Disquotational theories of truth are often criticised for being too weak to prove interesting generalisations about truth. In this paper we will propose a certain formal theory to serve as a framework for a solution of the generalisation problem. In contrast with Horwich’s original proposal, our framework will eschew psychological notions altogether, replacing them with the epistemic notion of believability. The aim will be to explain why someone who accepts a given disquotational truth theory Th, should also accept (...) various generalisations not provable in Th. The strategy will consist of the development of an axiomatic theory of believability, one permitting us to show how to derive the believability of generalisations from basic axioms that characterise the believability predicate, together with the information that Th is a theory of truth that we accept. (shrink)

Clark & Thornton take issue with my claim that parity is not a generalisation problem, and that nothing can be inferred about back-propagation in particular, or learning in general, from failures of parity generalisation. They advance arguments to support their contention that generalisation is a relevant issue. In this continuing commentary, I examine generalisation more closely in order to refute these arguments. Different learning algorithms will have different patterns of failure: back-propagation has no special status (...) in this respect. This is not to deny that a particular algorithm might fortuitously happen to produce the “intended” function in an parity-generalisation task. (shrink)

Uninformed learning mechanisms will not discover “type- 2” regularities in their inputs, except fortuitously. Clark & Thornton argue that error back-propagation only learns the classical parity problem – which is “always pure type-2” – because of restrictive assumptions implicit in the learning algorithm and network employed. Empirical analysis showing that back-propagation fails to generalise on the parity problem is cited to support their position. The reason for failure, however, is that generalisation is simply not a relevant issue. (...) Nothing can be gleaned about back-propagation in particular, or learning in general, from this failure. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the success of conventional field trials for vaccines against COVID-19, human challenge trials that could obtain more information about these and about other vaccines and further strategies against it are about to start in the UK. One critique of COVID-19 HCTs is their distinct paucity of information on crucial population groups. For safety reasons, these HCTs will exclude candidate participants of advanced age or with comorbidities that worsen COVID-19, yet a vaccine should protect such populations. We turn this cliché (...) on its head. The truth is that either an HCT or a field trial has intrinsic generalisability limitations, that an HCT can expedite protection of high-risk participants even without challenging them with the virus, and that an important route to obtaining results generalisable to high-risk groups under either strategy is facilitated by HCTs. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

Minimalism is the view that our concept of truth is constituted by our disposition to accept instances of the truth schema ‘The proposition that p is true if and only if p’. The generalisation problem is the challenge to account for universal generalisations concerning logical truths such as ‘Every proposition of the form 〈if p, then p〉 is true’. This paper argues that such generalisations can be deduced using a single example of the logical truth in question and (...) a single corresponding instance of the truth schema, employing the logical method of reasoning with arbitrary instances of universal and existential generalisations. Suggesting an inferentialist construal of Minimalism, the paper introduces conditional and general acceptance dispositions, distinguishes inferential meaning constitution from implicit definition, highlights the inferential nature of acceptance of instances of the truth schema, sketches a suitable account of structured propositions, compares higher-order with first-order means of quantification, and argues that the conception of truth Minimalism attributes to ordinary speakers is essentially inferential. It finally applies the deductive strategy to generalisations concerning logical validity as well as more complex logical truths. (shrink)

Generic generalisations like ‘Opioids are highly addictive’ are very useful in scientific communication, but they can often be interpreted in many different ways. Although this is not a problem when all interpretations provide the same answer to the question under discussion, a problem arises when a generic generalisation is used to answer a question other than that originally intended. In such cases, some interpretations of the generalisation might answer the question in a way that the original (...) speaker would not endorse. Rather than excising generic generalisations from scientific communication, I recommend that scientific communicators carefully consider the kinds of questions their words might be taken to answer and try to avoid phrasing that might be taken to provide unintended answers. (shrink)

Recent work on compositional distributional models shows that bialgebras over finite dimensional vector spaces can be applied to treat generalised quantifiersGeneralised quantifiers for natural language. That technique requires one to construct the vector space over powersets, and therefore is computationally costly. In this paper, we overcome this problem by considering fuzzy versions of quantifiers along the lines of ZadehZadeh, L. A., within the category of many valued relationsMany valued relations. We show that this category is a concrete instantiation of (...) the compositional distributional model. We show that the semantics obtained in this model is equivalent to the semantics of the fuzzy quantifiers of ZadehZadeh, L. A.. As a result, we are now able to treat fuzzy quantification without requiring a powerset construction. (shrink)

