The first part of this article discusses recent skepticism about character traits. The second describes various forms of virtue ethics as reactions to such skepticism. The philosopher J.-P. Sartre argued in the 1940s that character traits are pretenses, a view that the sociologist E. Goffman elaborated in the 1950s. Since then social psychologists have shown that attributions of character traits tend to be inaccurate through the ignoring of situational factors. (Personality psychology has tended to concentrate on people's conceptions of personality (...) and character rather than on the accuracy of these conceptions). Similarly, the political theorist R. Hardin has argued for situational explanations of bloody social disputes in the former Yugoslavia and in Africa, rather than explanations in terms of ethnic hatred for example. A version of virtue ethics might identify virtues as characteristics of acts rather than character traits, as traits consisting in actual regularities in behavior, or as robust dispositions that would manifest themselves also in counterfactual situations. (shrink)

The author develops and elaborates on her account of collective belief, something standardly referred to, in her view, when we speak of what we believe. This paper focuses on a special response hearers may experience in the context of expressions of belief, a response that may issue in offended rebukes to the speaker. It is argued that this response would be appropriate if both speakers and hearers were parties to what the authors calls a joint commitment to believe a certain (...) proposition as a body. This joint commitment puts speakers under an obligation to refrain from speaking in certain ways, and gives hearers a correlative right to such refraining, and hence a basis for offended rebukes. (shrink)

Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the prisoner’s (...) dilemma—are then considered. An explanation is given of how, when such a problem is interpreted in terms of the parties’ inclinations, a suitable collective intention resolves the problem for agents who are rational in a broad sense other than the technical sense of game theory. Key Words: rationality • collective action • collective intention • joint commitment. (shrink)

May social unity - the unity of a society or social group - be a matter of sharing values? Political philosophers disagree on this topic. Kymlicka answers: No. Devlin and Rawls answer: Yes. It is argued that given one common 'summative' account of sharing values a negative answer is correct. A positive answer is correct, however, given the plural subject account of sharing values. Given this account, those who share values are unified in a substantial way by their participation in (...) a joint commitment. Some consequences of such sharing of values for the liberty of the people involved are noted. (shrink)

It is almost commonplace to suggest that what is morally right for one person to do must also be right for anyone else similarly situated. The author suggests that this "universalization requirement" applies to only a limited sphere of the moral life, chiefly to duties of perfect obligation. Extending the requirement beyond this sphere fails to leave room for human freedom in vocation or for a clear recognition of human finitude.

We falter and stammer when trying to describe our own mental acts. Many mental acts, including thinking, are what the author calls ‘chain-undertakings’, that is, courses of action with some over-arching purpose governing the moment-by-moment sub-acts of which we are introspectively aware. Hence the intermittency and sporadicness of the passage of mental activity which constitutes thinking about something.

Here are some of the ways in which some philosophers and psychologists have taken the emotion of guilt to be essential to morality. One relatively central idea is that guilt feelings are warranted if an agent knows that he or she has acted morally wrongly. It might be said that in such a case the agent has a strong reason to feel guilt, that the agent ought to have guilt feelings, that the agent is justified in having guilt feelings and (...) unjustified in not having guilt feelings. It might be said that it would be immoral of an agent not to have feelings of guilt after realizing that he or she has acted morally wrongly or that only an agent with bad character would not have such feelings. (shrink)

