Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one’s country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one’s participation in a special kind (...) of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author’s definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous — actual contract theory — according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment. (shrink)

I have been supposing that for the theory of reasoning, explicit belief is an all-or-nothing matter, I have assumed that, as far as principles of reasoning are concerned, one either believes something explicitly or one does not; in other words an appropriate "representation" is either in one's "memory" or not. The principles of reasoning are principles for modifying such all-or-nothing representations. This is not to deny that in some ways belief is a matter of degree. For one thing implicit belief (...) is certainly a matter of degree, since it is a matter of how easily and automatically one can infer something from what one believes explicitly. Furthermore, explicit belief is a matter of degree in the sense that one believes some things more strongly than others. Sometimes one is only somewhat inclined to believe something, sometimes one is not sure what to believe, sometimes one is inclined to disbelieve something, sometimes one is quite confident something is not so, and so forth. (shrink)

These two puzzles were classic if academic examples of the dilemmas Professor Ryle is concerned with.

This is, as from the author of The Concept of Mind it could scarcely fail to be, a bold and rollicking book. It is also one of the most important works about Plato to have appeared since the first volume of Sir Karl Popper's The Open Society. Whereas The Concept of Mind was a general offensive against Cartesian views of man, eschewing any precise references to particular sources, Plato's Progress deals with scholarly questions of datings and developments, showing and demanding (...) familiarity with a wide literature. Yet Professor Ryle is still incapable as ever of the dry-as-dust. (shrink)

The common view is that no novel IS an argument, though it might be reconstructed as one. This is curious, for we almost always feel the need to reconstruct arguments even when they are uncontroversially given as arguments, as in a philosophical text. We make the points as explicit, orderly, and (often) brief as possible, which is what we do in reconstructing a novel’s argument. The reverse is also true. Given a text that is uncontroversially an explicit, orderly, and brief (...) argument, in order to enhance plausibility, our first instinct is to flesh it out with illustrations and relationships to everyday life. If this process is fictive (e.g., with “thought experiments”) and orderly, it is story-telling. This paper investigates whether there is a principled way of determining a novel’s argument, which should contribute as much to understanding arguments as to understanding novels. (shrink)

In their book EVALUATING CRITICAL THINKING Stephen Norris and Robert Ennis say: “Although it is tempting to think that certain [unstated] assumptions are logically necessary for an argument or position, they are not. So do not ask for them.” Numerous writers of introductory logic texts as well as various highly visible standardized tests (e.g., the LSAT and GRE) presume that the Norris/Ennis view is wrong; the presumption is that many arguments have (unstated) necessary assumptions and that readers and test takers (...) can reasonably be expected to identify such assumptions. This paper proposes and defends criteria for determining necessary assumptions of arguments. Both theoretical and empirical considerations are brought to bear. (shrink)

“Ethical criticism” is an approach to literary studies that holds that reading certain carefully selected novels can make us ethically better people, e.g., by stimulating our sympathetic imagination (Nussbaum). I try to show that this nonargumentative approach cheapens the persuasive force of novels and that its inherent bias and censorship undercuts what is perhaps the principal value and defense of the novel—that reading novels can be critical to one’s learning how to think.

May social unity - the unity of a society or social group - be a matter of sharing values? Political philosophers disagree on this topic. Kymlicka answers: No. Devlin and Rawls answer: Yes. It is argued that given one common 'summative' account of sharing values a negative answer is correct. A positive answer is correct, however, given the plural subject account of sharing values. Given this account, those who share values are unified in a substantial way by their participation in (...) a joint commitment. Some consequences of such sharing of values for the liberty of the people involved are noted. (shrink)

The paper explores the question of the relationship between the practice of original philosophical inquiry and the study of the history of philosophy. It is written from my point of view as someone starting a research project in the history of philosophy that calls this issue into question, in order to review my starting positions. I argue: first, that any philosopher is sufficiently embedded in culture that her practice is necessarily historical; second, that original work is in fact in part (...) a reconstruction by reinterpretation of the past and that therefore it bears some relation to historiographic techniques for the restoration of damaged objects and texts; and third that the special oddities of the relations of present and past do not fail to ensnare the philosopher, who must restore the past but freely break from it. I describe this relationship as proleptic. Finally, I argue that this is a moral imperative in writing philosophy, derived from the imperative to be honest. (shrink)

This short piece is a partial translation of the introduction to Gilbert Simondon’s most succinct philosophical reflections on the notions of form, information, and potentials. The material was presented on February 27, 1960, at the Session of the Société française de philosophie. After the abstract and Simondon’s definitions of form, information, and transductive operation, there is a discussion between Simondon and other attendees who were present at his talk, including Paul Ricoeur and Jean Hyppolite, both of whom had been (...) part of Simondon’s viva panel in 1958. The piece represents an interesting moment in the history of philosophy where cybernetics and information theory were problematized by thinkers like Simondon, who thought that the concept of information needed to be expanded and refined to adequately account for processes of individuation, or "ontogenesis.". (shrink)

How has ancient Greek thought been received within phenomenology? The volume offers chapters on Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacob Klein, Hannah Arendt, Eugen Fink, Jan Patočka, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida.