The new field of judgment aggregation aims to merge many individual sets of judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a single collective set of judgments on these propositions. Judgment aggregation has commonly been studied using classical propositional logic, with a limited expressive power and a problematic representation of conditional statements ("if P then Q") as material conditionals. In this methodological paper, I present a simple unified model of judgment aggregation in general logics. I show how many realistic decision problems can (...) be represented in it. This includes decision problems expressed in languages of classical propositional logic, predicate logic (e.g. preference aggregation problems), modal or conditional logics, and some multi-valued or fuzzy logics. I provide a list of simple tools for working with general logics, and I prove impossibility results that generalise earlier theorems. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the conditions under which generalisation from single case studies, in the sense of making inferences concerning a wider class of phenomena beyond a case, is reasonable. Two sets of conditions, in particular, provide the basis for our consideration of this issue. The first is an exploration of the impressive amount of empirical knowledge that is contained within the theories that are used to make observations, to classify phenomena, and to understand and (...) interpret cases. The second is recognition of the role of a pattern of inference known as abduction, or inference to the best explanation, in drawing conclusions from case studies. It is argued that these two conditions, when applied to the procedures for conducting case studies, can be used to defend, as reasonable, the making of certain provisional generalisations from single cases. An epistemological procedure for testing and further justifying these generalisations, with a particular emphasis on dealing with the problem of confirmation bias, is then discussed and recommended. (shrink)

In this paper, I am expressly concerned with issues emanating from the taking of p to be the case in evidence-based medicine. I interrogate the tenability of statistical generalisations with regard to reference classes and, in particular, demographic groups. Upon the grounds of my estimations, I contrarily make a moral argument that the credence of statistical generalisations should not categorically license outright rational belief in evidence-based medicine as supported by the opacity of bare statistical generalisations, the problem of reference (...) classes and inappropriate credence projection, even when such generalisations may appear epistemologically sound. (shrink)

In this paper non-Hausdorff manifolds as potential basic objects of General Relativity are investigated. One can distinguish four stages of identifying an appropriate mathematical structure to describe physical systems: kinematic, dynamical, physical reasonability, and empirical. The thesis of this paper is that in the context of General Relativity, non-Hausdorff manifolds pass the first two stages, as they enable one to define the basic notions of differential geometry needed to pose the problem of the evolution-distribution of matter and are not (...) in conflict with the Einstein equations. With regard to the third stage, various potential conflicts with physical reasonability conditions are considered with a tentative conclusion that non-Hausdorff manifolds are more likely to pass this stage than is typically assumed. When dealing with some of these problems, the modal interpretation of non-Hausdorff manifolds is invoked, according to which they represent bundles of alternative possible spacetimes rather than single spacetimes. (shrink)

We provide a list of open problems in the research area of generalised Baire spaces, compiled with the help of the participants of two workshops held in Amsterdam (2014) and Hamburg (2015).

A summary of recent experimental results shows that entanglement can be generated more easily than before, and that there are improved chances for its persistence. An eminent finding of Generalised Quantum Theory is the insight that the notion of entanglement can be extended, such that, e.g., psychological or psychophysical problem areas can be included, too. First, a general condition for entanglement to occur is given by the term ‘common prearranged context’. A formalised treatment requires a quantitative definition of the (...) similarity or dissimilarity between two complex structures which takes their internal structures into account. After some specific remarks on distance, metrics, and semi-metrics in mathematics, a procedure is described for setting up a similarity function with the required properties. This procedure is in analogy with the two-step character of measurement and with the well-known properties of perspective notions. A general methodology can be derived for handling perspective notions. Finally, these concepts supply heuristic clues towards a formalised treatment of the notions of ‘meaning’ and ‘interpretation’. (shrink)

We investigate the connection between interference and computational power within the operationally defined framework of generalised probabilistic theories. To compare the computational abilities of different theories within this framework we show that any theory satisfying four natural physical principles possess a well-defined oracle model. Indeed, we prove a subroutine theorem for oracles in such theories which is a necessary condition for the oracle model to be well-defined. The four principles are: causality, purification, strong symmetry, and informationally consistent composition. Sorkin has (...) defined a hierarchy of conceivable interference behaviours, where the order in the hierarchy corresponds to the number of paths that have an irreducible interaction in a multi-slit experiment. Given our oracle model, we show that if a classical computer requires at least n queries to solve a learning problem, because fewer queries provide no information about the solution, then the corresponding “no-information” lower bound in theories lying at the kth level of Sorkin’s hierarchy is \. This lower bound leaves open the possibility that quantum oracles are less powerful than general probabilistic oracles, although it is not known whether the lower bound is achievable in general. Hence searches for higher-order interference are not only foundationally motivated, but constitute a search for a computational resource that might have power beyond that offered by quantum computation. (shrink)

J.C. Beall and Greg Restall's Generalised Tarski Thesis is a generalisation of the seemingly diverse conceptions of logical consequence. However, even their apparently general account of consequence makes necessary truth-preservation a necessary condition. Sentences in the imperative mood pose a problem for any truth-preservationist account of consequence, because imperatives are not truth-apt but seem to be capable of standing in the relation of logical consequence. In this paper, I show that an imperative logic can be formulated that solves (...) the problem of imperative consequence by leading naturally to a further generalisation of the GTT. (shrink)

Cerreia-Vioglio et al. :341–375, 2011) have proposed a very general axiomatisation of preferences in the presence of ambiguity, viz. Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preference orderings. This paper investigates the problem of Arrovian aggregation of such preferences—and proves dictatorial impossibility results for both finite and infinite populations. Applications for the special case of aggregating expected-utility preferences are given. A novel proof methodology for special aggregation problems, based on model theory, is employed.

