A long-standing question in cognitive science is how high-level knowledge is integrated with sensory input. For example, listeners can leverage lexical knowledge to interpret an ambiguous speech sound, but do such effects reflect direct top-down influences on perception or merely postperceptual biases? A critical test case in the domain of spoken word recognition is lexically mediated compensation for coarticulation (LCfC). Previous LCfC studies have shown that a lexically restored context phoneme (e.g., /s/ in Christma#) can alter the perceived place of (...) articulation of a subsequent target phoneme (e.g., the initial phoneme of a stimulus from a tapes-capes continuum), consistent with the influence of an unambiguous context phoneme in the same position. Because this phoneme-to-phoneme compensation for coarticulation is considered sublexical, scientists agree that evidence for LCfC would constitute strong support for top–down interaction. However, results from previous LCfC studies have been inconsistent, and positive effects have often been small. Here, we conducted extensive piloting of stimuli prior to testing for LCfC. Specifically, we ensured that context items elicited robust phoneme restoration (e.g., that the final phoneme of Christma# was reliably identified as /s/) and that unambiguous context-final segments (e.g., a clear /s/ at the end of Christmas) drove reliable compensation for coarticulation for a subsequent target phoneme. We observed robust LCfC in a well-powered, preregistered experiment with these pretested items (N = 40) as well as in a direct replication study (N = 40). These results provide strong evidence in favor of computational models of spoken word recognition that include top–down feedback. (shrink)

BackgroundSonographic mesenteric pattern in celiac disease (CD) suggests a hyperdynamic circulation. Despite the well-known CD-related neurological involvement, no study has systematically explored the cerebral hemodynamics to transcranial Doppler sonography.Materials and methodsMontreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) and 17-item Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HDRS) were assessed in 15 newly diagnosed subjects with CD and 15 age-, sex-, and education-matched healthy controls. Cerebral blood flow (CBF) velocities and indices of resistivity (RI) and pulsatility (PI) from the middle cerebral artery (MCA), bilaterally, and the basilar (...) artery (BA) were recorded. We also assessed cerebral vasomotor reactivity (CVR) through the breath-holding test (BHT).ResultsWorse scores of MoCA and HDRS were found in patients compared to controls. Although patients showed higher values of CBF velocity from MCA bilaterally compared to controls, both at rest and after BHT, no comparison reached a statistical significance, whereas after BHT both RI and PI from BA were significantly higher in patients. A significant negative correlation between both indices from BA and MoCA score were also noted.ConclusionThese treatment-naïve CD patients may show some subtle CVR changes in posterior circulation, thus possibly expanding the spectrum of pathomechanisms underlying neuroceliac disease and in particular gluten ataxia. Subclinical identification of cerebrovascular pathology in CD may help adequate prevention and early management of neurological involvement. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis-à-vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by (...) Caspar Hare. I argue that the Subjectivist View of the Mental goes a considerable way towards solving certain long-standing philosophical puzzles having to do with the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge through testimony. (shrink)

It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what does it take to explain the fact (...) that mental self-ascriptions exhibit this sort of immunity? The aim of this paper is to bring these questions into focus, propose some tentative answers and use them to show that one prominent attempt to explain the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Martin-Löf Type Theory is both an important and practical formalization and a focus for a charismatic view of the foundations of mathematics. Per Martin-Löf's work has been of huge significance in the fields of logic and the foundations of mathematics, and has important applications in areas such as computing science and linguistics. This volume celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of the birth of the subject, and is an invaluable record both of areas of currentactivity and of the early development of the (...) subject. Also published for the first time is one of Per Martin-Löf's earliest papers. (shrink)

In 1685, during the heyday of Scottish Cartesianism, regent Robert Lidderdale from Edinburgh University declared Cartesianism the best philosophy in support of the Reformed faith. It is commonplace that Descartes was ostracised by the Reformed, and his role in pre-Enlightenment Scottish philosophy is not yet fully acknowledged. This paper offers an introduction to Scottish Cartesianism, and argues that the philosophers of the Scottish universities warmed up to Cartesianism because they saw it as a newer, better version of their own traditional (...) Reformed scholasticism, chiefly in metaphysics and natural philosophy. (shrink)

According to Reid, color sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that ‘there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.’ Reid justified these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden's report of the experiences of a young man affected by severe cataracts, and by appeal to cases of perception of visible figure without color. While holding fast to the principle that sensations are not extended, Dugald Stewart tried to show that ‘a variety of colour (...) sensations is a necessary means for the perception of visible figure.’ According to John Fearn, two motives appear to be central to Reid's views about color sensations and extension: his commitment to the Cartesian doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, and his attempt to evade ‘Hume's dilemma’ about the existence and immateriality of the soul. (shrink)

