to the question of what are groups. (shrink)

The so-called Trolley Problem was first discussed by Philippa Foot in 1967 as a way to test moral intuitions regarding the doctrine of double effect, Kantian principles and utilitarianism. Ever since, a great number of philosophers and psychologists have come up with alternative scenarios to further test intuitions and the relevance of conventional moral doctrines. Given that physicians routinely face moral decisions regarding life and death, the Trolley Problem should be considered of great importance in medical ethics. In this article, (...) five “classic” trolley scenarios are discussed: the driver diverting the trolley, a bystander pulling a lever to divert the trolley, a fat man being thrown from a bridge to stop the trolley, a bystander pulling a lever to divert a trolley so that a fat man may be run over, and a bystander pulling a lever so that a fat man falls off from a bridge to stop the trolley. As these scenarios are discussed, relevant moral differences amongst them are addressed, and some of the applications in medical ethics are discussed. The article concludes that Trolley scenarios are not the ultimate criterion to make ethical decisions in difficult ethical challenges in medicine cases but they do serve as an initial intuitive guide. (shrink)

L’assurance de mort qu’enveloppe notre condition d’êtres finis nous expose à la tentation d’adhérer à une doctrine de désespoir qui considère toute chose sous le signe du non-être. Il appartient à la pensée dialectique de préparer la commutation de cette systématique négative en une méta-prgblé- matique de l’être ; mais cette commutation elle-même ne peut être que l’oeuvre d’une liberté qui choisit de s’ouvrir au transcendant, dont elle reconnaît la sollicitation a tergo dans l’acte même par lequel elle le salue (...) et l’invoque. (shrink)

Philosophers often explain what could be the case in terms of what is, in fact, the case at one possible world or another. They may differ in what they take possible worlds to be or in their gloss of what is for something to be the case at a possible world. Still, they stand united by the threat of paradox. A family of paradoxes akin to the set-theoretic antinomies seem to allow one to derive a contradiction from apparently plausible principles. (...) Some of them concern the interaction between propositions and worlds, and they appear to afford the means to map classes of propositions into propositions – or, likewise, classes of worlds into worlds – in a one-to-one fashion that leads to contradiction. Yet another family of paradoxes threaten the view that whatever could exist does, in fact, exist, which is in line with modal realism, for example. This article aims to survey and identify the source of each family of paradoxes as well as to outline some responses to them. (shrink)

Although recent trends in politics and media make it appear that conspiracy theories are on the rise, in fact they have always been present, probably because they are sustained by natural dispositions of the human brain. This is also the case with medical conspiracy theories. This article reviews some of the most notorious health-related conspiracy theories. It then approaches the reasons why people believe these theories, using concepts from cognitive science. On the basis of that knowledge, the article makes normative (...) proposals for public health officials and health workers as a whole, to deal with conspiracy theories, in order to preserve some of the fundamental principles of medical ethics. (shrink)

In order to give a compositional semantics for IF -languages, we shall describe their syntax in a different way. We shall not any longer have quantifiers of the form (∃y/{Q1x1, ..., Qkxk}), (∀y/{Q1x1, ..., Qkxk}), (Qi ∈ {∃, ∀}) but instead (∃xn/{xi1, ..., xim}), (∀xn/{xi1, ..., xim}).

Resumo O curso proferido por Heidegger, no semestre de verão de 1923, e publicado posteriormente, sob o título de Ontologia: a hermenêutica da facticidade, é um dos importantes loci nos quais Heidegger deixa entrever tanto a influência e importância de Kierkegaard quanto algumas de suas avaliações acerca do pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês. Uma delas, em especial, não obstante formule um interessante juízo sobre a relação entre Kierkegaard e Hegel - a partir da figura de F. A. Trendelenburg -, um dos (...) temas mais revisitados da literatura interpretativa sobre Kierkegaard, não tem sido objeto frequente de avaliação por aqueles intérpretes. Assim, o objetivo deste artigo é expor, analisar e avaliar as teses de Heidegger sobre a relação Kierkegaard-Hegel, a fim de sopesá-las em sua correção. Por fim, o artigo apresenta algumas reflexões metafilosóficas, avaliando o juízo de Heidegger sobre Kierkegaard, quanto a não ter se “desprendido de Hegel”.The course delivered by Heidegger during the Summer semester of 1923, and published later under the title of Ontology - The hermeneutics of facticity, is one of the most important loci in which we can have a glimpse of Kierkegaard’s influence on and importance to Heidegger, as well as of some of his interpretations about the thought of the Dane philosopher. One of them, notwithstanding puts forward a very interesting assessment of the relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel - through F. A. Trendelenburg -, one of hottest topics in the Kierkegaardian scholarship, is not usually analyzed by that scholarship. Hence, this paper aims to show and analyze Heidegger’s theses on the relation between Kierkegaard-Hegel in that work in order to evaluate their correctness. As final remarks, this paper presents some metaphilosophical reflections on the very notions of relation and dependence between philosophers. (shrink)

I present a puzzle for absolutely unrestricted quantification. One important advantage of absolutely unrestricted quantification is that it allows us to entertain perfectly general theories. Whereas most of our theories restrict attention to one or another parcel of reality, other theories are genuinely comprehensive taking absolutely all objects into their domain. The puzzle arises when we notice that absolutely unrestricted theories sometimes impose incompatible constraints on the size of the universe.