Expressing a widely-held view, David Hitchcock claims that "an enthymematic argument ... assumes at least the truth of the argument's associated conditional ... whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's explicit premises and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion." But even definitionally, this view is problematic, since an argument's being "enthymematic" or incomplete with respect to its explicit premises means that the conclusion is not implied by these premises alone. The paper attempts to specify the ways in which the (...) view is incorrect, as well as seemingly correct (e.g., the case of a Modus Ponens wherein the major premise is implicit). -/- . (shrink)

One might ask of two or more texts—what can be inferred from them, taken together? If the texts happen to contradict each other in some respect, then the unadorned answer of standard logic is EVERYTHING. But it seems to be a given that we often successfully reason with inconsistent information from multiple sources. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to develop an adequate approach to accounting for this given.

This ambitious and sweeping book presents a powerful argument against moral relativism and in favor of the objectivity of a theory of democratic individuality. Unlike much recent work in this field, the book does not simply adumbrate such a view. Rather, it develops the parallels between various versions of scientific and moral realism, and then reinterprets the history and internal logic of democratic theory, maintaining, for example, that the abolition of slavery represents genuine moral progress. The book also recasts the (...) clashes between Marxist and Weberian, radical and liberal sociologies in the light of these moral claims, and sketches the institutions of a radical democracy. (shrink)

La déshumanisation à l’œuvre dans le projet génocidaire et l’héritage d’un tel événement traumatique entraîne une catastrophe de la transmission et de la filiation. S’ensuit une impasse des processus d’identification et de différenciation sur plusieurs générations. Dans cette contribution, on interroge la nature des obstacles entravant le processus de deuil, de séparation et l’investissement de la vie après une catastrophe sociale. Il s’agit pour cela de rendre compte du travail de subjectivation nécessaire à l’appropriation de sa propre histoire et de (...) celle de sa propre famille de manière à pouvoir engager un processus de séparation/différenciation. À travers une étude de cas, l’article montre la pertinence d’une rencontre clinique « médiatisée » pour la compréhension et la perlaboration du vécu traumatique d’une famille survivante qui vit entre-soi. Nous discuterons, en particulier, l’apport de la photographie comme une première tentative de figuration des affects et de mise au travail des processus intermédiaires garants de leur symbolisation. (shrink)

The Voice of Laruelle, the philosopher What is a voice in the context of the arts and philosophy? In the space of the philosopher's voice, in the complex grammar of his language is played his philosophical timbre, his own space, his particular voice, composed of concepts, articulated by the laws of coherence of the common philosophical language, with hypnotic specificities. These specificities are precisely the fruit of processes formerly called rhetoric, which I call non-hypnotics, one of whose functions is just (...) to speak in a double space: the common reference space of the reader or listener, and the conceptual virtual space peculiar to the philosopher. To the extent that the reader must pay increased and permanent attention to this double space, the philosophical trance effect, equivalent to the Ericksonian hypnotic trance, is facilitated. The difficulty of this double reading is the incessant passage from one code to another, which is also a hypnotic fascination. Heidegger prolongs and renews its structures and draws some effects from them, which provoke in the mind of the reader as an over-flow, a saturation effect, which itself favors the philosophical trance. Thus, each voice seeks to captivate the mind by confusing it with concepts, which seem at first sight familiar, but which reveal themselves with the use which is made, like formidable concepts to the power of unaccustomed fascination. One of the pleasures of reading Lareuelle's philosophy is due to this type of fascination with the philosophical voice and its language. (shrink)

Introduction -- As real as it gets : Derrida -- The experiential divide : Merleau-Ponty and Derrida -- Connective tissue -- The originary disconnect -- Deconstruction and the computer -- Reality show: baudrillard -- The problem with reality -- The genealogy of value -- Hyperreality -- Disappearance and death -- The baudrillard twins -- Reality shows : Virilio -- Speed, light ,and the attack on reality -- The tyranny of real time -- The ultimate interface -- War and faith -- (...) The fate of the real : Lyotard -- Withdrawal of the real : the two waves -- Complexification and the inhuman -- Virtual intelligence -- TDers, BUers, AI, and AL -- The remainder -- Getting real(er) -- The problem of technology -- The question of alienation -- Between alienation and reconciliation -- In praise of materialism. (shrink)