While we perceive events in our environment through multiple sensory systems, we nevertheless perceive all of these events as occupying a single unified timeline. Time, as we perceive it, is unified. I argue that existing accounts of the perceived unity of time fail. Instead, the perceived unity of time must be constructed by integrating our initially fragmented timekeeping capacities. However, existing accounts of multimodal integration do not tell us how this might occur. Something new is needed. I finish the paper (...) by articulating the hurdles that must be overcome to provide an account of the perceived unity of time. (shrink)

It’s often claimed in the philosophical and scientific literature on temporal representation that there is no such thing as a genuine sensory system for time. In this paper, I argue for the opposite—many animals, including all mammals, possess a genuine sensory system for time based in the circadian system. In arguing for this conclusion, I develop a semantics and meta-semantics for explaining how the endogenous rhythms of the circadian system provide organisms with a direct information link to the temporal structure (...) of their environment. In doing so, I highlight the role of sensory systems in an information processing architecture. (shrink)

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human (...) being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic. (shrink)

Relying on some auxiliary assumptions, usually considered mild, Bell’s theorem proves that no local theory can reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. In this work, we introduce a fully local, superdeterministic model that by explicitly violating ‘settings independence’—one of these auxiliary assumptions, requiring statistical independence between measurement settings and systems to be measured—is able to reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. Moreover, we show that contrary to widespread expectations, our model can break settings independence without an initial state (...) that is too complex to handle, without visibly losing all explanatory power, and without outright nullifying all of experimental science. Still, we argue that our model is unnecessarily complicated and does not offer true advantages over its non-local competitors. We conclude that while our model does not appear to be a viable contender to its non-local counterparts, it provides the ideal framework to advance the debate over violations of statistical independence via the superdeterministic route. (shrink)

En la actual campaña electoral uruguaya de 2019, se perfila un cuadro de descontentos generalizados que desborda claramente los estándares tradicionales de la política del país. Muchos de estos descontentos se articulan con diversos factores que los autores han venido destacando en trabajos anteriores, como señales de una mutación gradual pero efectiva de la política uruguaya. En continuidad con ese abordaje de investigación, en el artículo se indagará acerca de las posibilidades efectivas de que esta mutación política adquiera proporciones realmente (...) significativas en las actuales circunstancias, con la posibilidad de confirmación de "cisnes negros" que parecen atisbarse en la campaña electoral en curso. Para ello, luego de algunos discernimientos teóricos y metodológicos, se trabajará el itinerario de distintos indicadores de opinión pública a nivel nacional durante el período 1995-2017, vinculados con el objeto de estudio planteado. A partir de esos insumos, se realizarán algunas breves consideraciones de proyección analítica. (shrink)

A partir de los conceptos de carácter, virtud y amistad propuestos por la ética de la ficción de Wayne Booth, realizamos un análisis comparativo entre los efectos éticos provocados por el territorio y la música en las novelas Península, Península de Hernán Lara Zavala y en El llamado de los tunk’ules de Marisol Ceh Moo. Sugerimos que, a pesar de estar ante dos novelas que comparten el mismo contexto geo-histórico, los efectos éticos causados por el territorio y la música, bajo (...) la idea de Yucatán, guardan diferencias que ameritan llevar a cabo una co- ducción para dilucidar el tipo de compañía literaria que nos ofrecen. (shrink)

This note replies to a comment by Daniel Hausman on our paper ‘Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics’. We clarify our characterisation of behavioural welfare economics and acknowledge that Hausman does fully endorse this approach. However, we argue that Hausman’s response to our critique, like behavioural welfare economics itself, implicitly uses a model of an inner rational agent.

Edward Aloysius Pace, philosopher and educator, by J. H. Ryan.-Neo-scholastic philosophy in American Catholic culture, by C. A. Hart.- The significance of Suarez for a revival of scholasticism, by J. F. McCormick.- The new physics and scholasticism, by F. A. Walsh.- The new humanism and standards, by L. R. Ward.- The purpose of the state, by E. F. Murphy.- The concept of beauty in St. Thomas Aquinas, by G. B. Phelan.- The knowableness of God: its relation to the theory of (...) knowledge in St. Thomas, by Matthew Schumacher.- The modern idea of God, by F. J. Sheen.- The analysis of association of its equational constants, by T. V. Moore.- Bibliography (p. 224-225) - Character and body build in children, by Sister M. Rosa McDonough. Bibliography (p. 248-249) - The moral development of children, by Sister Mary.- Medieval education (700-900) by T. J. Shahan.- The need for a Catholic philosophy of education, by George Johnson. (shrink)