Just institutions have claims on us. There are two reasons for thinking that such claims are warranted. First, one may believe that we are under a natural duty of justice to support and further just institutions. If one believes that it matters whether institutions are just, one also has a reason, almost as a matter of consistency, to support and further just institutions. Second, one may believe that by enjoying the benefits brought about by cooperation through just institutions, one incurs (...) an obligation to support these institutions. Those who accept and enjoy the benefits brought about by cooperation through a just scheme are under an obligation of fairness to reciprocate. But what happens to these reasons to support and comply with an institution if the scheme of cooperation is less than fully just? There is hardly a real-world institution, policy, or scheme of social cooperation that would qualify as fully just. However, questions about obligations of fairness and duties of justice under conditions of injustice have hitherto suffered relative neglect. I shall outline an overall framework for thinking about these questions by asking what the victims of injustice owe to moderately unjust institutions. (shrink)

Ethical issues at the workplace have once again become topical and important due to considerable adverse publicity surrounding reports of unethical business practices by corporate managers. Accordingly, this paper re-visits the question of whether gender, age and work experience do have an effect on ethical judgement, using 655 business students as respondents. This is necessary as business students are likely to become managers during their career and will face complex ethical concerns and dilemmas in their daily, routine affairs. The findings (...) currently demonstrate that females are more ethically aware than their male counterparts – that is, there are differences between males and females regarding ethical judgement. There is also evidence to suggest that age is a factor that does impact on ethical judgement. However, we also found evidence to suggest that in some cases, the age factor does not necessarily have a significant impact on ethical awareness. The results further indicate that there is a difference in ethical judgement related to work experience. However, at the same time, in one question there is no evidence to suggest the claim that work experience does impact significantly on ethical judgement. Overall, it appears that ethical awareness does increase alongside work experience. (shrink)

Estamos inmersos en un contexto donde ya no encontramos ningún sentido hablar deidentidad, donde reina la incertidumbre y el desconcierto respecto de la imagen del hombre. Enese sentido, esta creciente saturación de la cultura ha puesto en entredicho todas nuestraspremisas previas sobre el yo, convirtiendo en algo extraño las pautas de relación tradicionales.De un tiempo para acá, se han puesto en entredicho todas las premisas tradicionales sobre lanaturaleza de la identidad personal, hasta tal extremo, que los conceptos mismos de verdad, (...) deobjetividad, de saber, y aún la idea de un ente individual, dotado de determinadas propiedadesmentales, de corporalidad, de conciencia, de subjetividad están corriendo el riesgo de sereliminados de nuestro panorama cultural. Y esto significa algo inquietante para nuestra vida encomún. En términos técnicos esto lo llamaría: dilemas y disloques de la identidad. A pesar delpanorama tan aparentemente oscuro, se podría sostener que anejo a este fenómeno, se pareceasumir con gran fervor las nuevas perspectivas que se avizoran. En consecuencia, evitando unescepticismo a ultranza, aceptando la invitación de Solzshenitsyn de “ir hacia arriba” en lasiguiente etapa antropológica, me atrevería a reconocer con Gevaert que, “los problemasantropológicos se imponen por sí mismos, irrumpen en la existencia y se plantean por su propiopeso. No es, el hombre el que suscita problemas; es el propio hombre el que se haceproblemático debido a la vida y a la condición en que vive. La existencia, al hacerseproblemática, requiere una respuesta y obliga a tomar posiciones” (Gevaert, 1995: 14). (shrink)

O presente artigo objetiva realizar um estudo de caso que aplica o modelo de inferência da melhor explicação (inference to the best explanation, IBE) de Peter Lipton ao episódio histórico da construção do modelo de dupla-hélice do DNA, no século XX. Procura avaliar a eficiência de tal modelo quando confrontado com a história da ciência e em que medida é capaz de rivalizar com ou superar outros modelos de explicação já consolidados na literatura de filosofia da ciência, tais como os (...) modelos nomológico-dedutivo e indutivo-estatístico de Carl Hempel, o modelo de relevância estatística de Wesley Salmon, ou, ainda, o modelo pragmático de explicação de Bas van Fraassen. Por fim, a conclusão apresentada é que o modelo de inferência da melhor explicação se mostra mais eficaz para ilustrar esse episódio da história da genética do que as outras propostas filosóficas analisadas. (shrink)

We show that if a first-order structure${\cal M}$, with universe ℤ, is an expansion of (ℤ,+,0) and a reduct of (ℤ,+,<,0), then${\cal M}$must be interdefinable with (ℤ,+,0) or (ℤ,+,<,0).

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

We present two studies investigating the impact of causal perceptions and the moral emotions of anger, shame, and guilt on the justification of deviant workplace behavior. Study 1 tests our conceptual framework using a sample of undergraduate business students; Study 2 examines a population of practicing physicians. Results varied significantly between the two samples, suggesting that individual and contextual factors play an important role in shaping the perceptual and emotional processes by which individuals form reactions to undesirable affective workplace events. (...) Implications of these findings for the study of ethics, emotions, and attributions, as well as for promoting ethical behavior, are discussed. (shrink)