Two radically different, general accounts of human character traits - the "essentialist" and the "summary" accounts - are given critical consideration. The former account is characterized in terms of Saul Kripke's conception of metaphysical essence. Both accounts are discussed with reference to Jean-Paul Sartre's treatment of character traits. The essentialist account cannot withstand considerations relating to personal identity over time. The summary account is also rejected, as is a certain kind of dispositional account. An approach to at least some character (...) traits in terms of persisting aims, beliefs, and so on is recommended. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de montrer comment un crime de masse tel que le génocide entraîne des répercussions psychiques sur plusieurs générations, ce que l’on peut considérer comme une catastrophe de la filiation. Comment s’inscrire dans un lien de filiation pour écrire son propre roman des origines lorsque l’horreur vécue musèle à jamais la vie de la mémoire, de la parole et de la transmission? C’est à travers la médiation projective de la libre réalisation de l’arbre généalogique que l’article tentera (...) d’explorer ces questions par une étude de cas. Dans l’espace intermédiaire de la rencontre, tout en respectant les aménagements défensifs du sujet, le travail de perlaboration se rend possible. L’article montre comment la dimension médiatrice et projective du dispositif se met au service du travail d’historicisation et de remémoration de l’histoire familiale et collective chez un descendant d’un survivant de la Shoah. (shrink)

I argue that philosophical inquiry as underpinning educational practice can reduce the fragmentation in the school curriculum, and therefore, create an educational environment that is in accord with the Adelaide Declaration on the National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-First Century, and in Queensland, the 2010 Initiative. It can also promote democratic practice itself as opposed to students merely practising the processes of democracy while at school in preparation to function effectively as future democratic citizens.

Parmi les versets du Pentateuque qui régissent la conduite à l’égard des étrangers, on étudie les commentaires médiévaux d’Ex 22, 21 et 23, 9, Lv 19, 33-34 et 25, 23, Dt 10, 19. Les lexiques (Papias, Huguccio de Pise, Jean de Gênes) permettent de préciser le sens des mots qui désignent l’étranger dans la Vulgate, advena et peregrinus. Les commentateurs (de Raban Maur à Dominique Grima) développent les raisons de cette exigence d’hospitalité : la compassion, l’amour du prochain, le fait (...) que les Hébreux aient été eux-mêmes étrangers en Égypte, la terre appartient au Seigneur. L’exégèse spirituelle assimile les étrangers aux pécheurs qui se repentent. (shrink)

Maestripieri et al. provide an important service in highlighting prosocial biases toward attractive people from a cross-disciplinary perspective. Here I comment on the conceptual and critical side of their review of evolutionary psychology studies. I propose that further work should be focused on understanding the role of signaling in prosocial behavior.

The cell assembly model of language posits that words are laid down in the cortex by discrete sets of neurons distributed over specific parts of the brain. The strong internal links of these “word webs” may not only bind articulatory and acoustic knowledge of a lexical item, they may also link word and meaning; for example, by connecting neuron populations related to word forms to those of actions and perceptions to which the words refer. Therefore, the cortical activation elicited by (...) words should reflect aspects of word meaning, a postulate that has received strong support from recent work using neurophysiological and metabolic imaging. Segalowitz & Lane make the point that this neurobiological model can also be used to predict reaction times in behavioral experiments, using the behavioral distinction between content and function words as an example. We acclaim their view, but warn that response times might be related to different mechanisms at the neuronal level, including the cortical distribution and internal connectivity of cell assemblies along with their mutual connections in the grammatical (syntactic and semantic) network. (shrink)

How do people reason about the what follows from certain assumptions? How do they think about implications between statements. According to one theory, people try to use a small number of mental rules of inference to construct an argument for or proof of a relevant conclusion from the assumptions (e.g., Rips 1994). According to a competing theory, people construct one or more mental models of the situation described in the assumptions and try to determine what conclusion fits with the model (...) or models constructed (e.g., Johnson-Laird 1983, 2006). The present collection offers eleven contributions to the mental models theory. (shrink)

Racially disparate policing, prosecution, and punishment harm individuals, families, and communities. These practices must be understood within the context of the development of the criminal legal system as a means of racialized social control. This context permits a critical examination of the way criminalization has been and is still deployed to subject poor and racialized communities to systemic injustices. This commentary frames a call for interventions to integrate a health justice approach to ensure that they advance racial and health equity (...) to promote the well-being of individuals, families, and communities. (shrink)