Modal fictionalists face a problem that arises due to their possible-world story being incomplete in the sense that certain relevant claims are neither true nor false according to it. It has recently been suggested that this incompleteness problem generalises to other brands of fictionalism, such as fictionalism about composite or mathematical objects. In this paper, I argue that these fictionalist positions are particularly threatened by a generalised incompleteness problem since they cannot emulate the modal fictionalists’ most attractive (...) response. I then defend mathematical and compositional fictionalism by showing that the reasons for which the incompleteness problem has been thought to affect them are mistaken. This leads to the question of whether there are other fictionalist positions to which the problem does in fact generalise. I give a general account of the features of a fictionalist position that generate the incompleteness problem and argue that whenever a fictionalist position does exemplify these features then the problem can be addressed in analogy to the modal fictionalists’ preferred response. (shrink)

How can different individuals' probability functions on a given sigma-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We (...) formalize this idea by introducing a 'premise-based' approach to probabilistic opinion pooling, and show that, under a variety of assumptions, it leads to linear or neutral opinion pooling on the 'premises'. This paper is the second of two self-contained, but technically related companion papers inspired by binary judgment-aggregation theory. (shrink)

La polémique entre V. Soloviev et L. Lopatine met en lumière les recherches de la philosophie russe sur son mode propre de compréhension du Moi. Pour Soloviev, on ne peut attribuer au sujet de la conscience en tant que tel une réalité autre que phénoménologique. Lopatine propose une variante, proche de Leibniz, selon laquelle le Moi est une conscience subjective, présente aux différents niveaux du développement spirituel. Cette interprétation est reprise et développée, dans une certaine mesure, par N. Losski. G. (...) Chpet tire un bilan de la discussion, en posant le caractère « communautaire » [ obščnost ’] particulier du Moi, qui se réalise non par la « généralisation » [ obobščenie ] mais par la « communication » [ obščenie ]. (shrink)

The black hole information problem provides important clues for trying to piece together a quantum theory of gravity. Discussions on this topic have generally assumed that in a consistent theory of gravity and quantum mechanics, quantum theory is unmodified. In this review, we discuss the black hole information problem in the context of generalisations of quantum theory. In this preliminary exploration, we examine black holes in the setting of generalised probabilistic theories, in which quantum theory and classical probability (...) theory are special cases. We are able to calculate the time it takes information to escape a black hole, assuming that information is preserved. In quantum mechanics, information should escape pure state black holes after half the Hawking photons have been emitted, but we find that this get’s modified in generalisations of quantum mechanics. Likewise the black-hole mirror result of Hayden and Preskill, that information from entangled black holes can escape quickly, also get’s modified. We find that although information exits the black hole as predicted by quantum theory, it is fairly generic that it fails to appear outside the black hole at this point—something impossible in quantum theory due to the no-hiding theorem. The information is neither inside the black hole, nor outside it, but is delocalised. (shrink)

Das problem der welt, nach der auffassung der moglichen welt-semantik, ist nur implizit vorhanden. bis heute gibt es nur eine allgemeine auffassung der welt im einverstandnis mit der intuition der moglichen welten. die fragestellung ist: wie kann ein gegenstand identifiziert werden und warum kann von dessen existenz gesprochen werden? der logisch-semantische streit geht quer durch das verfahren der universellen "instantijerung" und der existenziellen generalisation. das problem der eigenschaften in der kausalen namenserklarung wird durch die bestimmung des kunftigen, (...) durch vergangenes, also durch die these der starrheit gelost. unserer meinung nach, ist hier das verfahren der "moglichen welten" eine art kaleidoskop der referenz der eigennament. dies fuhrt dazu, dass entitaten sich verveilfachen und in verschiedenen "welten" alle gleich erscheinen. daruber hinaus mussen eigenschaften bei der beschreibung eines objekts wesentlich sein. dadurch werden grade der diskriminalitat eingefuhrt, die nicht akzeptierbar sind. (shrink)