The concept of simultaneous masking in visual field is discussed, in the light of classical examples, of the various kinds of the phenomenon, of a modal completion, of the figure/ground phenomenon, of ambiguous and reversible figures, of mimicry and camouflage and eventually of the complexity of the stimulus. There is some reference to masking in auditory field. The “reality” of the masked configuration is discussed, drawing the conclusion that it is perceptually unreal. The fact that the masking phenomenon cannot take (...) place without comparison between two perceptual acts – what we see at one moment and what we see a moment after LATER – and the fact that the masked configuration pops out with some surprise, lead to the conclusion that simultaneous masking in visual field is not a bare perceptual phenomenon, but a psychological process not unlike insight. (shrink)

In this article I point out that rather than two, as is commonly thought, or indeed one, which is an old idea recently revived by some scholars, Aquinas in fact presents three main senses of being: (A1) being as actus essendi or esse or ‘present actuality’; (A2) being as (real) form or essence; (B) being as the reply to the an sit? (is there…?) question or anitas or ‘there is’ sense. Regarding the relations among these three senses of being I (...) show that: (i) the same logical treatment holds for the form (B) and (A2), since both can and need to be re-written in the form: something is so-and-so (whereas the same process cannot be applied to the A1 sense of being); (ii) the relation between the A1 and A2 senses of being is not a mere relation between distinct elements, but rather a relation among different stages of a single process, namely that between first and second actuality; (iii) the relation between the A (1 and 2) and B senses of being seems to be one of grounding, since the ‘there is’ sense seems to Aquinas to be grounded on the present actuality sense of being as an effect to its cause. (shrink)

Meeting in the petri dish? -- Screen, test, weed out? -- Prettier, better, stronger? -- Is health a duty? -- The crisis of confidence in organ donation -- On the value of age : beyond the fitness imperative -- Living wills : are forms replacing dialogue? -- Being able to let go : for a new culture of dying -- Epilogue: happiness lies in our attitude toward the world.

Riassunto: Questo lavoro sviluppa due elementi, apparentemente lontani, ma per alcuni aspetti non secondari, convergenti. Per un verso l’attenzione è rivolta all’origine delle regole che disciplinano il comportamento sociale umano, oltrepassando le regole di matrice istituzionale e convenzionale, che sono spesso considerate le più nobili e le più umane, nel tentativo di far affiorare le regole più remote del nostro agire, legate al patrimonio genetico degli individui della nostra specie, al parlamento dei nostri istinti, sviluppatisi durante l’evoluzione filogenetica. Lungo questo (...) primo tratto del percorso l’articolo fa riferimento in particolare al pensiero di Konrad Lorenz e della sua scuola. Per altro verso, si seguono le tracce del pensiero etico di Lévinas, soffermandosi su alcuni punti fondamentali: il volto dell’altro, la passività, la responsabilità, al fine di porre in evidenza come tra il filosofo e l’etologo, pur nelle evidenti differenze di linguaggio, di approccio e di orizzonti, siano ravvisabili tratti e conclusioni comuni. Parole chiave: Alterità; Relazione; Istinto; Etica; Responsabilità Autrui: Ethics and anthropology in Lévinas: This paper moves along two seemingly distant paths, that turn out to converge in some significant ways. The first path leads us to the origin of what are often considered the most noble and essentially human principles that regulate our social behaviour, going beyond institutional and conventional norms. This allows us to highlight the deepest and most evolutionarily remote rules of human behaviour, related to our genetic code and instincts, which developed over phylogenetic evolution. As we move along this first path, we pay special attention to the work of Konrad Lorenz and his school. The second path follows the traces of Lévinas’ ethical thought, dwelling on some fundamental issues: the face of the other, passivity, and responsibility, and helps us shed light on some ideas and conclusions that are common to the philosopher and the ethologist, despite their clear differences in language, approach, and horizons. We hope this will show how the insights of each can be used to support of the theories of the other. Keywords: Otherness: relationship; Instinct; Ethics; Responsibility. (shrink)

