Strong notions of free will are closely connected to the possibility to do otherwise as well as to an agent’s ability to causally influence her environment via her decisions controlling her actions. In this paper we employ techniques from the causal modeling literature to investigate whether a notion of free will subscribing to one or both of these requirements is compatible with naturalistic views of the world such as non-reductive physicalism to the background of determinism and indeterminism. We argue that (...) from a causal modeler’s perspective the only possibility to get both requirements consists in subscribing to reductive physicalism and indeterminism. (shrink)

The present paper first shows that the validity of deductive-nomological (D-N) explanations (systematizations) depends in general on the interpretation context of the predicates involved in the explanation. Therefore, no logical-semantical model can be adequate. This problem is solved by relativisation of the validity criteria on both the confirmation context and the definition context of the premisses. Based upon this, a logical-pragmatical model of D-N explanation is developed. Thereby, especially explanations of laws and global explanations are taken into consideration, since these (...) can be regarded as prototypes of scientific explanation. (shrink)

It has not been sufficiently considered in philosophical discussions of ceteris paribus (CP) laws that distinct kinds of CP-laws exist in science with rather different meanings. I distinguish between (1.) comparative CP-laws and (2.) exclusive CP-laws. There exist also mixed CP-laws, which contain a comparative and an exclusive CP-clause. Exclusive CP-laws may be either (2.1) definite, (2.2) indefinite or (2.3) normic. While CP-laws of kind (2.1) and (2.2) exhibit deductivistic behaviour, CP-laws of kind (2.3) require a probabilistic or non-monotonic reconstruction. (...) CP-laws of kind (1) may be both deductivistic or probabilistic. All these kinds of CP-laws have empirical content by which they are testable, except CP-laws of kind (2.2) which are almost vacuous. Typically, CP-laws of kind (1) express invariant correlations, CP-laws of kind (2.1) express closed system laws of physical sciences, and CP-laws of kind (2.3) express normic laws of non-physical sciences based on evolution-theoretic stability properties. (shrink)

A SUMMARY IN ENGLISH [by Editor]The problem is to find out whether mathematical propositions are analytical, and if so, or if not, to what extent.Kant defined the analyticity in terms of Cartesian res extensa, exemplified by “A body is extended”, while he considered, because of such examples, mathematical propositions to be synthetic. The recent studies in set theory by Gödel, P.J.Cohen, etc., indicate, however, that such a proposition as the continuum hypothesis is certainly not “analytic (tautological)” in the strict sense (...) of logicists. Rather a small portion, comparatively speaking, of mathematical propositions must therefore be considered analytic relative to the definitions of fundamental conrepts in logic. Axioms, for example, are per definitionem non-analytic. Other problems that demand reöxaminations are, for instance: 1. Why is there only one unique series of the natural numbers? 2. On which ground is the factual eminence of Euclidean geometry to be founded? etc. The two assertions that mathematical propositions are analytic and that they are synthetic a priori are thus not at all contradictory; they are, to begin with, not even mutually exclusive Possibilities. (shrink)

Donald Davidson's unified theory of language and action can be understood as a continuation of the traditional analytic approach within philosophy of language and action. In the following we give an outline of some of the main themes of his philosophy centered around his core theory of radical interpretation (RI). His theory of rationality, his thesis of the anomalousness of the mental, and the externalist approach in his model of triangulation all follow in a systematic way from RI. Yet, Davidson's (...) philosophy can also be seen as giving a new systematic elaboration of central perspectives of W,v.O Quine's theory of language. In order to follow Davidson's main theses one therefore has to clarify the main differences and correspondences between both approaches. (shrink)

The domain of pragmatics is to arrange in the architectonic of competences. Competences are to discriminate on the base of distinction between rule-following behaviour and action-rules. This can be understood as a critic of L. Wittgensteins conception of following a rule. The Frankfurter version of speechacttheory has argued - following partial K Bühler - that three fundamental properties (functions) of language can be identified: the representation of state of affaires, the generation of interpersonal relationship and the expression of intentional make (...) happen someone (Erlebnisse). Further dimensions and explications for concerning this properties shall be elaborated. Steps to constructive pragmatics can be gone. (shrink)

Ascriptive solidarity is a fundamental relationship in human societies. Sociologists have often stated this social fact but they have seldom explained this kind of solidarity. Karl Otto Hondrich has elaborated fundamental social laws which are useful for the explanation of the evolutionary dominance of ascriptive solidarity. In the context of sociological knowledge I intend - following this account - to sketch variations of ascriptive solidarity in an evolutionary perspective and to describe structural problems of social integration in modern societies.

Nach Diskussion philosophischer Methoden, die sich vorwiegend an den Natur- oder Geisteswissenschaften orientieren, und nach Vorgabe eines Wissenschaftsbegriffs , bestimmt der Autor die Philosophie als zirkuläre Reflexion von Letztbegründungen. Ihr legitimes Gebiet umfaßt die "lösbaren Zirkel"; die "unlösbaren Zirkel" gehören zum Bereich der Spekulation, die gleichwohl für das Leben wichtig sind. Die jeweilige Grenze zwischen ihnen hat die philosophische Forschung zu eruieren.

Our know-it-alls, the new spirits, assert that faith alone saves and that works and external things contribute nothing to this end. We answer: It is true, nothing that is in us does it but faith, as we shall hear later on. But these leaders of the blind are unwilling to see that faith must have something to believe—something to which it may cling and upon which it may stand. Thus faith clings to the water and believes it to be Baptism (...) in which there is sheer salvation and life, not through the water, as we have sufficiently stated, but through its incorporation with God's Word and ordinance and the joining of his name to it. When I believe this, what else is it but believing in God as the one who has implanted his Word in this external ordinance and offered it to us so that we may grasp the treasure it contains? 1. (shrink)