Que sont les « lois de la nature » que les sciences empiriques, et en premier lieu la physique, tentent de saisir? Et si les scientifiques ne peuvent les découvrir, ou du moins les confirmer, que sur la base de l’expérience, quels sont la nature et le fondement de leurs opérations inductives? Comment garantir la possibilité d’une authentique connaissance de ces lois qui structurent la réalité? Ce livre propose une enquête épistémologique et métaphysique au cours de laquelle deux fils directeurs (...) s’entremêlent. Il s’agit d’une part de s’interroger sur la nature ontologique des lois, à partir des débats contemporains en philosophie analytique des sciences. Les lois de la nature sont-elles, comme le pensent les empiristes humiens, de simples régularités factuelles universelles? Ou bien devraient-elles être conçues comme des faits nomiques d’un autre ordre, capables de rendre nécessaires les régularités que nous observons? Il s’agit d’autre part de remettre sur le métier le problème classique de l’induction que nous héritons de Hume. L’induction n’est-elle que l’opération de généralisation qualitative à partir de l’expérience? Exige-t-elle, comme on le suppose souvent, de montrer que la nature est uniforme et que les lois sont stables dans le temps? Pour résoudre ces problèmes, nous développons une théorie inédite des lois, centrée sur l’analyse de leur nature quantitative, et proposons un fondement nouveau à l’induction scientifique, qui repose sur l’existence, dans la réalité physique, de structures quantitatives. Nous montrons ainsi que c’est la possibilité d’appliquer les mathématiques, dans la formulation des lois physiques, qui garantit la connaissance inductive. (shrink)

This article reports a study carried out in order to measure how semantic factors affect reductions in the difficulty of the Chinese Ring Puzzle (CRP) that involves removing five objects according to a recursive rule. We hypothesised that semantics would guide inferences about action decision making. The study involved a comparison of problem solving for two semantic isomorphic variants of the CRP ( fish and fleas ) with problem solving for the puzzle's classic variant (the Balls and Boxes (...) problem; Kotovsky learning involves generalising the relations within a coherent, interconnected whole that makes up the puzzle's rules. It seems that semantics make it easier for the puzzle's elements to be grouped together within coherent, meaningful wholes, which reduces relational complexity and facilitates problem solving. (shrink)

A remarkable surge in efforts to assess the quality of life of patients has occurred in recent years in medical research. Philosophical discussions of these developments have focused, on the one hand, on epistemological reservations about the plausibility of measuring quality of life and, on the other hand, on moral and ethical qualms about the meaning of life conveyed in such assessments. Whilst providing an important note of caution, such critiques fail to recognise two basic principles of quality of life (...) in medical research. Firstly it is intended to provide understanding about groups and categories of patients rather than individuals. Secondly the purpose of such research is to produce generalisations about the relative costs and benefits of specific health care interventions rather than absolute judgements regarding the quality of life of patients per se. Selecting a good quality of life measure for a clinical trial requires balancing criteria such as validity with practical feasibility. Such measures will play an increasingly central role in providing research evidence to improve health care. (shrink)

This thesis is an argument for the view that there are problems for Modal Reductionism, the thesis that modality can satisfactorily be defined in non-modal terms. -/- I proceed via a case study of David Lewis’s theory of concrete possible worlds. This theory is commonly regarded as the best and most influential candidate reductive theory of modality. Based on a detailed examination of its ontology, analysis and justification, I conclude that it does badly with respect to the following four minimal (...) conditions on a satisfactory reductive theory of modality: that it be (a) genuinely reductive, (b) materially adequate, (c) conceptually adequate and (d) that its justification provides good reason to think it true. -/- These problems for Lewis’s theory are not, I suggest, due to his idiosyncratic conception of possible worlds as concrete entities. Rather, because Lewis’s theory can be seen to represent an important class of structurally similar reductive theories of modality, the problems for Lewis’s theory generalise to problems for these other theories. This suggests that Modal Reductionism is unpromising. In the light of this, the alternative approach to understanding modality, Modal Primitivism, appears more attractive. (shrink)

A popular view in metasemantics is the view that a speaker’s dispositions regarding the use of a symbol determine the meaning of that symbol for the speaker. Kripke (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982) arguments against simple versions of semantic dispositionalism have inspired ever new versions. A recent account in the literature, due to Warren (Noûs 54(2):257–289, 2020) offers a sophisticated version of semantic dispositionalism whereby certain conditions are imposed on speaker’s dispositions to count as (...) meaning determining—conditions we can refer to as ‘standard’. In this paper, I argue that there are a number of cases that suggest that even under such conditions, a speaker’s meaning and their dispositions can come apart, and that this suggests that dispositional accounts of semantic content presuppose that there are semantic norms, independent of a speaker’s dispositions, and thus do not explain semantic content. I conclude that, since these problems generalise to non-standard dispositionalist accounts, the dispositionalist’s prospects are dim. (shrink)

One of the main problems that Paul Horwich’s Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich’s response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified. -/- L’un des principaux problèmes (...) auxquels la théorie minimaliste de la vérité de Paul Horwich doit faire face est le problème de la généralisation. Horwich soutient que le minimalisme a un rôle explicatif fondamental, mais le problème de la généralisation montre que cette théorie est trop faible pour tenir ce rôle. Dans cet article, je défends la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation à partir d’une objection soulevée par Bradley Armour-Garb. Je prétends également que ma réponse à Armour-Grab nous permet de formuler d’une manière plus simple la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation. (shrink)