This essay is unique in putting intersubjectivity front and center. It is an attempt to provide a clinical method to re-establish the fragile dialogue of the soul with oneself and with others. Throughout, the book builds on the assumption that to be human means to be in dialogue. It uses dialogue as a unitary concept to address three essential issues for clinical practice: 'What is a human being?', 'What is mental pathology'?, and 'What is care?'. To be human - it (...) is argued - means to be in dialogue with oneself and with other persons. Thus, mental pathology is the interruption of this dialogue - of the person with the alterity that inhabits them, and with the alterity incarnated in other persons. Therefore, therapy is a dialogue with a method whose aim is to re-enact one's interrupted dialogue with alterity. Lost in Dialogue provides a method to approximate the Other, to understand its experiences, actions, and in general, understand the world in which it lives. (shrink)

Estudo introdutório de apresentação, seguido de tradução, da palestra “Fenomenologia e antropologia”, ministradas por Edmund Husserl nas sedes da Kantgesellschaft de Frankfurt, Berlim e Halle em 1931, na qual avalia criticamente, a partir dos pressupostos transcendentais da fenomenologia, a tendência da filosofia alemã dos anos 20 do século passado para uma antropologia filosófica.

It is a curious feature of Hegelian studies in English that its practitioners seem incapable of tackling their subject without first disclaiming any adherence to the more metaphysical side of Hegel's thought, be it called “speculative metaphysics,” “dialectical logic” or whatever. I say “curious” because I doubt that the same scholars would feel obliged to enter an equivalent disclaimer at the head of a study on, say, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza or even Newton—even though all of these classics have a metaphysical (...) side at least as abstruse as any of Hegel's worse romantic excesses. Hegel himself, if he could witness the practice, would be flattered by it. He would not see it as an indication that “the problems of [his] logic remain alien and artificial to us in ways that the problems of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy do not” but, on the contrary, as a hidden acknowledgement that, whether for good or bad, his philosophy is still alive, still so close to our culture that we instinctively feel the need of exorcizing it ritually, like a demon capable of frightening us. (shrink)

The author investigates the origin and development of the concept of liberty and its special meaning in the Republican tradition of political thought. The origin of the Western concept of liberty lies in ancient Greece, in the opposition between liberty and slavery conceived after the liberation of Athens from tyranny and the victory over the Persian empire. The author then investigates the Republican notion of liberty that originates in ancient Rome and reaches its peak with Cicero. This conception of liberty (...) emphasizes self-government and partecipation in common deliberation and runs through Western political thought up to Rousseau, Tocqueville and the authors of the Federalist Papers. (shrink)

The present work is a comment of a recent paper by Fortin and coauthors in which the authors propose the introduction of Bohmian mechanics in the philosophy of chemistry and the use of standard quantum mechanics as a mere instrument of prediction. This way would allow overcoming the obstacles found in linking molecular chemistry and quantum mechanics. Starting from some remarks on the orbital concept, we highlight and discuss some general issues that need to be taken into account when two (...) scientific theories coexist within the same investigation field, i.e. SQM and BM. (shrink)

Originariamente letto a una conferenza nel marzo 1907, questo breve saggio non e ne una biografia di Giordano Bruno ne un'esposizione del suo pensiero, ma un'analisi del ruolo da lui ricoperto nella cultura del tempo e delle ragioni del suo scontro con le autorita ecclesiastiche. Rifiutando le semplificazioni di un Giordano Bruno ateo o anticlericale, Giovanni Gentile espone una sua personale interpretazione della vita del pensatore nolano, considerandolo non gia un "martire del libero pensiero," quanto piuttosto, al pari di (...) Socrate, un "martire della filosofia." Ne scaturisce il ritratto di un Bruno avverso non alla religione in se ma alla superstizione, e fautore, in anticipo sui tempi, della separazione tra fede e scienza.". (shrink)

"El título de este trabajo puede parecer pretencioso; sin embargo, mi intención ha sido muy modesta, puesto que he querido solamente resumir en capítulos sumarios un curso de lecciones dictadas este año en la Universidad de Pisa, a los estudiantes de la Facultad de Jurisprudencia. El curso estaba consagrado a las cuestiones fundamentales de la Filosofía del Derecho, es decir, a aquellas cuestiones que comúnmente pasan por alto los especialistas de esta disciplina, demasiado inclinados a enredarse en el empirismo de (...) la Enciclopedia Jurídica, y por la cual, merced a ellos, no se advierte cómo aquella Filosofía puede ser considerada de otra manera. La Filosofía del Derecho justificará su existencia mientras sea Filosofía, a la cual no se llega partiendo del Derecho, como tampoco se llega partiendo de ningún otro concepto empírico, puesto que todos los conceptos, cuando están rigurosamente determinados, son ya filosofía, y no pueden, por consiguiente, germinar en otro lugar que no sea su terreno". Giovanni Gentile. (shrink)