Confucius proposes the view of human beings as moral agents that have to behave according to their own individual thinking and reflection. In Analects, I, 4, one of his disciples says: “Have I passed on to others anything that I have not tried out myself?” And in Analects, XIII, 23, Confucius says: “The gentleman agrees with others without being an echo.” That is, when one agrees with others it is because using his (today we will say “his or her”) own (...) understanding he (or she) has arrived at the same conclusions. In Analects, XV, 16, he is quite explicit: “When a man is not in the habit of saying: What shall I think of this? What shall I think of this? I can indeed do nothing with him.” In this sense it is clear that he believes in moral autonomy and in human equality. Contrary to what a lot of scholars think, he is not a communitarian thinker; he is a philosopher who wants people to think by themselves. From this early time in the History of China he was proposing what Socrates defended in Athens; the importance of an internal moral conscience. So, if we can speak about Enlightenment in the Greek world, we cansay that Confucius was an enlightenment figure in the Chinese world. In this sense I believe we can conclude that Confucius is not a good example to argue for “Asian Values”. On the contrary, Confucius presents a universalistic theory that strengthens the position of the individual and of his or her self-cultivation. And if one of the objectives of education is that individuals can think by themselves, don’t we have to conclude that the political implication of this theory for the modern world is democracy? (shrink)

Presento mi Teología del cambio de época [=TCE] como una teología del “peregrinando-nos”, reducción teologal que se corresponde con el “estar siendo discípulo/s misionero/s”. Al “peregrinando-nos” le son inherentes el icono sapiencial del “camino” y el icono teologal del “santuario”: el primero remite al mundo y el segundo remite a Dios. En la dialéctica controlada existente entre ambos iconos vamos desplegando un proceso de “autotrascendencia teocéntrica en la consistencia”. Este yo peregrinante tiene una vertiente personal (el creyente individual) y otra (...) colectiva (el pueblo de Dios peregrino, pero también implícitamente, una nación en camino). La peregrinación se va desplegando espacio-temporalmente, desde la existencialidad histórica en progresiva apertura al misterio trascendente. O también, desde la progresiva vivencia teologal de las virtudes en diálogo interpelante con todo lo que de bueno, bello y verdadero vamos encontrando por el camino. Esto nos conduce a una cada vez más satisfactoria vida en el Espíritu, renacida de lo alto desde el “santuario” descubierto como ya inhabitando en el mismo “camino”, lo cual traduce y expresa muy bien e inculturadamente lo propio de la esperanza teologal cristiana. A esta teología, el magisterio pastoral del Papa Francisco le fue confiriendo un dinamismo evangelizador que no tenía, al menos no en el mismo grado, en su fundante Trilogía. (shrink)

La cuestión del ser, presente a lo largo de todo el camino de pensamiento de Martin Heidegger, no es sin embargo, tratada de un modo fijo, sino que sus sucesivas variaciones responden al horizonte a partir del cuál ella es experimentada en tanto constituye la “cosa” del pensar. Se trata pues, en este artículo, de sacar a la luz el horizonte desde el que fue experimentado el libro Sein und Zeit Allí, la cosa del pensar es vislumbrada bajo el trazo (...) del “sentido”. Este, lejos de representar un mero recurso terminológico, señala en dirección del lugar a partir del cual ella misma es aprehendida; pero también, pone de manifiesto su alcance y sus límites. Precisamente en ellos se produce el cambio en la marcha, que mantiene al pensar esencial en la proximidad de aquello que constituye su “cosa”. (shrink)

El presente artículo aborda lo que Martin Heidegger llama «pensar inicial» y las condiciones interpretativas que le conducen, para desde allí pensar el lugar histórico de la pregunta por el nosotros, aquellos que pensamos. En un primer momento, indagamos el significado del «pensar inicial», en el primer y en el otro inicio. Tomamos a este como un pensar que proyecta Ser y en el cual quien piensa es proyectado al mismo tiempo a una interrogación por sí-mismo. En un segundo momento (...) exponemos los posibles presupuestos de la interpretación de este pensar inicial, lo que se conecta directamente con el proyecto heideggeriano del pensar histórico, en la pregunta por el nosotros se hace cada vez más apremiante. Desde allí preguntamos por nuestra particularidad en el proyecto de tal pensar inicial. (shrink)

Defendemos la postura de la necesidad de un desarrollo y de una lectura de Zubiri en clave metafísica para ello mostramos como se han dado las interpretaciones de zubiri, luego lo que ha sido la sedimentación de la interpretación exclusivamente noológica, para en un tercer momento mostrar su carencia y por lo tanto el deber de realizar una reflexión metafísica con las herramientas de la filosofía zubiriana.

While Isocrates regarded rhetoric not as a rigid discipline, but as a creative and pliable art, it is not possible to standardize art. According to his point of view, good speech depends on certain principles: opportunity ; suitability and novelty. The sophists, according to Isocrates, did not pay attention to these principles, and that was their main mistake. The problem was, however, that it was difficult to teach these principles to the disciples, precisely because rhetoric was a flexible art. Still, (...) although it is not possible to provide fixed rules concerning rhetorical principles, the ancient rhetor provided some useful suggestions in his works which make it possible to reconstruct the nature of these principles. (shrink)

Memories often come with a feeling of pastness. The events we remember strike us as having occurred in our past. What accounts for this feeling of pastness? In his recent book, Memory: A self-referential account, Jordi Fernández argues that the feeling of pastness cannot be grounded in an explicit representation of the pastness of the remembered event. Instead, he argues that the feeling of pastness is grounded in the self-referential causal content of memory. In this paper, I argue that this (...) account falls short. The representation of causal origin does not by itself ground a feeling of pastness. Instead, I argue that we can salvage the temporal localization account of the feeling of pastness by describing a form of egocentric temporal representation that avoids Fernández’s criticisms. (shrink)