I flesh out the sense in which the informational approach to interpreting quantum mechanics, as defended by Pitowsky and Bub and lately by a number of other authors, is (neo-)Bohrian. I argue that on this approach, quantum mechanics represents what Bohr called a “natural generalisation of the ordinary causal description” in the sense that the idea (which philosophers of science like Stein have argued for on the grounds of practical and epistemic necessity) that understanding a theory as a theory (...) of physics requires that one be able to “schematise the observer” within it is elevated in quantum mechanics to the level of a postulate in the sense that interpreting the outcome of a measurement interaction, as providing us with information about the world, requires as a matter of principle, the specification of a schematic representation of an observer in the form of a ‘Boolean frame’—the Boolean algebra representing the yes-or-no questions associated with a given observable representative of a given experimental context. I argue that the approach’s central concern is with the methodological question of how to assign physical properties to what one takes to be a system in a given experimental context, rather than the metaphysical question of what a given state vector represents independently of any context, and I show how the quantum generalisation of the concept of an open system may be used to assuage Einstein’s complaint that the orthodox approach to quantum mechanics runs afoul of the supposedly fundamental methodological requirement to the effect that one must always be able, according to Einstein, to treat spatially separated systems as isolated from one another. (shrink)

Many attempts have been made to solve Hume's problem. However, the assumptions leading to the problem have remained largely unnoticed. Moreover, since Goodman introduced the predicate "grue", philosophers without relevant mathematical education have been confused. In addition, various delusive arguments from convergence have been presented. In this book, it is maintained that knowledge has to be feasible and relevant and that several solutions fail to meet that demand. It is argued that the crucial presupposition of the problem (...) of induction is that clairvoyance is impossible and that this presupposition is unproven. Generalized Goodman predicates are introduced. To criticize arguments from convergence, the notion of "undecided game" is introduced. A relationship between Zeno's paradox and the problem of induction is revealed. A distinction between "do not know" and "cannot know" is consistently held. It is concluded that, as yet, we do not know the future and that it is impossible to prove that it is impossible to know the future. This book should be useful to professionals in epistemology and philosophy of science, and might be of interest to logicians and mathematicians. (shrink)

L’ambiguïté qui existe entre l’interprétation du principe de différence par le maximin ou par le leximin est reconsidérée. Le maximin satisfait seulement le principe de Pareto-faible (x>y ssi chaque composante de x > la composante correspondante de y), tandis que le leximin satisfait le principe de Pareto-fort. À la différence du maximin, le leximin n’est pas représentable par des courbes d’indifférence. Dans la position originelle, le choix leximin l’emporterait sur le choix maximin ((2, 4) > (2,3)), qui semble plus proche (...) des formulations de Rawls. Plusieurs solutions de l’ambiguïté sont évoquées, notamment celle que propose Alain Boyer, qui consiste à distinguer le maximin et le principe de différence en précisant que le second est le premier couplé à une règle tierce, la minimisation de l’inégalité. Cette solution, qui s’appuie par ailleurs sur un raisonnement suspect de Rawls sur la possibilité de trouver un troisième vecteur en enlevant n au plus riche, ce qui semble présupposer, comme le fait Boyer, que l’existence du fisc redistributeur est reconnue comme une possibilité dans la position originelle, est jugée insuffisante, en ce qu’elle ne vaut que pour le cas de deux individus (même si Rawls parle de deux classes). On suggère d’utiliser, pour les cas où le nombre des individus ou des classes est >2, un critère tel que la variance. Mais cela s’avère toujours insuffisant, et non justifiable dans la position originelle, et l’on fait appel à la théorie de la décision proposée par Gilboa et Schmeidler (1989 ; 1997) pour suggérer, par exemple, que le choix juste à faire entre (1, 2, 3) et (0, 3, 3) se porte sur le second état (où le plus pauvre a moins que dans l’autre cas). Cette règle demeure cependant plus proche du maximin (généralisé) que du leximin, peut être rapprochée de ce que l’on appelle le prioritarisme, et peut donc conserver une coloration appréciablement rawlsienne. (shrink)

One version of the Julius Caesar problem arises when we demand assurance that expressions drawn from different theories or stretches of discourse refer to different things. The counter‐Caesar problem arises when assurance is demanded that expressions drawn from different theories . refer to the same thing. The Julio César problem generalises from the counter‐Caesar problem. It arises when we seek reassurance that expressions drawn from different languages refer to the same kind of things . If the (...) Julio César problem is not resolved then the Fregean account of numbers as objects is cast into doubt, the notion of number left relative to a language. Wright introduced this problem by asking whether there can be such a thing as ‘International Platonism’. After rejecting Hale's attempt to resolve it I argue that the threat posed by the Julio César problem diminishes – even though it cannot be made to logically disappear – once it is recognised that the radical interpretation of an unfamiliar language is inevitably holistic, the evidence available invariably defeasible and consequently Cartesian certainty about the significance of the utterances of a foreign tongue neither to be sought after nor attained. (shrink)

In three studies, we explored the retention and transfer of tool-making knowledge, learnt from an adult demonstration, to other temporal and task contexts. All studies used a variation of a task in which children had to make a hook tool to retrieve a bucket from a tall transparent tube. Children who failed to innovate the hook tool independently saw a demonstration. In Study 1, we tested children aged 4 to 6 years (N = 53) who had seen the original demonstration (...) 3 months earlier. Performance was excellent at the second time, indicating that children’s knowledge was retained over the 3 month period. In Studies 2 and 3 we explored transfer of the new knowledge to other tasks. In Study 2, children were given two variants of the apparatus that differed in surface characteristics (e.g. shape and colour). Participants generalised their knowledge to these new apparatuses even though the new pipecleaner also differed in size and colour. Five- to 6-year-olds (n = 22) almost always transferred their knowledge to problems where the same tool had to be made. Younger, 3- to 5-year-olds’ (n = 46), performance was more variable. In Study 3, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 146) saw a demonstration of hook making with a pipecleaner, but then had to make a tool by combining pieces of wooden dowel (or vice versa: original training on dowel, transfer to pipecleaner). Children did not transfer their tool-making knowledge to the new material. Children retained tool-making knowledge over time and transferred their knowledge to new situations in which they needed to make a similar tool from similar materials, but not different materials. We concluded that children’s ability to use tool-making knowledge in novel situations is likely to depend on memory and analogical reasoning, with the latter continuing to develop during middle childhood. (shrink)

Using the Chinese Ring Puzzle (Kotovsky & Simon, Citation1990; P. J. Reber & Kotovsky, Citation1997), we studied the effect on rule discovery of having to plan actions or not in order to reach a goal state. This was done by asking participants to predict legal moves as in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1) and by asking participants to make legal moves as in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Our hypothesis was that having a specific goal state to reach has a (...) dual effect on rule discovery. The first effect is positive and related to feedback from moves done in order to attain the goal: generalising the results of action and associating them to the conditions in which they were obtained allows discovery of the rule and learning it. The second effect is negative. In attempting to reach a specific goal, participants first tend to reduce the distance that separates the current state from the goal state (hill climbing) and so neglect the kind of exploration that facilitates rule and procedure discovery because this would seem to be a detour from the goal. Results show that having to plan actions improved performance in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1), yet it impaired performance in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Although implicit learning and problem solving are based on rule discovery, and entail noticing regularities in the material, in both cases, rule discovery processes appear to be task-dependent. (shrink)

The structural representation (S-representation) account provides an increasingly popular way of understanding the role and value of representation in cognitive science. Yet critics remain unconvinced that the account has the resources to rescue representationalism. This paper reviews problems faced by the S-representation account. In doing so, it offers a novel taxonomy that divides objections into two broad camps that ought to be disambiguated: ‘conceptual’ and ‘empirical’. It further shows how these objections can be met, bolstering existing responses in the literature (...) with novel solutions, thus strengthening the S-representation account. Finally, this paper suggests that the types of objections identified provide a generalisable taxonomy for a better understanding of any version of anti-representationalism. Thus, this review is of value to the representation debate more broadly. (shrink)

Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation is beset by a problem of circularity: the analysis of causes is in terms of interventions, and the analysis of interventions is in terms of causes. This is not in itself an argument against the correctness of the analysis. But by requiring us to have causal knowledge prior to making any judgements about causation, Woodward’s theory does make it mysterious how we can ever start acquiring causal knowledge. We present a solution to this (...) class='Hi'>problem by showing how the interventionist notion of causation can be rationally generated from a more primitive agency notion of causation. The agency notion is easily and non-circularly applicable, but fails when we attempt to capture causal relations between non-actions. We show that the interventionist notion of causation serves as an appropriate generalisation of the agency notion. Furthermore, the causal judgements based on the latter generally remain true when rephrased in terms of the former, which allows one to use the causal knowledge gained by applying the agency notion as a basis for applying Woodward’s interventionist theory. We then present an overview of relevant empirical evidence from developmental psychology which shows that our proposed rational reconstruction lines up neatly with the actual development of causal reasoning in children. This gives additional plausibility to our proposal. The article thus provides a solution to one of the main problems of interventionism while keeping Woodward’s analysis intact. (shrink)

In a letter of 1932, Karl Popper described _Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie – The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge_ – as ‘…a child of crises, above all of …the crisis of physics.’ Finally available in English, it is a major contribution to the philosophy of science, epistemology and twentieth century philosophy generally. The two fundamental problems of knowledge that lie at the centre of the book are the problem of induction, that although we are able (...) to observe only a limited number of particular events, science nevertheless advances unrestricted universal statements; and the problem of demarcation, which asks for a separating line between empirical science and non-science. Popper seeks to solve these two basic problems with his celebrated theory of falsifiability, arguing that the inferences made in science are not inductive but deductive; science does not start with observations and proceed to generalise them but with problems, which it attacks with bold conjectures. _The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge_ is essential reading for anyone interested in Karl Popper, in the history and philosophy of science, and in the methods and theories of science itself. (shrink)

According to the Transparency Method, one can know whether one believes that P by attending to a question about the world—namely, ‘Is P true?’ On this view, one can know, for instance, whether one believes that Socrates was a Greek philosopher by attending to the question ‘Was Socrates a Greek philosopher?’ While many think that TM can account for the self-knowledge we can have of such a belief—and belief in general—fewer think that TM can be generalised to account for the (...) self-knowledge we can have of other propositional attitudes, such as our desires, intentions, wishes and so on. Call this the Generality Problem. In the present paper, I contrast my own attempt to solve the Generality Problem with several recent ones. I argue that in order to extend TM beyond belief, we must look to the concepts underpinning each kind of mental state. Doing so, I argue, reveals a series of outward-directed questions that can be attended to, in order to know what one desires, intends, wishes and so on. Call this the conceptual approach to extending TM. I support the conceptual approach in the present paper by showing how it generates Moore-Paradoxical sentences that are analogous to the case of belief. (shrink)

Big data increasingly enables prediction of the behaviour and characteristics of individuals. This is ethically concerning on privacy grounds. However, this article discusses other reasons for concern. These predictions usually rely on generalisations about what certain sorts of people tend to do. Generalisations of this sort are often under scrutiny in legal cases, where, for example, lawyers argue that people with prior convictions are more likely to be guilty of the crime they are currently on trial for. This article applies (...) criteria for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable generalisations in legal cases to a number of big data examples. It argues that these criteria are helpful, and highlights three issues that should be taken into account when deciding whether predictions about individuals are ethical. (shrink)

The “Asian disease” problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) demonstrated behaviour in contradiction to the invariance axiom of EU theory. However, the risky choice behaviour was simply seen by the equate-to-differentiate model as a choice between the best possible outcomes or a choice between the worst possible outcomes. It was then argued that a way in which frame influences choice is through the perceived difference between possible outcomes. A “judgement” task was designed to examine whether the knowledge of “the value (...) difference between each possible outcome and the certain outcome” will permit prediction of preference in the choice pattern related to the Asian disease problem. Participants were exposed to an anthrax disease problem (the original or probabilistic version of the Asian disease problem) and a SARS problem (the fuzzy version of the Asian disease problem). It was shown that the empirical evidence in relation to the Asian disease problem could be satisfactorily accounted for by the generalised weak dominance strategy revealed by the judgement results. (shrink)

A modest solution to the problem(s) of rule-following is defended against Kripkensteinian scepticism about meaning. Even though parts of it generalise to other concepts, the theory as a whole applies to response-dependent concepts only. It is argued that the finiteness problem is not nearly as pressing for such concepts as it may be for some other kinds of concepts. Furthermore, the modest theory uses a notion of justification as sensitivity to countervailing conditions in order to solve the justification (...) problem. Finally, in order to solve the normativity problem, it relies on substantial specifications of normal conditions such as those that have been proposed by Crispin Wright and Mark Johnston, rather than on Philip Pettit's functionalist specification. This theory is modest in that it does not meet the demands of Kripke's sceptic in full. Arguments are provided as to why this is not needed. (shrink)

In Philosophy of Education we frequently argue for or against different educational theories. Yet, as I illustrate in this analysis of two articles, in order to maintain the abstract theoretical distinctions, we are liable to ignore the concrete details of practice, caricature the theories we reject and make false distinctions. The two articles that I analyse, one from Golding and one from Boghossian, grapple with the pedagogical theories of transmission teaching, constructivism, pragmatism and Socratic pedagogy, in the context of dialogical (...) philosophy teaching. As a result of my analysis, I first present three examples where the authors have rejected abstract theories based on arguments that I show to be strawmen: These theories would not or could not be adopted in practice. Then, I present two examples where the authors attempt to make distinctions between educational theories which seem sound in the abstract, but which turn out to be false distinctions if we consider the details of concrete practice. My conclusion is that, in these two articles, abstract educational theory is prone to problems when it ignores concrete practice. Although I am presenting a case study, and do not argue that my conclusion is generalisable, I do suggest some reasons why this conclusion might apply more widely to Philosophy of Education. My recommendation is that we be more discerning in our treatment of educational theories and more mindful of the educational practices that they entail. We should acknowledge the practical similarities between different abstract theories rather than forcing caricatured distinctions. (shrink)

The present paper will summarise the methodology, the scientific outcomes, and the potential for generalisation of the model of a project that studied cohabitation between human inhabitants and liminal species (in the present case, corvids) in Tartu, Estonia, from October 2021 to July 2023, with a comparative field study in Paris, France. It will present the context and goals of using a semiotic model to map interspecific cohabitation, expose what kind of data can be used to feed the model (...) in a relevant way and how it was done in the case of this project. This paper will present how the model diagnosed issues in cohabitation, both from material nuisances and cultural aspects, insisting on the concept of “hostile minority” that emerged from the study. It will discuss the importance of problem-solving in interspecific cohabitation, what the model suggested regarding this aspect, how this tool can be generalised to a large variety of cases and why it should be used this way. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the main characteristics of the epistemology of modal rationalism by proceeding from the critical investigation of Peacocke’s theory of modality. I build on arguments by Crispin Wright and Sonia Roca-Royes, which are generalised and supplemented by further analysis, in order to show that principle-based accounts have little prospects of succeeding in their task of providing an integrated account of the metaphysics and the epistemology of modality. I argue that it is unlikely that we will able (...) to develop an exhaustive and accurate principle-based account that discriminates objectively between correct and deviant modal knowledge. Even if such an account can be formulated, a non-circular way of justifying its necessity also seems to be out of our reach. (shrink)

The work reported in this paper investigated the putative functional dependence of pragmatic language skills on general mind‐reading capacity by testing theory‐of‐mind abilities and understanding of non‐literal speech in patients with schizophrenia and in healthy controls. Patients showed difficulties with inferring mental states on a false‐belief picture‐sequencing task and with understanding metaphors and irony on a story‐comprehension task. These difficulties were independent of low verbal IQ and a more generalised problem inhibiting prepotent information. Understanding of metaphors and understanding of (...) irony made significant and independent contributions to discriminating patients from controls, suggesting that metaphor and irony make distinct pragmatic demands. (shrink)

In his new commentary, Damper re-emphasises his claim that parity is not a generalisation problem. But when proper account is taken of the arguments he puts forward, we find that the proposed conclusion is not the only one that can be drawn.

It is currently common practice in social and business research, to lift concepts and theories from one country context—and extending the validity of the results—using them in another. This paper discusses the question relating to such generalisability in the context of global, innovative industries. Statistical methods are applied to compare results of a quantitative investigation of firm life-cycle theory between two developed countries. Such comparison implemented with statistical rigour on a quantitative basis is not common, and difficult to execute. Results (...) show that even though life-cycle theory has been found meaningful and valid on both country-specific populations, the quantitative comparison of these results has highlighted a substantial amount of statistically significant differences. This leads to the conclusion that extension of social theory between various country contexts needs to consider a variety of contextual parameters, cautioning computer scientists offering solutions to various problems around the world coming from their own, unique, country-specific perspectives to keep an open mind. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: This Book's Theory: A Summary and a Name Core Problems Evaded Further Practicalist Reconceptions A Predictive Practicalism? J. L. Austin on ‘Trouser‐words’ Wittgensteinian Certainty — Generalised.

The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with (...) the incorporation of new information). Makinson has generalised this work by introducing the notion of a withdrawal operation. Underlying the account proffered by AGM is the idea of rational belief change. A belief change operation should be guided by certain principles or integrity constraints in order to characterise change by a rational agent. One of the most noted principles within the context of AGM is the Principle of Informational Economy. However, adoption of this principle in its purest form has been rejected by AGM leading to a more relaxed interpretation. In this paper, we argue that this weakening of the Principle of Informational Economy suggests that it is only one of a number of principles which should be taken into account. Furthermore, this weakening points toward a Principle of Indifference. This motivates the introduction of a belief removal operation that we call severe withdrawal. We provide rationality postulates for severe withdrawal and explore its relationship with AGM contraction. Moreover, we furnish possible worlds and epistemic entrenchment semantics for severe withdrawals. (shrink)

The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single ‘aggregate belief system’ and when an individual whose belief system is compatible with several probability measures wishes to evaluate her options on the basis of a single aggregate prior via classical expected utility theory. We investigate this problem by first recalling some negative results from preference (...) and judgment aggregation theory which show that the aggregate of several probability measures should not be conceived as the probability measure induced by the aggregate of the corresponding expected utility preferences. We describe how McConway’s :410–414, 1981) theory of probabilistic opinion pooling can be generalised to cover the case of the aggregation of infinite profiles of finitely additive probability measures, too; we prove the existence of aggregation functionals satisfying responsiveness axioms à la McConway plus additional desiderata even for infinite electorates. On the basis of the theory of propositional-attitude aggregation, we argue that this is the most natural aggregation theory for probability measures. Our aggregation functionals for the case of infinite electorates are neither oligarchic nor integral-based and satisfy a weak anonymity condition. The delicate set-theoretic status of integral-based aggregation functionals for infinite electorates is discussed. (shrink)